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 The aim of this thesis is to examine how the Islamization phenomenon has influenced 
zakat. The study shows that the distribution of the fund for income generation is a 
manifestation of the impact of Islamization on the zakat institution. Islamization is an 
outgrowth of increased religious awareness among Muslims and greater governmental 
concern with Islamic matters. Such a phenomenon might be initiated either by society or by 
government. In the case of zakat, a religious duty, the institution has been revived and shaped 
to become a potentially useful development tool, causing Muslims to look to existing 
initiatives, in this case income generation, to improve the disbursement system. The greater 
role of zakat in the economy has also entailed new interpretations of law by means of ijtihad, 
as the new mechanism to a certain extent is adoption of modern practice originally outside of 
Islamic realm.    
 Income generation through zakat is a new way of distribution whereby the zakat fund 
is used for helping the poor to generate their own income. Discussion of the new idea began 
in the mid-twentieth century and has been implemented in a few Muslim countries. In a 
country which was clearly moving towards the formation of an Islamic State, namely 
Pakistan, the effort to introduce the initiative could be seen as part of the effort to achieve a 
fully religious government. By contrast, where a government, like that of Indonesia, tends to 
remain neutral in regard to religion, income generation has been mainly part of a societal 
agenda. In both cases, the zakat rulings will change according to the form taken by 
Islamization in the country.  
 Malaysia, the country given a special focus in this thesis, is an example of 
Islamization as initiated by both government and society. The Islamization of society in the 
1970s led the secular government to become accommodative towards Islam. Zakat was 
gradually rejuvenated through better administration and was eventually proposed for active 
involvement in poverty eradication. The tradition hence has been transformed into a 
development institution which is not merely religious in nature.  
 In a federation such as Malaysia, policies outlined by the federal government will be 
followed by the states. Selangor, as the most active state in offering income generation 
through zakat, has been chosen for further elaboration in this study. Looking at zakat’s 
financial potential, the state has embraced the institution as part of its development program. 
Society and the state government have cooperated in supporting the implementation of 
income generation. Income generation in this context complements the state’s development 
effort. In addition, ijtihad has been employed to accommodate the changes in the practice of 
zakat. 
 In sum, the thesis shows how the Islamization phenomenon has influenced religious 
institutions in general and zakat in particular. It appears that the institution can adapt to 
contemporary challenges, depending on the societal, economic and political agendas of a 
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Note: The Arabic words which are very common in the English written literature on Islamic 
studies like zakat, Quran and hadith are not in italics. 
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‘Amil Zakat collector/ administrator  
ABIM Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth 
Movement) 




Those whose hearts are reconcilable 
al-Riqab Those in bondage 
al-Tamlik Conference of ownership  
Bayt al-Mal (or 
Baitulmal) 
Public treasury in an Islamic state 
BAZIS Badan Amil Zakat, Infaq dan Sadaqah; semi-autonomous zakat 
administration  
BAZNAS Badan Amil Zakat Nasional; National semi-autonomous zakat 
administration 
BPRS Bank Pengkreditan Rakyat Syariah;  Shari’a based Credit  Bank 
CII Council of Islamic Ideology 




DD Dompet Dhuafa Republika 
DZC District Zakat Committee 
Faqir (faqir in 
Malay) 
Needy 
Fatwa (fatwa in 
Malay) 
A religious opinion issued by a competent scholar or mufti 
Fi sabil allah Those in the way of God 
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Fiqh Islamic Jurisprudence; an expansion of Shari’a derived from 
interpretation of Islamic jurists 
FOSIS Federation of Islamic Student Societies 
FOZ Forum of Zakat 
Hadith or Sunna Reports of statements or actions of Muhammad or of his tacit 
approval of something said or done in his presence 
Halal The term is used to designate food seen as permissible according 
to Islamic law   
Ibn sabil Wayfarer 
IDB Islamic Development Bank 
IGP Income generation program 
Ijtihad Decision making in Islamic Law; Legal reasoning 
Imam Ruler or leader 
IMFI Islamic Micro Financial Institutions 
IRCFT Islamic Religious Council of Federal Territory 
IRCS Islamic Religious Council of Selangor 
IRDS Islamic Religious Department of Selangor 
ISBOZ The International Board of Zakah, Kuwait 
KUAZ  Group of Zakat Recipients Entrepreneurs (Kumpulan Usahawan 
Asnaf Zakat) 
LAZ Lembaga Amil Zalat; non-state sponsored zakat agencies. 
LZC Local Zakat Committee 
Madhhab Islamic sect or school of law 
Miskin Poor 
MORA Ministry of Religious Affairs 
Mufti (Mufti in 
Malay) 





MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Islamic 
Scholars) 
NEP New Economic Policy 
Nisab prescribed minimum amount of wealth liable to zakat  
NU Nahdatu Ulama (Ulama Awakening Organization) 
NZF National Zakat Foundation 
OIC Organization of Islamic Conference 
PAS Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Pan Malaysian Islamic Party) 
Pesantren Indonesian religious boarding school 
PKPIM Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam Malaysia (National 
Association of Malaysian Islamic Students) 
PKPU Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (Justice Post of Muslim Care) 
PRZS Permanent Rehabilitation Scheme of Zakat 
PVTC Punjab Vocational Training Council 
PZC Provincial Zakat Council 
Ramadan Month of fasting 
Shari’a Religious law of Islam derived from Quran and Sunna 
Sultan State ruler or king 
Surau  Prayer house 
Takaful  Islamic Insurance  
Takhayyur Selection and incorporation of less credible opinions from any 
school of law 
Talfiq Amalgamation; combining in one opinion, elements from 
various quarters within and outside the school. 
UMNO United Malay National Organization  
VTI Vocational technical institution 
Waqf  A charitable trust dedicated to some socially beneficial 
purposes; religious endowment 
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ZBS Zakat Board of Selangor 
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  Zakat is one of the most important religious institutions for Muslims. In 
recent years, the Malaysian zakat institution has been frequently cited and discussed in 
newspaper reports, seminar papers and academic writings which show how the 
institution has been improved. The literature also reveals a considerable change in 
zakat distribution in that the fund is not merely disbursed directly to the poor but is 
used to finance various programs which help them to generate income through their 
professions. Indeed, zakat is now not merely a religious institution but is more akin to 
a development body.  
  The new pattern of zakat disbursal raises the question of how this change 
could have occurred. It seems that there must be some explanations in the form of a 
link with broader socio-economic and political circumstances. In addition, considering 
zakat as a religious duty, there must be an explanation of how a secular economic 
approach could be incorporated into its administration. As a religious obligation the 
sanctity of which must be preserved, zakat’s new emerging role also should require a 
new legal justification. 
  If we track the situation further, we see that the distribution of the fund 
cannot be separated from the collection side. In Malaysia, the improvement in the 
distribution mechanism was actually sparked by the significant increase in collection 
realized earlier, during the 1990s. That improvement was a product of the 
government’s Islamization agenda, which introduced a b etter way of zakat 
administration called corporatization. Hence, it is not an exaggeration to assert that 
Islamization is behind all the changes.    
 In view of this underlying perspective, the aim of the thesis is to discuss the 
change and seek explanations for it. Looking at the development and improvement of 
the zakat administration before and largely after the Islamization period, this study 
tries to show how Islamization has influenced such an institution. The process of 
transformation of the institution from a religious observance to a tool in economic 
development, eventually used to finance income generation programs, will be 
elaborated on. In this context, the process is to an extent associated with national 
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socio-political and economic factors.  The change in the institution, however, has not 
been solely administrative but is also associated with reinterpretation of legal rulings.  
 It is worth noting that this thesis is original in the sense that it is the only 
study so far which tries to relate the development of income generation through zakat 
to the Islamization phenomenon. In fact, the very concept of income generation 
through zakat, along with issues pertaining to its legal basis, has yet to be specifically 
discussed in any other research.  
Theoretical discussion indicates that Islamization is a phenomenon observed 
in the twentieth century whereby society and government have sought to revive and 
strengthen Islamic institutions. As far as zakat is concerned, it a ppears that the 
phenomenon has brought about the expansion of zakat's role in economic 
development, beyond its initial religious function, in order to solve modern 
problems.  
 In addition, this unfolding process leads to a re-examination of zakat rulings. 
Here, the classical rulings on zakat will be reviewed in the light of modern needs. In 
terms of practical implementation, such a process of expansion, as we shall see, has 
depended on the pattern of Islamization in each country: that is, on whether it was 
sponsored by government, on the one hand, or by society, on the other. 
 Economically, the income generation program represents a development 
approach to eradicating poverty. Muslim scholars and economists since the mid-
twentieth century have believed that, as an economic mechanism for poverty 
eradication, zakat money could be used to finance income generation programs. In 
these programs, the recipients gain not only material capital in the form of a grant or 
loan to enhance their professional expertise, but also intangible aids such as training 
and other services.  
 The disbursement of zakat for income generation programs has been 
introduced in a number of Muslim countries. Pakistan and Indonesia are among those 
which offered the programs before Malaysia, around the 1980s. The two earlier cases 
thus merit exploration as foundational examples before venturing further into 
discussion of Malaysia. In Pakistan, zakat has been an integral part of taxation policy 
in the process of establishing the country’s identity as an Islamic state. Therefore, 
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income generation through zakat can be seen as part of the government’s effort to 
build such a state. Indonesia, on the other hand, is a country which has excluded 
zakat from its field of interest. Consequently, the proper administration of zakat there 
has been heavily dependent on s ociety, so that when income generation was 
eventually introduced, it was as a social development mechanism. The growth of 
zakat administration slowly succeeded in persuading the government to establish a 
law on zakat at the end of the twentieth century, although payment to the fund is still 
largely voluntary. In this context, it seems that the effort to improve the institution 
has depended on challenging the secular Indonesian state.  
 Islamization in Malaysia, as in other Muslim countries, is a topic of 
discussion which matters for every Malaysian. Over time, the government has 
introduced an element of Islam into administrative practice. As seen on the ground, 
Islam has also been more visible in the public sphere. Although this does not mean 
that everyone is a devout and observant Muslim, the elements and symbols of Islam 
are clearly evident everywhere in Malaysia. This is an interesting point considering 
the actuality of Malaysia, in which Muslims merely comprise a simple majority of its 
28 million people.  
  The Islamization phenomenon in Malaysia is not solely motivated by 
religion, but is also related to the dynamic of the national socio-economic and racial 
composition. There was a racial riot in 1969 caused by economic imbalance and 
distrust between races. As a reaction, the government brought in economic policies 
favouring the majority in the population, who are Muslim Malays. The 
implementation of the new policies in the 1970s gradually gave Malays access to 
higher education and urbanization, leading to a shift in their outlook. Educated 
Muslims established movements to revive religious practice and argued that the 
government should not merely strengthen Malays economically but must also 
promote their religion. Eventually, the movements succeeded to an extent in 
attracting urban Muslims and posing a political challenge to the government.  
The Islamization phenomenon in society led the government to become more 
accommodative towards Islam, introducing a number of Islamization policies such as 
the co-option of religious individuals and reinforcement of Islamic institutions, 
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including zakat. In this case, the government’s Islamization agenda was directed not 
towards establishing an Islamic state but rather towards linking Islam with economic 
development in such a way as to empower the Muslims economically.  
 Historically, the zakat institution in Malaysia had failed to function 
effectively, having no proper management or successful collection methods. As part 
of the improvement initiative, the government introduced corporatization, that is, 
setting up a corporate entity to collect zakat. As zakat is administratively under the 
power of each state, the corporatization model was initially introduced in Federal 
Territory, which has a closer relation with the federal government. The move was 
followed in stages by other states, leading to a considerable incremental increase in 
collection. 
 Due to the improvement in collection, productive distribution through income 
generation programs was gradually introduced in the 1990s in a number of states. 
The aim was to improve the distribution mechanism in response to the current needs 
of the Muslim community and also to exhortations from individuals and various 
organizations. Discussion of Islamization of the zakat institution, however, stopped 
at the federal level, there being no s pecific examination of the continuous 
Islamization process at state level, although the process has undoubtedly evolved.  
In practical terms, Selangor is the most extensive state in Malaysia to have 
implemented such a program. Selangor is the foremost state in collection and 
distribution, as a result of the Islamization phenomenon in the state and the 
corporatization of the institution. Economically, as a state in a federal country, 
Selangor has assumed the supportive role of helping the federal government to 
implement its development policies. To supplement the actions of the federal 
government, the state, however, has embarked on many of its own income generation 
programs. With limited money for development, the state was receptive to any 
possible sources of finance, including zakat.  
The swelling of the collected fund eventually led to the zakat body’s focus on 
poverty eradication and income generation. Indeed, in implementing income 
generation programs, including the provision of training and supervision for fund 
recipients and other initiatives to promote its effectiveness, the Selangor zakat body 
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played a considerable part in ensuring that the distribution produced better incomes 
for the recipients. In terms of religious rulings, it appeared that the official legal 
expounder in the state (Mufti  also gave an affirmative ruling on the zakat body’s 
practice. In this context, income generation is justified as conforming to shari’a and 
thus accommodating the needs of Muslim society. What the zakat body actually 
achieved, apart from establishing that the fund could be effective in poverty 
eradication, was to complement the state’s accommodative policy towards zakat. 
 On the basis of this introduction, we can reach a broad conclusion, which is 
also to become the general argument of this research: that the Islamization process 
has changed zakat in accordance with modern needs. The phenomenon has not only 
made the religious duty more visible and consistently observed by its followers but 
has also used it to solve modern development problems. The process accordingly 
does not merely establish a greater role for Islam in aspects of modern living, but, in 
reverse, also exposes the religion to individual hopes and government agendas.  
 
1.2 The Objectives of the Study 
 From the above rationale and discussion, we can therefore outline the 
following objectives to be achieved by the thesis: 
1. To survey the meaning of the Islamization phenomenon, in particular as it is 
related to the zakat institution.  
2. To study income generation through zakat as a new, evolving role for zakat in 
economic development as manifested by the Islamization process. This is an 
exploratory study on t he theory of economic development from an Islamic 
perspective, with zakat projected as a p overty eradication mechanism. Besides 
theoretical investigation, a brief survey of practical implementation in a few 
Muslim countries will be presented.  
3. To understand the Islamization phenomenon in Malaysia and how such a 
phenomenon could affect zakat. This approach will shed light on the extent to 
which the institution has interacted with features of its external environment such 
as government agendas or social aspirations. 
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4. To study the implementation of the income generation program through zakat in 
Malaysia generally and in Selangor particularly, and to explore the Islamic legal 
interpretations supporting it. Apart from that, this study aims eventually to 
analyse the impact of programs on the recipients socially, economically and 
legally.   
 
1.3 Literature Review 
 The issue of zakat has been discussed in countless writings, in various aspects 
and contexts. In terms of fiqh and from a legal perspective, zakat is widely explained 
in classical literature, while modern commentaries discuss it f rom more diverse 
standpoints including those of sociology, politics and economics. As this study looks 
at zakat from multiple aspects, it will incorporate both types of literature. Classical 
writings by authors such as al-Shafi’i1, al-Nawawi2 and al-Buhuti3 will be referred to 
together with modern studies by Siddiqi4, Saud5, Sayed Sikandar6, and many others. 
 Although it is not our intention to discuss all the texts referred to, there are a 
number of writings that merit review before we venture further into this topic. 
Besides being widely read, they also to an extent touch upon some aspects that we 
shall explore later. However, there remain some areas which are not covered by any 
of these works. 
 Yusuf al-Qardawi, a renowned Islamic scholar who emerged in the mid 
1960s with a book entitled Fiqh al-Zakah7, is among the writers meriting attention. 
The book can be placed among the most important works to date for the thorough 
explanation of zakat that it provides. It covers many aspects of zakat, encompassing 
                                                          
1 Muhammad ibn Idris al- Shafi’i, Kitab al-Umm, v3 (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Ilmiyya, n.d). 
2 Al-Nawawi, Abu Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din ibn Sharaf, Rawda al-Talibin, v 2 (Beirut:  Dar al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyyah, n.d); Abu Zakariya Muhy al-Din al-Nawawi, Kitab al-Majmu’, v6 (Jeddah: Maktaba al-
Irshad, n.d). 
3 Mansur Ibn Yunus Ibn Idris al-Buhuti,  Kashaf al-Qina’ ‘an Matni al-Iqna’, v2 (Beirut: ‘Alim al-
Kutub, 1997).  
4 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, “The Guarantee of a Minimum Level of Living in an Islamic State” 
in Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy, ed. Munawar Iqbal ( Leicester: 
The Islamic Foundation, 1986). 
5 Mahmoud Abu Saud, Contemporary Zakat (Cincinnati: Zakat and Research Foundation, 1988). 
6 Sayed Sikandar Shah Haneef, “Issues In Fiqh Az-Zakah: Implications for Islamic Banking and 
Finance”, The Islamic Quarterly (52)( 2) (2008). 
7 Yusuf al-Qardawi, Fiqh az-Zakah, trans. Monzer Kahf (London: Dar-al-Taqwa, 1999). 
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its basic definition, its ancient historical background, and its legal principles, along 
with rules regarding collection and distribution. He also explains contemporary 
issues which are not addressed by any classical scholars, such as new types of 
taxable wealth and monetary payments.  
 In discussing various issues, the writer bases his argument mainly on classical 
treatises, among which, in each case, he cleverly chooses that which, in his 
judgement, offers the best alternative. At some points, where classical literature 
offers no s ound alternative or is completely silent, al-Qardawi provides his own 
decision (ijtihad). We shall refer to the book in examining several questions 
pertaining to zakat in later chapters.    
 Some years later, zakat received a m ore modern treatment by Afzalur 
Rahman, a Muslim economist. Rahman is among the prominent writers who early on 
proposed a theory of economics based on religion, popularly known as Islamic 
economics. In his massive work (consisting of four volumes altogether) entitled 
Economic Doctrines of Islam, written between 1974 to 1979, he  outlined many 
factors related to economics and argued, on the basis of al-Quran and Sunna, that 
they formed the economic system of Islam.8 He maintained that such an economy 
provided an alternative to other systems, namely, capitalism and socialism.  
 In his book ahman looks at many issues, ranging across production 
mechanisms, ownership, exchange and lending activities, land rental and many 
others. Zakat, the topic discussed in volume three along with questions of interest 
and usury, is portrayed as a religious duty which has the potential to cure society’s 
economic ills. He outlines the principles of zakat according to Islamic law, including 
its collection and distribution. He also interprets zakat as a mechanism for abstaining 
from hoarding, reducing inflation,9 and achieving fairer distribution of wealth for 
social security purposes.10 
 Indeed, al-Qardawi and Rahman have discussed zakat theoretically from legal 
and economic perspectives. In addition, both authors have presented the concept of 
income generation, as we shall later observe. Neither, however, offers any discussion 
                                                          
8 Afzalur Rahman, Economic Doctrines of Islam, vol.1 (Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1980), 7. 
9 Rahman, Economic Doctrines of Islam, vol.3, 230. 
10 Rahman, Economic Doctrines of Islam, vol.3, 241. 
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of the real practice of zakat collection in Muslim countries, or explains why the duty 
must now start to be viewed as an economic tool.  
 Although there are many writers, including these two, who believe that zakat 
could be a tool for poverty eradication and redistribution of wealth alongside its 
original role as a religious duty, this opinion is not necessarily shared by others. For 
example, Timur Kuran, in his papers “Islamic Economics and the Islamic Sub 
economy” and “Economic Impact of Islamism”, written respectively in the 1980s 
and 1990s, has expressed disagreement on the matter.11 
  His articles are based on observation of numerous writings appearing since 
the early 20th century, which have tried to demonstrate the relevance of an economic 
system based on Islam. Kuran notes that the principles of Islamic economics, as 
outlined by the literature he surveyed, are as follows: the expectation that Muslims in 
their economic life will act for the benefit of society (rather than for personal gain), 
as demanded by the religion; the prohibition of riba (usury); and Islamic 
redistribution, mainly through zakat.12   
 Kuran, however, argues in his critique that what has been proposed is not 
realistic. As for the first principle, a person will still act primarily in his own interest, 
with common interests perhaps not catered for in modern complex communities, 
religion notwithstanding. The corruption which is found widely in Muslim states is 
evidence of this tendency.13  He also claims that Islamic Banking represents merely a 
change of name and contract, disguising interest within the Islamic contract as 
murabaha (mark-up sale).  As far as zakat is concerned, the collection was still far 
too small to make a significant contribution to poverty eradication.14 
 He then argued that all the development of the Islamic economics idea since 
its introduction (including centralized zakat collection and disbursement by the state 
                                                          
11 These articles have been republished in a book. Please refer Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon, The 
Economic Predicaments of Islamism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
12 Timur Kuran, “Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy” in Islam and Mammon, The 
Economic Predicaments of Islamism, ed. Timur Kuran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) , 
39-42. 
13 Timur Kuran, “The Economic Impact of Islamism” in Islam and Mammon, The Economic 
Predicaments of Islamism, ed. Timur Kuran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) , 30. 
14 Kuran, “The Economic Impact of Islamism” 10-11. 
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for poverty eradication) is related to Islamization, its exponents being motivated by 
the desire to defend Islamic civilization against western cultural influences.15  
 Perhaps Kuran, in this case, is among the earliest writers to combine zakat 
with elements of Islamization. Although he touched briefly on s tate collection of 
zakat in Malaysia in the 1980s, which is understandably referred to as part of the 
Islamization phenomenon, this practice differs from the ones that will be discussed in 
the present study. Although in a different sense from Kuran’s, we have still 
considered zakat collection by the state as Islamization. As we shall explain in later 
chapters, Islamization by the state through zakat could only be observed after the 
1990s, which is beyond Kuran’s observed period. In a further dissimilarity from the 
present research, no exploration of legal issues was provided by Kuran.    
 Another work worth looking at is Charles Tripp’s book Islam and the Moral 
Economy, which studies and synthesizes various responses of Muslims reformers, 
scholars and political leaders to the dominance of capitalism since the early 20th 
century.16 Tripp argues that the emergence of capitalism as a key mode of production 
posed a new challenge to Muslim intellectuals, to which they had to find a response. 
Hence they drew upon rich Islamic primary sources to find parallels to the situations 
they faced in their own eras. In this exercise, as Tripp demonstrates, they were not 
totally successful, since the reality on the ground had changed over time, so that 
scholars needed to modify their approach to make it relevant to the modern world. 
Although Tripp did not clearly claim that what happened amounted to Islamization, 
the alternative picture of conventional modern development indeed identifies such a 
phenomenon. 
 Tripp in this book b riefly touched upon z akat along with Islamic banking, 
which he refers to as a mechanism of moral economy (economic system) proposed 
by Islamists. Like Kuran, Tripp briefly cited the sparse collection in Muslim 
countries such as Pakistan and Iran, to indicate that what had been proposed by 
Muslim scholars as an instrument of poverty eradication might not be practical. He 
                                                          
15 Kuran, “Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy”, 39. 
16 Charles Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy, the Challenge of Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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also seemed to share Kuran’s view that the practice of Islamic banking was merely 
cosmetic.17 
 Although it is undeniable that zakat, after a few decades of official collection, 
has yet to make a significant dent in poverty, that does not mean that zakat will never 
be a useful economic tool. As we shall see in a later chapter, zakat can still play an 
effective role in helping the poor on t he micro scale. Considering that Tripps’s 
discussion devotes only two pages to zakat, a broader perspective on z akat’s 
performance might be beyond his scope. Nor does he present any new approach to 
zakat disbursement, such as income generation.  
A closer relation between zakat and Islamization is portrayed by Arskal 
Salim, an Indonesian writer, in his book The Shift in Zakat Practice in Indonesia.18 
Through his studies, he found that zakat is nowadays no l onger an expression of 
personal piety but rather a type of Islamic economic system. He perceives this as part 
of the Islamization process, that is, a process of calling for the establishment of 
Islamic doctrines in Muslim socioeconomic and political systems.19  
Salim maintained that the shift in zakat practice in Indonesia, which was 
intensified after the fall of the second Indonesian President Soeharto, represents the 
entrenchment of Islamization in that country. Such a p rocess includes the change 
from the Muslim perception of zakat as an expression of religious piety to 
recognition of it as the foundation of the religious and economic system, together 
with improvements in its management, as we shall discuss later in greater detail.  
Indeed, Salim’s study has something in common with this one in the sense 
that zakat is the main focus of both. We shall refer to a certain extent to Salim’s 
definition of Islamization when explaining what is meant by such a phenomenon. 
There is, however, one difference that should be clarified: while Salim’s study is 
closely concerned with the zakat collection mechanism in Indonesia, the present 
research will specifically deal with a new objective of the zakat distribution program, 
namely income generation, for which Malaysia will be the main geographical setting.  
                                                          
17 Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy, 124-125. 
18 Arskal Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice in Indonesia: From Piety to an Islamic Socio-Political-
Economic System (Bangkok: Asian Muslim Action Network, 2008). 
19 Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice in Indonesia, 7-8.  
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 As this thesis incorporates a broad range of ideas including income 
generation through zakat and Islamization, the contributions of Kuran, Tripp and 
Salim are indeed valuable and help us to have some insight into the subject matter. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, their focuses are dissimilar to that of this thesis.   
 Since Malaysia provides a key focus of this research, some studies pertaining 
to Malaysian zakat should also be mentioned here. In this regard, at least three 
writings need to be carefully surveyed. Habib Ahmed of the Islamic Development 
Bank Group is one of the writers who have observed the zakat administration in 
many Muslim countries. He conducted research into zakat and waqf (inalienable 
endowment), and in early 2000 he  observed the role of the zakat and waqf 
institutions in poverty eradication in selected countries.  
 In his book Role of Zakah and Awqaf in Poverty Eradication, Ahmed 
investigates how zakat and waqf – two wealth-related religious institutions – can be 
used in poverty eradication from either a macro or a micro perspective. From the 
macro perspective he examines the problem of poverty in Muslim countries and 
compares it with the zakat collection, which he finds is too small to be used as a 
national poverty eradication mechanism. It is unfortunate that this is true also in the 
case of waqf, which consists of wealth mainly in the form of mosques and shrines 
that cannot generate investment.20 As for the micro level, however, Ahmed believes 
that zakat can still play its part in denting poverty if, among other approaches, it is 
effectively used for income generation and to improve the capacity and entitlement 
of the poor (as will be elaborated upon i n later chapters). In the same chapter, he 
observes the practice of waqf and zakat in a number of countries such as Pakistan, 
Malaysia and South Africa, and sees some improvements in disbursement of zakat 
for the purpose of income generation.21 
Looking at the Ahmed discussion, we find consideration of some current 
zakat practices, including those in Malaysia; he also has touched briefly on the 
potential of income generation through zakat. In addition, he has inserted into the 
report some legal decisions on i ssues pertaining to zakat and waqf. Unlike several 
writers mentioned earlier, however, he did not relate the observed centralized 
                                                          
20 Habib Ahmed, Role of Zakah and Awqaf in Poverty Alleviation (Jeddah: IDB, 2004), 115 
21 Ahmed, Role of Zakah and Awqaf, 108. 
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collection and distribution of zakat in Muslim countries to the phenomenon of 
Islamization or to any other event which can explain such a development.  
 Unlike Ahmed, who surveys the Malaysian case among a number of 
countries examined, Abdul Aziz Muhammad in his work specifically deals with the 
Malaysian case. He covers its history from before the establishment of official 
collection by the state (approximately the 1950s) right through the 1980s in his 
research entitled Zakat and Rural Development in Malaysia.22 This study concerns 
the practice of zakat in Malaysian rural areas, where he observed that the obligation 
to pay fell only on farmers, while other more lucrative sectors remained untaxed. As 
development at that time (the 1980s), especially in rural areas, was dominated by 
agriculture, the author wanted to know how rural development affected zakat.  
 He found numerous anomalies in the Malaysian zakat system, such as 
ineffective distribution and collection, the tendency towards disbursement to the non-
poor, and many others. He suggests that such a situation arose because the 
development approach adopted by Malaysia did not focus on or  incorporate the 
importance of zakat.23 Apart from that, the then ulamas merely followed classical 
legal opinion (which designated only staple food as subject to tax), without looking 
at the pressing need to charge other profitable sectors and industries.  
 Based on his study, Muhammad proposed that some changes in zakat 
practice, such as determination of the minimum taxable wealth, are needed, which 
would take cognisance of economic conditions. Zakat also must be an obligation for 
all rich Muslims, not just farmers or staple food producers.24 
 Indeed, his discussion is very informative about the history of zakat and 
provides valuable statistics from the 1970s and 1980s which were not readily 
available. But he only focuses on the zakat on r ice, which he regards as associated 
with rural development, and nowhere mentions the productive use of zakat.  
 As Selangor is the state given special attention in the two final chapters, we 
should mention some studies which have been carried out in this state. A few 
                                                          
22 Abdul Aziz Muhammad, Zakat and Rural Development in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Berita 
Publishing, 1993). 
23 Muhammad, Zakat and Rural Development , 175. 
24 Muhammad, Zakat and Rural Development, 184-186 
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researchers, such as Patmawati Ibrahim and Hamdino Hamdan, have researched 
zakat in Selangor. The former writer, studying the zakat practice in Selangor, focuses 
on poverty eradication. In her research entitled The Economic Role of Zakat in 
Reducing Income Inequality and Poverty in Selangor, she investigates the extent to 
which zakat in the state has ameliorated poverty and inequality in Muslim society, 
and notes that zakat has been disbursed annually. In this context, Ibrahim uses 
mainly quantitative methods such as the income level of the recipients prior and post 
distribution, besides incorporating statistical measurements such as the Atkinson 
index and Gini coefficient, as we shall discuss later.25 Based on her analysis, she 
found that zakat has to a certain extent improved the incomes of recipients and 
reduced the inequality between them and others.  
 The most recent research was conducted in 2009 by Hamdino Hamdan, who 
studied the implementation of micro finance (another name for income generation) 
for poverty eradication in Selangor. He surveyed a number of organizations, 
including the Selangor zakat body among the observed samples. His analysis 
incorporated several factors such as the improvement in income, the method of 
monitoring, and features contributing to the success or failure of the recipients of 
financial aid. In this case, Hamdan regarded the income generation programs offered 
by the Selangor zakat body as a micro financing initiative, in which the grants 
resembled those given by other institutions of the state.26 According to Hamdan’s 
findings, zakat has to a certain degree succeeded in helping the recipients to move 
out of poverty, although some areas need to be refined.27    
 The writings of Muhammad, Ibrahim and Hamdan look at zakat from a local 
development perspective, arguing that zakat, if practised effectively, could yield 
economic betterment for the recipients. They give valuable information about the 
overall practice of zakat in Malaysia in general and Selangor in particular, although 
only Hamdan has so far offered a discussion pertaining specifically to income 
                                                          
25 Patmawati Ibrahim, “Economic Role of Zakat in Reducing Income Equality and Poverty in 
Selangor”, Phd Thesis, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 2006, 7.1. 
26 Hamdino Hamdan, “Keberkesanan Program Kewangan Mikro di Kalangan Orang Miskin di 
Malaysia: Kajian Kes di Selangor”, Phd Thesis, University of Malaya, 2011, 197. 
27 Hamdan, “Keberkesanan Program”,  384. 
14 
 
generation. Similarly, some information about Malaysia can be found in Ahmed’s 
work.  
 There are however some limitations in these writings, affording us the 
opportunity to fill the gap. They do not try to relate the zakat institution and recent 
occurrences to the phenomenon of Islamization, nor do they give much attention to 
the legal aspect. These two areas will be addressed in detail in this study. In the case 
of the earlier mentioned writings, all are by international writers, none of whom has 
touched on Malaysian zakat, although they have undeniably given early recognition 
to the idea that any improvement in zakat administration can be associated with 
Islamization.   
 Looking at these literatures and their respective focuses, we can say that the 
present study is indeed an original contribution, with no other research to date having 
outlined a completely similar picture. This study surveys the implementation of 
income generation through zakat, viewed as a manifestation of the Islamization 
phenomenon. As we shall later find, the Islamization concept is not merely a 
governmental initiative, but also reflects the efforts of society. Accordingly, in terms 
of law, the process of ijtihad will also be delineated. 
 
1.4  Methodology and Approach of the Study 
  This section will briefly discuss the research methodology and its approach.  
Concerning the methodology, the study is mainly qualitative and is derived heavily 
from library research. As for the approach of the study, it could perhaps be 
characterized as a discourse on economic development from an Islamic perspective. 
Indeed, “Islamic perspective” here is not merely a distinct point of view pertaining to 
a certain aspect of the study, but also indicates a pattern according to which a given 
concept or subject will or should be researched. The first part of the section discusses 
methodology while the second concentrates on the approach of the study, which can 
be extracted from the discussion on development from an Islamic perspective.  
1.4.1 Research methodology 
The research adopts a qualitative method, using references from both primary 
and secondary sources. For theoretical discussion of the Islamization phenomenon 
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and some aspects of it related to zakat and income generation, the study has relied 
substantially upon s econdary sources, including journals, working papers, 
dissertations and books. As the thesis also incorporates to a lesser extent a discussion 
of fiqh and classical rulings, some classical legal books have been referred to. Most 
of this material has been gathered through research at a number of university libraries 
such as Edinburgh University, the British Library, the University of Malaya, the 
National University of Malaysia and the International Islamic University of 
Malaysia.  
 For the implementation aspect of zakat and income generation in Malaysia in 
general and Selangor in particular, apart from secondary sources, information has 
been gathered from primary sources. These include zakat reports, official zakat 
magazines, government reports, meeting reports and many other printed materials 
provided by zakat institutions and government agencies. Although some are in 
English, the sources are mainly written in the Malay language. The researcher has 
also conducted interviews with a number of zakat officials in Malaysia. However, 
their opinions are merely supportive of what was written and reported in the gathered 
primary and secondary sources. For modern rulings related to the implementation of 
income generation through zakat, especially in Selangor, the information is mainly 
drawn from rulings and legal decisions documented by the religious body and 
associated agency. It is perhaps worth mentioning that, in terms of the format of 
materials, both primary and secondary, while some are in print, many are internet 
versions.  
1.4.2 Development from an Islamic perspective 
The fact that Muslim countries have been lagging behind in many sectors 
such as economy, science and technology, despite their commitment to the secular 
development mechanisms similar to those implemented in the western capitalist 
countries, has led to the formulation of a new concept of development based on an 
Islamic perspective.28 This suggested that western development ideologies have not 
                                                          
28 Khurshid Ahmad, “The Challenge Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective” in Making 
Globalization Good, ed. John H. Dunning (New York: Oxfrod University Press , 2003), 190; Ziauddin 
Sardar, “Beyond Development: An Islamic Perspective”, The European Journal of Development 
Research, (8)(2) (1996): 37;  Khurshid Ahmad, “Introduction”, in Studies in Islamic Economics , ed. 
Khurshid Ahmad (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1980), xiv-xviii; M. A Mannan, “The 
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been suitable for local Muslim communities; hence, universal implementation of 
such economic systems was objected to.29 Explaining the situation, Ziauddin Sardar 
clearly says: 
“No matter how you define and redefine development, it just does 
not fit non western countries; and when it is imposed on them, it 
fragments, dislocates and destroys societies based on traditional 
worldviews. It is almost a truism to say that development is not a 
universal concept, applicable to all societies at all times. It is a 
product of a specific culture that happens to be the dominant 
culture in this particular phase of human history.”30  
In order to get rid of the over-dependency of Muslim countries on w estern 
ones, the concept of development in Islam has been introduced.31 It reflects the 
attempt to find an alternative which better suits the native people’s needs.  
It is claimed that the development concept in Islam has distinct features 
compared to those of conventional concepts. It has been based on c ertain Islamic 
philosophical foundations and ethical axioms. Khurshid Ahmad is a good example of 
scholar who has given considerable attention to this concept.  
In his paper, Ahmad argued that the philosophical foundation of the Islamic 
approach to development is based on the four fundamental concepts: tawhid (the 
unity of Allah); rububiyya (divine arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and the 
direction of things towards their perfection); khilafa (a person’s role as the trustee of 
god on earth; and tazkiya (purification plus growth).32  
Tawhid and khilafa are two important concepts defining the basic relationship 
between God and person, person and person, and the person’s relationship with 
his/her environment.33 The khilafa concept also underlines Islam’s unique idea of 
man’s trusteeship, moral, political and economic, and its principle of social 
organization. Rububiya refers to the fundamental law of the universe, which throws 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Economics of Poverty in Islam With Special Reference To Muslims Country”,  in Distributive Justice 
and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy, ed. Munawar Iqbal (Leicester, The Islamic Foundation, 
1986), 315-316. 
29 See Khurshid Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework” in Studies in Islamic 
Economics, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1980),173; Mannan, “The 
Economics of Poverty”, 315. 
30 Sardar, “Beyond Development”, 38. 
31 Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework”, 172.  
32 Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework”, 179. 
33 Sardar, “Beyond Development”, 48. 
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light on the divine model for the useful development of resources and their mutual 
sustenance and sharing. It is in this context of divine arrangement, according to 
Ahmad, that human effort takes place.34 
Tazkiya is the most important concept, being that which relates to the growth 
and development of people in all their relationships and from which the overall 
concept of development is derived, since, according to Ahmad, it addresses itself to 
the problem of human development in all dimensions. The concept of tazkiya is also 
concerned with growth and expansion towards perfection through purification of 
attitudes and relationships. This is within the mission of all prophets of God, 
according to which tazkiya should be performed by every man in his relationships. 
The result of tazkiya is al-falah – prosperity in this world and the hereafter.35  
Zakat is an obvious example, since the practice is etymologically derived 
from the tazkiya concept. Sardar, in this regard, made it clear that the idea 
incorporates the notion of increasing one’s wealth by actually subtracting from it – 
that is, giving it away to less fortunate members of the community. Although it 
seems to reduce the capital of the wealthy, it is in fact a cause of God’s blessing 
which consequently brings prosperity.36 This is evident from an economic point of 
view inasmuch as the zakat distribution can improve the purchasing power of the 
poor, in turn directly increasing the demand for basic necessities and bringing 
assured vitality to businesses.37  
Based on the foundational concepts underlined above, it can be suggested that 
the Islamic theory of development possesses the following features: 
1. It is a comprehensive development covering a wide range of material, 
spiritual and moral aspects, all being inseparable entities. The ultimate 
objective is not merely confined to worldly achievement but also extended to 
life in the hereafter. 
2. Man is the main focus of development in that it d efinitely entails the 
development of man and his physical and socio-cultural environment. Since 
                                                          
34 Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework”, 179. 
35 Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework”, 179. 
36 Sardar, “Beyond Development”, 50. 
37Yusuf al-Qardawi, Fiqh az-Zakah, trans. Monzer Kahf (London: Dar-al-Taqwa, 1999), 545; 
Mahmud Ahmad, Economics of Islam (Lahore: S.H Muhammad Ashraf, 1958), 91-92. 
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human attitudes, incentives, tastes and aspirations are policy variables as 
much as are physical resources, capital, labour, education, skill organization, 
etc., the maximum participation of the people at all levels of decision-making 
and program implementation is also emphasized.  
3. Development concerns the optimal utilization of resources bestowed by God 
upon man and his physical environment. It also leads to the equitable use and 
distribution of these resources for the promotion of human relationships on 
the basis al-‘adl (justice). 
 
Perhaps the essence of the discussion surrounding the Islamic development concept 
can be conveyed by Ahmad’s words: 
“...Islamic framework economic development is a goal 
oriented and value realizing activity involving a confident and 
all pervading participation of man and directed towards the 
maximization of human well being in all aspects and building 
the strength of the ummah so as to discharge in the world its 
role as God’s vicegerent on e arth and as the ‘mid-most 
people’. Development would mean moral, spiritual and 
material development of the individual and society leading to 
maximum socio economic welfare and the ultimate good of 
mankind.”38 
 From the underlying philosophy and ultimate goal of development from an 
Islamic perspective, Chapra has formulated strategies through which development 
might be practically achieved. He suggested that the economic system should be 
reorganized according to a set of four indispensable and mutually reinforcing 
elements:39 
1. The establishment of the moral filter mechanism of Islamic values within the 
context of khilafa and ‘adala. According to Chapra, Islam requires of its 
followers a humble life style not allowing for extravagance. With the 
demands of this concept in mind, Chapra argued that the inner consciousness 
of Muslims will cause them to abstain from unlimited wants, reducing claims 
                                                          
38 Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework”, 180. 
39 M. Umer Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge (Herndon : The International Institute of 
Islamic Thought and The Islamic Foundation, 1992), 213-224. 
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for unnecessary resources. This will enable Muslims to eliminate potential 
claims before these are expressed in the market place.  
2. A strong motivation system to induce the individual to perform at his best in 
his own interest as well as in the interests of society. Islam encourages people 
to strive after their interests in this world as well as the hereafter. While 
interests in this world may be, though are not necessarily, served by being 
selfish and unscrupulous, the interests in the hereafter cannot be served 
except by fulfilling one’s obligations towards others, though without 
necessarily resorting to self denial. The belief in accountability before God 
can thus play a powerful role in containing self interest and encouraging 
behaviour oriented towards social welfare. 
3. Restructuring of the whole economy with the objective of realizing Maqasid 
al-Shari’a in spite of scarce resources. The Maqasid refers to the goals of 
Islam, which he argued are opposed to those of predominantly secular 
systems.40 The filter mechanism and the motivating system will only be 
effective within supportive economic and political boundaries. Thus a 
systematic and coherent reform program should be introduced, to include: a. 
invigorating the human factor by motivating and enabling the individual to 
perform his tasks with the aim of realizing both efficiency and equity; b. 
reducing the concentration of wealth and of economic and political power; c. 
reforming all social, economic and political institutions. 
4. A positive and strong goal-oriented role for the government. The 
comprehensive restructuring may not be possible unless the state plays an 
active role in the economy. But the role of the state should be within the 
constraints of the shari’a and of democratic channels of consultation (shura).  
 
 With reference to the final point, Chapra indicated that government is one of 
the strong forces for ensuring that the implementation materializes. Like other 
economic systems, an Islamic system is operational within specific geographical 
governance. The government’s interest and support will directly influence its 
workability.   
                                                          
40 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, 6. 
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Looking back at the discussion on economic development according to Islam, 
at least three perspectives can be extracted. These perspectives, will give us a 
specific direction not only through a general understanding of what development 
means in Islam, but also through shedding light on ho w this study should be 
approached. They could be summarized as follows: 
1. Conceptual discourse of development – dual perspective 
Reflecting on t he above discussion about the continuous attempt to find 
alternative development systems, it is evident that, consciously or otherwise, 
the process must begin with an understanding of the current established 
systems. In order to seek a better solution, the problem of the sector in which 
improvement is to be sought must first be well understood. Thus, in studies 
regarding Islamic development; the conventional concept must first be 
understood and analyzed. It is not unusual that two approaches, the secular 
and the Islamic, go hand in hand. 
Following a similar procedure, this will be the approach of the present 
study, in which income generation will be discussed through both 
perspectives: first examining the concept of income generation in the modern 
conventional system before venturing onto the discussion of income 
generation through zakat, a distributive aspect of an Islamic religious 
institution.  
 
2. Actual implementation perspective  
Apart from the theoretical discussions, this study will also venture into the 
practical implementation of the Islamic development concept. Islamic 
development is not merely an imaginative vision; it mu st be able to be 
translated into the real world. In this context, the implementation of income 
generation through zakat must be measured to ascertain whether or not it can 
help to eradicate poverty in the Muslim community.  
 
3. Judicial and legal discourse 
As earlier mentioned, every corner of Muslim life, including that related to 
economic development, should be determined with reference to religious 
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precepts. The values embodied in the Quran and Sunna constitute a major 
contribution to the purposefulness of human life, with the establishment of 
what is halal  (permissible) and haram (impermissible) acting as a moral 
filter for a Muslim.41 From this perspective, the study could not avoid such an 
approach.  
The challenge presented by this aspect is how to identify the distance 
between the ideal and the present-day reality of the Muslim world and to 
formulate an appropriate strategy for pursuing developmental efforts in such 
a way that an Islamic framework for life may ultimately evolve.42 In this 
context, scholars must decide whether to stick with classical meanings or to 
come up with new interpretations. Accordingly, in addition to rulings made 
by classical and modern jurists regarding zakat distribution mechanisms, the 
subject of ijtihad (reasoning) and the concept of general interest in Islamic 
law are among the issues touched.  
  
 The above three approaches will be incorporated in the study. Through them 
it is hoped that the research can provide a clear outlook on another facet of Islamic 
development, namely, income generation through zakat, and can eventually succeed 
in showing that the program is to an extent related to the Islamization phenomenon, 
the argument earlier advanced.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Study 
 This research comprises eight chapters altogether. The first chapter gives 
some explanation of the overall background to the subject matter. Chapter 2 
discusses the basic concept of Islamization and its dynamics. As we shall see from 
this chapter, Islamization has influenced the zakat institution so as to broaden that 
institution’s role in economic development. In facing this new role, religious scholars 
need to re-examine existing religious rulings through the process of ijtihad. The 
chapter will try to fulfil objective 1.  
                                                          
41 Ahmad, “The Challenge Global Capitalism”, 175, 194. 
42 Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework”, 171; Mehmet Asutay, “A Political 
Economy Approach to Islamic Economics: Systemic Understanding for an Alternative Economic 
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Chapter 3 will try to define income generation through zakat, based on a brief 
survey of writings by Muslim scholars and economists. Income generation through 
zakat, according to the discussion in the chapter, comprises three main initiatives: 
financial aid, training, and advisory and other services. All these initiatives will be 
discussed further in the chapter, through which it is hoped that objective 2 will be 
achieved.  
From the survey in Chapter 3 o f writings pertaining to zakat, a number of 
countries are found to have been implementing income generation programs through 
zakat. The fourth chapter will briefly elaborate on t he implementation of such 
programs in Pakistan and Indonesia. These two cases provide a glance at two models 
of Islamization: Islamization from the state and Islamization from society. The 
models will help us to understand practical aspects of Islamization in the zakat 
institution before venturing onto the Malaysian case. This chapter will also partly 
fulfil objective 2.  
 The Malaysian case, as the main focus of this thesis, will be discussed from 
the fifth chapter through the seventh. The fourth chapter will focus on t he 
Islamization process in the country, indicating that it w as initiated by both 
government and also by society and masses. The process consequently led, on the 
one hand, to improvement of the zakat institution and, on t he other, to gradual 
interest in bringing the fund within the national mechanism for poverty eradication. 
The chapter will also briefly survey the implementation of income generation in 
various states. This chapter hence aims to achieve objective 3. 
 The sixth chapter will elaborate on the economic, social and political 
structure of the state of Selangor. Selangor will be discussed in order to provide a 
detailed Malaysian micro perspective on income generation implementation. Hence, 
before the comprehensive discussion pertaining to the overall process of the initiative 
as a manifestation of Islamization in the state, the chapter will give an introductory 
explanation of essential relevant aspects. This chapter will eventually aim at partly 
fulfilling objective 4. 
 Chapter 7 will offer a thorough deliberation on the actual implementation of 
income generation, including contributing factors and overall achievement to date. 
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Apart from that, the fatwa mechanism is brought into focus as the means through 
which judicial approval has been conferred. This appraisal will clarify the 
connections among the zakat institution, other government departments and 
bureaucrats and the Muslim community as a whole. Through this chapter, it is hoped 
that objective 4 can be fully achieved. Finally, all the findings will be gathered into a 





 ISLAMIZATION AND ZAKAT PRACTICE: EXPANDING THE ROLE 
OF THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The Islamization process in Muslim countries, which dates back as far as the 
early 20th century, has considerably changed the role of zakat from an act of solely 
personal piety to a national economic policy. During this period, Muslim scholars 
began actively advocating Islamic systems of existence embracing social, economic 
and political practices to form a complete way of life.1 Zakat, in this context, is 
perceived not only as an Islamic religious practice but also as a mechanism for 
hastening economic development.  
Islamization is a multidimensional concept whereby the process affects 
religious institutions, and indeed the zakat system, without exception. Islamization is 
hence referred to as an aspect of reassertion of an identity which was suppressed 
under western colonial rule. Islam, in this respect, is the only alternative feature 
which distinguishes Muslim society from western colonial power. To ensure that 
Islam can offer the solution to any modern problem, many scholars believe that 
religious interpretation should not be tied to the traditional heritage, but rather should 
be revived with new interpretations. Therefore, zakat has been given new roles in 
economic policy, with the expanding scope of the institution based on new religious 
interpretations as well as on economic justifications. 
 Looking at the practice of zakat today, there are many improvements and new 
mechanisms have been introduced. In numerous academic seminars, the questions of 
how effective zakat is in eradicating poverty and of how the institution could play a 
significant role in broader economic development are among the many issues 
frequently raised. The zakat institution and the formation of its management bodies 
have also become a focus of states in implementing their Islamization policies. All 
                                                 
1 Sarfaz Khan, Muslim Reformist Political Thought, Revivalists, Modernists and Free Will (London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003), 2. 
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these developments obviously manifest evidence of an evolving yet subtle process of 
Islamization.  
Throughout this chapter, the discussion will try to shed light on the concept 
of Islamization and its impact on the zakat institution. The chapter is to fulfil the first 
objective by showing the interrelation between zakat and Islamization. In regard to 
this aspect, the meanings of Islamization and zakat will be elaborated on, after which 
the impact of the former upon the latter will be further delineated. 
 To achieve its objective, the chapter is divided into two main sections. The 
first will discuss the basic notion of Islamization and the dynamics of the process. 
Two important elements in it are given special attention, namely the direction of 
Islamization (state or society) and the process of ijtihad. Top-down Islamization is 
official Islamization sponsored by the government, mainly through laws and 
enforcement. By contrast, the bottom-up type is mainly animated by society through 
propagation and education.   
 This section will then briefly explain the basic concept of zakat, the main 
institution with which the thesis is concerned. Throughout the section, we shall see 
that zakat in the present context is a religious obligation which is adaptable to change 
in the environment and could potentially be used in development. 
  The second section of this chapter will discuss how Islamization affects 
zakat in accordance with the dynamism described in the preceding section. As we 
shall see, the zakat institution under the influence of Islamization has been perceived 
as an economic tool, thus greatly extended from its original role as a purely religious 
duty. To accommodate this change, the employment of ijtihad is a m uch-needed 
method.  
  Indeed, Islamization has influenced Islamic institutions including zakat, 
where the former has induced the latter to be more adaptable to the economic needs 
of modern Muslims. The institution hence has continuously evolved and been used to 
support tools of development. The underlying concepts presented in this chapter are 
pertinent as preparation before we venture further onto the more detailed 
development mechanism, of which income generation is the main feature to be 




2.2 The Concept of Islamization and Zakat 
 As two main concepts in this chapter in particular and throughout the thesis in 
general, Islamization and zakat merit explanation. This section therefore will clarify 
first the concept of Islamization and later give a brief explanation of zakat.  
 
2.2.1 Islamization  
The meaning of Islamization varies with context and circumstances. From the 
historical perspective of the early advent of Islam, Islamization refers to the process 
of conversion to the religion.2 In this regard, different methods, phases and locations 
imply different forms of Islamization. There are a number of aspects of conversion to 
Islam such as political domination, trade, and the propagation of sufi, which induce 
personal and communal conversion. Commercial ties between continents, namely 
Asia and the Middle East, was not only bringing merchandise up to the Levant from 
south Arabian ports, but also eventually providing a dispersion channel for the new 
religion. Thus the transmission of Islam from the Middle East to Asia begins as early 
as the second decade of the 8th century, reaching its south-eastern limits in the Malay 
archipelagos by the 13th  century.3 Although Islamization, in this phase, to a certain 
extent influenced the dynamism of Muslim society as a whole, it is not of interest to 
this study, which focuses on the modern Islamization that took place in response to 
the reawakening of Islam in the 20th century. 
Islamization in the 20th century was no longer pursued in order to Islamize 
non-Muslims, but rather to reassert Islamic values and re-establish Islamic systems 
as a reaction against western domination. The initial seed of this revival, as John L. 
Esposito rightly argues, was planted by end-19th/early-20th century reformers, 
notably Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (died 1897), Muhammad Abduh (died 1905) and 
Rashid Ridha (died 1935). They were widely known for actively disseminating their 
                                                 
2 Nehemia Levtzion, “Toward a co mparative Study of Islamization”, in Conversion to Islam, ed. 
Nehemia Levtzion (London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979). 
3 Peter Mandaville, “Transnational Islam in Asia: Background, Typology and Conceptual Overview”, 
in Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia, NBR Research Project (Washington: The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), 3-4. 
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idea of renewed Islam and rejection of colonialism, which sought to reform political, 
legal and intellectual institutions on an Islamic basis.4 The gradual worldwide 
experience of the reawakening phenomenon of Islam at the approach of the mid-20th 
century, later followed by a number of global forces, has shaped the process of 
modern Islamization. These forces include, among others, the proliferation of da’wa 
(propagation) organizations and the formation of Islamic governments. 
The burgeoning of Islamic movements is a salient feature of the modern 
reawakening of Islam. The establishment of movement-type bodies and 
organizations had the aim of making Muslims better organized and hence more 
effective in resolving their problems and difficulties.5 Jamaat Islami of Pakistan and 
the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, which have been in operation since the early 
1940s and 1920s respectively, are among earlier movements. They are well-
connected and often referred to by other movements throughout the world. The 
organizations, have been demanding Islamization in wider areas of human life. The 
writings of their prominent leaders have been translated into many languages and 
distributed worldwide and have influenced many movement leaders who came 
afterwards.6  
Apart from that, students and young professionals who are committed to 
Islam also have collectively attracted masses to Islam and have strongly urged 
authorities to show it more concern. Among the organizations in this category are, to 
mention them briefly, the Islamic Society of North America (founded in 1953), the 
Muslim Youth Movement Malaysia (established in 1971), and the Saudi based 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (founded in 1972). 7 
The establishment of new Islamic states has also, to an extent, intensified the 
global eagerness for further Islamization. Islamization in Pakistan for instance, has 
sparked general interest in state Islamization programs. The Islamization programs 
undertaken by the government have been rigorously studied and discussed in 
                                                 
4 John L. Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John 
L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 6. 
5 Hussin Mutalib, “Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political Implications”, Asian Survey, 
(30)(9) (1990): 878-879. 
6 John L. Esposito, “Pioneers of the Islamic Resurgence”, in Voice of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. 
Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 63. 
7 John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th edition (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 319. 
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international conferences and writings through which, within the Sunnite ideology, 
experiments in Islamic politics, law, economics and education have been 
introduced.8  
Islamization in Pakistan, which included a wide range of state political 
mechanisms, was mainly initiated by President Zia ul Haq (1977-1988). The steps 
displaying the government’s commitment to the formation of a state in line with 
Islamic principle seemed to be the main vehicle for attracting popular support for the 
president. To understand the political context of the country and the Islamization 
process, we should look back briefly to a few years before Zia took office.  
Pakistan was under the regime of President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for nearly a 
decade (1971-1977). Despite the fact that Bhutto initially secured the mandate 
through election, gradually he came to be viewed as a controversial leader who 
centralized power under himself, contradicting his early promise to form a 
democratic government.9 
Bhutto faced strong rejection by opposition parties dominated by religious 
groups. This was partly due to his approach to managing his country’s economy, 
using a socialist model which, in the view of religious groups, was an ideology 
inconsistent with Islam. His steps of strengthening the power of central government 
over provincial authorities, were also perceived by the masses as an overuse of 
political power, particularly exacerbated by his actions to suppress his political 
enemies.10 
The episode of his collapse began with the March 1977 ge neral election, 
when his ruling party’s victory was widely discredited by accusations of deception. 
He failed to win over opposition parties which then formed a coalition against him 
despite facing harsh repression. The whole country experienced widespread 
disturbances and riots. Having no option, Bhutto finally imposed martial law and a 
curfew, but found that the army itself had turned its back on him. Zia ul-Haq (1924-
1988), the general of the army at the time (1977), came to realize that he could no 
                                                 
8 Charles H. Kennedy, “Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989”, Pacific Affairs (63) 
(1) (1990): 73. 
9 Surender Nath Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan (Sindh: Sani Hussain Panhwar, 1984), 76. 
10 Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan, 65-75. 
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longer uphold Bhutto’s government and decided to initiate a coup d’état.11 After 
declaring himself president of Pakistan, he announced his agenda of Islamization in 
the country. Looking at the political situation at the time, during which he drew 
significant support from religious leaders and parties, it does not seem so strange that 
he displayed a commitment to Islam.12   
Based on the discussion of the steps taken by Zia, we can suggest that his 
proposal of Islamization was an attempt to win the support of the masses, a strategy 
clearly departing from that of the previous government. The implementation of his 
policies, in many cases representing a top-down approach to governing, could be 
understood as a reflection of his army background. Since he promised to return 
government to the people as soon as possible, his policies during his tenure were put 
into effect hastily, sometimes in the face of popular rejection. He finally broke his 
promises by holding on to power for almost ten years until his demise in a helicopter 
crash.   
 The Islamic Republic of Iran (formed in 1979), is another example of 
formation of Islamic state. The success of the revolution was inspirational for 
Muslims in which for them, the revolution signified a strong rejection of the western 
model upheld by Reza’s government, which was considered to have brought only 
harm to Iran and was commonly denoted as “westruckness”. The revolution was also 
perceived as a m ove to reverse the loss of religio-cultural identity due to the 
absolutism of an autocratic ruler.13 
 Projected to the outside world, the revolution was promoted as a symbol of 
rejection against oppression, hence causing a great deal of enthusiasm, particularly 
among oppressed people around the world.14 The export of the revolutionary idea, in 
addition to denunciation of oppression, included attracting students from around the 
                                                 
11 Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988”, Asian Survey, (28) (10) (1988): 1087. 
12 Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan, 108. 
13 John. L. Esposito, “The Iranian Revolution: A Ten Year Perspective” in The Iranian Revolution, Its 
Global Impact, ed. John. L. Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 23;  
Mohamad Abu Bakar, “Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia”, Asian Survey, 
(21)(10) (1981): 1053; Judith Nagata, “Religious Ideology and Social Change: The Islamic Revival in 
Malaysia”, Pacific Affairs, (53) (3) (1980): 412-413. 
14 Farhang Rajaee, “Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution”, in The 
Iranian Revolution, Its Global Impact, ed. John L. Esposito, (Miami: Florida International University 
Press, 1990), 72. 
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world to study in Iran, especially through its international religious school, 
Hujjatiyeh Seminary. In 1981 Iran also set up an organization for the propagation of 
Islam, through which it published books in multiple languages to disseminate the 
idea of revolution throughout the globe. Apart from that, every February, Iran 
arranged an international conference to which scholars from all over the world were 
invited.15  
 All the steps taken by Iran so far clearly showed that the general population 
in other Muslim countries remained unattracted to the prospect of waging a similar 
revolution, although it was a fact that what happened in Iran undeniably made 
monarchical governments nervous. In this connection, Shi’ism as a main ideology of 
Iran was the primary cause of failure to strongly win over predominantly Sunni 
followers in other Muslim countries.16Most Islamic activists, too, despite admiring 
the revolution and its prominent leaders, have chosen to work within the already 
constituted Sunni Islamic groups. Anwar Ibrahim, for example, a Malaysian activist 
who later became deputy prime minister, in the early 1980s continued to be active in 
the local movement, the Muslim Youth Movement Malaysia, but refused to take 
revolutionary action, although he personally visited Khomeini soon after the 
revolution.17 In this context, Iran has far to go towards achieving universal 
acceptance of its approach to struggle, and has been unable to detach itself from 
Persian and Shi’ite ideology. In fact, even its success in attracting foreign students 
was not an undiluted source of pride, since it was reported that some of the students 
who enrolled failed to digest the ideology and ended up leaving the country not long 
afterwards.18   
 To simplify, what we can derive from the above events is that Islam has over 
time played an important role in the affairs of nations. The formation of the Islamic 
republic provided Muslims in general with a firsthand experience for them to 
monitor closely if not to emulate. The process of Islamization also gave them 
confidence and a strong belief in the superiority of Islam as a basis for solving 
                                                 
15 Rajaee, “Iranian Ideology”, 75. 
16 Esposito, Islam and Politics, 218. 
17 Gillis Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (London: I.B. Tauris 
Publishers, 2002), 132. 
18 Rajaee, “Iranian Ideology”, 77. 
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modern problems. The process, however, faced some limitations: as earlier 
mentioned, the different sect prevailing in Iran as compared to the rest of Muslim 
world, plus the non-democratic way of obtaining and holding power in Pakistan.19  
Looking at the multiple features of Islamization all over the globe, some 
scholars have tried to give a succinct definition of Islamization in the modern era. 
John L. Esposito, for instance, in his study, defined Islamization as a p rocess of 
creating a more Islamic system of government.20 The definition, derived from the 
context of modern Pakistan, refers to the government’s Islamization projects, 
involving, among other things, laws, regulatory institutions, programs and policies. 
The study, which mainly focuses on these Islamization programs, found that the 
project was less acceptable for having been inspired by an unrepresentative 
government whose then president, General Zia ul-Haq, had acquired power through a 
military coup d’état.21 Esposito hence suggested that the top-down approach must be 
accompanied by Islamization from society or masses through da’wa (religious 
propagation) and education.22  
In similar vein, Ann Elizabeth Mayer in her article defined Islamization as a 
reinstatement of Islamic norms and values, with reference to various agendas 
intended to make societies and law more Islamic.23 Through her discussion of the 
Islamization programs taking place in a number of countries such as Pakistan, Iran 
and Sudan, she suggested that Islamization does not merely revive traditional Islamic 
values and classical Islamic law. The process also involves the redefinition and 
transformation of Islamic doctrines to suit the political agendas of various groups of 
Muslims in the course of those agendas’ codification and application by the 
governments of nation states.24 Based on t his analysis, she observed that the 
                                                 
19 Esposito, The Iranian Revolution, 5. 
20 John L. Esposito, “Islamization: Religion and Politics in Pakistan”, The Muslim World, (72) (3) 
(1982):197. 
21 Esposito, “Islamization”, 218-221. 
22 Esposito, “Islamization”, 218-221. 
23 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East”, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law (35)(1987):129. 
24 Mayer, “Law and Religion”, 184. 
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Islamization programs have significantly bridged the gap between religion and the 
state.25  
In contrast to Esposito and Mayer, Vincent J. H. Houben looked at the 
Islamization process from a different angle, describing it specifically as a bottom-up 
process of growing religious identification and piety undergone by people.26 In his 
article on Islam in Southeast Asia, he described the process of accord between Islam 
and this region as taking place in three different forms. The first is the 
accommodation between state and Islam which leads to a different structure of 
political Islam, as in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. The second 
accommodation process involves the link between the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia, whereby the attempt to reinstate orthodox Islam in the 19th and 20th centuries 
had a significant impact on the latter region. Houben briefly referred to the issue of 
resurgent Islam in the 20th century, observing that the attempt to reinstate orthodox 
Islam as a centre of human thought and action in the individual and socio-political 
spheres is indeed a process of Islamization. The third strand of accommodation 
between religion and the region relates to ethnicity and Islam, elements which have 
lately been embroiled in conflict.27 Having found through his analysis that Islam in 
Southeast Asia has specific characteristics, he suggested that the relationship 
between the region and Islam must be understood on its own terms, based both on 
historical developments and on the contemporary context.28  
Arskal Salim is another writer who merits examination, as he addressed 
Islamization of both state and society. As mentioned in previous chapter, Salim’s 
definition of Islamization is also closer to the approach of this study. He defined 
Islamization as a process consisting of certain measures and campaigns calling for 
the establishment of what are regarded as Islamic doctrines in Muslim legal, political 
and social systems.29 The process, according to Salim, is often promoted by Islamic 
groups who view it as a proactive force for political change and social 
                                                 
25 Mayer, “Law and Religion”, 184. 
26 Vincent J. H. Houben, “Southeast Asia and Islam”, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science (588) (2003):163. 
27 Houben, “Southeast Asia and Islam”, 167. 
28 Houben, “Southeast Asia and Islam”, 167. 
29 Arskal Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice in Indonesia: From Piety to an Islamic Socio-Political-
Economic System (Bangkok: Asian Muslim Action Network, 2008), 7-8.  
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development.30 Through his study of the shift in zakat management in Indonesia, 
perceived as part of the Islamization process, he observed that zakat is no longer an 
expression of personal piety but rather a type of Islamic economic system. Thus 
Islamization, within Salim’s theoretical framework, consists of attempts to: a) change 
the Muslim perception of zakat as a form of religious piety to recognition of it as the 
foundation of the religious and economic system; b) encourage the state to become 
involved in the official management of zakat; and c) transform the voluntary act of 
zakat into a compulsory one.31 
In his study, Salim opined that the shift in zakat practice in Indonesia began 
in the Soeharto era and subsequently intensified after that regime’s collapse.32 
Structural changes in zakat organization and the enactment of zakat law have 
comprised a visible shift towards the entrenchment of Islamization within 
governmental boundaries. A cultural shift is also observed in the change in payment 
behaviour, with the payers now making payment to the agency instead of directly to 
the poor. Although the shift is still minimal, the process, according to Salim, is 
continuing.33 
It is interesting to note that although the present research will specifically 
deal with a new zakat distribution program, namely income generation, for which 
Malaysia will be the main setting, however, the Indonesian experience still needs to 
be referred to. Indonesia had earlier embarked on this project, although the structural 
shift to official zakat collection management had previously been in operation in 
Malaysia. The overall situation of Indonesian zakat institutions will thus be briefly 
described in the later chapter as the basis of the implementation model and the 
Islamization process.   
Based on the definitions of Islamization mentioned above, we can formulate a 
brief view of the concept as involving several elements. The writers have referred to 
the involvement of government and society in the process of Islamization, 
characterized respectively as top-down and bottom-up approaches. In extending their 
characterization, we can find another element which is mentioned at least once by 
                                                 
30 Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice, 8. 
31 Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice, 8. 
32 Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice, 60. 
33 Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice, 60-62. 
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Ann Mayer, who correctly identified it as a redefinition of Islamic doctrines. With 
regard to this element, we could suggest that Islamization is also much associated 
with the process of reinterpretation of law (ijtihad). The following subsection will 
further elaborate on these two attributes. 
 
1.  Islamization of state and society for greater role of religion 
Colonialism in the 19th century produced a major crisis in Islamic history. 
Muslim countries generally followed the path of westernization and secularization, 
hence the separation of state and religion became more apparent.34 Islam later re-
emerged to inspire anti-colonialism and rejection of western culture, offering an 
alternative which distinguished Muslim society and united it against colonial power. 
As such, the phenomenon of reawakened Islam in the 20th century has gone on to 
shape the Islamization process as a rejection of the colonial ideology through the 
assertion of Islamic identity. 
Referring to this particular phase of Islamization, Chandra Muzaffar argued 
that Islamization constitutes an endeavour to establish the uniqueness of a civilization 
which refuses to accept colonial domination and control. The action, according to 
him, could be initiated by either government or society.35 
As mentioned above, Islamization by the state implies the introduction of 
official programs and agendas designed to make society and law more “Islamic”. The 
programs usually call for the reinstatement of Islamic law as the law of the land and 
also for the establishment of Islam as a more prominent component of political life 
and social organization.36 Riaz Hassan explained how official Islamization was put 
into place in Pakistan. The Islamization process, according to him, involves a 
religious and social change which seeks to expand the role of religious institutions 
and the scope of religious practice in Pakistani society. The expansion process was 
                                                 
34 Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics”, 5-6. 
35 Chandra Muzaffar, “Islamization of State and Society: Some Further Critical Remarks”, in Sharia 
Law and the Modern Nation State, ed. Noraini Othman (Kuala Lumpur: Sisters in Islam, 1994),114. 
36 Mayer, “Law and Religion”, 129. 
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carried out through redefinitions of the role of existing institutions and through 
restructuring of the state bureaucracy.37  
Religious institutions usually come under the direct patronage of the state. It 
is also to be the state’s responsibility to enforce respect and compulsory observance 
of the principal religious obligations.38 One interesting example to note here is the 
new role of the zakat institution as part of the economic reform, within which it is 
now the responsibility of the government to force compulsory payment on the citizen. 
Thus, the function of zakat will be expanded to finance the state’s welfare program, 
despite its traditionally limited role of expressing individual piety.39  
It is worth remembering, however, that Islamization from above 
(government), or top-down Islamization, is not strong enough to completely instil 
Islamic values in society. That is the reason why as earlier stated, Esposito suggested 
Islamic propagation and education methods to be adopted if Islamization is to be 
successfully maintained. 40 In this aspect, Shukri Salleh, a M alaysian academician 
argued, somewhat similarly, that true Islamization is only achieved when Islamic 
culture and values become embedded in society. Islamization programs in many 
instances merely accommodate certain Islamic elements in a f ragmentary manner 
while leaving members of society persistently dominated by their un-Islamic 
attributes. In response to this situation, Salleh proposed that Islamization should also 
be initiated at an individual level alongside a strong commitment to a top-down 
approach on the part of the government. He stressed that Islamization must first be in 
the bottom-up form, beginning within the individual through the implantation of faith 
and piety and, in their place, allow noble attributes to flourish. On this foundation can 
emerge an Islamic family and, later, an Islamic society, in time, an Islamic state and, 
eventually, a strong Islamic diaspora (umma). The existing systems will finally be 
replaced by a new, totally Islamic system which arises through the gradual process of 
Islamization.41  
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40 Esposito, “Islamization”, 221. 
41 Muhammad Syukri Salleh, “Islamization of State and Society: A Critical Comment”, in Sharia Law 
and the Modern Nation State, ed. Noraini Othman (Kuala Lumpur: Sisters in Islam, 1994), 110. 
37 
 
Besides understanding the direction of the Islamization process, it is pertinent 
to briefly consider its final destination. The ultimate objective of an Islamization 
program is indeed the formation of an Islamic state.42 It is, however, widely known 
that there is no single, universally accepted model of the Islamic state despite 
abundant discussion of its general characteristics.43 Esposito pointed out several 
factors contributing to the confusion and lack of consensus regarding the true 
meaning of an Islamic state, namely: 1. The Medinan ideal does not offer much in the 
way of a d etailed model; 2. The later caliphate provides only a skeletal system of 
government, apart from its non-acceptance by the Shi’i; 3. F ailure to establish an 
Islamic state led to the development of ideal formulae for Islamic law and political 
theory which, at best, constitute a theoretical, idealized version of a utopian society; 
4. The relationship of religion to the state has been subject to interpretation through 
the ages.44  
It is not, however, the purpose of this study to clarify what the Islamic state 
actually means and what it implies, but rather to give a general idea of the objectives 
of Islamization and the extent to which such a campaign in certain countries actually 
produces an Islamic state. In this regard, perhaps Salim has sufficiently summarized 
the idea through his continuum representing the depth of the Islamization process as 
it moves towards the realization of an Islamic state. 
Salim briefly described the process of Islamization towards establishment of 
an Islamic state, an endeavour which includes initiatives to produce an Islamic 
constitution, to introduce shari’a rules and to discard all existing laws that contradict 
shari’a. Viewed through this lens, it could be concluded that the deeper the shari’a 
rules incorporated into state legal system, the deeper is the Islamization of the 
country.  
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The formal implementation according to Salim can be divided into 5 ranked 
areas:45 
1. Family issues, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance; 
2. Financial matters and institutions such as zakat, waqf, and Islamic banking; 
3. Ta’zir (discretionary) punishment for committing prohibited acts, such as 
liquor consumption and gambling, or for omitting the required acts, for 
instance, the use of headscarves for women; 
4. Hudud and qisas penalties: hudud for those who commit adultery or 
fornication and theft and qisas for those found guilty of murder; 
5. Islam both as a basis of the state and as a system governing the country.  
From the above continuum, it can clearly be inferred that the higher the demand, the 
closer conformity to it approaches the establishment of an Islamic state.46  
In sum, although some countries try to call for an Islamic state to be 
established, this is not necessarily the case in others.  S ome countries choose to 
implement a “p iecemeal” approach according to which the Islamization program is 
merely a response to the demands of societies and political opposition groups. 
Through this kind of Islamization, some practices are encouraged, for instance the 
celebration of the Prophet’s Birthday, Friday as a public holiday, or the introduction 
of Islamic banking, which are politically unthreatening to the legitimacy of the ruling 
government.47 On the basis of the above ranks as suggested by Salim, we can clearly 
observe that a country which adopts such an approach to Islamization will only be 
willing to initiate changes up to the second stage. 
 
2.    Islamization implies new ijtihad 
As earlier mentioned, besides allowing more space for Islam in state and social 
affairs, Islamization also involves reinterpretation of Islamic law. Mayer in her article 
noted that Islamization is reinstating the Islamic law in opposition to westernization. 
During the era of colonialism (18th–19th centuries), Muslim countries heavily 
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adopted colonial law, such as that of France and England, in the hope of promoting 
material development.48   
Hence, Islamization uses Islamic law, in the course of which process, as Mayer 
observed, Islamic rulings have been redefined to suit the demands of the modern 
state. This is an important step towards ensuring that Islamic law can be implemented 
within the framework of contemporary administration. In this context, it is widely 
observed that in many cases Islamic law (shari’a law) needs readjustment in ways 
that cause it to diverge from the original classical treatises.49  
Apart from the westernization which entailed the significant export of foreign 
law into Muslim states, the dormant development of Islamic law has been another 
challenge for Muslims. Between the 9th and 10th centuries, the Islamic framework 
for society and state was essentially viewed as fixed and determined – preserved in 
Islamic law and strongly guarded by ‘ulama.50 Scholars, such as Schacht and Gibb, 
maintained that the gate of ijtihad was closed as early as the tenth century. Such a 
closure resulted in Muslims in general only following classical rulings that had been 
determined much earlier.51  
Wael B. Hallaq, however, rejected this notion. According to him, the door of 
ijtihad was never closed since there were new mujaddid (religious restorer) and 
mujtahid (competent shari’a interpreter) in every century; besides which there was a 
total lack of consensus among jurists of any period regarding such matters. Hallaq 
nevertheless admitted that the number of mujtahid considerably declined, particularly 
after the 16th century, which effectively thwarted the development of Islamic law; 
while the doctrine of taqlid in the meantime was widely accepted.52 
It is difficult to ascertain with certainty who is more accurate in this debate, 
since both perspectives have their own merits. What we obviously observe in many 
classical books, especially after the formation of four mainstream Sunni sects, is that 
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the pattern of the ‘ulamas at that time was to occupy themselves mainly with 
commentaries and marginal notes on t he writings of previous eminent scholars, 
adding little to the development of knowledge.53 As was further evident from 
classical discourse after the 9th or10th century, many ‘ulamas concluded that they no 
longer needed any new sect. Hence, they confined themselves to certain categories, 
on the assumption that they were not on a level that entitled them to form a distinct 
madhhab (sect).54  
Based on t he above discussion, perhaps we could safely suggest that 
colonization has exaggerated the slow pace of ijtihad, which had occurred earlier, 
when the door of ijtihad was widely believed to have been closed. To ensure that the 
Islamization process can be successfully put in place, the ijtihad is needed wherever a 
creative way of solving problems needs to be found, thus making the departure from 
classical ways of thinking inevitable. 
 For a basic understanding of how this process might materialize, perhaps we 
should have a glance at the basic concept of ijtihad. Ijtihad represents a jurist’s 
exertion of the utmost endeavour to formulate a conjecture as to religious rules in 
such a way that reaching beyond it would be impossible.55 This is an important way 
to find answers to any new problem regarding which no clear solution or evidence is 
found in the Quran and Hadith, through understanding the intention of the 
Lawgiver.56 When this procedure is followed, the decision arrived at will not deviate 
from the spirit of those sources.   
 The ijtihad could take many forms, among which the most important are: 1. 
Ijma’,  the consensus of scholars of Islam after the demise of the prophet;57 2. Qiyas, 
meaning didactic analogy or, in other words, comparison with a view to suggesting 
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equality or similarity between two things;58 3. Fatwa of sahaba, the individual 
rulings of the Prophet’s companions;59 4. Istihsan (equity), or authorizing departure 
from the existing rule when its enforcement leads to unfair results;60 and 5. Maslaha, 
considerations which secure benefit or prevent harm but which are, simultaneously, 
in harmony with the objectives (maqasid) of the shari’a.61   
The active use of such methodology has proved that they are effective in 
keeping religion abreast of the constant development of society. The formation of 
various madhhabs is itself a manifestation of active and creative solutions found in 
conditions of total freedom for divergence of opinion between scholars.  
The sweep of modernization in the 19th and 20th centuries clearly shows that 
the rich heritage of classical rulings was unable to keep pace with modern challenges. 
As observant Muslims lagged behind materially, many of them strayed from religion. 
Modern scholars accordingly called for a return to “creative” solutions through 
ijtihad.  Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905),  
Muhammad Rashid Ridha (1865-1945) and Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) are 
among those actively invigorating the idea of reform for Muslims all over the world. 
Having firsthand experience of western colonialism, these personalities demonstrated 
their sheer rejection of it. Al-Afghani, for example, clearly maintained that 
colonialism brought more suffering than scientific gain.62  
Al-Afghani firmly contended that Islam is most conducive to progress when 
Muslims do not fall behind their contemporaries by holding strongly to the religion.63 
On the question of the closure of the gate of ijtihad, he replied negatively by 
questioning the authority of any imam to declare that this was the case. Accordingly, 
he called for direct reference to the Quran and Sunna through analogical deduction, in 
keeping with modern science and the needs of the current age.64  
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Like his master Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh also denounced blind imitation 
and call for more liberal interpretation. In this context, he suggested that shari’a 
consists of two major parts, ‘ibada and mu’amala, concepts which have been upheld 
by many succeeding modern jurists. The nature of the former, according to him, is 
clearly established in the Quran and Hadith, whereas the latter is not derived from 
unambiguous texts and so is subject to independent thought.65 Among his rather 
controversial religious views are support for the legalization of shareholdings and of 
drawing interest from the post office.66 
Looking at this brief review of the reformers and their basic ideas, it is 
perhaps sufficient to observe a common pattern within which, in facing the modern 
challenge, modern jurists are inclined to employ fresh reasoning rather than 
continuing to hold tightly to classical opinions.  
Through time, the idea and call initiated by a number of scholars have been 
slowly taken up by scholars worldwide. al-Mawdudi (1903-1979) and Sayyid Qutb 
(1906-1966), two famous scholars in mid of 20th century for example, maintained that 
Islam is the divinely mandated alternative to the western capitalism and communism. 
In this regard, western technology and science should be cautiously adopted and 
Islamized but its embedded values should be rejected.67 
Many modern scholars also are of the view that Islamization is a process by 
which Islamic principles and values are reapplied to meet the circumstances and 
needs of a ch anging socio-political milieu. They encouraged the establishment of 
Islamic banks and the creation of Islamic universities, and believed that Islamization 
can include the adoption of foreign systems that are not contradictory to Islam. They 
understood that they live at a time when specific programs can be actually developed 
and not simply advocated and written about by pioneering voices.68   
 In sum, Islamization has diverse meanings, all referring to an ongoing process 
involving programs and agendas initiated by government and society in order to 
create a more Islamic system of governance. Religious institutions in this case, will 
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be under government patronage, with their expanded role not merely confined to 
religious piety as classically denoted, but including participation in the development 
apparatus. The process, apart from government initiatives, could also to an extent be 
instigated from the bottom by societies and activists. Both means of Islamization are 
pertinent for ensuring that Islamic values and culture become truly embedded in 
Muslim society.  
Another element of this process that needs to be focused on is the concept of 
religious renewal through ijtihad. In order to Islamize the current “secular system”, 
the scholar cannot simply hold strongly to classical rulings. In this case, the advocates 
of reform promote a more democratic attitude to religion, with the interpretation of 
religious practice being based on modern perspectives rather than confined to the 
classical view, which was initially derived from medieval experience.  
 
2.2.2 Zakat: a dynamic and adaptable institution 
 As the main focus of this thesis, it is pertinent to understand the basic concept 
of zakat. The present part hence will briefly provide general information regarding 
zakat, of which two characteristics will be given particular attention: adaptability of 
zakat to legal change, and the potential for the economic role that it is suggested 
zakat can play in the modern state.  
 Zakat (zakah in Arabic) has been defined in almost all the major works of 
Islamic jurisprudence, by classical as well as contemporary jurists.69 The word 
“zakah” literally means “growth” or “increase” (as in the phrase zakat al-zar’: the 
crop grew) and also purity (as in the Quranic phrase “qad af laha man tazakka” 
(verily the pure one prospered). Accordingly, this religious duty has been so named 
with reference to the first meaning of the word, as its observance will lead to 
increased prosperity in this world and thawab (growth of religious merit) in the 
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hereafter. With reference to the second meaning, the payment of zakat gives 
purification from sins.70  
 Zakat is the third pillar of Islam, after the obligation of salah (prayer) and 
shahada (creed). The duty is mentioned 30 t imes or so in the Quran.71 As such, 
zakat, like other pillars of Islam, is a fundamental ‘ibada (religious duty) without the 
fulfilment of which one’s claim to be loyal to Islam can be seriously doubted.72  
 Zakat, technically, stands for an act of monetary worship according to which 
any Muslim who possesses wealth (mal) equal to or exceeding a prescribed 
minimum limit (nisab) must give away a portion of it, at the specified rate, to 
designated categories of people.73 The sources of zakat may include various types of 
wealth, such as livestock, agricultural produce, trade income and gold and silver.74 
As the situation changed and the zakat along with it, nowadays the taxable wealth 
has been expanded to comprise professional income, bonds and financial investment 
papers and other financial sources.75 
 Apart from that, there is another type of zakat named al-fitr levied on each 
Muslim in every Ramadan. In this case, every individual has to submit for himself 
and their dependents one sa’ or approximately 2.2 kilograms of staple food such as 
wheat, rice, dates and barley. The payment also could be made in the form of money. 
Despite of slight differences with zakat, in general, al-fitr is similar in other aspects 
especially in its mechanism of collection and distribution.76   
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 Besides stipulating the obligation to pay, the Quran also underlined clearly 
the rightful recipients of the fund, consisting of eight groups altogether. They are the 
poor (miskin), the needy (faqir), the zakat collector (‘amil), those whose hearts are 
reconcilable (al-muallaf qulubuhum), those in bondage (al-riqab), those in the way 
of God (fi sabil allah), the debtor (al-gharimin) and the wayfarer (ibn sabil).77  
  As a religious monetary duty, zakat is indeed an institution highly adaptable 
to changes in its environment. This is not, however, to claim that the duty can be 
haphazardly shaped to suit contemporary settings; rather, in legal terminology, every 
aspect of it is subject to the employment of ijtihad. Although is undeniable that some 
aspects of the duty can be clarified through reasoning, it is rather tricky to draw a line 
clearly indicating how far the process can be employed.  
 Mahmoud Abu Saud, a modern Islamic scholar, has elucidated the nature of 
the obligation. According to him, despite the essential role of zakat and its vital 
importance, its implications have been ambiguous since the dawn of Islam. He 
asserted that a cursory perusal of different scholars would reveal a strikingly broad 
divergence of opinion. Each scholar arrived at his conclusions through his own 
interpretation of the Quran and of the various hadith, taking into account the public 
interest as adjudged at the time.78 
   The explanation of the issue is actually deeply rooted in the places where 
zakat was originally introduced. Of the general instructions pertaining to zakat given 
in the Quran’s verses, some are dated as early as the Prophet’s residence in Mecca, to 
be followed by the more serious version of the Medinan period. The zakat is 
prescribed through the verses revealed in the latter.79 These verses, however, only 
present basic injunctions in which many rulings pertaining to the practical 
implementation of collection and distribution were left to the hadith. Hadith, in this 
regard, played a substantial role through giving examples and directions, detailing 
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the general Quranic commands, and converting its theoretical axioms into the living 
realities of human life.80 
 In fact, the role of the Prophet in Medina was not only that of apostle of God 
but also that of head of state. Hence, as far as zakat is concerned, the Prophet’s 
rulings pertaining to the obligation might possibly not constitute religious principles 
deriving from his capacity as a Prophet, but rather, as issuing from a head of state, 
might possess a type of authority dissimilar to the sanctity of purely religious 
rulings.81 This hypothesis can perhaps be strongly supported by Saud’s further 
explanation. According to him, in many cases the hadith were based on a letter 
written by Abu Bakr, the first caliph, to his governor Anas Ibn Malik.  It is said that 
the letter was originally written by the Prophet but was never sent out or made 
public. This indicates, he argued, that the decree stands as a h ead of state’s 
pronouncement rather than as a revelation. Accordingly, the ruling is considered 
indicative, not restrictive, and applicable merely to the necessities and requirements 
of the period.82 Considering the overall nature of the sources, it is unsurprising that 
later scholars, facing different societal problems, have shown greater variance in 
their rulings and legal conclusions.  
 Generally speaking, there are some aspects of the institution on w hich 
scholars have unanimously agreed; among others, the obligatory nature of zakat, the 
eligible recipients, and the traditional taxable wealth such as livestock, agricultural 
products and gold and silver, which have been established clearly by the Quran and 
many reputable Hadith.83 There are nevertheless many disagreements about other 
aspects.  
 One issue which has attracted considerable attention among scholars is that of 
expanding taxable income. When the Quranic verses and hadith are consulted, 
besides a number of types of wealth being listed, as above, no indication can be 
found that either one or both of the main legal sources have identified only these 
types as subject to zakat. Additionally, the Quran (verse 9:103) simply gives “mal” 
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(wealth) as a general connotation, which could be literally interpreted as comprising 
all wealth.84 
  As a result, some jurists, especially contemporary ones, are of the view that 
the category of zakatable wealth should be expanded. In addition to the general 
connotation as mentioned above, they argued that zakatable wealth must conform to 
its basic raison d’être, growth. This concept was derived from the opinion of 
classical scholars such as al-Kasani (died 1144) and Ibn Humam (died 1456), who 
maintained that the forms of zakatable wealth were chosen for their nature as 
growing wealth.85 Using a similar rule, modern scholars such as al-Qardawi, Abdul 
Wahab Khalaf (died 1954) and Muhammad Abu Zahrah (died 1973), among others, 
asserted that the levy on wealth should be extended to cover all new sources of 
wealth, provided they meet that criterion.86  
 In contrast to the above group, there are scholars, classical and modern alike, 
who did not support such a change. Classical jurists such as Ibn Hazm (died 1064) 
and al-Shawkani (died 1834) favored restricting the sources of zakat to the eight 
types of wealth clearly stipulated by the Quran and hadith.87 This is because they 
regarded zakat as a purely religious obligation which must strictly follow the clear 
text without incorporating any analogies.88 This opinion in fact is still strongly 
upheld by some contemporary scholars, as is evident in the Fatwa by Organization of 
Islamic Conference Fiqh Academy produced at its meeting in 1985.89   
 On the distribution side, as mentioned earlier, the Quran clearly stipulates the 
rightful recipients, who are the only ones entitled to receive the fund. Hence, there is 
no disagreement on this aspect, and equally no room for ijtihad and reasoning. The 
Quran, however, stops at this point, which indicates that the practical details of 
distribution to each group should be treated as an operational matter and left to the 
Hadith and to ijtihad on the part of later jurists.  
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 Concerning the issue of productive distribution, which is also the subject of 
this study, although no scholar totally rejects the idea, there are wide divergences on 
how distribution should be realized. As later chapters will illustrate, the scholars 
disagree on many aspects of implementation, such as the amount of distribution, 
ownership and the decision to spend, among others. Altogether, a great degree of 
effort has been put into the exercise of ijtihad by scholars, both modern and classical, 
in the search for practical decisions. 
 It is not our intention to go into unnecessary detail regarding those two issues. 
However, considering the above discussion in general, what concerns us is that the 
nature of zakat leaves ample room for change and further expansion. The general 
explanation given by the Quran and the non-restrictive approach of the hadith enable 
jurists to apply ijtihad to many aspects of zakat. Ultimately, this portrays the nature 
of the institution as indeed dynamic and adaptable to local needs.   
 Another aspect worthy of delineation is the potentially multifunctional role of 
zakat, which has led to its strong connection with the surrounding society and the 
political arena. In the present study, a p revalent theme that will emerge is the 
institution’s ability to play an effective role in economic development in a particular 
political setting.   
 The economic potential of zakat actually stems from the very nature of the 
institution, which involves wealth. Hence, it is not hard to draw the connection 
between wealth and economics. Another element providing a strong potential link 
with economics is the nature of prescribed recipients outlined in the Quran, and 
clearly indicated by the above list, in which poverty is the problem that is taken 
seriously. According to scholars, it s erves as a basis for the implementation of 
Islamic socio-economic justice, by which a certain portion of income is transferred 
from the haves to the have-nots.90 Since, within the purview of economics, the 
potential roles of zakat are indeed various, we could perhaps have a quick look at the 
outline suggested by a writer with reference to numerous other zakat writings: 
1. To promote economic growth and productivity through the circulation of 
wealth. The fund will enable the poor to become economically productive, or 
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will help the state to channel the zakat into wealth-creating business sectors 
with the aim of creating job opportunities for the needy and jobless. 
2. To fulfill the consumption needs of the poor through enhancing their ability 
to purchase necessary goods and services. 
3. To check the tendency to hoard idle money, since the uninvested money will 
be taxable. 
4. To finance projects such as education, medical care and social welfare. 
5. To reduce the gap between rich and poor.91 
 Such a huge objective will not be achieved without strong support from the 
government and the state. This connection is clearly pointed out by scholars, 
inasmuch as zakat is required by the concept of the Muslim community and Islamic 
state, within which it is the government’s duty to administer the fund.92  
 Overall, from the discussion in this section, we can conclude that zakat is 
dynamic in nature. There is ample room for revision in its practices, which can be 
adjusted to suit the needs of modern times. Apart from that, the institution can also 
function as a modern form of taxation and of national fiscal policy. These 
characteristics of zakat, as we shall see later, have a s trong connection with the 
process of Islamization. 
  
2.3 Islamization Impact upon Zakat Institution  
 Little is known of how zakat has been collected and distributed throughout 
Islamic history. The institution played an important role during the early days of 
Islamic caliphate which then unfortunately gradually faded and confined to the extent 
that it was merely as personal obligation. The history of earlier caliphs, especially 
Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, indicates that the zakat has been strongly enforced and the 
duty significantly developed during their reigns. Abu Bakr, for example, sternly 
waged war against those who evaded the duty.93 His era was perceived as 
establishing the very fundamental principle, as Rodney Wilson and el-Ashker 
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observed, that zakat as the form of Islamic taxation was a matter for the state, not for 
personal discretion.94 This practice was continued by ‘Umar with a more proactive 
collection system. He posted collectors on roads and ports to check on and collect 
zakat from merchants. Some modifications were also introduced in his time, such as 
the termination of portion for those who might do harm to Muslims under the 
heading of “al-muallafa qulubuhum” (whose hearts were to be won over), since the 
condition of Islam, according to him, was already strong and secure.95  
 In the period after the fourth Caliph, the situation deteriorated because of the 
people’s growing perception that the governments were not committed to religion.96 
In fact, starting from the reign of the third caliph, ‘Uthman (between 644 and 656), 
there were reports of mismanagement of the fund. Due partly to this situation, he 
introduced a new division of zakat sources into apparent and unapparent wealth. 
From then on, the government was only responsible for the apparent assets, mainly 
agricultural produce and grazing animals.97  
 During the later Islamic Caliphates (approximately after mid of seven 
century), although zakat collection was still the responsibility of the state, there was 
no clear proof that it was functioning as well as it was supposed to according to 
religious rulings. There were also reports of mismanagement such as overcharging, 
improper reporting and distribution for political mileage.98 On the legal side, the 
absolute power of the state to collect was also revised.99 Finally, it was reported by 
some scholars such as Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (died 1071) and al-Razi (died 1209) that by 
about 1100 AD the practice of zakat had become a largely personal matter.100 The 
situation was unchanged during the era of colonization. Hence it is something not 
strange fact that zakat was in the colonial economic systems, there was neither 
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proper management nor serious enforcement of zakat by states, and there was 
technically no room for the institution in those systems.101    
It is interesting to note that, the image of zakat has gradually changed since 
20th century simultaneously with the beginning Islamization programs. This era 
features its limited traditional role has been extended into a vital institution for 
promoting general welfare. The process of reviving the zakat institution began with 
the idea, in the mid of 20th century, of a handful of scholars who were of the strong 
belief that such an institution had been a central state fiscal policy during the era of 
the Prophet and the four rightly guided caliphs. However, the idea became a 
phenomenon when it was further explored by the end of 20th century. During this 
period, international seminars and serious commitment by a number of states played 
important roles in giving the zakat institutions a new image and improving their 
effectiveness. 
 The above brief history of zakat has been provided to show the condition of 
the institution before the Islamization era was ushered in. This was important to 
establish before we go on to the impact of that phenomenon and the extent to which 
it has influenced the institution.  
Given the framework of this study, in which zakat is being subjected to 
scrutiny, Islamization could be understood as specific measures and campaigns that 
call for the reinstatement of Islamic doctrines in the Muslim socio-economic system. 
It is a force for the development and enhancement of the zakat institution, through 
which zakat’s new roles are introduced. Hence, this study specifically refers to 
Islamization as any effort towards or means of encouraging the examination and 
implementation of new roles and initiatives involving zakat. To be more specific, 
income generation, which is a new form of disbursement, will be the main concern. 
And for a better understanding of this phenomenon, the impact of Islamization on the 
zakat institution can be detailed as follows: 
 
                                                 
101 M A Zaki Badawi, "Zakat and the Social Justice", in The Muslim World and the Future Economic 
Order (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1979),113. 
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2.3.1 Reviving the zakat institution and its incorporation into modern economic 
development  
 Contemporary discussion of zakat differs from that in the middle ages, in that 
it is derived not merely from the fiqh but also from a p ractical socio-economic 
perspective. Consistent with Muzaffar’s argument that Islamization is about 
distinguishing Muslim identity from others, some scholars have creatively argued that 
zakat is an Islamic fiscal policy which, unlike the secular tax system, is divinely 
sanctioned, as a result of which the payer will not only contribute to development but 
also gain a religious reward.102 However, fully conscious of the problems of zakat 
collection and the complexity of current demands, they recommended that zakat 
should be practically revised to suit these pressing needs. 
 Looking back at the dynamics of Islamization discussed earlier, we see that 
the process of reviving the institution could be initiated by either state or society. In 
the case of state Islamization, the zakat institution will be incorporated into broader 
state economic policy. Pakistan, for example, as we shall observe later, locates zakat 
at the very centre of its fiscal policy, complementing the country’s taxation system.103 
On the other hand, at the social level, more effort has been observed to take place 
through proliferation of discussions and community collection initiatives. In this case, 
local agencies have multiplied, reflecting the higher awareness of Muslims. This 
latter situation has been much observed in countries such as Indonesia from the 1970s 
onward.104  
It is indeed true that the traditional way of collecting and distributing zakat 
has had no impact on development, as it has not been centrally collected and 
effectively managed.105 In order to make it more effective, many Muslim scholars 
have proposed that the role of zakat should be promoted alongside economic tools 
such as poverty alleviation, income redistribution and investment. The later 
                                                 
102 Monzer Kahf, “Potential Effects of Zakat on Government Budget” IIUM Journal of Economics & 
Management  (5)(1)(1997): 68; 79-80; F.R Faridi, “Zakat and Fiscal Policy”, in Studies in Islamic 
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103 Esposito, “Islamization”, 210. 
104 Taufik Abdullah, “Zakat Collection and Distribution in Indonesia”, in The Islamic Voluntary 
Sector in Southeast Asia, ed. Mohammed Ariff (Singapore: ASEAS, 1991), 51.  
105 Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon, The Economic Predicaments of Islamism (Princeton: Princeton 
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commitment by states and society at large has significantly changed the image of 
zakat so that the collection and distribution mechanism has been to some extent 
improved. 
 Modern theoretical discussion of the zakat institution is not unorganized. 
Starting with a few initial advocates in the early period (approximately following the 
1940s), such as al-Mawdudi and Sheikh Mahmud Ahmad, discussion increased after 
the 1970s.106 The first seminar on Islamic economics in 1976, which marked the shift 
in Muslim thinking on e conomics from “economic teaching of Islam” to “Islamic 
economics”, has directly contributed to the proliferation of discussions of zakat.107 
This is not unexpected, as zakat is considered one of the fundamental characteristics 
of Islamic economics.108 The practice of zakat in Muslim countries has, hence, been 
evaluated and compared and consequently improvements have been suggested. As an 
economic tool, zakat has been discussed within the context of development and 
poverty eradication.  
 As the aim of discussion has been mainly to improve the zakat institution’s 
effectiveness, many aspects have been suggested, with the use of zakat for generating 
income among the new mechanisms the exploration of which has been proposed. 
This process can also be considered part of the Islamization of the institution, 
whereby scholars individually and collectively strive for ways to make Islamic 
institutions more effective. Within the purview of zakat, these efforts are part of the 
continuous and gradual process of Islamization, pursuing the ultimate goal of 
positioning such an institution as national economic policy.  
 The idea of using zakat for income generation has evolved within the broader 
development of modern zakat discussion, having been raised around mid of 20th 
century. The idea was further discussed by Muslim economists such in many 
seminars and writings and has also been implemented by a number of countries such 
                                                 
106 For examples, refer: Ahmad, Economics of Islam, 81-108; Abu A’ala Al- Mawdudi, “The Nature 
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Publication Limited, 1984). 
107 John L. Esposito, and John O. Voll, “Khurshid Ahmad: Muslim Activist- Economist”, The Muslim 
World, (80) (1) (1990): 31. 
108 Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 39. 
54 
 
as Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia. The pattern of emergence of the initiative will 
be elaborated on in a later chapter.  
From the above discussion, we can see that Islamization has inspired the 
effort to revive the zakat institution and eventually expand its role. In this respect, the 
purpose of the zakat institution is not only to collect and distribute wealth but also to 
ensure that the distribution benefits the eligible recipients. Hence, it is suggested that 
zakat improve its practice consistently with its new role as a modern economic tool.  
 
2.3.2 Legal reinterpretation in the zakat rulings (through ijtihad)  
 In the course of enhancing the institution, some improvements and 
modifications have to be made. The new extended role poses a juristic challenge to 
the classical outlook. There have been some suggestions for adjusting the traditional 
view, involving, for example, the revision of zakat rates, the extension of taxable 
wealth and the use of zakat for productive purposes. The last suggestion represents 
the area of particular interest to this research.  
 It is worth recalling that the nature of zakat is unique, as compared to the 
other pillars of Islam, in the sense that it is a hybrid between ritual and revenue 
raising, considered as a human affair. Hence, zakat can technically be seen as a 
monetary form of worship, or divinely ordained act of worship with fiscal aspects. In 
this respect, Islam gives humans so much scope, on the basis of their wisdom, for 
determining their own preferences in relation to human affairs, with only those 
practices which fall completely under the doctrine of ‘ibada being prohibitively 
modified. 109 
 The 20th and 21st century scholars who are interested in zakat have shown 
their eagerness to revise the classical heritage and investigate unsolved problems 
through ijtihad. As briefly discussed in the section pertaining to the basic concept of 
zakat, scholars such as al-Qardawi, Saud and many others call for revision of many 
aspects of zakat including the scope of wealth, the taxable limit and the classical 
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practice of distribution. In this context, the ideas of earlier reformers have to an extent 
inspired these scholars. This pattern can be indirectly observed from several 
examples. In giving his judgement regarding the distribution for fi sabil allah (in the 
way of Allah), al-Qardawi for instance based his view on Rashid Ridha’s. Ridha, on 
this point, was of the opinion that the fund in this category could be used for broader 
public welfare in projects such as the construction of roads and bridges.110 This 
obviously had some influence on Qardawi’s decision when eventually he gave 
positive rulings on many initiatives such as the formation of Islamic centres and 
propagation using zakat money.111 In another case, Iqbal’s opinion has to a lesser 
extent influenced the idea of Mahmud Ahmad, among the proponents of modern use 
of zakat. Ahmad in his writings on zakat has recommended ijtihad regarding many 
aspects, on the understanding that the method could improve the institution. 
Revealing that his idea was considerably inspired by Iqbal, he cited Iqbal’s poems at 
the end of his analysis.112 
 It should be noted, however, that, in this particular context, the present thesis 
is confined to the question of the new practice of income generation, in relation to 
which the difference between classical and modern rulings will be elucidated in later 
chapters. As for the basic theme of this section, it is sufficient to argue that the idea 
of fresh ijtihad, advanced by early reformers as an element of the Islamization 
process, has to certain extent influenced the concept of zakat in modern discussions.  
 In the employment of ijtihad, modern scholars generally use three methods 
which can be briefly summarized as: 1. ijtihad istislahi, which means defining the 
essence of shari’a in general, so that it is adopted as a source of legislation, to be 
ultimately used as a r eference for deducing the right ruling in any new matter in 
terms of istislah (public welfare); 2. ijtihad bayani, applied to cases that are 
explicitly mentioned in the Quran and Hadith but need further explanation; and 3. 
Ijtihad Qiyasi, applied to cases that are not mentioned in the Quran and Hadith but 
are similar to cases mentioned in either of them. In this procedure, the first method 
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can only be practised on the condition that the latter two methods prove unable to 
yield a sound decision.113 
 In addition to the aforementioned methods, scholars apply the concepts of 
takhayyur and talfiq. Takhayyur (selection) technically involves the incorporation of 
less credible opinions from any school of law.114 Talfiq (amalgamation) means 
combining in one opinion elements from various quarters within and outside the 
school. Although this device is not genuine ijtihad by nature, it has been widely used 
today in many legal reforms in areas such as family and inheritance law.115  
 To give us a brief summary of how today’s ijtihad should be practised, 
especially in the area of zakat, al-Qardawi has offered a guide to deduction methods 
which, according to him, provide the best way of finding a new solution. In his view, 
the ijtihad needed in modern times could take two forms, selective and creative. 
Selective ijtihad involves selecting one of the opinions in our large legal legacy to 
give a sound judgement through drawing an analogy between different examples of 
textual and ijtihad evidence. Ultimately, we choose the most conclusive evidence, 
taking into account the current needs and requirements which impose on the modern 
jurist the obligation to issue practical and feasible rulings. As for creative ijtihad, it is 
applied in most cases to completely new matters.116  
 In sum, the Islamization process has sparked significant interest among 
modern scholars in re-evaluating traditional zakat rulings and ultimately in 
employing ijtihad to form opinions based on current needs and modern requirements. 
This procedure is imperative to ensure that the intended change in the practice of 
zakat can be realized without encountering serious juridical hindrance.  
 From the discussion of both effects of Islamization upon zakat, we can finally 
conclude that Islamization has indeed considerably influenced the modern zakat 
institution, in that the former has engendered the drive to renew and revive the latter. 
This process will consequently give new meaning to the expansion of zakat’s role 
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beyond what has been traditionally determined. The process then generates not only 
economic but also religious effects whereby the reconsideration of classical views is 
constantly called for.  
 Islamization should not, however, be conceived of as an antidote to all ills, 
since the problems of Muslim countries have persisted for a long time. The use of 
Islamization to relieve the problems must be applied through a gradual approach. 
Chapra, in this regard, suggested that such a change cannot be achieved instantly 
through the use of force and regimentation. Wisdom and understanding, according to 
him, must be the pillars of Islamization as required by the Quran, in which 
connection he observed that even the Prophet encouraged gradual transition by his 
own example.117 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
Islamization is a phenomenon where Muslims are trying to solve their socio-
economic problems through Islam. This strategy has emerged from the rejection of 
the colonial system which they regard as the cause of their backwardness. The 
process of Islamization is aimed, to a certain degree, at achieving a greater role for 
Islam in the nation-state, although not all states choose to become fully Islamic. 
Many of them only adopt selective elements of Islam, in keeping with the condition 
and needs of the particular state, as shown in the continuum suggested by Salim.  
As a result of the Islamization phenomenon, Islamic institutions are being 
revived and strengthened to address modern problems. What is needed in addition is 
a stronger commitment to revising the tradition, in order to ensure that classical 
practices do not hinder the proposed contemporary developments.  
Islamization provides a space within which Islam and its institutions, 
including zakat, can play an important role in private and state affairs. Zakat is a 
unique institution in the sense that it has flexible legal attributes which can adapt to 
change in its surroundings. Apart from that, the discussion in the second section of 
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this chapter has revealed that zakat also has strong links with wealth, thus ultimately 
offering potential for development. 
Consequently, as a result of Islamization’s impact, the role of the institution 
has evolved gradually yet significantly. Since the beginning of the 20th century, 
scholars have suggested that the role of the institution be expanded, not merely as a 
religious duty but as an economic policy of the state. Indeed the initiative is not 
merely theroretical but to a considerable extent has been transferred to the real world.  
In regard to the legal impact of Islamization upon zakat, the latter has been in 
the forefront of continuous endeavours by modern scholars to come up w ith new 
rulings affecting it. These scholars normally use economics to support their 
arguments, while, in this context, the ijtihad approach incorporating talfiq and 
takhayyur has been used alongside other more ingenious approaches. Overall, zakat 
is eventually no longer a dormant ‘ibada, but a significant tool of the economy. 
Throughout this chapter, we have gained a cl ear picture of the dynamics of 
Islamization and its influence on the zakat institution. This study hence, considers 
Islamization as any effort towards or means of encouraging the examination and 
implementation of new roles and initiatives involving zakat. In addition, the spirit of 
ijtihad, has promoted the more creative approach to handling the fund. Income 
generation programs through zakat, hence, will be seen as a result of this continuous 
effort. The discussion pertaining to the program will, however, be pursued further in 







CONCEPT AND MECHANISM OF INCOME GENERATION THROUGH 
ZAKAT 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to define income generation through zakat. In the 
theoretical sphere, income generation through zakat is a n ew mechanism which 
modern scholars have proposed as a way of refining the zakat distribution system. It 
is also apparent that the initiative has been implemented by a number of Muslim 
countries as an outgrowth of Islamization. Hence, the Islamization process has to a 
certain extent brought zakat into the fundamental domain of development. With 
reference to the objectives of the thesis, this chapter will try to partly fulfil the 
second objective. Another part of the objective will be accomplished by the next 
chapter.  
The chapter consists of three main parts. The first part will look at the 
concept of poverty eradication and income generation from the standpoint of modern 
development. It is important to understand this concept before we investigate further 
the use of such a program in conjunction with zakat. Such an initiative has been 
implemented in many developing countries since the end of 1970s. It is primarily a 
development initiative for eradicating poverty through poor people’s own efforts, by 
encouraging them to be productive. ‘Productive’ in this case refers to a situation in 
which they can work and sustain themselves without depending on continuous dole.  
The second part shows the extent to which such an initiative has been 
theoretically touched on by Muslim scholars and economists. It appears that many 
Muslim writers from the mid-twentieth century on have briefly considered the use of 
zakat for enhancing the capabilities of the recipients. In this aspect, their view might 
be to certain extent influenced by the then situation where modern income generation 
was started to be micro development approaches widely adopted in many countries. 
From a s urvey of relevant writings we can also see that the program has been 
implemented by some Muslim countries since the 1980s as a result of the impact of 
Islamization in these countries.  
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Following the survey of writings in section two, the third section tries to 
sketch the basic mechanism of income generation through zakat and provide a 
definition of it. The section also seeks to explain the overall concept and various 
aspects of the program. It has been recommended that zakat be used not merely to 
disburse financial aid but also to incorporate non-monetary benefits such as training 
and advisory assistance. Indeed, a closer look will reveal that zakat has been 
proposed for incorporation into the new development mechanism of income 
generation, akin to what was outlined by the modern development writers discussed 
in an earlier section. Discussion of the concept of income generation through zakat is 
a new venture undertaken by this thesis; the subject has not been examined 
exclusively in any previous writing.  
The chapter from this point on will show how Muslim writers and scholars 
collectively or individually have given zakat a new interpretation, engendering a 
greater role for the religious institution in economic development.  
 
3.2 Income Generation as a Poverty Alleviation Strategy: Modern Development 
Approach   
 Poverty in modern economics is described as the condition of having little or 
no wealth or few material possessions.1 It is a social and political construction linked 
to individual ownership, remuneration and valuation. The practical definition of 
poverty varies from one country to another as the conditions resulting in poverty also 
differ. For example the ownership of twenty-five acres of land can make people poor 
in a desert country but rich in a fertile country.2    
 One of the most popular mechanisms to measure poverty is through Poverty 
line income (PLI). PLI is defined as the income required to maintain a family in good 
nutritional health as well as to satisfy minimum conventional needs in respect of 
                                                          
1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (electronic resource) http://dictionary .oed.com.ezproxy 
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clothing, household management, transport and communication.3 The PLIs in 
Malaysia for example, is estimated to be RM800. The limit is  actually based on 
minimum cost of a food basket that could provide enough nutrition to sustain good 
health.4   
 As poverty is a complex problem, there is no single universal strategy could 
effectively eradicate it. At the macro level, development and economic growth are 
main strategies to mitigate poverty as it is widely assumed that rapid development 
tends to bring more opportunities to the whole community, thus increasing their 
income together with the poor.5 In Indonesia, for example, massive primary school 
construction has substantially increased the education level which then enabled the 
poor people to obtain better job opportunities. In this case, the primary school 
graduation rate rose 12 percent while income wages increased by 2 percent.6 
 From the micro level, income and wealth typically have a direct relation with 
the entitlement concept. Entitlement is a set of alternative commodity bundles that a 
person can command in a society in using the totality of right and opportunities that 
he or she faces.7 A person’s “entitlements set” is the full range of goods and services 
that he or she can acquire by converting his or her endowment (asset and resources 
including labour power) through entitlement exchange.8 If the income of the 
household derived from various entitlements is less than the poverty line, then it will 
be considered poor.9     
 As far as the microeconomic aspect of poverty is concerned, the poverty 
could be eradicated by raising the income of the individual. In this aspect, Habib 
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8See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines, (electronic resource), http://www.Oxfordscholarship 
.com.ezproxy.webfeat.lib.ed.ac.uk/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/9780198284635/toc.html, 
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Ahmed, for example argued that poverty could be alleviated through capacity 
building and wealth creation as well as income support. The first approach relates to 
the productive or a person who have capacity to work, whereas the latter designed for 
the incapable one. He asserted that creating opportunities for the productive 
household will consequently enhance income generating capabilities and their 
entitlements, therefore the level of income will be increased for longer period of 
time. 10 Differing from the productive household, the non-productive could be helped 
through charitable acts by members or institutions in a society or through social 
security benefits from the government. The periodic stipend from these sources will 
sustain the non-productive members in the society with a minimal livelihood.11 
Although it is  not clear who first came up with the idea of enhancing 
capabilities as a means of eradicating poverty, such an initiative has been gradually 
emerging as a p opular strategy since approximately in the 1970s, when many 
developing countries started to revisit their development strategies due to the fact 
that these approaches had yet to reduce social inequality. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
many newly independent countries focused on growth and development, especially 
through increased exports and industrialization, as well as on m assive agricultural 
projects, the strategies which seemed most conducive to economic recovery after the 
Second World War.  
Governments encouraged local and international investors to build factories 
for large-scale production of goods, preferably for export. In Southeast Asian 
countries like the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand during the 1960s, tax 
concessions were granted for operating factories. Finance at low interest rates was 
also easily obtained. Lower monetary exchange rates as compared to western 
countries’ currency, notably the US dollar and the pound, further facilitated 
exports.12 A more or less similar approach was adopted by South Asian countries 
through improving the urban infrastructure, expanding ports, and improving the 
power supply to support industrialization. As a result, in the early 1960s, countries 
like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, alongside their continuing reliance on 
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agriculture, succeeded in achieving up t o 10% exports as a percentage of Gross 
domestic product.13 
In the area of rural development, many countries embarked on enhancement 
of the agricultural sector, a strategy popularly known as the Green Revolution. This 
move was intended to raise the living conditions of farmers, who in many countries 
constituted the largest segment of the population. In this project, governments 
stimulated agricultural production in various ways such as providing modern 
fertilizer and introducing new, improved varieties of seedlings. They also expanded 
the cultivated land area and built modern irrigation systems. India and Pakistan, for 
example, irrigated respectively over 30 thousand and 12 t housand hectares of 
agricultural land (according to 1970 s tatistics).14 Consequently, both countries 
increased production of their staple foods rice and wheat, between almost 2% to 
more than 5% annually (based on statistics for the years 1965 through 1973).15   
Both industrialization and the Green Revolution are macro approaches 
whereby massive projects initiated by the government were directed towards the 
population as a whole. The strategies generally enabled the population – that is, those 
who were productive – to keep busy helping themselves, thus releasing them from 
economic dependency, and ultimately enabled the countries to export their products. 
Between the 1950s and 1960s, economic growth in Southeast Asian countries, for 
instance, attained rates of between 5 and 7 pe rcent, whereas rates for countries in 
south Asia reached between 3 and 5 percent, showing that the strategies adopted had 
positive effects.16 Encouraged by such growth rates, governments expected that the 
income obtained by the majority of the population through economic enhancement 
would be shared equally with the rest, providing the opportunity for all to flourish 
and thus eradicating poverty. This did not turn out to be the case, however, as in the 
1970s poverty and inequality were still found to be rampant.  
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By the mid 1970s, there was growing realization that economic growth and 
general development efforts had not made much of a dent in poverty.17 For example, 
in the middle of the decade, almost 50% of Bangladeshis were still undernourished 
while in the Philippines 38% of families still consumed less than 80% of the 
minimum adequate level of nutrition.18 The situation was similar in other countries 
such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan.  
As a reaction to the poverty problem, governmental and non-governmental 
bodies in many countries introduced a more focused, micro approach to poverty 
eradication through income generation, in which category many programs have 
gradually emerged since the early 1970s. One of the bodies involved was the Self 
Employed Women Association (SEWA), established in 1972 to support tens of 
thousands of self-employed women who were among the lowest income earners in 
India. In that country, 90% of the working women (including small traders, home-
based producers, cleaners, cigarette makers and farm labourers) were engaged in 
unorganized sectors in which their welfare was unprotected, and were thus easily 
exposed to exploitation.19   
Since its establishment, SEWA has been helping women through setting up 
numerous cooperatives pursuing a wide range of economic activities such as craft 
making, agriculture, livestock rearing, trading and vending as well as service 
activities.20 Through this initiative, members can obtain other support services such 
as training and cheaper production inputs. In addition, through the cooperatives, they 
can sell their finished products for a more stable and reasonable profit. In 1973, 
SEWA began to provide loans for its members to enable them to enhance their 
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businesses. SEWA’s performance is very encouraging; by the end of the 1980s it had 
more than 30 000 de positors and approximately 8000 borrowers with only a 10% 
default rate. It has also been recognized by the Indian government, which granted 
SEWA the right to set up a n Unorganised Labour Board in 1980, w ith further 
recognition extended by the International Labour Organization.21 
Another important income generation initiative is Grameen, established in 
Bangladesh in 1976 b y a professor from the University of Chittagong, after his 
research found that the poor could be helped out of poverty by means of financial 
aid. He ran a pilot project in a village near his university which was later replicated 
in many districts throughout Bangladesh.22 
Since its establishment, Grameen has been targeting neglected landless 
people who had no op portunity to obtain financial help from any other party. 
Through close monitoring systems and a systematic group arrangement, Grameen 
has been providing its members with loans enabling them to be productive, thus 
utilizing resources to generate income. As a strict commitment, members must make 
their payments weekly; otherwise fellow members of the group will put pressure on 
them.  
Grameen achieved great success, showing that such a scheme could 
significantly improve the lives of the poor. In the mid 1980s, for instance, its 
members’ annual income increased more than 30% within 2 years of membership, 
while the standard national increment in income was merely 2.5% for a s imilar 
interval. Moreover, the members’ spending capacity to meet health, housing and 
clothing needs increased between 2 and 4 times.23 Its success was such that the 
founder of the Grameen project was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for his 
contribution to economic development. 
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Many other successful income generation programs emerged during 
approximately the same decades as the above-mentioned projects, such as the Aga 
Khan Rural Support Program of Pakistan, the Bharat Agro Industries Foundation of 
India (both established in 1982) and the Small Farmer Development Program in 
Nepal and Thailand (established in 1987).24 All these projects give financial and 
technical assistance to the poor. Through the programs’ workers and volunteers, the 
beneficiaries are carefully selected and given suitable help with which to sustain 
themselves. Successful projects have been duplicated in many other countries. 
Indeed, nowadays almost all developing countries have organizations running 
income generation programs, which provide what are normally called “micro 
finance” and are internationally recognized as poverty eradication mechanisms.    
What can be seen from this discussion is that twentieth-century economic 
development strategies have been concerned with employment creation and labor 
incentive instruments. On the macro scale, governments have focused on the Green 
Revolution and industrialization, providing better farming systems and encouraging 
mass production, in order to achieve higher economic growth overall. But the benefit 
of macro strategies was not necessarily shared by all; hence poverty remained 
rampant. To alleviate poverty, income generation was later given attention by the 
government and non-governmental agencies to complement the earlier macro 
strategy.  
 Thus, from the discussion, it is clear that activity to generate income, or what, 
as we shall see shortly, is also known as “income generation”, is a p overty 
eradication strategy. This concept can be further elaborated on as follows. 
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3.2.1 The concept of income generation   
 Income Generation Programs (IGPs) is defined as a targeted and deliberate 
intervention from the government or non-government to assist the initiative of poor 
people, for example, by helping them to improve the existing skills or join together 
to increase their economic power. The supporting agencies, in this aspect, are called 
interveners and the activities and skills which the beneficiaries are involved in are 
referred to as Income Generating Activities (IGAs).25 
 The main objective of the program is to help poor people generate income 
and induce self-sufficiency so that they will be entirely independent after the 
program ends. This is however not the only desirable goal for an income generation 
program. There are many other objectives could be achieved which are, among 
others, building just economic relations26, creating work satisfaction and the 
enhancement of the participants assertiveness, self confidence as well as mutual 
support and organization27.   
  In Income generation programs, intervener agencies usually offer more than 
one service which are offered in a package. Such a package usually comprises 
provision of small capital through grants or loans, training or advice in skills or small 
business management and other support services such as marketing and provision of 
temporary trained personnel.28 All the services can be grouped into several areas as 
about to be discussed as follows:    
1. Financing 
 Financing is an important area in income generation programs. The financing 
provided for the poor is very important, as they usually have limited access to the 
capital to expand their economic activities. This is due to a number of factors 
including limited assets to be pledged29, government and institutional failure30 and 
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the poor attitude towards risks. 31 Thus, in many cases the poor turn to easier access 
credit such as borrowing from family members and private money lenders. This 
however will only have little or even no pos itive impact as the money lent by 
families is a relatively small amount and money lenders tend to charge extremely 
high interest rates.32  
 As to solve the above problems, income generation programs could offer 
financing to the poor either in the form of loans or grants. Grants are appropriate 
option in circumstances involving substantial loan amounts that the repayment would 
be impossible. This is often why large grants are given to groups to establish 
production units which require expensive machinery and other inputs.33  
 Apart from that, grants could also be given to the poor who are too vulnerable 
to take on the risk of a loan.  Without pressure to repay, grants however, may 
encourage misuse or poor use of funds and the development of dependent attitudes. 
As an alternative for the grants, credit, which requires repayment, has a great 
advantage of forcing the participants to take responsibility for the funds and to 
consider the economic viability of the productive investment. Thus, credit is usually 
a more appropriate form of assistance to income generation activities than a grant or 
subsidy.34  
2. Advisory and Training 
 The provision of advice to the participants and beneficiaries is very important 
during the process of program implementation. Training and advisory are means of 
knowledge transfer from the intervener to the poor to ensure that they can benefit 
from the intervention. In general, the advisory service is less structured compared to 
the training service. 
 An advisory service could be channeled through responsive centers or 
extension officers. The responsive centre is an approach in which the poor can visit 
the center and seek advices they need. On the other hand, extension officers are 
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whom obliged to meet directly with the poor to give necessary advices and 
recommendations. 35 These services however should not make the participant totally 
dependent on the advisors as they should take more responsibility on their own 
decision. 
 As for the training, it is  a useful strategy to develop beneficiaries’ skills 
especially those which involve more complicated skills. There are different types of 
training such as vocational training and apprenticeships.  Vocational training usually 
refers to the technical courses offered by vocational technical institutions (VTIs) 
focusing on the skills which have high demand in the wage employment market or 
many opportunities for self-employment.36 Vocational institutions however often 
charge expensive fees and located in developed areas resulted the exclusion of the 
poor from benefiting. Hence, the government or bodies offering income generation 
programs could provide the poor with trainings that suit the needs of the poor for free 
or within their financial capability.37 There are NGOs actively runs free or low fees 
training centers in rural areas which have greater potential for directly impacting on 
poverty reduction. In Tanzania, for example many churches located in rural areas 
have been providing poor with two-year courses in manual trades with relatively low 
fees.38  
 Different from training which uses classroom as its main medium, 
apprenticeships are one way of transferring employment related skills through the 
place of work.  At the beginning stages, the master or the employer watches over the 
apprentice closely and intervenes at all crucial stages. As the apprentice becomes 
progressively more skilled, the direct intervention from the master will be reduced 
and the apprentice is assumed to be more responsible to his/her own work.39 
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2. Other Services 
 Poor farmers, small producers and petty traders often have problems in 
sustaining their earning due to the problems faced in their daily economic activities. 
They tend to have problems with product marketing especially when they produce 
something which is not for local consumption as they have to rely heavily on the 
middle men. High competitive markets also could weaken their negotiating power 
over the buyer, thus inhibiting them from getting reasonable prices. In this case, 
agencies that offered income generation programs could set up alternative marketing 
organizations to help them by paying a fair price to the producers as compared to the 
traditional intermediaries.40  
 Apart from that, the poor also frequently face purchasing problems as they 
have to acquire the production input with the higher price from the retailers. In this 
aspect, a development agency could help to solve this problem through the provision 
of credit or organizing collective and bulk buying, so that they are entitled to 
commercial discount.  
 As for an example, in India, SASHA, a non-profit organization has been 
offered income generation aid for poor producers of handcrafted goods. In this case, 
the agency provides a whole range of marketing related support to the producers. 
Since its foundation, SASHA has been able to ensure a significant impact on 
producer groups by maintaining their competitiveness and their quality of product 
and in the mean time speeding up the payments to alleviate cash flow problems.41 
 As for the discussion of income generation from modern development point 
of view, we could hence sum up that the program is a micro development tool meant 
to empower poor and enhance their capability to work. The initiative is a 
microeconomic strategy which can be initiated by either government or non 
government body. An appropriate package as earlier discussed could successfully 
help the poor to release them permanently from poverty.   
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 The approach of helping the poor to flourish has not been confined to 
development agencies or governments. Religious institutions also can play a similar 
role in improving the livelihood of the poor by providing support for development of 
their professional skills. Through the discussions and writings on zakat, as we shall 
see later, the concept of income generation by means of the fund has been illustrated 
and proposed as a way to distribute zakat. 
 
3.3 A Brief Survey on the Idea of Income Generation through Zakat  
This section surveys what Muslim economists and scholars have written 
about disbursement of zakat to the poor to enable them to generate income. The 
proliferation of academic discussions on zakat in the mid-twentieth century has shed 
light on t he introduction of the initiative, later gradually implemented in some 
Muslim countries as part of the Islamization phenomenon.  
It is difficult to determine with certainty who first introduced the idea of 
income generation through zakat. In the middle of the twentieth century, a few 
writings briefly touched on the use of zakat for that purpose. Abul A’la al-Mawdudi 
in his writings on zakat in 1965, f or example, suggested that the fund was a 
necessary guarantee of help for the destitute and poor, including those who were 
temporarily unemployed. He considered as unemployed those who did not have the 
means to earn their living but were capable of standing on their own feet once they 
were provided with the necessary financial and material support.42  
Although in this account he did not offer any details as to how zakat should 
be given, he did briefly mention that the unemployed should be helped temporarily, 
with the aim of recovering independence through rehabilitation, which is similar to 
the objective of the income generation program. We can understand from this that 
“material and financial support”, as stipulated by al-Mawdudi, might refer to 
something akin to helping the poor through income generation.  
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Farishta de Zayas, in her writing in the 1960s, also mentioned the possibility 
of distribution to help zakat recipients into work. She suggested that the poor should 
be helped to acquire tools or any necessary machines that could enable them to 
recover, and further, that the zakat institution should play an active role as an 
employment agent, matching job hunters with prospective employers.43  
Another early writer on income generation is Yusuf al-Qardawi, a renowned 
Islamic scholar in the Muslim world. Through his best-known work on the subject of 
zakat, published for the first time in 1966, he gave considerable attention to the 
possibility of productive distribution, including distribution for helping the poor to 
generate income. Considering zakat as a solution to the problems of poverty and 
unemployment, he proposed that the fund also be given to the eligible recipients to 
empower them to generate their own income without being dependent on the fund 
over a long period of time.44 
On the issue of distribution of zakat to able-bodied recipients, he referred to 
the views of all the major schools of Islamic law, contending that each of them could 
be the best one to apply in the proper instance.45 Al-Qardawi hence preferred to give 
the disabled and other unproductive recipients living expenses sufficient for a 
specific period, preferably in monthly payments to help them control their spending 
wisely.46 For those with the power to sustain themselves, he proposed that zakat 
should be used to enable them to work in accordance with their skills and 
professions. He basically derived his latter proposal from the classical ideas of 
Shafi’is scholars, who were of the view that the disbursement should permanently 
support the recipients, including the able-bodied, by giving them enough money to 
enable them to return to the state they occupied prior to falling into poverty.47  
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 All the above writers are among the earlier proponents of the idea of using 
the zakat fund for income generation programs. Although at this stage they do not 
specifically employ the term “income generation”, they unmistakably imply the same 
intention. Looking at the suggestions advanced by Mawdudi, Zayas and Qardawi, we 
can indeed see some similarities with the income generation programs introduced by 
modern development bodies for poverty eradication, such as those mentioned in the 
previous section. It is however doubtful that the authors were in any way influenced 
by the practice, as they were talking about it before any of the programs (started only 
in the 1970s, as earlier indicated) were in existence. In addition, they nowhere 
suggested in their writings that they were referring to any modern development 
policies.  
  Perhaps it is safe to say that the scholars merely offered a simple suggestion 
for dealing with the problem of Muslim unemployment in their time. Furthermore, 
what they proposed was a basic mechanism, namely giving the zakat collection to the 
unemployed poor, unaccompanied by more detailed and creative ideas such as 
providing training or courses for the recipients. This proposal was simpler than that 
actually implemented by modern development bodies, which encompassed many 
other support activities. It is possible for many people to have similar ideas without 
having necessarily encountered or influenced each other.  
 The idea of the use of zakat to generate income was continuously developed 
in the 1970s. Discussion of zakat and to a certain extent of income generation 
burgeoned through writing in books, journals or seminar papers. The subject was 
mainly addressed within the newly emerging discipline of Islamic Economics.  
 In a book b y Afzalur Rahman, a Muslim economist, published in the mid-
1970s, zakat is portrayed as a religious duty which has the potential to cure economic 
ills in society. Hence, the state must play an important role in collecting the fund and 
mobilizing it so as to ameliorate the country’s economic problems.48 In discussing 
the economic potential of zakat, Rahman also pointed out that disbursement is an 
important issue: here, he clearly stated that disbursement through cash will not solve 
the poverty problem entirely. He believed that such a disbursement is not effective 
inasmuch as it might create a class of permanent dependents with no motivation to 
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work.49 Instead, the focus must be on a llocations which provide the poor with a 
means of earning a l iving.50 He argued that such an initiative, including the 
establishment of small enterprises and cottage industries and provision of necessary 
training in poor communities, would yield profitable occupations for recipients. 51   
Serious thinking and discussion of zakat in this decade was also to be found 
at a few international seminars. For example, the seminar on Islamic economics in 
1976 in Mecca, attended by religious scholars and Muslim economists from around 
the world briefly featured zakat as one of its themes. At this seminar, F.R. Faridi, an 
academician from Aligarh University, suggested in his paper that zakat should be a 
fiscal (taxation) policy in an Islamic State. In this context, the fund could be used to 
guarantee a minimum means of livelihood to every individual in the community, 
while also ensuring the productive use of economic resources for the material 
wellbeing of the community.52   
The paper showed additional concern for productive distribution by 
suggesting that the zakat fund be used to help fund industries and firms owned by the 
poor. Apart from that, the poor could be given necessary training. His view was that 
the continuous receipts from initiatives supported by zakat money could give the 
recipients stable incomes and eventually free them from poverty.53  
Besides the seminar on Islamic economics, an International Zakat Seminar 
took place in America in 1979. F ive zakat papers were presented in this seminar, 
some of which mentioned distribution for income generation. Abdool Aziz Shaik, for 
instance, in his paper surveyed Qur’anic texts pertaining to zakat and examined their 
meaning in the light of contemporary economics. Referring to the verses concerning 
the poor, he argued, like the above-mentioned writers, that the poor who were 
entitled to the zakat fund according to the verse could be inclusively defined as those 
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who could not earn a livelihood. In that case, zakat should act as national insurance 
by helping them during periods of unemployment.54  
Another presenter in this seminar, Muhammad Mahmood Awan, an 
academician in America and a Pakistani ex-government official, portrayed zakat as a 
viable instrument of economic development. He argued that zakat could break the 
poverty cycle by transferring money from the unproductive to the productive sector. 
In this context, he explained that the fund would encourage more productive ventures 
to be set up, a s any idle wealth in the hands of the rich would be taxed away.55 
Altogether, the presenter maintained that the objective of zakat, among others, was to 
enhance productivity.  
Up to this point, we can see that the subject of the use of zakat for income 
generation, discussion of which began in the 1960s, was repeatedly touched on b y 
various writers in later decades. Perhaps the obvious pattern to be discerned in this 
period was one of purely theoretical discussion of an idea that was yet to be 
implemented. At this time, the discussion of zakat was introduced from a 
development standpoint, with the fund seen as a mechanism for eradicating poverty 
and solving the unemployment problem.  
 Although none of the above writers suggested that zakat should replicate 
modern income generation initiatives, or regarded any income generating 
organization as a model, at this stage the writers had started to use some terms 
associated with development, perhaps showing that Muslims were beginning to see 
the potential of the religious fund for modern economic development. Considering 
the individuals presenting those ideas, who were undeniably well versed in modern 
economics, it is fair to say that they were at least aware of the emergence of income 
generation programs as a n ew mechanism of poverty eradication. In fact, some of 
them came from the countries where income generation had been kick-started. That 
is perhaps why they went on to propose more ambitious projects, such as building 
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factories and providing other support initiatives, ideas stemming partly from their 
academic and personal experiences.  
 Through the 1980s and 1990s, as in previous decades, writings on zakat and 
income generation continued to flourish. They differed from those of previous 
decades, since the 1980s saw brief discussions of the attempt to implement the 
initiative. Among theoretical discussions, Mohamad Nejatullah Siddiqi, at the 
International Seminar in Islamic Economics in 1983, presented the concept of a 
guaranteed minimum standard of living in an Islamic state. Siddiqi expressed the 
opinion that an Islamic state should use zakat to fulfil this duty. He further suggested 
that the fund might be disbursed to help unemployed people. On top of that, zakat 
could finance vocational training and the creation of skills for the poor.56  
Another presenter, Zubair Hasan, described the concept of equity and 
economic distribution in Islam. In this context, he considered zakat as a means of 
wealth distribution in society and, in an argument similar to Siddiqi’s, suggested that 
zakat could be distributed as an income-creating asset and training resource.57 
Besides theoretical discussions like these, in the 1980s there were already 
signs that distribution of zakat for income generation was beginning to be put into 
practice. At a seminar on zakat in 1985 in Pakistan, examples of implementation of 
zakat administration in two countries, Kuwait and Pakistan, were presented. Fuad 
Abdullah al-Omar  e lucidated the mechanism of collection and disbursement in 
Kuwait. In that country, zakat was considered a voluntary contribution, with its 
administration handled by a semi-governmental organization, namely, Kuwait Zakat 
House. Omar reported in his paper that through its zakat disbursal mechanism for 
helping the poor, Kuwait Zakat House had assisted in several ways such as giving 
money as a lump sum aid and offering income generation schemes (known as 
rehabilitation) to the eligible poor.58  
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 In another paper, I.A. Imtiazi described the Pakistan government’s 
experience of zakat administration. By contrast with the Kuwaiti system, zakat 
payment in Pakistan is compulsory, the fund being directly deducted from personal 
bank accounts by the government. Regarding disbursement, some of the collected 
amount was used to help the poor to become productive.59  
In these two cases, it appeared that income generation had been implemented 
to a certain degree as part of a strategy of zakat disbursement. In the case of Pakistan, 
however, Imtiazi found that the disbursement for income generation should be 
increased, as the situation at the time indicated that much of the disbursement went 
on direct contributions.60 As for Kuwait, there was no indication by Omar that the 
zakat body should do as Imtiazi suggested. But this discrepancy was unsurprising, as 
Kuwait was a rich country with no acute problem of poverty and, hence, no pressing 
need for income generation disbursement there. In fact, some of the fund collected in 
the country was donated outside it, as mentioned briefly by Omar.61 
Of the two cases presented in the seminar, Pakistan seemed to have made a 
more serious political commitment to disbursement for income generation. The then 
Chairman of Senate of Pakistan himself, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, in the seminar’s 
concluding address, announced a strong commitment to income generation projects 
through the zakat fund. He stated clearly that the income generation initiative, known 
as rehabilitation programs, would be the first priority, rather than subsistence 
allowances. The National Zakah Foundation was then set up to enable the program to 
be partly financed within the government’s budget.62 Looking back at the discussion 
in the previous chapter, we can see that such a serious attempt by the Pakistan 
government to organize zakat administration in the country is a good example of 
Islamization from above. The Pakistan case hence, will be discussed further in a later 
chapter.  
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Indonesia is another country that initiated a program of income generation 
through zakat, although there was never any centralized zakat body in that country. 
Taufik Abdullah, a writer on Indonesia, in an article published in 1991, br iefly 
explained the zakat system in Indonesia, mentioning that disbursal of the fund for 
income generation had been practiced since the 1980s.  
According to him, the move resulted from the rising tide of Islamization in 
Indonesia, in the course of which local scholars, together with local technocrats, 
promoted the scheme by independently setting up zakat bodies. The initiative was 
part of the process of improving the zakat collection and distribution system in the 
country, where the zakat institution competes with others, making it necessary to 
gain the confidence and trust of the Indonesian masses in order to encourage them to 
pay their dues through official channels. 63  
Indeed, Indonesia is an interesting case to explore further in regard to 
Islamization from society, by contrast with the position in Pakistan. Practical 
developments within the borders of this country will also be dealt with, alongside the 
Pakistan case, in the next chapter. 
The discussion of income generation through zakat continues to evolve in the 
twenty-first century, with some writers suggesting more ambitious advances and 
integrated mechanisms, although there is no clean break from the previous pattern. 
Habib Ahmed of the Islamic Development Bank Group is among recent economists 
who have conducted research into zakat and waqf (inalienable endowment). In early 
2000 he observed the role of the zakat and waqf institutions in poverty eradication in 
a few countries. He generally favoured zakat distribution for the purpose of 
enhancing recipients’ income-generating abilities, and observed that such a 
distribution has been implemented to some extent in the countries he has researched, 
namely Pakistan, Malaysia and South Africa. Seeing that the management of zakat is 
still not fully systematic, he called for further examination of the mechanism, which 
he believed to be more beneficial to the recipients than the traditional 
disbursement.64 
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In addition to performing as an independent mechanism, zakat could be 
integrated with other economic tools to help recipients generate income. As the 
income generation programs need more direct intervention from experts and 
professionals, zakat authorities should work together with other institutions such as 
the Islamic Micro Financial Institutions (IMFI) which have expertise in organizing 
such programs. Ahmed and Obaidullah, for example, proposed that zakat should 
complement the Islamic Micro Financial Institutions by providing the beneficiaries 
with zakat to meet their basic needs. In that case, zakat agencies would provide food, 
clothing and other daily necessities for the program participants, while the IMFI 
would only supply the capital needed for generating income. Since both institutions 
have similar targets, such collaboration would reduce the need to divert to 
consumptive use funds given by the IMFI for productive purposes, a complication 
which would lower the programs’ success rate.65  
 Looking at the pattern of discussion by late twentieth century and early 
twenty-first century writers, we see that they continued to propose usage of the zakat 
fund for a number of initiatives such as training and other mechanisms, over and 
above purely financial help. In using terms such as “income creating assets”, 
“empowerment” and “microfinance”, which show the influence of contemporary 
economics, the proposers could be understood as referring to existing modern 
income generation programs. 
 And in some cases they no l onger hesitated to recommend that zakat work 
hand in hand with modern development initiatives. Ahmad and Ubaidullah, for 
example, in promoting income generation programs based on Islamic principles (that 
is, free from usury and other haram elements), proposed zakat as a supporting fund 
for such initiatives. Indeed, they regarded zakat and the development scheme as 
having similar objectives. They also believed that the use of zakat for micro 
programs, especially in the form of income generation, was more appropriate 
considering that the zakat collection had yet to reach the volume at which it could 
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benefit the economy at a macro level, or support large-scale initiatives (e.g. major 
industrialization projects or modernization of agriculture).  
 It is clear that their ideas have now been implemented in a number of 
countries. This shows that the earlier, purely theoretical idea of finding a better way 
to utilize zakat has, since the 1980s, been put into practice in reality. On the basis of 
the above-mentioned writings on zakat, we can outline a more meaningful concept 
and mechanism of income generation, as follows.  
 
3.4 Concept and Mechanism of Income Generation through Zakat 
  The discussion addresses three main areas, namely, financing, training, and 
other services. This to a c ertain extent resembles the concept of the income 
generation program as explained in the first part of the chapter, from which we can 
easily appreciate that zakat has been assigned a stronger role in modern economic 
development. 
3.4.1 Zakat for financing income generation 
 Many writers, as previously observed, have suggested using zakat as a financial 
resource for income generation. It could be used to buy tools, fertilizer and other 
necessary items for the poor. On a larger scale, zakat could also finance the creation 
of cottage industries.66  
 In order to counteract the tendency to misspend the fund, especially for 
consumption purposes, the beneficiaries could be paid in kind, for instance with tools 
or equipment appropriate to their skills and professions, rather than in monetary form. 
This has been suggested because of a tendency on the part of recipients to spend 
zakat money on i nappropriate goods due to either ignorance or bad habits.67 
Elaborating on t he situation, Mannan for example suggests that the provision of 
education for a poor family is preferable to a cash endowment, since the family 
would most probably spend the money on ot her things, while the educational 
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spending would remain at a minimum.68 However, the decision regarding disbursal is 
left to the discretion of zakat officials. According to al-Qardawi, they are most likely 
to know the real needs of individual recipients after taking into consideration the 
interests of the Muslim community as a whole.69 
 Another important aspect of the implementation of income generation programs 
through zakat is the method of issuing the fund, whether in the form of a grant or 
alternately in the form of a loan. As for grant disbursal, there is no objection from any 
scholar in relation to zakat provision, as it is akin to the normal distribution whereby 
recipients are under no obligation to repay the money.  
 Although loan provision from zakat has been offered, modern scholars are 
still not in full agreement. Al-Qardawi in this case opines that utilizing zakat as a 
loan is in line with the broader goal of zakat. Thus, persons who need a loan can be 
given zakat under the heading of ‘those in debt’. This would not only relieve them of 
the debt but also contribute in a practical way to the elimination of interest, which is 
one of the objectives of Islamic Economics.70 
By contrast with al-Qardawi, Zayas rejects the use of zakat for loans as, 
according to her, there is no s upport for it whatsoever in any of the Quranic 
principles or in any of the prophet’s rulings. She argues that such an initiative is a 
very serious impediment to the rehabilitation of needy Muslims. It also serves to 
defeat the noble and supremely important aim and purpose of the institution of 
zakat.71  
 It is however necessary to mention that the commentary of Zayas and al-
Qardawi about the permissibility of using zakat in the form of loans is not found in 
the same section as the suggestion that it be used to help the unemployed poor (zakat 
for income generation). The comment is made within the discussion on distribution 
of the fund for debtors, as they are also among the beneficiaries. Although it is 
evident, therefore, that such an opinion could not be thought of as giving a green 
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light to distribution for income generation through loans, it is still relevant to our 
discussion in this area. The reason is that, as will be shown in the coming chapters, 
such views were later used to support modern fatwas and religious opinions on the 
permissibility of utilizing zakat for loans (including those provided within income 
generation programs).  
 
 3.4.2  Zakat for training and advisory services  
In programs of income generation through zakat, training and skill 
development are important for strengthening participants’ ability, competence and 
potential for success. The zakat fund, in this case, as suggested by Siddiqi and 
Hassan, could be used to cover the expense of the training and courses provided.72 As 
a mechanism for empowerment, skill improvement programs should be introduced 
before start-up capital is given. Obaidullah, however, believes that these measures 
should be taken only after basic consumption needs have been met.73  
Through having adequate skills, the zakat recipients could use the distributed 
fund effectively and hence minimize the tendency of the poor to use it for the other 
purposes which Ahmed considered a default risk.74 According to Ahmed, the default 
risk increases when a person is given funds with which to exercise a skill that has not 
been acquired. For example, prospective beneficiaries may apply for funds for a 
cottage industry like basket weaving, but if they do not know how to weave, the 
probability of the fund being misused increases.75  
The training provided is not limited to technical and conventional skill 
training. The additional furtherance of religious awareness could encourage them to 
use their funds effectively. Ahmed in this regard indicates that such a course has had 
a positive impact on t he performance of recipients. In his study of an institution 
which provides Islamic micro financing in Bangladesh, he found that the Islamic 
concept of brotherhood along with the religious duty of debt repayment, as imparted 
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through the educational content of the Social Development Program, could help to 
clear instalments and strengthen group relations. 76 
Since training requires a range of facilities from buildings to specific 
equipment, zakat funding for such preparatory needs will also be necessary. In regard 
to this situation, Mannan commented in his paper that the zakat fund must always be 
spent in such a way that only eligible recipients receive the benefit. He described as 
the “free rider effect” the circumstances in which non-recipients might also 
inappropriately benefit from the fund, and suggested that non-recipients be charged 
accordingly and the revenue be returned to the designated recipients.77 Another way 
to avoid such misspending is to require that the expenditure come from other sources, 
that is, either from government or from charitable donations. This policy is similar to 
that of the Pakistan government, which used the state budget to set up training 
institutions. This will be observed later in the Pakistan case.  
 
         3.4.3 Other services 
 Besides the initiatives mentioned, zakat institutions could offer services that 
help people to find employment. Zayas, for example, suggested that zakat institutions 
could act as intermediaries, matching jobseekers with potential employers. For this 
purpose, she argued, each zakat centre should remain in close contact with all 
prospective employers within its jurisdiction, with the main zakat centre acting as an 
agent for coordinating employment supply and demand throughout the country.78 
This service would be provided as an additional support, to enhance the effectiveness 
of the zakat mechanism for poverty eradication; Zayas preferred that such a service 
be rendered free of charge.79  
  Support services offered by zakat institutions could indeed take many forms 
according to the creativity and capabilities of individual agencies. As we shall see in 
later chapters, from practical examples in a number of countries, there are various 
other mechanisms which could be associated with this type of service, such as 
support for recipients in relation to advertising, marketing, accounting and 
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management. These measures, however, would depend on the capacities of specific 
zakat organizations and related government authorities.  
 All the above functions and types of income generation could be fully 
implemented by zakat institutions themselves or in conjunction with other 
professional institutions. In the case of implementation carried out wholly by the 
zakat institution, all finance, training and associated services would be paid for with 
zakat wealth.  
 There have also been suggestions that zakat might incorporate other 
professional bodies, such as the Islamic Micro Financial Institutions (IMFI), which 
have expertise in organizing this type of program. Ahmed and Obaidullah, for 
example, proposed that zakat should complement the work of the Islamic Micro 
Financial Institutions by providing zakat to the beneficiaries to meet their basic 
needs. In this case, zakat agencies would supply food, clothing and any other daily 
necessities for the program’s participants, while the IMFI would only supply the 
capital needed to generate income. Since both institutions have similar aims, the 
proposed collaboration would reserve IMFI funds for productive purposes, avoiding 
endowment for consumption, which would limit the success of the programs.80 
 It can be concluded from the above discussion that the distribution of zakat to 
generate income is a n ew, complex mechanism involving a n umber of areas and 
encompassing both material and non-material aid. Looking back at the discussion of 
income generation from the modern development perspective, which defines the 
program as an economic intervention, it can perhaps be inferred that income 
generation through zakat is also a deliberate intervention by the zakat administration 
to help its beneficiaries improve their standard of living. Hence, this research 
suggests that an income generation program through zakat means one in which zakat 
proceeds are distributed in a manner that assists eligible beneficiaries to improve 
their living conditions by developing their skills. Through this program, zakat funds 
can finance the economic activities of eligible recipients on the basis of their skills 
and capabilities. Zakat administration, for its part, should play an important role in 
monitoring the activities of the involved recipients, beyond providing them with 
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necessary skills, so that they can make the most of the zakat funds channelled to 
them and avoid misspending.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 Income generation is a modern development strategy through which the poor 
can be helped to flourish and finally to escape from poverty by their own efforts. 
Within the modern micro development approach, income generation is a poverty 
eradication initiative by state or non-governmental organizations to provide monetary 
and non-monetary aid for the targeted poor so that they can be productive and 
employable. The programs have been initiated by several organizations in various 
developing countries since around the 1970s to complement larger, governmental 
macro development strategies. The reason is that the latter approach, although to a 
certain extent bringing about higher incomes and economic growth, still left a large 
number of poor people neglected and excluded from the benefits of development.  
 In the same period, the strategy implemented in modern income generation 
programs has been gradually embraced by an Islamic institution, namely zakat. 
Theoretical discussion of the use of zakat for income generation began shortly after 
the middle of the twentieth century. In this context, the zakat institution was 
envisioned as providing the poor with financial and non-financial aid, ranging from 
grants of money for tools and necessary equipment, to the provision of training and 
advisory support. 
 As we trace back the idea of zakat for income generation to the discussions 
reviewed above, we can see signs that it was to a degree influenced by the modern 
income generation programs which already existed. Although the influence was not 
so clear earlier on, later authors, especially those who emerged in the 21st century, 
suggested that zakat should adopt the practice of modern income generation bodies 
or work cooperatively with them. This development indicates that Muslim writers 
have directly or otherwise looked at the modern initiative as a potential model to 
follow.    
 From a survey of the literature pertaining to the association of zakat with 
productive distribution, the chapter also clarifies what is meant by income generation 
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through zakat, which is a key subject of this thesis. Through this mechanism, the 
zakat institution does not merely distribute the fund for consumption, but empowers 
the recipients through other forms of support, including training and advisory 
services. 
 It is however necessary to say here that, although the zakat can be disbursed 
in such a way as to help recipients to generate income, that does not mean that the 
fund, as a religious fund, can be manipulated in the same way as a modern economic 
tool. Because of this qualification, writers are still at variance over some aspects of 
income generation initiatives, such as granting loans from the fund and scrutiny of 
recipients’ individual latitude in spending the money. Hence, new legal explanations 
(ijtihad) are needed to address these aspects.  
 With such a mechanism in place, the role of zakat has clearly been extended 
beyond its original one as a religious obligation, to become a more significant 
element in economic development. In this respect, some elements of the modern 
approach have been gradually and carefully accommodated. Indeed, this process 
represents one of the impacts of Islamization upon zakat, through which Muslims try 
to enhance the institution so that it will benefit them not only spiritually but also 
economically.  














THE ISLAMIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INCOME 
GENERATION THROUGH ZAKAT IN PAKISTAN AND INDONESIA: A 
BRIEF OBSERVATION 
4.1 Introduction  
Zakat for income generation, as briefly mentioned, has been put into practice 
in some Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Kuwait. The 
implementation of the program in each country depends on the Islamization 
phenomenon as well as the individual state and societal surroundings. As the 
Islamization process could be initiated from above or from below; this chapter will 
accordingly demonstrate the way in which these two implementation approaches 
happen.  
 This chapter will present two examples of the implementation of income 
generation programs through zakat, featuring cases from Pakistan and Indonesia in 
which two models of Islamization will be clarified: Islamization from the state and 
Islamization from society. The chapter will therefore try to partly fulfil the second 
objective of this thesis which is showing the implementation perspective of income 
generation through zakat in Muslim countries. It will also elaborate further on the 
Islamization phenomenon in each country. 
The first part of the chapter elaborates on the practice of zakat in Pakistan 
after the Islamization project was introduced by the government of the end of 1970s. 
The Pakistan model of zakat, as we shall see shortly, clearly shows the top-down 
direction of execution. Pakistan merits examination, since its zakat implementation 
in general has been the most widely discussed in many seminars and writings and has 
been exemplary of the state’s Islamization agenda.1 Here the zakat program has been 
mainly inspired from above, with much support from higher-level officials. The 
government has formed the centralized system of zakat all over the country and made 
the practice obligatory for every Muslim citizen. The hasty implementation of the 
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system however, was not always welcomed by all members of society. The 
collection was therefore stagnant for many years.   
Apart from administrative discussion, this chapter will also discuss the legal 
aspect of several issues concerning income generation. This is consistent with the 
Islamization concept earlier discussed which to a cer tain extent related to the 
reinterpretation of classical zakat rulings. In this regard, there is a limited process of 
ijtihad in Pakistan as classical Hanafi opinion is still widely held. Legal issues are 
solved by the extra support of government help.  
 The second part of this chapter features an Indonesian case which also started 
its collective zakat system at the end of the 1960s. By contrast with Pakistan, the 
Indonesian case presents the opposite situation in which, despite little interest on the 
part of government, society has largely inspired the improvement of the zakat 
institution in the country. In many cases, the collection and distribution have been 
initiated from below, among members of Muslim society, to benefit themselves. 
Little or no help from the government has forced society to experiment and create 
initiatives that proffer zakat from a personal matter to a society development tool.  
  Apart from this different approach in the zakat administration in Indonesia as 
compared to Pakistan, there is also difference in legal interpretation. Modern 
scholarship in Indonesia has, to a greater extent, employed ijtihad in which they 
encounter no problems using zakat for income generation.  
Through the discussion in the chapter, we will see different ways of 
implementing zakat management in general and income generation in particular. The 
two cases will give us a basic exemplary implementation, showing the pattern of 
Islamization of government and of society. It is hoped that these two cases will shed 
light on the practical aspects before we go on to consider the Malaysian one.  
 
4.2 Pakistan - Islamization of State  
 Since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, Islam has played a significant 
role in government and in people’s lives. While popularly known as an Islamic 
republic, Pakistan, following its partition from India, appeared to follow a western 
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model. In the 1970s the phenomenon of Islamization was at its peak, embodied in the 
state’s bold commitment to “nizam-al islami” – which was widely known as the basis 
of a t rue Islamic state. As we shall make clear, to win the hearts of Muslims in 
Pakistan, the state undertook to Islamize many areas within its power, during which 
process zakat became part of its economic Islamization policy. Such a major role 
assigned to the religious duty was significantly supplemented by institutional aid and 
religious interpretations that suited the popular national madhhab. This move was 
important for gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the people. 
 As we look at the history of Pakistan, we see that it was not meant to be a 
religious state at its establishment. The founding father, Ali Jinnah, was in fact a 
nationalist leader who used Islam as a rallying cry for separation from “Hindu” India. 
The demand for an Islamic state came from religious followers whom he persuaded 
to support him.  
 The founding father himself was not really committed to Islam and clearly 
wanted the newly established state to be free from any religious influence.2 In a 
constituent forum of the new state of Pakistan, Jinnah for example stated that “you 
may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the 
business of the state … we are starting with this fundamental principle, that we are 
all citizens of one state”.3  
 In the 1950s, the problems faced by the new state, such as the demise of 
Jinnah and the settlement problems of Muslim refugees from India, overshadowed 
religious dissimilarities as Pakistan searched for a national identity. The national 
constitution was only successfully drafted in 1959. It was apparently based on 
western parliamentary democracy, with some Islamic elements, including the 
requirement for a Muslim head of state, the title of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and 
the repugnancy clause by which no law contrary to al-Quran and sunnah could be 
enacted. Furthermore, fundamental concepts such as democracy, popular sovereignty 
and the equality of all citizens on the basis of Islamic principles, were left 
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undiscussed.4 After all, the constitution was too brief to delineate how the Islamic 
state could be put into operation.  
 The weak government of the 1950s, resulting from the power of the Governor 
General (civil service) over the legislature, gave Muhammad Ayub Khan (with the 
Governor General’s cooperation) the chance to eventually lead a military coup d'état 
in 1958.5 Khan, a western-oriented modernist, clearly tried to distance Islam from the 
state in order to promote modern development. He stressed the need to “liberate the 
spirit of religion from the cobwebs of superstition and stagnation which surround it 
and move forward under the forces of modern science and knowledge”.6 He also 
tried to delete the word “Islamic” from the official name of the republic, but failed 
because of Muslims resentment. Although he introduced the Advisory Council of 
Ideology and Islamic Research Institute (as mandated by the 1956 c onstitution) to 
advise the government on ways of encouraging Muslims to live in conformity with 
Islam, and to indicate whether proposed legislation was repugnant to Islam, it 
seemed that Khan’s government did not take seriously the need to adhere strictly to 
the advice.7  
  Democratic power returned to the people in the early 1970s only after 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to office through a democratic election. Bhutto belonged to 
the Pakistan People’s Party which hailed socialism and promoted equality among 
people.8 In the early days of his regime, Bhutto promised democratic government but 
as time passed he tended to centralize power under himself.9 Bhutto was then 
strongly rejected by the masses, with a coalition of opposition parties, as well as 
religious groups, accusing the president of abusing his power. To suppress opposition 
parties, he used harsh methods and finally declared martial law. The situation was 
viewed by Muhammad Zia ul Haq, then head of the military, as an opportunity to 
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topple the Bhutto government, which he accomplished through another coup d’état 
in 1977, seizing power and ruling until his death in 1988.10  
 From the discussion it i s evident that Pakistan since its establishment has  
followed the western governance model. The law of the nation was mainly derived 
from British civil and colonial Mohammedan law. Economically, the country still 
relied on interest-based banks and western development policies such as land reform 
and the green revolution. Its leaders also to a certain extent tried to distance Islam 
from state affairs, as we have seen.  
 The Islamization of the state became an important feature of Pakistan from 
the start of Zia ul Haq’s military rule, to an extent never apparent under previous 
leaders. Zia was popularly associated with his ambition to establish a “true Islamic 
society” in Pakistan.11 It is difficult either to validate or to dismiss this statement, and 
it is not our intention to reach a conclusion regarding it. What is important to us is 
that, during this era, the Islamization program encompassed many economic, social 
and political features of the Pakistan government. Legally, shari’a laws and courts 
were significantly broadened and strengthened, with the introduction of laws 
affecting fasting, prayers and penal policies. New types of punishment derived from 
the Quran and the Hadith, such as flogging and amputation, were brought in. Also 
during this time, zakat was assigned a substantial role as part of the economic 
Islamization agenda, along with the introduction of interest-free banking.12 Hence, 
within this particular context, the implementation of the fund’s administration as well 
as the income generation program will be delineated.  
 
4.2.1 Zakat administration and its distribution for income generation  
Zakat during the military rule of Zia ul Haq has been established as an 
official state social welfare institution and an element of fiscal policy. Directly after 
taking presidential power, Haq asked the Council of Islamic Ideology, to explore a 
zakat system as part of a series of potential legal changes based on Islamic law; he 
then appointed a task force to develop a plan for implementing a national zakat 
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system.13 As a result, the collection and distribution of the fund has been undertaken 
by the government since the early 1980s, as underlined by state law in the Zakat and 
Ushr Ordinance of 1980. 
Under the ordinance, the federal government is responsible for deducting 
zakat on certain categories of assets. Eleven types of wealth are listed, from which 
the government mandatorily subtracts 2.5 percent on the 1st of Ramadan every year, 
the sum then being credited to the Central Zakat Fund maintained by the State Bank 
of Pakistan.14 The taxable wealth includes, among other types, savings bank 
accounts, government securities, life insurance policies and provident funds. These 
are the kinds of wealth which are considered obvious to the eyes of government and 
easily accessible, and which it is thus government’s responsibility to administer. 15  
Zakat on a gricultural produce (known as ‘Ushr) is also collected by the 
government on a compulsory basis and charged at a rate of five percent.16 In contrast 
to zakat, which came into effect as early as 1981, the collection of ‘ushr could only 
be realized in 1983 due to management problems. 17  
The zakat administration is composed of one Central Zakat Council (CZC) at 
Federal level, one Provincial Zakat Council (PZC) in each province, a District Zakat 
Committee (DZC) in each district, a tehsil (sub district) Zakat Committee in each 
tehsil and a Local Zakat Committee (LZC) in each locality (for each block of 3000 to 
5000 people in urban areas and in each village (deh) in rural areas).18 As far as the 
distribution of power is concerned, the five-tier administration of zakat shows the 
degree of centralization whereby the CZC provides policies and guidelines for 
supervising all zakat matters. The lower-level administration (DZC and LZC) merely 
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implements the prescribed policy, including the choice of rightful recipients and 
presentation of the money to them.19 
The council is chaired by a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and the 
remaining members include three religious leaders (nominated by the Council of 
Islamic Ideology) as well as five other selected persons with at least one from each 
province. In addition, the federal secretaries of the Finance and Religious Affairs 
Division, the administrator-general of zakat, and the four provincial zakat chief 
administrators are ex-officio members.20 
The Provincial Zakat Council (PZC) is comprised of 12 m embers, with a 
sitting or retired judge of the High Court acting as chairperson. The remaining 
members consist of seven public persons, plus four ex-officio members, drawn from 
among provincial government officials and chief zakat administrators. The district, 
tehsil and local zakat committees consist of members who work on a voluntary basis, 
with each council consisting of eight or nine persons.21 The Local Zakat Committees 
(LZCs) perform most of the operational work of the zakat system. Their primary 
function is to determine the zakat beneficiaries, disburse the fund and keep records of 
disbursement and meetings. There is, however, no financial return, as district and 
local members are volunteers.22  
Looking at the administrative composition, it is clear that the higher levels 
have been manned by high-ranking government officials at national or provincial 
level. As the main body for establishing zakat policies, such a composition could be 
seen as illustrating the closeness of the institution to government machinery, 
enabling it to function according to the government’s agenda. Incorporating 
government employees, however, has its own problems, since the selected officials 
will normally be overburdened because of their existing workload. On the other 
hand, it is a s hameful fact that, despite the crucial role of lower-level district and 
local committees, many of their members, besides working for free, lack the 
                                                          
19 Clark, “Pakistan’s Zakat and Ushr”, 143. 
20 Richardson, “Islamic Law and Zakat”, 160. 
21 Clark, “Pakistan’s Zakat and Ushr”, 147. 
22 Clark, “Pakistan’s Zakat and Ushr”, 144. 
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necessary management skills and are illiterate.23 This leads to problems of fund 
abuse and bribery.24   
 As regards the collection mechanism, the zakat council seems to have simply 
followed the easiest path of deducting from individual accounts so as to comply with 
governmental aspirations, without first considering the feelings of general Muslim 
society and trying to persuade people to pay voluntarily. In view of the fact that the 
practice of zakat is an obligation that has been so neglected in some parts of Pakistan 
that only 5% of Muslims performed it,25 the government should perhaps have 
instituted a publicity campaign before making it compulsory. This was, however, not 
the case, the decision having been the sole prerogative of the state, without society 
being well informed. Such a motive was clearly proven when the implementation in 
1980 took place without warning. On June 20, the president promulgated the Zakat 
and Ushr Ordinance and on the very same evening, the announcement was made that 
the next day banks would be closed for the deduction.26  
 As a result, the government has been confronted by strong resistance from 
society. Shi’a followers, for example, completely rejected the implementation of 
compulsory collection on the grounds that they are not obligated to pay zakat on 
capital and trading money. On top of that, they do not recognize the Pakistani 
government’s right to collect on behalf of their community. The government in this 
case finally allowed them an exemption for not having similar grounds in Islamic 
law.27 Unlike the Shi’i sect’s followers, the Sunnis on the other hand simply evade 
the payment annually by withdrawing their money from their bank accounts prior to 
Ramadan.28  
Due to the administrative problems and society’s lack of confidence, the 
collection of zakat showed no consistent increment. The collection of the fund was 
                                                          
23 Clark, “Pakistan’s Zakat and Ushr”, 144. 
24 Clark, “Pakistan’s Zakat and Ushr”, 147; Esposito, “Islamization”, 211; G. M. Arif, “Targeting 
Efficiency of Poverty Reduction Programs in Pakistan”, Pakistan Resident Mission Working Paper 
Series, No.4, Asian Development Bank, Islamabad, 2006, 37-38; Nazir, “Zakat and Ushr”, 337. 
25 Clark, “Pakistan’s Zakat and Ushr”, 141. 
26 Esposito, “Islamization”, 210. 
27 Esposito, “Islamization”, 211; Hassan, “Islamization: An Analysis ”, 279; Clark, “Pakistan’s Zakat 
and Ushr”, 141. 
28 Grace Clark, “Pakistan’s Zakat System: A Policy Model for Developing Countries as a Means of 
Redistributing Income to the Elderly Poor” in Issues in Global Aging, ed. Frederick L. Ahearn Jr. 
(New York: The Haworth Press, 2001), 63. 
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reported to yield about Rs 844.25 million  in 1981, slightly increasing since then by 
approximately 12% per year until the mid 1990s.29 The trend of zakat collection, 
however, has been stagnant since then, at approximately Rs 4 billion (approximately 
USD 45 million).30 For the ‘ushr, the annual collection hardly even reached Rs 250 
million (1981-1995 financial years).31  
Regarding the distribution mechanism, this process also starts from the 
centre, where the bulk of income credited to the Central Zakat Fund is through 
deduction at source, as previously explained.32 In the disbursement process, specific 
amounts are periodically released to the Provincial Zakat Council in proportion to the 
size of its population. A major share of this fund is then passed on to Local Zakat 
Committees through the District Zakat Committees. In this way, the actual zakat 
disbursement to the needy is made mainly by Local Zakat Committees. 33  
Pakistan’s zakat is primarily used as a poverty reduction mechanism, with the 
greater part of the fund designated for the poor and needy.34 In carrying out this 
policy, the zakat ordinance clearly stipulates that the utilization of the fund is not 
merely limited to the monthly stipend for the unproductive poor, but is also meant to 
help those who are still productive. Under the rehabilitation program, people in the 
latter group will be given grants for generating income.35  
The government is fully aware of the potential of the disbursement for 
income generation. The remarks of several individuals are perhaps worth noting to 
highlight the ruling government’s serious effort to give the highest priority to the 
rehabilitation mechanism; these comments also show that such a mechanism, like 
other features of the Islamization program, has been inspired from above. For 
instance, in the International Seminar on t he Management of Zakah in Modern 
Muslim Society held in 1985, as mentioned in previous chapter, the then Chairman 
of the Senate of Pakistan who was later the president of the country, clearly 
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(Islamabad: MORA, 2006). 
31Nazir, “Zakat and Ushr”, 336.  
32 Richardson, “Islamic Law and Zakat”,161. 
33 Nasim Shah Shirazi, “Targeting, Coverage and Contribution of Zakat to Household’s Income: The 
Case of Pakistan”, Journal of Economic Cooperation Among Islamic Countries (17) (3-4) (1996):166. 
34 Imtiazi , “Organization of Zakah”, 170.  
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mentioned the importance of the rehabilitation mechanism in zakat disbursal.36 
Citing his awareness of complaints about the focus on monthly or annual allowances 
in the distribution arrangements, he signalled a government commitment to ensuring 
that rehabilitation would be the first priority. As a clear example of how serious the 
government was, he indicated that the National Zakat Foundation had been set up to 
reinforce zakat in building the necessary rehabilitation facilities, which zakat on its 
own was unable to realize.    
Imran Ahmad Imtiazi, the first Administrator General Zakat, also firmly 
noted a similar commitment, and expressed the personal view that to give the highest 
priority to rehabilitation was in line with the letter and spirit of shari’a.37 According 
to him, it w as the intention of the CZC from its inception to achieve a greater 
distribution for rehabilitation than for subsistence. Unfortunately, the distribution 
turned out to consist of a greater proportion for the latter than for the former, for 
which fact he did not give any reason. He suggested that, accordingly, a new strategy 
for managing the fund should be introduced so as to give more attention to 
rehabilitation.38 Since he was the person personally chosen by President Zia to be the 
first general manager of the zakat council, such a commitment from him definitely 
carried great significance for the overall zakat administration.39  
 Although neither the government nor the zakat administration has revealed 
the origin of the idea of using zakat for such an initiative, it is understood that the 
Pakistan government might have been inspired by the scholarly writings on z akat 
which have been widely available throughout the world.  In addition, the income 
generation initiative, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was in operation at the 
time in many developing countries including Pakistan, so that the government could 
see its contribution to poverty relief in the country. 
Initially, the distribution for income generation was mainly for providing 
sewing machines or initial capital with which to purchase a buffalo, with a 
distribution range of between Rs 500 to Rs 5000.40 It is the practice of the CZC to 
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specify how much of the fund should be disbursed through such a mechanism. 
Rehabilitation was targeted to 4% of recipients and they would be struck off the list 
of beneficiaries once they received the grant. This to some extent discouraged 
potential recipients from applying for rehabilitation funds.41  
 As a result, the larger fraction of the fund went to beneficiaries who were 
considered unproductive. In this case, Grace Clark reported that if the LZCs gave 
more attention to rehabilitation, it would come out of the total allocation, leaving less 
money for stipends to widows, orphans and others.42 Such competing demands 
would, most of the time, retard the rehabilitation disbursement. 
Due to the excess of undistributed funds, there was a policy shift regarding 
disbursement in the year 2000, when the CZC introduced a Permanent Rehabilitation 
Scheme of Zakat (PRZS). PRZS is an improved rehabilitation program enabling the 
beneficiaries to acquire tangible assets with which to sustain economic activity. 
Under this program, the beneficiaries would be given a one-off lump-sum financial 
grant of Rs 10,000 to Rs 35,000, besides any other technical support and training.43 
Between 2002 a nd 2003, Rs 4862 m illion was disbursed under this program, 
benefiting 257,671 recipients nationally.44 How well the program might perform is 
difficult to discuss as there is no report tracking its performance. Since the scheme 
mainly relies on undistributed funds rather than on the increment from collection, the 
sustainability of the project is much in doubt. The undisbursed fund itself was a sign 
of the incapability of zakat management; so it is quite puzzling how the zakat council 
could ensure the success of this project without first improving its overall 
distribution function.  
The Islamization of the state through the zakat administration in general and 
income generation in particular, besides being illustrated by the strong 
encouragement it received from the government, could also be observed through 
institutional support. The establishment of the National Zakat Foundation (NZF) is 
practical evidence that the government is making a serious effort to achieve its goal. 
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The NZF, established in 1982, ha s been working towards rehabilitation of the 
indigent by aiding relevant existing institutions and setting up a new one.45 With an 
initial grant of Rs100 million from the Federal Government, the purpose of the 
Foundation is mainly to build vocational and technical training centres, and health 
and educational institutions, among other projects.46 The foundation could be seen as 
a supplementary institution for making zakat more effective with using general 
funds. At the same time, it could solve the fiqh problem of ownership. By the 
principle of zakat disbursal (according to Hanafis in particular), the fund could only 
be given to individuals and its utilization to meet the costs of institutional 
establishment is thus prohibited. We will discuss about it shortly.  
Discussing the NZF, Gail Richardson stated that 40% of overall government 
allocation went on the establishment of training institutions. However, it was also 
stated in the same article that only marketable skill programs, such as sewing, 
carpentry and candle making, had been introduced. Although the idea is good, the 
effect of the NZF remains insignificant due to lack of advertisement and 
management weaknesses, among other reasons.47 Apart from that, the inception and 
role of the NZF were not fully understood by the community, who most of the time 
were confused and suspected that the fund was taken from the zakat.48 The NZF also 
lacked close contact with other government agencies, and so could not effectively 
market the availability of the fund to prospective applicants; hence, it is basically less 
exposed and does not function well.49 
Provincial governments have to a certain extent further contributed to the 
proliferation of zakat disbursement for income generation initiatives. Provincial 
authorities are always aware of the huge number of young poor people who need 
training and capital to enable them to be successfully employed. Therefore, the 
technical and vocational training program supported by zakat funds has been in 
operation since as early as 1998. Punjab is a notable province that has been strongly 
supporting over a hundred vocational training institutes through the autonomous 
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corporate body the Punjab Vocational Training Council (PVTC). The realization of 
this initiative was facilitated by the Punjab Vocational Training Council Act of 1998, 
with the vital mission of alleviating poverty, through zakat and the private sector, by 
enhancing the employability of disadvantaged youth.50  
Through this initiative, prospective students eligible for zakat funds could 
bring their zakat certificates to any local vocational training institute, which on 
behalf of each student would directly approach the district zakat committee for 
confirmation and withdraw the zakat funds. In 2006, f or example, each student 
received $36 per month out of which $8 was for personal stipends and $28 for the 
course fee. On top of that, at the end of the course a trainee would be given an 
additional $85 with which to buy necessary tools and equipment.51 As we understand 
the working of the initiative, it is akin to distribution for poor eligible students of 
other branches of knowledge. The difference lies only in the extra funds given on 
completion of the course to enable students to launch their potential income 
generation projects.  
Until 2008 there were 145 Vocational Training Institutions under the Punjab 
Vocational Training Council, with a track record of 25,000 students passing.52 There 
have also been rather encouraging records of accomplishment, as a s tudy revealed 
that almost 80% of the more than a thousand graduates accounted for have managed 
to secure employment in various sectors.53 In general, the PVTC project seems to 
have been fruitful and to have had a good impact on many poor youth in the locality. 
The main question, whether such a mechanism could be expanded to the older 
productive poor, has yet to be answered. Support for youth could undeniably provide 
them with a better future without necessarily relying on t echnical and vocational 
skills. In this context, it was also fortunate to have vocational institutions which 
willingly (but of course not for free) offered their services to zakat recipients. The 
provincial zakat council must indeed seriously consider how such a mechanism could 
benefit a broader range of zakat recipients.  
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Up to this point of discussion, it is clear that the Pakistan government has 
formed a rather sophisticated organizational structure to collect and disburse zakat. 
Similar to that of collection part, government through its top leaders has shown an 
active role to ensure their project will be successfully undergone. In this context, as 
earlier stated, the president himself selected the first man responsible for the whole 
project. In other occasion, the Chairman of Senate also involved in announcing 
improvement in zakat disbursement. As meant to improve the distribution, 
government has initiated the zakat dispersal for income generation and later 
established NZF to help zakat administration more smoothly functional. As we will 
see shortly the NZF is to certain extent help government to solve legal problems. Of 
all, as we have seen through the establishment of zakat institution in Pakistan in 
general, we could briefly say that state has demonstrated a top down model of 
Islamization in realizing its aim to reform in economics through zakat.  
4.2.2 Limited ijtihad in Pakistan  
Apart from improving the zakat system by introducing new means of 
disbursement, the Islamization process in the zakat institution also involves the 
process by which the government of Pakistan overcomes the limitations of classical 
fiqh requirements: in other words, how to deal with the traditional view which, in 
certain ways, hinders the zakat from being utilized for generating income. It is worth 
noting that among the problems of the distribution through income generation are the 
issue of al-tamlik (ownership) and also the maximum amount could be received by 
an individual recipients. Such issues are pertinent to be clarified as income 
generation will involve the bigger amount as compared to the direct disbursement. 
The fund also will not necessarily given to the recipient in the form of tangible asset, 
but in certain cases will involve services such as provision of training courses and 
other intangible contribution.  
As far as the issues are concerned, the Hanafi school of law in particular 
upheld most strictly. As the Hanafi is the predominant school of law for the majority 
Sunni sect in Pakistan, for such an initiative to be widely offered obviously presents 
a challenge. Perhaps we should first delineate the issues in classical Hanafi 
perspective before going further on what Pakistan scholars have said about it. 
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 The principle of al-tamlik has been substantially discussed in any classical 
writings about zakat.  Al-tamlik means the transfer of individual ownership rights of 
the zakat from payer or his representatives to the recipients which is validated by the 
Lawmaker except where there is a constraint.54 In a normal situation, the zakat is 
transmitted to the beneficiaries in person, so that they possess full right and 
ownership over it. Consequently, the beneficiaries can dispose of the zakat as they 
wish without any outside interference. This can be deduced from the word “ita’” 
(give) in a number of Quranic versus such as (2:43) 55 and (2:110).56 
 Apart from that, the majority of jurists agree that the condition of ownership 
transfer could also be understood from the usage of “lam al-tamlik” as it is considered 
as a preposition to signify the transfer of right in verse (9:60) which prescribed the 
eight designated recipients.57In this aspect, Hanafis hold that perfect ownership must 
be observed all the time and extended to all of the designated recipients. Perfect 
ownership is also considered an essential element (rukn) to ascertain the validity of 
zakat distribution58 whereby it is  only satisfactorily observed when the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
1. Full entitlement must be granted with perfect personal freedom to use the 
disbursed wealth without any restriction. Accordingly, the disbursements 
such as building a mosque, providing food for the poor, paying debt of the 
deceased and freeing slaves are not permitted. The Hanafis however approve 
as a s ubterfuge, any expenditure made by the recipients for the above 
purposes provided the right has been initially conferred.59  
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58 al-Kasani, Bada’i Sana’i, v 2, 39.  
59 Ibn ‘Abidin, Radd al-Mukhtar,v3, 171; al-Kasani, Bada’i Sana’i, v2, 39. 
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2. The fund can only dispersed tangibly. Hence, paying zakat in the form of 
intangible benefits, such as giving the right to reside in a house is invalid, as 
Hanafis do not consider such a benefit as a wealth.60 
3. The recipients must be legally sensible (a’qil) and have capacity to possess 
the wealth (ahl al-tamalluk). As a result, the insane, underage, deceased and 
slaves are not eligible for the zakat proceeds.61  
4. Previous owner of the wealth should not, in anyway, involve in the fund 
spending. Thus, the transfer from father to his children is void as the former 
might still have power on the wealth utilization.62  
 It is however worth noting that the classical scholars have also discussed 
about the situation where the perfect al-tamlik might not necessary prevail. Other 
mahdhab apart from Hanafi are rather lenient in this matter. Referring to the 
distribution verse (9:60), instead of the usage of the preposition “li”, the other half of 
the recipients have been mentioned using the preposition “fi”. The different 
preposition used for the second group namely slaves, debtors, those in the way of 
God and wayfarers signifies the difference in how the zakat should be distributed to 
them. 
 In this case, the Hanbalis and the Shafi’is divide the recipients into two, with 
the former comprising the first four groups where physical wealth must be handed 
over personally. The “lam” prefix of the first four groups connotes an absolute 
transfer of ownership since it involves personal recipients who can own the wealth.63 
Malikis in this regard, however include the wayfarer in the first four groups.64 The 
distribution of zakat differs for the latter four groups of recipients where the “fi” al-
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zarfiyya denotes that the ownership is restricted for specific purposes only.65 In this 
case, the wealth is not actually for their personal consumption but to be paid to 
someone else, thus the recipients merely act as a keeper for the real owner (ahzan 
mura’an).66 For example the wealth given to the debtor is actually not meant for him 
but to pay the lender which in turn will indirectly benefit the debtor. The jurists 
further assert that should there be any excess after settling the debt, the recipient 
should then return it to the collector. A similar condition applies to the other groups 
such as the slaves as they must return the money if the objective of the disbursement 
failed to be achieved.67  
 Apart from the issue of ownership, the idea of zakat for income generation, as 
briefly aforementioned, is indeed to certain extent related to maximum eligible 
amount could be received by a recipients. This issue actually deeply rooted from the 
broader question of whether or not an able-bodied person is entitled to accept zakat 
fund.  The majority of scholars opine that zakat must not be spent for a rich person or 
a person capable of working whose income would be adequate for personal and 
family needs.68 This is based on the prophet’s saying: “Alms are unlawful (both) for 
him who is materially self sufficient and for him who is mentally and physically fit 
(and able to find work)”.69 
  In this context, Hanafis apply simple property tests based on the ownership of 
nisab (minimum amount liable to zakat) to determine wealth. They consider wealth 
as owning a nisab value of property above an individual’s need, either the property is 
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subject to zakat or not. That is the reason why zakat is only taxable upon those who 
have more than a nisab value or equivalent of five awsuq (measurement of volume) 
of grain, five camels or awaqi of silver (200 dirhams). On the other hand, having less 
than that is considered poor and hence eligible to receive zakat.70 Shah Waliy allah 
al-Dihlawi, an 18th century Hanafi scholar for example, in rationalising the nisab as a 
poverty line, observes that the raison d’entre is that, in the time of the prophet, five 
awsuq was sufficient to last a family of three for a year.71  
 As having the amount of nisab is considered sufficient or rich, any 
distribution of zakat to each person must therefore be less than nisab value.72 The 
Hanafis recommend that the poor should receive enough zakat to relieve them of the 
need to beg for only one day. They disapprove of giving property to a poor person 
that is equivalent to or more than nisab value since the ownership of property above 
that level may obligate the owner to pay instead of receive zakat.73 This is consistent 
with their view of prohibiting the same individual to be both a payer and recipient at 
the same time.74  
For the other madhhab, the state of rich is not measured by nisab but based 
on personal economic sufficiency. In this regard, they applied means testing. The 
Shafi’is, for example, opine that a person is considered rich when he can meet the 
expenses of his lifestyle, including food, clothing and shelter.  Such a person is said 
to possess a “sufficiency” (kifaya).75 According to al-Shafi’i, the founder of Shafi’i 
madhhab, someone could only be considered rich when he has ample wealth where 
their loss in earnings does not affect their wealthy state or when he has stable 
earnings.76Unlike Hanafi scholars which limit the entitled recipients to receive no 
more than nisab value, Shafi’is do not  have such a limit. They suggest that the 
amount of zakat fund given should be substantial enough to remove them from the 
                                                          
70 Shams al-Din al-Sarakhshi, al-Mabsut, v3 (Beirut: Dar al-Ma’rifa, n.d), 4; Kamal al-Din 
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahid Ibn Humam, Sharh Fath al-Qadir, v2 (Egypt: Maktaba wa Matba’a 
Mustafa al-Halabi, 1970), 266. 
71 Shah Waliy allah al-Dihlawi, Hujjat allah al-Baligha, v2 ( Beirut: Dar al-Jil: 2005), 66; Saud, 
Contemporary Zakat, 75. 
72 Ibn Humam, Sharh Fath al-Qadir, 303. 
73 Ibn Humam, Sharh Fath al-Qadir, 303-306; Ibn ‘Abidin, Radd al-Mukhtar, 303. 
74 Ibn Humam, Sharh Fath al-Qadir, v2, 283. 
75 al-Nawawi, Kitab al-Majmu’, v6, 172. 
76 Al-Shafi’i, al-Umm, v3, 189 
105 
 
poverty permanently (ma tahsilu bihi al-kifaya ‘ala al-dawam) without specific 
limit.77  
 The Hanbalis and Malikis also have a similar definition of wealth and 
sufficiency as that of the Shafi’is,78 The different between them might regard to the 
length of the period where a r ecipient should be helped. They however, look to 
sufficiency for a year, where any zakat distribution may only suffice an individual’s 
need for a period of one year.79  
Based on the above discussion, it appeared that classical opinions in Hanafi, 
unlike other schools of law, are not in favour to any attempt to disperse the fund 
exceeding the limit and without complete personal ownership. Such opinions, could 
potentially discourage income generation initiative through zakat. Hence, as we find 
shortly, scholars and government alike in Pakistan have introduced solutions for the 
issues.     
Looking back to the modern Pakistan, the overall zakat system is closely 
supervised by the CZC and the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), the highest 
authority pertaining to legal ruling in the state. The CZC will normally only adopt a 
certain policy if it is in line with the CII stand.80 As the majority of the population 
belongs to the Hanafi sect, it is not surprising that traditional Hanafi scholars have 
been dominant members of the CII who ultimately use Hanafi fiqh as a m ain 
reference.81 In this regard, Muhammad Ikram Khan clearly mentioned in his paper 
on zakat that among the objectives of including religious scholars in zakat councils is 
to ensure that the practice will conform to traditionally sourced Hanafi fiqh to the 
greatest possible extent. Only in the case of a situation not covered by the source, 
according to him, will ijtihad then be employed.82 
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The general view that the al-tamlik principle must be observed at all times is 
widely shared by Pakistani scholars. Khan also clearly emphasized that the principle 
is among the main elements under the control of distribution, so that the fund could 
not be spent on bui ldings, roads and other infrastructure.83 This view is in fact not 
only that of the CZC or CII but is also held by others. Outside these bodies, Taqi 
Uthmani, for example, has been among those holding strictly to the al-tamlik 
principle. As a notable scholar internationally, he was also a judge of the Federal 
Shariah Court and Shari’a Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan during 
the Zia ul Haq government. Although he agreed that the poor should be helped to be 
productive, the way zakat is distributed must be fully in accord with the principle. 
That is why he also rejected the use of zakat for building facilities and suggested that 
funds for that purpose should be allotted from other sources.84 Al-Mawdudi, perhaps 
one of those who were quite lenient regarding the issue of al-tamlik, earlier explained 
that he was affirmative towards the broader use of zakat for productive purposes.85 
However, since he died before the official zakat administration was launched, it 
seems that all his fundamental ijtihad has not been put into practice. 
In order to overcome the fiqh limitation, as earlier mentioned, the government 
prefers to make a structural modification. Government helps the zakat institution 
through the NZF whereby training and other welfare institutions could be legally set 
up. Provincial government also extensively supports training programs, using their 
own allocation. In short, the al-tamlik principle in many ways has been observed by 
using other sources to top up zakat funds, with government, in this regard, being the 
biggest contributor.   
There are a few small modifications that could, however, still be found in the 
Pakistan zakat practice. It is an interesting point to note about the distribution of 
zakat, especially for rehabilitation, is that under the strict Hanafis view, as 
aforementioned, the distributed fund must be less than nisab, which is not necessarily 
the case.  In the early 1980s for example, the disbursement reportedly amounted to 
Rs 5000, whereas the then nisab limit was only around Rs 2000-Rs 3000. After 2001, 
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under the newer rehabilitation system the limit is much higher – up to Rs 35,000 as 
compared to the nisab limit which is for example only around Rs 15,000 in 2009.86 
Hence from the practice, we could clearly see that the zakat institution has  made a 
slight modification in this area. Having the fact that the organization could not do 
without blessing from the scholars, we could suggest that the modern Pakistan 
scholars have turn to affirmative in this aspect.   
In the collection procedure, the deduction at source is also a new means of 
zakat payment never mentioned in any classical sources. It seems also that savings 
accounts and certificates safeguarded by the bank are currently included within the 
doctrine of apparent assets, a new interpretation based on the modern perspective. 
This is because Hanafis are of the view that only apparent assets are subject to 
compulsory collection by the government. 87 This, however, will not be discussed 
here, as the collection mechanism is not part of the focus of this study.  
From the above discussion pertaining to the ijtihad in Pakistan, we can 
observe that the process is similar to the overall administration mechanism which 
features strong central control. The decision regarding zakat is mainly under the 
purview of the CZC and CII. As they are close to the highest authority, the approach 
of using government support, as in the establishment of the NZF, seems to promise 
easier realization.  
Although we cannot see many changes, especially regarding income 
generation, we cannot simply say that most of the ‘ulama in Pakistan hold strictly to 
the traditional rulings of the Hanafi school of law, themselves resisting any bold 
change. The problem with this type of top-down approach is that the policy and 
decision maker is too far from the real problem, the masses of recipients, and cannot 
see directly how the distribution has been operating and what related problems have 
arisen. When many problems and anomalies cannot be clearly seen from above, how 
can the policy makers begin their investigation and process of reasoning?  
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Another possibility in such a situation is perhaps to consider it from a 
political angle. It is difficult to make a considerable change in fiqh, which is widely 
accepted by the majority, when in fact society is suspicious about how zakat is 
handled in Pakistan. In this case, any departure from traditional fiqh will be directly 
seen as the government fabricating religious obligations in accordance with its 
political aims.  
4.2.3 Performance and achievement  
 After three decades in operation, the overall zakat distribution has only 
managed to minimally help the recipients. Shirazi’s appraisal, for example, provides 
a broad view of Pakistan’s zakat. Using the economic census and caloric intake 
studies, he concluded that zakat has increased the caloric intake of the lowest income 
group and reduced the poverty gap by 2-3%.88 Grace Clark, in a 1999 s tudy, also 
found that zakat had contributed only modestly to the betterment of the poor 
beneficiaries. The majority of the fund still goes into the monthly stipend, with only 
about 4% going into rehabilitation. Although training has been made available, many 
of the recipients still do not receive it so that the funds distributed may not be put to 
effective use. There are also other major problems such as bureaucracy and 
mismanagement. For example, Clark noted one ironical case where, despite the 
widespread belief that the zakat fund was far from sufficient, there was at the time a 
large undistributed stock of sewing machines in the North-West Frontier Province 
awaiting CZC permission to disburse them.89  
The Pakistan Socio-Economic Survey 2000/2001 also indicated that zakat 
could be  ut ilized by only a fraction of Pakistani society, in which, out of seven 
million poor households, fewer than one-tenth received zakat from LZCs.90 Of these 
beneficiaries, the majority received the monthly allowance, amounting to 0.72 
million households. Although the study has proven that the distribution reached the 
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target of the lowest income group, there are still leakages of the fund due to 
favouritism and mismanagement.91  
Savera Hayat and Iqbal M. Khan, through their basic research in 2006, 
however, have shown that the impact of the training and income generation program 
is rather encouraging. The study, which incorporates eight VTIs in Punjab, found that 
the employability of the youth is significantly high, 78% percent of graduates being 
employed.92 The study also provides examples of graduates who are able to employ 
other new graduates.93 As mentioned earlier, this is the area which Pakistan’s zakat 
program should further develop and give more attention to, alongside other measures 
to ensure the wider expansion of such a mechanism.  
After decades of implementation, it seemed that the Pakistan state 
Islamization model of zakat was very much reliant on the personal commitment of 
the then head of government, Zia ul Haq. Subsequent leaders, however, did not share 
the same dream. The golden age of zakat, according to Clark, could only be observed 
during the first 15 years when the government was very careful in its management. 
Mismanagement of the fund has been frequently reported with no c onclusive 
rectifying steps having been taken by the government so far.94 Nawaz Sharif, the 
later president, introduced his own brand name welfare body, Baitulmal, within 
which the NZF was absorbed.95 The zakat management at one time had even been 
surrendered to the Financial Ministry before being handed back to the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs in 1997.96 The collected fund also has been neglected and left 
undistributed for a period (1996-1997) without clear explanation.97 Such a situation 
not only shows clearly the ambivalence of government in managing the fund, but is 
also in clear contradiction with the sacred rulings, in total contrast to its predecessor. 
These are among the reasons why zakat still does not play an important role in 
poverty alleviation in Pakistan even after almost three decades since its launch. With 
the lack of commitment of the current government, it remains unclear whether or not 
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zakat can contribute to the betterment of society, let alone help the government to 
achieve a full Islamic state. As an ideologically inspired programme aimed at 
establishing a true Islamic society, it seems that the top-down approach, the intended 
impact of which is for the society to become more Islamic, is still hardly followed.98 
In sum, the Islamization of the zakat institution in Pakistan is a model of the 
Islamization of the state, whereby the state has extensively used its apparatus to meet 
its target of improving the people’s economic condition through an Islamic 
instrument. The enhancement of the zakat institution, including the income 
generation initiative, could therefore be seen as part of a government  agenda for 
building an “Islamic state” which is hoped could finally succeed in pleasing people.  
 When Zia come to power, he promised to hold elections after a few months, 
but apparently failed to do so. He then turned to Islamization project, an endeavour 
which can be easily understood as a means of gaining support from society. Hence, it 
can be safely argued that that is why, as we have seen, the government made 
concessions to ensure the successful implementation of the project.  
  Indeed, the government to a cer tain extent succeeded in forming a 
centralized zakat administration system. Despite the strong commitment from the 
top, the community did not seem very supportive in helping the government’s aim to 
make zakat as a successful part of economic reform become reality. The problem of 
commitment from below might perhaps only be rectified through greater focus on 
publicity and on-going education.  
 
4.3  Indonesia – Islamization of Society  
 Although Indonesia is the most populated Muslim nation in the world, Islam 
has never been constitutionally declared a s tate religion.99 Historically, the nation 
was established after the demise of Japanese rule in 1945 and was earlier under 
Dutch colonial government from 1602 until 1942. The Indonesian government has 
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consistently kept itself detached from any religious inclination.100 Accordingly, the 
government, from the time of its first president, Sukarno, has chosen to set Islam 
aside and install its own national philosophical foundation, pancasila, which derives 
from the nationalism of the republic.101   
 Indeed there was an endeavour by Muslims leaders when the nation was 
about to be established (1945), to add an Islamic element into the pancasila. There 
was an agreement made in a m eeting in Jakarta, which has since been popularly 
known as Jakarta Charter.  In the meeting, the first principle of pancasila has been 
modified, changing it from “Belief in God” to “Belief in God with the obligation to 
carry out Islamic shari’a for its adherents”. The agreement however, was finally 
nullified because secular nationalist leaders including the selected first president to 
be, believed that the Christians who resided in eastern parts of the country would not 
join the republic should Islam be fused with the state.102   
 Soekarno (president from 1945 t o 1966), took a stance against the west, 
mainly Britain and the US, and appeared generally inclined towards the communist 
ideologies supported by China and Russia. In 1957 however, he introduced a guided 
democracy in which power of the government was mainly concentrated on 
himself.103 With this level of power and backed by the army, he sturdily suppressed 
religious dissention by disbanding religious parties and jailing scholars. In this way, 
Masyumi, a Muslims’ party, was dissolved in 1960 with many of its leaders being 
jailed.104 Under the screen of such oppression, the Islamization phenomenon in 
Indonesia during the era of Soekarno was something not clearly observed.  
 Soekarno handed over power to Suharto when he was no l onger able to 
control the situation; his communist sympathizing presidential guards had murdered 
a number of high military officers in 1965. Suharto subsequently took control of the 
army and assumed power, eventually putting the full blame for events on t he 
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communist party, leading to a massacre of its members. 105  A calm and peaceful 
situation in Indonesia only returned in around 1968. Unlike previous eras of conflict, 
poor economy and political instability due to a communist threat, economic 
development also took an upturn in the 1970s, especially with the aid from west. 
 In the earliest days of Suharto’s assumption of power, there were several 
attempts made by Muslim leaders to change the government attitudes towards Islam. 
For example in 1968, i n a parliamentary meeting, a number of religious leaders 
suggested reintroducing the amended version of the first principle of pancasila 
agreed upon i n the Jakarta Charter.106 It appears that the attempt was however 
rejected by the members of parliament. Throughout his time in power, the second 
president, also from a military background, generally continued the policy of steering 
clear of religion and religious issues (although he was not necessarily against it).  
 Unlike in Pakistan, where Islamization is strongly encouraged by the 
government, in Indonesia it is not always welcomed. Since the attempt to Islamize 
the state through politics failed, Islamization in Indonesia is commonly associated 
with attempts to Islamize society, mainly through propagation and community 
services. It is also associated with a subtle change in society which has slowly taken 
place without any signs of a revolution.  
 For example, scholars and leaders since the 1970s, have been trying to come 
up with a way to implement Islam in secular modern Indonesia. Some of them finally 
considered that an Islamic state was no longer a p riority and was not necessarily 
needed in order to implement Islam.107 Consequently, society and Muslim masses 
has established charitable and social services organizations to take care their interest 
such as Islamic schools and zakat and charity bodies. It was through this type of 
Islamization that zakat administration and income generation in Indonesia appears to 
have been commonly introduced.   
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4.3.1 Zakat administration and income generation in Indonesia 
 Because of the neutral stance of the government, zakat has generally been left 
to the community to collect and discharge. Even after independence, the ruling 
government restrained the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA)108 from interfering 
in community zakat administration. The role of MORA, established during the Dutch 
rule, is mainly to guarantee people’s freedom to practise their beliefs, regardless of 
their religion.109 Hence, as far as zakat is concerned, what MORA needed to do, in 
the eyes of the government, was only encourage people to observe their obligation to 
discharge what was due, and to ensure that the disbursement is in accordance with 
Islamic principles.110 
 Several occasions have marked the positive development of zakat 
institutionalization, from as early as the beginning of the second president’s term at 
the end of the 1960s. This came as part of the national phenomenon of Islamic 
resurgence, during which society was increasingly concerned to improve the 
management and utilization of zakat.111  
 As mentioned above, there were attempts by religious leaders to revive the 
Jakarta Charter between 1966 and 1968, but these failed. This however, did not stop 
them making further attempts. Some scholars in 1968 were of the view that before 
the Jakarta Charter could be revived, the state should actively promote adherents to 
be better observed. Mohd Dahlan, who was then Minister of MORA, and Saleh 
Suaidy, a religious scholar in Jakarta believed that the first step of the zakat should 
be administered by state.112 MORA eventually issued a Ministerial Decree in July 
1968, concerning the foundation of a  B adan Amil Zakat (zakat agency) and the 
formation of a Baitulmal (Bayt al-mal or the Islamic Treasury), which would be 
responsible for managing zakat. 
 Although this effort was quite inconsistent with the government’s overall 
stance, it was not surprising, since MORA at that time had leanings towards the 
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Nahdatul Ulama, a Muslim organization (which sometimes opposed government 
policies) of which Mohd Dahlan himself was an ex-president of the organization.113 
Furthermore, since the government was still in transition, the president did not have 
strong grip over the minister’s selection. 
 It is worth noting that in September 1968, and perhaps supporting the MORA 
effort, eleven religious scholars of Jakarta issued an appeal to the new president, 
reminding him of the importance of zakat in hastening the process of development. 
They asked the president to urge Islamic adherents to comply with their religious 
obligations and to advise governors of all provinces to take the initiative in 
coordinating the collection and distribution of zakat.114 
 Eventually in his speech during the Prophet’s Ascension celebration in 
October 1968, S oeharto advised people to comply with their religious duty by 
stressing its religious and social importance. He declared his willingness as a private 
citizen to take charge of a n ational collection.115 He then assigned his military 
officers to make all necessary preparations for a n ationwide collection. He also 
suggested that all provincial governments set up their own systems of collection.116 
The fund was then to be credited to his account and then disbursed personally. 117The 
first governor to take such an initiative was Ali Sadikin, who established Badan Amil 
Zakat dan Sedekah (Zakat and Charity Collection Body or BAZIS) Jakarta, a semi-
governmental zakat agency, in December 1968. Many other BAZIS offices were 
established later, for example, in East Kalimantan (1972) and West Sumatra (1973). 
 The president’s undertaking to administer the fund in a personal capacity, 
despite his power to make it official and compulsory through legal and government 
regulation, was rather puzzling. His motive, however, can be explained by the 
subsequent effect of his actions. As a d irect consequence of the president’s 
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announcement, the decree earlier issued by MORA had to be annulled to give way to 
the new project.118  
 This collection system, however, could only be sustained until 1974, w hen 
Soeharto officially withdrew from duty, which according to him this was because of 
the lack of collection.119 It is ironic however, despite his statement that the collection 
from zakat was too small, that later, in 1982, he created a foundation which levied 
charitable contributions (not zakat) from public servants (deducted directly from 
their salaries) with which he successfully built hundreds of mosques all over the 
country.120 This, he could have done with zakat, but he was reluctant; therefore, we 
could safely conjecture that Soeharto’s act of introducing the collection and disbursal 
of zakat in his personal capacity as a Muslim could be seen as an intentional move to 
maintain the government’s neutral policy towards zakat.121   
  Although the president’s personal effort thwarted the direct influence of 
MORA on zakat management, to a cer tain extent it had the effect of raising many 
people’s awareness of the need to devise a better and more proper method of 
administering zakat. It also provided a first-hand example of the possibility of 
national collection in Indonesia through a personal project. The president has also 
indirectly inspired governors and higher officials at the provincial level to set up their 
own institutions for the benefit of local inhabitants.  
 When the president stopped his fund collection project in 1974, the existing 
BAZIS were left without a strong foothold since their main function was to help 
president to collect zakat fund. Since then they have had to struggle to remain in 
existence, relying totally on local support.122 By then it w as clear that the 
government was not keen to help and should the process of enhancement be 
continued it must be from a societal level.  
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 This dampening development, however, did not obstruct the enhancement of 
zakat in the country. With support from society, the zakat organizations continually 
flourished all over Indonesia. In the 1970s and 80s many BAZIS organizations were 
established such as in West Java (1974), South Kalimantan (1974), South Sumatra 
(1975), Lampung (1975), Irian Jaya (1978) and North Sulawesi (1985).123 It should 
also be observed that, although the body was initially set up by government officials, 
the overall cost of the operation is still mainly financed by the collection. In this 
respect, local government only uses the existing apparatus to tap the zakat from 
society for the utilization of the local community, usually based on their respective 
contacts with local government.124 The BAZIS must also survive and compete with 
other local non-governmental organizations. For example, BAZIS Sulawesi in the 
1980s had to compete with more than 100 existing local personal agents or agencies 
scattered throughout its province.125  
 In view of the lack of support from federal government, combined with the 
voluntary nature of contributions from society, it seems safe to suggest that the 
formation of BAZIS cannot be considered a top-down government initiative. It rather 
represents both driving forces, namely, strong support from society through non-
governmental organization, plus awareness of it by the highest officials in authority, 
perhaps typifying middle-class society. Although some provincial government 
officials were undeniably involved in the formation of the zakat bodies, their effort 
was not formally recognized by the government. Furthermore, no zakat regulatory 
regime or system was introduced, showing that the government, especially after the 
withdrawal of the president’s collection effort in 1974, no longer had any interest in 
the fund. Indeed, the act of collection by the president in a merely individual capacity 
rather than as head of government (1968-1974), together with the government’s 
unconcerned attitude towards the fund afterwards, can be seen as an indirect means 
of distancing the government from the direct practice of zakat.   
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 Ultimately, local populations and society as a whole have continually 
supported the management of zakat through non-governmental zakat bodies. In this 
respect, BAZIS agencies have used zakat for their administrative costs, like any other 
private collectors and unlike fully sponsored organizations which would expect to be 
financed by the government. Eventually, the Muslim masses have made greater effort 
towards and had a more direct impact on the development of zakat, showing that the 
process of Islamization from below has been clearly more operative than the top-
down force of government. 
 Besides the establishment of semi-autonomous organizations, there were also 
an increase in discussions, seminars, surveys and personal experiments pertaining to 
the zakat administration. Among the central themes discussed were jurisprudence 
governing zakat, structural organization and the potential role of zakat in community 
development.126 
  A seminar held in Jakarta in 1975 f or example, surveyed the opinion of 
scholars and intellectuals concerning zakat.  It was found that the majority of 
respondents considered zakat not only as a religious obligation but more as ‘ibada 
ijtima’iyya (a religious social obligation). To ensure that the fund would benefit 
Muslim society, they therefore preferred it to be managed by an efficient 
organization set up for the purpose, ideally a national Baitulmal (national treasury) or 
zakat agency. Apart from that, the respondents chose to use zakat for productive 
rather than consumptive purposes.127 
 Another workshop organized in Jakarta later in 1981 clearly demonstrated the 
Indonesian scholars’ position on t he duty against a background of modern 
circumstances. In this seminar, they adopted a clear legal stance according to which 
zakat is a dogmatic regulation to be rationally deliberated upon. From this 
perspective, ijtihad is much needed when addressing a matter not clearly settled in 
the Quran and hadith.128    
 In a similar vein, a seminar held in 1986 by a pesantren (Indonesian religious 
boarding school) coordinated body reached a commonly held conclusion. Rooted in 
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the spirit of ijtihad, the most urgent task, according to the participating scholars, was 
to formulate a zakat system taking changing social realities into consideration but 
without abandoning the spiritual value of zakat as religious act. Accordingly, the 
goal of zakat was to transform recipients into payers. They also believed that the 
traditional practice of distributing zakat merely for consumption must be reviewed 
and the focus placed on productive purposes. Zakat was thus seen as an integral part 
of development programs.129  
 There was also a survey held by TEMPO, an Indonesian magazine in 1988, to 
find what Muslims think about zakat. According to the survey, the majority of 
respondents (which possibly its readers) were of the opinion that the government 
should involve in the fund management. Since zakat is seen as a means of eradicating 
poverty, the majority (43%) thought that zakat should be used for productive 
purposes. Only 25% believed that the traditional disbursement (to the mosques, 
orphans, etc.) should be continued.130   
  Through these seminars and surveys, it was clearly seen that scholars and also 
general Muslims during this era tried to associate the duty with economic 
development. It was suggested that zakat could be used as community development 
mechanism which in many cases, as earlier considered, income generation was 
among the ideas commonly proposed. As the effort from the president has ended in 
1974, and the seminars and surveys only appeared after that, it could be understood 
that the government had no influence on it.  
 In the regard of zakat disbursement for income generation, there were a 
number of experiments begun in the 1980s. For example early in the decade, a 
professor of economics and influential Islamic scholar, carried out an experiment by 
distributing zakat, collected by himself, to fishermen and street vendors in his 
locality. The distribution was in the form of borrowed capital, enabling them to start 
small-scale income-generating activities. After a f ew years he found that the 
distributed capital failed to help fishermen, but that the program was very successful 
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with the street vendors. Unlike the fund lent to the fishermen, which was left never 
repaid, the fund borrowed by street vendors was fully repaid.131   
 Another case was reported in Gontor, in the eastern part of Java Island, in 
which the Pesantren of Gontor (Islamic Boarding School of Gontor) established by 
Kiai H. Zarkashi used zakat money to set up a  women’s cooperative. The impetus 
behind this measure was the fact that the huge number of students, up to 3000, with 
monthly expenditure of up t o Rp 75 m illion, could potentially profit by such a 
business enterprise. The pesantren, which had a close relationship with the local 
people, also used some portion of zakat money collected from former graduates 
throughout the country to finance several cottage industries for the assistance of the 
local poor.132  
 Similarly, BAZIS Jakarta disbursed capital support amounting to Rp 90.4 
million in the form of loans, which comprised so-called productive funds for no 
fewer than 1700 be neficiaries in 1980/81. This program, however, was not very 
successful, with the number of recipients declining to 174 beneficiaries in 1984/85, 
and the distributed fund only amounting to Rp 54.2 million. The shortfall was due to 
unpaid loans, despite the initial intention that the fund should be a self-generating 
one that was expected to grow.133 The BAZIS Jakarta later identified other factors 
contributing to the failure of the program, such as a lack of proper planning and of 
training and monitoring systems.134  
 As a response to the above problems, beginning in the fiscal year 1985/86 
BAZIS designed a new approach to the productive funds projects, giving top priority 
to successful beneficiaries and being highly selective in recruiting new candidates. In 
addition, the BAZIS channelled the fund collectively through other similar programs, 
in cooperation with various NGOs or the Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Social 
Institute of Self Reliance).135 
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 These developments in the zakat institution in Indonesia during the 1970s and 
1980s signified considerable change in the way zakat was perceived and practised. 
As is clearly shown, the change was sparked by several initiatives started by 
members of society, promising the continued existence of zakat organization 
although the government had stopped its commitment. The practice of zakat during 
this era was to a certain extent directed to achieving its objective of eradicating 
poverty in society. In this context, the zakat fund had been managed creatively and 
experimented in income generation.  
 Towards the end of the 1980s, zakat agencies in Indonesia were continually 
growing. A national seminar organized in 1986 encouraged the formation of 
privately based zakat organizations and was then highly endorsed by Majlis Ulama 
Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars). Such an endorsement led to the 
emergence of zakat agencies sponsored by private companies such as the Bontang 
LNG Company, Pertamina, and Muslim community organizations including Dompet 
Dhuafa Republika, Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat and Yayasan Dana Sosial Al-Falah. 
By then the zakat agencies in Indonesia could be easily segregated into two major 
groups, Badan Amil Zakat (BAZ) for semi-government agencies and Lembaga Amil 
Zalat (LAZ) for non-state sponsored zakat agencies.136  
 The establishment of many non-government organizations managing zakat 
funds in the country suggests that the societal effort initiated were gradually fruitful. 
The proliferation of agencies in later years led to greater pressure on the government 
to take more serious steps concerning zakat administration. Due to the nonexistence 
of a national agency in the country, in 1997 e leven BAZ and LAZ cooperatively 
formed the Forum of Zakat (FOZ). The FOZ played an important role in 
coordinating efforts, disseminating information and being consulted on various 
problems pertaining to zakat. In 1999 m ore than 150 or ganizations throughout the 
country joined the FOZ.137 
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 The most remarkable contribution of the FOZ was as a force for the 
formulation of zakat law in Indonesia. The zakat law was considered important for a 
number of reasons, among which was the need to increase the zakat collection in the 
country through greater levels of Muslim participation and religiosity. A higher zakat 
collection would enable the fund to be used for poverty eradication and social 
welfare. Another objective was to provide the legal foundation for a zakat agency in 
Indonesia and to establish such a national agency.138 
 It is worth mentioning that since the demise of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has 
become a fully democratic nation and Islamization of society has taken on a n ew 
momentum. This is not to say that the government has become more Islamic. For a 
government in which has been under a secular constitution and kept away from 
religion for more than 50 years, changing this stance would not be easy. Unlike 
under the previous regime, the effort to bring legal draft or to discuss religious 
matters, however, became possible.  
 Finally in 1999, after cooperating with MORA, the government approved a 
zakat bill.139After lengthy deliberation by the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(Parliamentary meeting), however, the approved law seemed to be merely a guideline 
on zakat management, with its collection remaining voluntary in nature. The 
government was very careful not to include any words which could be seen as an 
attempt to make zakat obligatory, thus demonstrating that the government had no 
intention of forcing its payment.140 In 2001, following the passing of the law, Badan 
Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS) was formed as a n ational zakat collector, 
considered an umbrella to all zakat organizations. So far the formation was, however, 
similar to that of other zakat organizations, its job being to collect and disburse the 
fund rather than act as the parent zakat organization, in contrast to its earlier 
envisioned role.141  
 With the formation of zakat agencies constantly growing, the income 
generation programs have been continued by many organizations. Bazis Aceh, for 
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example, offered income generation after a decision made during its 1997 workshop 
that the agency would place a greater focus on t hat than on c onsumptive 
disbursement. Bazis, through its Baitul Qirad program, gives recipients capital for 
income generation.142 Apart from that, it collaborated with the Bank Pengkreditan 
Rakyat Syariah (BPRS), a credit institution managing financial aid and loans for 
income generation. In this connection, Bazis channelled its collected fund to BPRS, 
who then distributed it to potential recipients, each of whom normally received 
between Rp 1,000,000 to Rp 2,000,000 in the form of a revolving capital loan. The 
BPRS also closely monitored the recipients’ performance.143 From the period of 
1997 through 1999, Bazis, via Baitul Qirad and BPRS, spent approximately Rp 
25,000,000. Although the initiative could be considered an early step for an agency 
employing such a mechanism, it was still small compared to what had been spent on 
other programs.144   
 Many similar programs have been offered by non-governmental zakat 
agencies. Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (Justice Post of Muslim Care or PKPU), for 
example, has introduced several programs such as integrated animal, fish and 
chicken husbandry and micro enterprises including a special program enabling street 
sweeper communities to start small businesses.145 It was officially established as an 
independent foundation in December 1999 and received permission to collect zakat 
in 2001. A s a zakat institution, PKPU has collected zakat and other charitable 
donations nationally and also has agencies located in many other countries.146   
 Supardi, in his article, has briefly evaluated Kelompok Swadaya Mustahik 
Mandiri, the program through which PKPU gave zakat funds to street sweepers as 
business capital. Through this program, established in August 2004, each individual 
beneficiary was given business loans ranging from Rp 200,000 to Rp 400,000. They 
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were also provided with training during biweekly meetings. Although the program 
has been running for many years, its effectiveness is still questionable. 147 Based on 
Supardi’s basic research, many problems have been indicated which hinder its 
effectiveness, such as insufficient loans and ineffective training and monitoring 
systems.148 In addition, the PKPU, according to Supardi, was not transparent to the 
academic communities, any attempt to evaluate such a program being usually 
unwelcome.149 This is why he did not offer any specific findings regarding the extent 
to which the program has achieved its objectives, but only briefly suggested that, 
although the program provides an opportunity to give the recipients extra income, it 
is still far from successful in turning the recipients into payers.150  
 Dompet Dhuafa Republika (DD) is another private agency, which has 
collected zakat since 1993. It was set up b y a group of journalists from the 
Indonesian magazine Republika to help unfortunates in the country.151 The agency is 
one of the leading organizations that helped to establish the Forum of Zakat.152 As 
regards income generation, the DD since 2000 has promoted the initiative through its 
autonomous agency Masyarakat Mandiri (MM). Supported mainly by DD 
contributions, MM has offered many programs of income generation. Covering more 
than 12 provincials all over Indonesia, MM and its partners, including many private 
companies, have individually or cooperatively offered entrepreneurial programs to 
empower the poor and needy.153 In 2010 a lone, MM spent more than Rs 3 trillion 
(approximately 350,000 USD), drawn mainly from DD, for more than 15 types of 
income generation program. In rural areas, the focus has been on programs such as 
agriculture and farming, while in urban areas, MM concentrates on small businesses, 
with the aid given to the poor being extended to unemployed youth.154  
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 Besides the above-mentioned agencies, modern pesantren based zakat 
agencies have also been active in distributing zakat for income generation. Dompet 
Peduli Ummat Daarut Tauhiid (DPU-DT), an agency under the modern pesantren 
Daarut Tauhiid, has been one of the national LAZ since 2000.155 Since 2002, DPU-
DT has focused on i ncome generation programs, which have received the greatest 
portion of its zakat disbursement.156 Its main program, Misykat, is a microfinance 
initiative, giving revolving capital from the zakat fund to any poor people who might 
become involved in various economic activities, including small-scale trade, 
farming, cottage industries, and many others.157 The distribution is also accompanied 
by technical and advisory assistance. In 2010, of what had been collected from zakat, 
it appeared that the Misykat program received a considerable portion, more than Rp 
800 million, although the DPU-DT runs almost 20 ot her programs for poor and 
needy alone. This large apportionment could indicate the agency’s aspirations for the 
direction of zakat disbursement.158  
 It is difficult to determine how well income generation programs have 
performed throughout the country; specific research into that question is needed. As 
the purpose of this section is to understand the direction of the process by which the 
role of zakat has been extended, it suffices to suggest that in many ways the direction 
is from below. The large number of zakat bodies has led the organization to do 
whatever is required to suit local needs, depending on the availability of the fund.  
 Up to this point, we could conclude that zakat management in Indonesia and 
its development have been much influenced by the societal initiative. The 
government role in the development and administration of zakat was comparatively 
limited. Islamic scholars and local intellectuals play a significant role by constantly 
propagating the masses and suggesting the better use of zakat through seminars and 
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personal experiments. Income generation through zakat in this case has been the 
societal initiative to use zakat as a local level development approach for poverty 
eradication.  
4.3.2 New ijtihad for income generation through zakat   
 As mentioned above, Indonesian scholars have warmly welcomed the 
utilization of zakat for productive purposes and development in general.  The 
positive attitude towards the initiative was evident when a number of scholars 
approached Soeharto in 1968 a nd suggested that zakat be associated with national 
development. In addition, Indonesian scholars, despite differences in doctrinal and 
ideological orientation, seem mostly to adopt a moderate stance. In an opinion survey 
of religious scholars and intellectuals regarding zakat, conducted in Jakarta in 1975, 
the respondents preferred to use zakat for productive rather than consumptive 
purposes. Since they view zakat as an ‘ibada ijtima’iyya (religious social obligation), 
the practice must accord with current needs, in relation to which zakat, as a dogmatic 
regulation, should be rationally considered by means of ijtihad, in any aspect 
regarding which no clear discussion is found in the Quran and hadith.159   
 From the views of the majority of scholars, it can be clearly discerned that 
Indonesia, unlike Pakistan, does not hold strongly to the classical view of madhhab. 
In making their decision, amidst the stance of being freely open to any potential 
suggestion from modern scholars, the classical opinion from Shafi’i, as the most 
popular mahdhab in the country is still taken into consideration.  
 Perhaps we could briefly survey the classical opinion of Shafi’is regarding 
zakat distribution for income generation. As mentioned in the previous case, the 
majority of classical scholars including Shafi’is opine that zakat must not be spent on 
a rich person. 160 
Slightly critical in their explanation, some Shafi’i scholars such as al-Shirazi 
and al-Nawawi, however consider that an able-bodied person who does not have a 
stable income due to unemployment or loss of trade could be given zakat to help 
them recover. The recipients, in this case, are not considered rich. Al-Nawawi 
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considers that a person is only rich when he can meet the expenses of his lifestyle, 
including food, clothing and shelter to which he and his dependants are accustomed 
from his lawful property distributed over the average lifetime or from his lawful 
earnings.161 On top of that, al- Nawawi also says in his commentary on the al-
Shirazi’s work:  
A craftsman would be given an amount sufficient to buy tools and 
equipment that allow him to work and gain his sustenance. This 
certainly differs according to time, country and ability of the individual 
concerned. Some of our colleagues give examples that a person who 
sells vegetables might be given five or ten dirhams, while a person 
whose profession is selling jewels might be granted ten thousand 
dirhams (translated)…162 
In sum, the classical Shafi’i scholars appeared to have no objection to the effort to 
disperse zakat fund for productive purposes.  
 The affirmative view in the madhhab has to a cer tain extent induced 
Indonesian scholars to suggest income generation. For example, Indonesian Council 
of Muslim Scholars in February 1982 pr oduced a ruling on z akat for productive 
activities such as giving the poor necessities for trading and agricultural activities. In 
this case, the council based their opinion to the classical Shafi’i jurists namely al- 
Nawawi and al-Bayjuri who, as mentioned above, suggested the use of zakat for 
productive purposes. 163 
 Furthermore, Nahdatul Ulama, at its 28th general meeting in November 1989, 
approved the productive use of zakat. It is worth mentioning that the organization 
which is among the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia is popularly known as 
a strong Shafi’i follower. In making the decision, the meeting referred not only to the 
classical but also modern views of zakat. As for the classical, similar to the Council 
of Muslim Scholars, al- Nawawi’s view has been based upon. The organization also 
based their decision on the modern scholar, namely Yusuf al-Qardawi through his 
popular book Kitab al-Zakah. Al-Qardawi in this case, was also cited by the meeting, 
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and was of the opinion that zakat could be used for productive initiatives such as 
developing business and factories for poor. The meeting however reminded members 
that all of the initiatives must be carefully planned and clearly informed of the 
recipients. Basing also to the al- Nawawi’s opinion, such initiatives must be carried 
out with the recipients’ full agreement.164  
 Although the affirmative fatwa by Nahdatul Ulama was unsurprising since 
the majority of classical Shafi’i scholars are in favour of the disbursement, the fact 
that Nahdatul Ulama itself has moved away from the principle of taqlid (imitation) to 
the employment of ijtihad is evident. This is perhaps why, as we will see later, they 
also affirm the use of zakat for other community interests such as building mosques 
and schools, despite the negative view of the majority of classical jurists. The shift 
was further confirmed by the official decision of its 1992 National Conference, held 
in Lampung, that ijtihad was the recognized methodology of Nahdatul Ulama.165    
 As briefly shown through the above fatwa and meetings, we can see that apart 
from the influence of classical Shafi’is, it is also clear that modern opinion also has 
been incorporated into the Indonesian legal decision. Indeed, modernist thinking has 
indeed been entrenched in the society. Such an inclination towards a modern view is 
actually something not uncommon in Indonesia. The country houses the modernist 
organization, Muhammadiyya, which is among the largest Islamic organizations, 
with 28 million members nationally. The organization was founded in early 20th 
century as a religiously motivated social and educational organization and has been 
issuing religious rulings for its members.166The income generation through zakat is 
something that is clearly encouraged by this organization. The case of productive 
project in Pesantren of Gontor earlier reported for example is among the project 
could be possibly linked to this organization.  
 It is worth briefly explaining how religious rulings are arrived at in Indonesia. 
Indonesia does not have an official mufti (expounder of Islamic law) who acts as 
highest interpreter of the law. The way a fatwa (religious ruling) is issued is 
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normally through discussion and collective decision-making incorporating many 
Islamic organizations, particularly Indonesian Council of ‘Ulama, Nahdatul Ulama 
and Muhammadiyah. Each organization also has hundreds of branches throughout 
the country which do no t necessarily agree with each decision made by the parent 
organization. They could vary along with other branches or organizations instead.167 
Without a state mufti and active involvement from the state apparatus, the fatwa in 
Indonesia is usually various and voluntarily followed without powers of 
enforcement.   
 A more recent discussion concerning the opinion of religious scholars in 
Aceh also indicated that, according to the majority, the distribution must be based on 
productivity and development. Nazarudin A. Wahid in 1999, he ld brief interviews 
with a number of ‘ulama in Aceh, including religious scholars from pesantren and 
lecturers from local universities, pertaining to zakat practice in Aceh.168 The majority 
of the interviewees had no obj ection to distribution for productive purposes. 
Religious scholars from pesantren unanimously agreed that distribution for income 
generation is better in circumstances in which consumptive needs have been 
completely fulfilled. They refer to classical opinions which confer approval on the 
use of zakat to help the recipients acquire tools and other necessities of their 
professions.169  
 This view was shared by a number of academicians from local universities in 
Aceh who, besides being in favour of productive distribution, suggested that the 
initiative should be combined with continuous monitoring and appropriate skill 
development.170 Apart from the suggestion as to how the distribution should be 
improved, no obj ection by the academicians regarding the practice of BAZIS was 
reported by Wahid.  
 From what we can observe, the religious scholars from pesantren normally 
confined their opinions to the classical literature, as a result of which they sometimes 
found it quite difficult to accept all new practices. One example given by Wahid is a 
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small variation in the pesantren scholars’ opinions. Regarding the use of loans for 
the distribution, a scholar was reported as stating clearly that this was not acceptable 
because of ownership principle was not fully observed. According to the respondent, 
the zakat agency accordingly has no right to take back funds once they have reached 
the recipients.171   
 Regarding this, it is worth mentioning again the discussion about the 
principle of ownership in classical literature. As mentioned in the case of Pakistan, 
the majority of classical scholars are indeed concerned over the fulfilment of the 
ownership principle. In this case, Hanafi is found to be the strictest madhhab as the 
principle must be observed all the time by all recipients. The Shafi’i , together with 
other madhhabs namely Hanbali and Maliki on the other hand, are of the opinion that 
perfect ownership might not prevail all the time. As could be referred to the 
distribution verse (9:60), it is clear that instead of the usage of the preposition “li” for 
some eligible recipients, the other half of the recipients have been mentioned using 
the preposition “fi”. The different preposition used for the second group of 
beneficiaries, namely slaves, debtors, those in the way of God and wayfarers, 
signifies that the principle might not necessary applied to them.  
 If we look carefully into the discussion, all the madhhabs including the 
Shafi’i s however did not exempt the poor and needy from the ownership principle 
(proposition “li” is used for them). In this context, the utilization of zakat as a loan 
for the poor is something clearly contradicted by the classical requirement even from 
the Shafi’i point of view as they will not have complete ownership due to the need to 
return the fund received to the zakat body.    
 The negative opinion of the zakat loan, as expressed by this pesantren 
scholar, was, however, not widely shared by the others. Such a mechanism has been 
widely used in Indonesia as early as the 1980s, Abdullah personally citing it as the 
most important innovation in zakat administration during that period.172 Despite the 
mechanism’s extensive implementation by various agencies, no s pecific fatwa 
against it has ever been produced, particularly by popular religious organizations. It 
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seems that the method is generally acceptable within the broad concept of productive 
disbursement.  
 Nevertheless, the issue has been discussed by individual ‘ulama. For 
example, Didin Hafidhudin, a local scholar and also BAZNAS president, has briefly 
dealt with this issue. According to him, the zakat fund is better spent on as many 
recipients as possible. On that principle, in the event that the fund is limited, it could 
be loaned so as to be utilized by more recipients.173 In a seminar on zakat in June 
2003, he further clarified the issue to the effect that, although the fund is only lent to 
the recipients, it is legally owned by them and no longer belongs to the zakat body or 
the payer. He added that the distributed fund in this regard does not, however, belong 
to a specific poor individual, but instead is collectively owned by many recipients. 
Thus, the earlier recipients should return the money to be utilized afterwards by the 
rest.174 Given the clear argument of Hafidhuddin, it can perhaps be safely inferred 
that, in the view of Muslim Indonesia, a loan from zakat is acceptable on the grounds 
that it is perceived as an element of productive disbursement, with the fund being 
collectively owned by many rather than belonging to any specific individual.  
 From this brief discussion, it seems that the ownership issue has never been a 
serious problem in Indonesia, by contrast with Pakistan. It is normal practice in 
Indonesia that the disbursement of zakat is given to institutions and to build 
mosques, not necessarily given to individuals. The president himself, during the time 
when he was personally in charge of the collection and distribution (1968-1974), 
spent the greater part of the collection on welfare institutions and building mosques. 
Besides that, many mosques in Jakarta were also built mainly from zakat money.175  
 In fact such a distribution has been approved by Nahdatul Ulama and the 
Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars in their decision made respectively in 
1981and 1982. In both decisions, the organization has incorporated both classical and 
modern opinions in which zakat affirmatively can be used for society interest and 
welfare under the broad definition of in the way of Allah (fi sabil allah). After all, 
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Muslim scholars appeared to be flexible in determining the legal decision in 
accordance to their societal background and necessities.176  
Indeed, Muslims in Indonesia are free to hold plural opinions. If we found 
that Nahdatul Ulama lean more towards tradition, holding rather tightly to Madhhab, 
especially Shafi’i, while Muhammadiyah tend to be rather modern in their approach, 
there are also a number of scholars who go beyond the boundaries of both groups.  
These scholars endorsed logical reasoning in their thinking, which could lead to 
decisions far different from those of any other scholars, whether modern or classical. 
Since their mode of judgement is akin to that of the mu’tazila – a school 
of theology based on rationalism which flourished during the Abbasid era in 
Baghdad and Basra – writers normally refer to them as neo-muktazilites.177  
In Indonesia, these thinkers normally call themselves the golongan 
pembaharuan (reform faction). Harun Nasution, for example, claimed in the 1960s 
that it is not compulsory for Muslims to hold tightly to hadith. This is because he 
viewed the hadith as not having been collected or well documented during the life of 
the Prophet, but as merely relying on the memory of companions. He then suggested, 
as a logical consequence, that the lapse between the time of the Prophet and the time 
of its documentation had possibly compromised its authenticity. As a result, he 
eventually asserted that Muslims must only rely on the Quran and reject hadith as a 
credible source of law in Islam.178 In addition, Harun Nasution contended that 
Muslims should no longer believe in the qada’ and qadr (divine preordainment) – a 
principle of religion without which one’s faith could be open to serious doubt – as, 
according to him,  such a belief could result in Muslims being underdeveloped and 
backward.179   
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Another such figure is Nurcholis Madjid, an intellectual who has been an 
active proponent of modernization within Islam since the 1970s, following 
completion of his PhD in America. Some of his opinions can be considered 
controversial in Indonesia. In the early 1990s, for instance, he claimed that women 
do not have to cover their hair, as it is not considered a part that must be concealed. 
He regarded the jilbab (known as headscarf in Indonesia) as merely symbolic, having 
no religious significance.180 In the case of Muslim marriage, he also would allow 
religious intermarriage, with Muslims permitted to marry non-Muslims. Commenting 
on the fact that such a marriage is clearly prohibited in the Quran, he argued that the 
prohibition merely referred to the non-Muslims of the Prophet’s time and did not 
prohibit present-day Muslims from marrying non-Muslims.181 Besides this, he was 
averse to Muslims holding firmly to any madhhab, even daring to claim that 
madhhab was a factor in Muslim backwardness. In this context he bravely accused 
al-Shafi’i – as a founder of a madhhab – of contributing to the underdevelopment of 
fiqh when proposing his methodology of usul al-fiqh (the methodology of deducing 
religious rulings), since, according to Madjid, it limite d the use of personal 
reasoning.182 
 As far as zakat is concerned, here too some modifications have been 
suggested by the reform faction. Another controversial opinion related to zakat was 
advanced, also in the early 1990s, by Masdar F. Mas’udi, a scholar whose ideological 
inclinations resemble those of Madjid. He suggested replacing zakat with a secular 
tax. Mas’udi, in this respect, maintained that those who had paid state taxation 
(collected by government) were not obliged to pay zakat, since the tax paid was 
intended (diniatkan) as a zakat payment. He based his claim on the similar objectives 
of zakat and taxation, in that both are used for the welfare of society. If the taxation 
collected by the state can fulfil that objective, he argued, then let the state handle the 
collection.183 This opinion is indeed far removed from that of the majority of 
scholars in Indonesia. In 1988, for example, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 
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affirmed that zakat and tax were different duties, both of which Indonesian Muslims 
were obliged to pay. The reasoning underlying this view is that zakat is a religious 
duty mandated by God through the Quran and Sunnah, while tax is a duty established 
by the nation state.184   
 If scholars of this faction could go so far as to equalize zakat with tax, the use 
of the fund for generating income would pose no problem at all for them. That this is 
actually the case was proved when Nurcholis Madjid, described that the fund is a 
mechanism of reducing economic disparity in society and could also strengthen their 
productive effort, a view unsurprisingly parallel to that of the majority of other 
modern Indonesian scholars.185  
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that the opinions of the faction go 
well beyond the parameters of most scholars. These scholars, in presenting their 
opinions, use purely personal reasoning without referring to the Quran and Sunna, 
sometimes even going against clear stipulations of the Quran – as exemplified by 
Madjid’s view. In addition, the rulings are produced without systematically 
following the qawa’id al-fiqh (legal maxim, or the specified way of reaching a 
verdict). If the modern scholars, as discussed in an earlier chapter, such as Rashid 
Rida and Muhammad Abduh, merely urged reconsideration of rulings regarded as 
mu’amala, they could go further with their new rulings which include ‘ibada and 
‘aqida (theology). Although up t o now there has been no report that they have 
attracted a large number of followers, as compared to other popular Islamic 
organizations in Indonesia, they have plainly set a trend whereby logic exerts a key 
influence on religious opinion. 
In conclusion, throughout the section we could suggest that the 
institutionalization of zakat in Indonesia is mainly  bot tom-up process of 
Islamization, in which the steps have been dominated by local activists and scholars 
for the their community’s wellbeing. Amid the limited support from the government, 
especially throughout the era of the second president, non-government zakat 
institutions were established and continuously supported by local society. In the 
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democratic atmosphere following the Soeharto regime, the zakat agencies through 
FOZ have urged the government to be more proactively involved in zakat. With 
regard to collection, they call for strict regulations and making zakat payment 
obligatory so that the collected fund might be considerably increased.  
 As far as the zakat disbursement is concerned, productive disbursal is a 
process of improvement, by which zakat agencies with limited funds must do what is 
required to improve the community’s wellbeing. Income generation, therefore, can 
be seen as a manifestation of the Islamization process in society by which zakat is 
gradually incorporated within societal development and poverty eradication.  
 Indonesia’s voluntary zakat actually creates a huge space in which society 
can introduce better collection and distribution methods according to their needs and 
requirements. As such, it is up to the payers to submit their payment according to 
their beliefs and individual preferences. Accordingly, the zakat agencies must 
compete with each other to attract more payers through the “soft” approach of 
propagation. They must also go to great effort to improve their management and 
prove that they can help the masses through their disbursal mechanisms. This is the 
reason why, it is not uncommon to see a minuscule sum having to be shared among 
recipients through a revolving fund. In the end, only the most impressive, productive 
and efficient organization will prevail.  
 As far as legal discussion is concerned, Muslim in Indonesia do not strictly 
adhere to a particular school of law. Scholars have freely considered all potential 
opinions combining modern and classical according to the need of society. There are 
also group of scholars who hold on rationalism in their judgement.  Indonesian 
society also seems tolerant of various viewpoints, allowing people to choose any 
organization that suits their personal faith. At the same time, the agencies, to attract 
payment, can reciprocally adapt their mechanisms to the needs and requirements of 
the local society. Ultimately, society can determine its own means of collection and 
disbursement according to its own barometer, without the imposition of an 
exclusively accepted, standard definition of Islam.  
 Zakat law in Indonesia, after all, still does not require people to pay zakat but 
merely encourages them to pay to the zakat agencies rather than personally donating 
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to the beneficiaries.186 According to some researchers, the law has also not increased 
fund collection in Indonesia.187 It is difficult to judge where the process of 
Islamization will go and what it might possibly achieve. There is a long way to go to 
the completion of such a process, and its outcome also will depend on the current 
government’s decision whether to co-opt or resist it. 
 
4.4 Conclusion   
 The general improvement of zakat administration and, in particular, the 
introduction of income generation is an impact of the Islamization phenomenon in 
Muslim countries. The process of Islamization, can be sparked by government as 
well as society. In this case, both parties want to use zakat as a development tool 
beyond its original role as simply a personal religious duty.  
 As discussed in the chapter, Pakistan has actively instigated government 
Islamization in many aspects of governance including economics, law and education. 
In this aspect, the country has made a commitment to establish a “truly” Islamic 
state. As part of the Islamization policy introduced by the president Zia ul Haq, zakat 
was embraced by the government as part of its taxation system in which the 
government established centralized zakat management. Zakat since then has been 
compulsory for every Muslim with a minimum amount in their personal account 
from which the payment will be directly taken. The fund was intended to eradicate 
poverty in the country and income generation is among the efforts begun to improve 
the disbursement system.  
 Despite the strong pressure from above, the Pakistan zakat system it seems, 
does not always run smoothly as some Pakistani people are apparently not willing to 
pay. Consequently, the collection has not been very satisfactory, and this has 
hindered the achievement of more effective distribution.  
 As far as the legality is concerned, the section has further discussed the 
process of legal interpretation in Pakistan. As a state which holds tightly with Hanafi 
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madhhab, the scholars opined that the concept of ownership must be observed all the 
time, to a certain extent limiting the zakat from freely being disbursed for income 
generation. To resolve this legal problem, the state has introduced a mechanism in 
which the zakat has been supplemented by a state fund through the establishment of 
a zakat foundation. In all, the implementation of income generation through zakat in 
Pakistan is seen as a part of government effort in fulfilling its dream to establish an 
Islamic governance.  
 In the second part of the chapter, the Indonesian case displays the robust 
energy of an Islamization process issuing from society. In Indonesia, the society 
itself has initiated a fuller collection of zakat after their efforts to persuade the 
government to improve the fund administration was unfruitful. The country, and at 
times even the president himself, while persuading people to pay their due, has still 
tried to keep the administration of the zakat free from government influence or 
coercion. The collection and distribution of zakat in the country has been based on 
societal initiatives without a strong commitment from the government. Zakat 
organizations therefore compete with each other in order to survive as they are more 
than enough in number. The distribution and collection mechanisms, including the 
implementation of income generation programs, depend on t he creativity and 
commitment of local institutions. After all, although there has been a slight change in 
government attitude towards zakat since the demise of the authoritarian president at 
the end of 20th century, the nature of the fund is still voluntary.   
 Unlike in Pakistan, in Indonesia, judicial issues have not seemed to hinder the 
implementation, since interpretation has rested with local scholars who are free to 
make decisions on the basis of local interest. There is no single official interpretation 
of law in this country. Such a freedom in interpretation is unsurprising since the state 
has a neutral attitude towards religion. Looking at the pattern of Islamization in the 
country, the introduction of income generation is a societal initiative which 
eventually challenge the government’s stance towards religion.  
 Based on the two cases, it is clear that both types of Islamization offer their 
own advantages and challenges. Each approach to Islamization has in a way shaped 
the distribution and collection patterns as well as affecting the way religious rulings 
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are determined. In order to achieve an effective zakat management system, both 
“top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches should be concurrently in place. The 
government involvement needs to be planned and carefully implemented to reduce 
resistance from society. Coercive power by the government seems will be 
misperceived by society as merely political motivated. Society also needs to take 
part. Indonesian society for example has strived hard to ensure the fund is used for 
their benefit. In both cases the fund has played its role beyond religious duty, proving 






 ISLAMIZATION AND ZAKAT PRACTICE IN MALAYSIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Zakat has a s pecial place in Malaysian economics. Realizing its economic 
potential, the government has promoted an atmosphere increasingly conducive to the 
institution’s development. This chapter aims to discuss the development of zakat, 
featuring its enhanced role in the country’s economy. It is clear that the institution 
was initially a religious tradition, with the fund collected on behalf of particular 
rulers. The Islamization phenomenon, has led the government to become more 
accommodating towards Islam. By fostering greater awareness of religion, the 
phenomenon also impelled society and, later on, government to perceive zakat as a 
tool for resolving economic problems. Eventually, the zakat institution evolved to 
incorporate economic aims beyond its religious function. 
 This chapter comprises five sections altogether. In order to give a clear 
picture of how the Malaysian socio-political and economic system works, the first 
part of the chapter will deal with the overall background to the nation’s economy and 
form of government. Overall, Malaysia is a secular democratic country containing a 
multiracial community.  
  The next part discusses the dynamic of Islamization in the nation, a 
phenomenon which has taken place since the 1970s. In this period, there was a 
proliferation of religious movements and of Islamic awareness in society, creating a 
demand that the ruling government show more concern for Islam.  
As a reaction to the growth of Islamization among the people, the government 
increasingly favoured the religion by establishing Islamic institutions and co-opting 
religious leaders. It was not, however, the government’s intention to establish an 
Islamic state but rather, through Islamization in Malaysia, to improve the social and 
economic conditions of Muslims.   
 As we look into previous cases, we can see that Islamization in Malaysia has 
taken a slightly different form from that in Pakistan and Indonesia. Apart from the 
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Islamization pattern in the country being a mixture of social and governmental aims, 
Malaysia generally did not fulfil the demand of religious movements that the state 
become Islamic on the model of Pakistan. On the other hand, neither did the state 
follow Indonesia by totally rejecting all elements of religion in politics. Malaysia in 
this respect could perhaps be seen as accommodative secular state.  
In the third section, the development of the zakat institution in Malaysia will 
be elaborated on. Formed earlier in the twentieth century, as a result of the shrinking 
power of the Sultan, the zakat institution prior to the Islamization period was a 
merely religious one. After Islamization, society called for a better use of zakat. The 
institution acquired a broader perspective which encompassed development, as it was 
contended that the fund’s management, including the poverty eradication 
mechanism, needed improvement. Seeing potential in this tendency, the government 
introduced a better approach to administration which led to the inclusion of 
economic thinking in managing the fund. Gradually, the institution was absorbed into 
the broader economic development agenda, with the government, over time, 
stipulating the fund in its economic plans and recommending its use for eradicating 
poverty. 
Since zakat is compatible with the objective of poverty eradication, more 
effective disbursement was sought. The final section will elaborate on this aspect 
within the purview of income generation programs, which are among the means of 
zakat disbursement most regularly suggested by writers and academicians at 
numerous seminars. This section will give an overview of the practice in various 
states, including Selangor, which is the most advanced in this respect. Full 
deliberation on the practice of income generation as it r eflects the impact of 
Islamization in the state will, however, be presented in the next chapter.   
 This chapter throughout could fulfil objective three, by discussing the 
development of zakat and the implementation of income generation through the fund 
as a manifestation of the Islamization phenomenon in the country, thus showing how 
zakat interacts with features of its surrounding environment such as government and 
society. This chapter will also provide a brief picture of Malaysia before we 




5.2 A Brief Background of Malaysia  
Before venturing further into the main subject of the chapter, it will be 
helpful to outline the general socio-political and economic characteristics of 
Malaysia, as well as to provide some general facts about Islam and Malaysian 
Muslims. All this information is pertinent, as it gives us a glimpse of how the country 
has been systematically run.  
Geographically, Malaysia comprises 13 states from two major regions: the 
peninsular, which is made up of  eleven states (Selangor, Perak, Pahang, Johor, 
Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Kedah, Perlis, Terengganu, Kelantan and Pulau Pinang), 
and Borneo Island, consisting of Sarawak and Sabah. In addition, there are three 
areas within federal territory, namely Kuala Lumpur, the official capital city of the 
country; Putrajaya, the federal administrative city; and Labuan, the only federal 
territory located on Borneo Island.  
The Malaysian Federation establishes a system of government based on 
constitutional monarchy, federal structure and parliamentary democracy. The 
governmental system is closely modelled on the British Westminster inherited from 
British colonial rule.1 The legislative power is divided into federal and state 
legislatures. The federal legislative component comprises the two Houses of 
Parliament, namely, the House of Representatives and the Senate.2 At the state level, 
there is a State of Legislative Assembly (SLA).3 With a prime minister at the head at 
federal level and a chief minister at state level, the practice of regular, periodic and 
free elections has been maintained to sustain both Houses of Parliament and the 
SLAs and ultimately to appoint the prime minister.4  
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election. See http://www.parlimen.gov.my/dR-maklumatumum.htm (accessed 18 Feb 2010) 
3 Shafrudin Hashim, “Governance and Social Policy in Malaysia”, in Towards Asia’s Sustainable 
Development: The Role of Social Protection, ed. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (Paris: OECD, 2002), 74. 
4 “The Constitution of Malaysia”, Article 55 and 43, http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/ docs 
/malaysia.pdf (accessed 18 February 2010).  
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 Executive power in the country is held by the prime minister, chosen by 
election, upon the approval of Yang Dipertuan Agong (the supreme ruler), among 
those who, in his opinion, command a majority in Parliament. The United Malay 
National Organization (UMNO), a Malay ethnic based party, is the most dominant 
party in the parliament, from which all prime ministers have emerged. The current 
prime minister, Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak, who took office in 2009, is the sixth.5 
Malaysia is a multiracial country. Recent reports indicate that the Malaysian 
population has reached approximately 28.3 million, with an average annual 
population growth of around 2.1%. Ethnically, the primary division in Malaysia is 
between the majority indigenous Muslim Malays and minority non-Malay Chinese 
and Indians. The latter two races came to Malaysia mainly under British patronage to 
engage in the two predominant pre-modern industries, namely tin mining and rubber. 
While there were already some Chinese and Indian inhabitants in Malaya before 
British occupation, the mass migration only took place between the late nineteenth 
century and the 1930s.6 In addition to the aforementioned ethnic groups, there are 
many indigenous ethnicities, briefly categorized as Bumiputra (sons of soil). Their 
numbers, however, are only significant in the Borneo state of Sarawak and Sabah.7 
Details of the ethnic composition can be found in Table 5.1 below.  
Table 5.1: Malaysian Citizen Composition Based on Ethnicity (in percentages) 
State 
 
Malay Other Bumiputra Chinese Indian Others  
Perlis 85.94 0.33 9.51 1.23 2.99 
Kedah 77.63 0.25 13.58 6.74 1.85 
Pulau 
Pinang 
44.74 0.45 43.98 10.39 0.44 
Perak 54.88 2.58 29.66 12.53 0.4 
Selangor 54.96 1.67 28.5 13.79 1.09 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
44.57 1.1 42.1 10.88 1.36 
                                                 
5 For the composition of members of Parliament, please refer: http://www.parlimen.gov.my/dR-
statistik.htm, (accessed 18 February 2010). 
6 Anand, Inequality and Poverty in Malaysia,1-4; Roslan Abdul Hakim, “Income Distribution and The 
New Economic Policy in Malaysia”, Phd Thesis, University of Wales Bangor, 2001, 116. 
7 For discussion about Bumiputra, see Sharon Siddique and Leo Suryadinata, “Bumiputra and 






58.49 1.6 23.85 15.61 0.45 
Johor 57.16 1.41 33.61 7.17 0.65 
Pahang 72.96 5.28 16.2 4.75 0.82 
Terengganu 96.78 0.33 2.41 0.22 0.26 
Kelantan 94.61 0.85 3.32 0.25 0.98 
Sarawak 23.28 50.12 26.19 0.19 0.22 
Sabah 15.4 65.73 12.46 0.5 5.92 
Labuan  44.61 34.82 15.98 1.28 3.31 
Malaysia 55.1 11.9 24.34 7.35 1.3 
Source: Adapted from Basic Population Characteristics by Administrative Districts, Department of 
Statistics, Malaysia, 2009. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that Malaysia is a s ecular 
democratic multiracial country. The secular nature of the country is however not 
totally free from the influence of any religion. As Islam is the religion professed by 
the Malays, the nation’s majority ethnic group, the constitution gave a special 
position to the religion. The constitution briefly stipulated that Islam is an official 
religion in the country with a guarantee that other religions can also be freely 
adhered to without any restriction.8  
It is worth noting that the status given to Islam does not mean that 
independent Malaysia is a religious state. In this case, the Constitutional  
Commission reported in 1957 that the provision was merely intended to fulfil the 
ceremonial role such as reciting Islamic prayers at the opening or closing 
government functions.9 The commission also clearly reported that the stipulation 
“shall not imply that the state is not a s ecular state”.10 Apart from that, the 
government has also stressed the secular nature of the country. The first prime 
minister in 1960s for example has publicly said that Malaysia is a secular country 
and the status of Islam is merely the official religion of the state.11  
                                                 
8 “The Constitution of Malaysia”, Article no.3(1), http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/ 
malaysia.pdf (accessed 18 February 2010). 
9 Joseph M. Fernando, “The position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia”, Journal of South East 
Asian Studies, (37)( 2) (2006): 250; Norhashimah Yassin, “Islamisation or Malaynisation? A Study 
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University of Warwick, 1994, 82. 
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11 Yassin, “Islamisation or Malaynisation?”, 93. 
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Amid the clear declaration by the commission and also the government over 
the nature of the country, the existence of the statement has nevertheless created a 
space in which Islam can have an impact on t he nation. As we shall see in this 
chapter, the Islamization phenomenon has to a certain extent put pressure on the 
government, with Muslims and their movements, basing its cause on this statement, 
using the argument that government should do more to realize an Islamic state. The 
ruling government, on the other hand, was inclined to keep Islam with the position of 
the religion remaining as it is.12 As a result, the government over time has to promote 
its version of Islamization in which the government chose to strengthen Muslims 
economically rather than legally. Such an effort was undertaken on the understanding 
that the country’s Muslims are still, in that respect, disadvantaged compared to non-
Muslims. As we shall see in the coming sections, the nature of Malaysia’s ethnic 
composition and the status of Islam will be among important elements in shaping the 
Islamization pattern in the country.  
 
5.3 Economic Imbalance and the Role of Islam: The Dynamics of the 
Islamization Phenomenon in Malaysia 
It is a matter of fact that although, the Malays are strong in numbers, this is 
not the case when it comes to the economy, in which non-Malays dominate. The 
disparity between races, which was inherited from the era preceding Malaysian 
independence in 1957 and has prevailed since, finally led to political instability and 
racial rioting in 1969. Consequently, the Malaysian government, through its national 
economic policies, has over time initiated infrastructural features and institutions 
designed to empower Malays economically as they compete with other ethnic 
groups. 
Soon after the introduction of the New Economic Policy, around the early 
70s, the Malaysian social landscape concurrently showed a r emarkable change, 
featuring the proliferation of Muslim religious groups and leading to the gradual 
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strengthening of Islamic forces at the societal level. The phenomenon has caused the 
ruling government to react accordingly by introducing its version of Islamization.  
Hence, throughout this section, we can observe the process of Malaysian 
Islamization, which is associated with the empowerment of Muslims in response to 
racial economic competition. The pattern of embracing Islamic institutions in the 
sphere of Malaysian economic development is important for understanding the 
overall position of zakat in the country, the perusal of which will follow later.  
The earlier part of this section shows the economic situation in newly 
independent Malaysia, featuring the imbalance between races which ultimately led to 
the racial riots of 1969. The effect of the riots was that the government took firm 
steps to introduce affirmative policies favouring Malays.  
 The second part discusses the Islamization of society in the 1970s and 1980s, 
leading to religious awareness and the demand for a greater role of Islam in society. 
The change has exerted political force for the government to react by introducing 
official Islamization. This part will reveal what was actually meant by Islamization in 
the Malaysian context.  
 
5.3.1 Racial economic imbalance and government policies to empower the 
Malay Muslims 
The problems of poverty and economic development in Malaysia cannot be 
separated from the dynamics of the country’s racial composition. As mentioned 
earlier, British colonial policy in the early twentieth century attracted Chinese and 
Indian immigrants, arriving to work in the booming Malayan tin mining and rubber 
plantation industries. The British in this case provided many incentives for interested 
immigrants, such as free accommodation and an immigration fund.13 The proportion 
of Malays, originally 90% of the total population of the Malay states at the beginning 
of 1900, was drastically reduced to merely 45% by 1931.14 This circumstance led to 
                                                 
13 Firdaus Abdullah, “Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate 
Poverty”, Ethnic Studies Report, (15)(2) (1997), 149. 
14 Abdullah, “Affirmative Action”, 195; Ozay Mehmet, Development in Malaysia: Poverty, Wealth 
and Trusteeship (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 7; John H. Drabble, An Economic History of 
146 
 
the formation of a plural society which changed the overall Malaysian societal 
structure. 
As the mines were transformed into urban areas, the non-Malays were 
directly exposed to development and urbanization in their places of residence.15 The 
non-Malays, besides being actively involved in mining activities, were also active in 
business and trading as the main enterprises in urban areas. Since then, these 
economic activities have apparently been considered lucrative in the country. In the 
early 1930s, for example, respectively 80% and 90% of the tin mines and business 
proprietorships in Malaysia were already in the hands of non-Malays, especially 
Chinese.16 
The Malays, on the other hand, largely remained in rural areas, traditionally 
holding small parcels of land and working as farmers, fishermen and rubber 
tappers.17 These activities unfortunately were not as lucrative as business and mining, 
so that ultimately the Malays were economically worse off than the other, non-native 
races.   
Making the cleavage between races worse, a segregated geographical setting 
limited interracial communication in the pre-independence period, with the different 
races generally communicating only briefly, in the course of business or retail 
dealings.18 In 1957, for instance, only 11% of Malays lived in urban areas, by 
contrast with the 45% and 30% of Chinese and Indians respectively. This situation 
has led to racial segregation without mutual understanding, despite the fact that the 
races actually share the same country.  
The existing interracial society together with interracial economic imbalance 
prior to Malaysian independence in 1957 w as inherited by the post-independence 
government. Economically, the government after independence and in the 1960s 
focused on developmental growth, in the belief that the benefits of economic 
                                                                                                                                          
Malaysia, c.1800-1990, The Transition to Modern Economic Growth (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 
2000), 90. 
15 Abdullah, “Affirmative Action”, 196 
16 Leon Comber, 13 May 1969, A Historical Survey of Sino-Malay Relations (Singapore: Graham 
Brash (Pte) Ltd, 1983), 91. 
17 Drabble, An Economic History, 110; Mehmet, Development in Malaysia , 30-42; Hakim, “Income 
Distribution”, 116. 
18 Hakim, “Income Distribution”, 116. 
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progress would be shared equally by all races.19 This unfortunately was not to be the 
case, as it proved impossible to eliminate the disparity. The concentration of the 
different races in rural and urban areas in the period from independence to the end of 
the 1960s can be clearly seen in the following official statistics. 
Table 5.2: Population by Community Groups and Degree of Urbanization at 
1957 and 1970 
 1957  1970  
 Urban (%) Rural (%) Urban (%) Rural (%) 
Malays 11.2 88.8 14.9 85.1 
Chinese 44.7 55.3 47.4 52.6 
Indians 30.6 69.4 34.7 65.3 
Others 49.3 50.7 40.8 59.2 
Total 26.5 73.5 28.7 71.3 
Source: Government of Malaysia, Economic Report 1973-1974 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 
1973), 205, cited in  Fred R. von der Mehden, “Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income 
Distribution in Malaysia”, Asian Survey, (15)(3) (1975): 248. 
 
Besides that, measured by household income, ownership of companies and 
membership of registered professional bodies, it was also obvious that the non-
Malays were still better off.20 At a glance, the condition of the three races in 1970 
was as follows: 
          Table 5.3: Communal Economic Determinants in 1970 
Determinants 
 
Malay Chinese Indian 
Mean of Household Incomes 
(M$ per month) 
172 394 304 
Capital Ownership in Limited 
Companies (M$ million) 
49294 1064795 40983 
Membership of Registered 





Source: Modified from Firdaus Abdullah, “Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia”, 210-213.  
 
The poverty problem also could still be traced on a racial basis, with figures 
showing that 65% of Malays were still living in poverty. Table 5.4 gives the details: 
 
                                                 
19 Hakim, “Income Distribution”, 125. 
20 Abdullah, “Affirmative Action”, 198; R. S Milne, “The Politics of Malaysia’s New Economic 
Policy”, Pacific Affairs (49)( 2) (1976): 240-241. 
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Table 5.4: Peninsular Malaysia: Households in Poverty, 197021 










Malay 901.5 584.2 64.8 73.8 
Chinese 525.2 136.3 26.0 17.2 
Indian 160.5 62.9 39.2 7.9 
Others  18.8 8.4 44.8 1.1 
Total  1606.0 791.8 49.3 100.0 
All rural 1166.7 683.7 58.6 86.3 
All urban 439.3 108.1 24.6 13.7 
Sources: Government of Malaysia, Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980 (Kuala Lumpur: Government 
Printers, 1976); Abdullah, “Affirmative Action”, 212. 
 
Twelve years after independence, ethnic relations in the country became 
strained. Malays were strongly resentful of the fact that they had been swamped by 
immigrants, and there was further dissension over the way the government was 
handling the country’s economic and political situation. They ultimately called for a 
political agenda aimed more firmly at strengthening Malays. 22   
On the other hand, the non-Malays were concerned about their political 
under-representation, perceiving that too much power was being given to Malays, 
and feeling that they themselves should be given a more substantial voice in 
politics.23 In certain respects, they felt that the government agenda was weighted 
against them. For example, in the 1960s they rejected the Language Policy 
establishing Malay as the national language, which was a government plan to unite 
segmented groups in the country, but which they claimed was an agenda for 
                                                 
21 In Malaysia, poverty has been measured by poverty line income which is constructed from the basic 
cost of purchasing certain minimum necessities of life including foods, clothing, shelter, 
transportation, education and health care. The line has been occasionally revised. For example, in the 
1970s and 1990s, the government applied respectively $252.36 and $425.00 for a household Poverty 
Line. Muniappan Perumal, “New Budget Standard Poverty lines for Malaysia”, Review of Income and 
Wealth (38)(3) (1992): 347; Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Government Printers, 1971), 2; Prime Minister’s Department, Malaysia, “Malaysia: 30 Years 
of Poverty Reduction, Growth and Racial Harmony” Paper presented in Scaling Up Poverty 
Reduction: A Global Learning Process and Conference, Shanghai, 25-27 May 2004, 40.  
22 Abdullah, “Affirmative Action”, 197; Jomo K. Sundaram, “The New Economic Policy and 
Interethnic Relations in Malaysia”, Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme Paper Number 7, 
(Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2004), 2; Gordon P. Means, 
“Special Right as Strategy of Development: The Case of Malaysia” Comparative Politics, 
(5)(1)(1972): 55-56, 59. 
23 Abdullah, “Affirmative Action”, 197; Sundaram, “The New Economic Policy”, 2; Means, “Special 
Right”, 55-56, 59. 
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suppressing them culturally. Indeed, the main problem underlying the conflicting 
views was the mistrust between Malays and non-Malays.  
It was exacerbated by the approach of the 1969 general election. To show 
their feelings, the majority of those who had previously supported the government, 
gave their support to the opposition, with the result that the ruling Alliance Party won 
the poll with only a slim majority, giving the opposition for the first time a sense of 
rising popularity. As a tragic consequence, a racial riot broke out on May 13, 1969, 
due to an overheated victory celebration. The situation arose when opposition 
supporters, mainly non-Malays, celebrated their candidate’s victory by allegedly 
chanting racial slogans slandering Malays in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian capital city 
and telling them to move out of the city. The Malays, who were mainly UMNO 
members, responded negatively, leading to terrible clashes.  The riot, regarded as the 
most violent event in post-independence Malaysia, eventually claimed nearly 200 
lives, injured more than 500 people and led to 9000 arrests. The crisis went on 
intermittently for two months, culminating in a declaration of a state of emergency 
and an 18-month suspension of Parliament.24  
The tension was construed by the government as the product of mutual 
misunderstanding between races and the resentment felt by the majority over the 
economic disadvantage they suffered as natives. The government then initiated the 
New Economic Policy (NEP), encompassing four 5-year Malaysian plans from 1970 
to 1990, w hich affirmatively inclined the majority Malays towards the belief that 
political stability and national unity could only be attained if they received a fair 
share of the nation’s wealth.25  
  The NEP specified a target: namely, that by the end of 1990, poverty should 
be reduced by about 16% and Malays should hold a fair share of economic power. 
Specifically, 30% of the country’s wealth should belong to them.26 To achieve the 
policy’s objective, the government directed its resources towards areas and sectors 
                                                 
24 Yassin, “Islamisation or Malaynisation?”, 96. 
25 Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, 3; Prime Minister’s Department, 
Malaysia “Malaysia: 30 Years of Poverty Reduction”, 3. 
26 Sundaram, “The New Economic Policy”, 3; Milne, “The Politics of Malaysia’s New Economic 
Policy”, 238; Government of Malaysia, Second Outline Perspective Plan 1991-2000 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Government Printers, 1991), 75-76. 
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where Malays were generally concentrated, namely rural areas and the agricultural 
sector.  
 A few examples of agencies and bodies established to deliver the 
government’s policies may illustrate this point. In 1970, B ank Pertanian Malaysia 
(BPM) was established to provide agricultural loans and credit. Over ten years, BPM 
approved RM 642 million loans, mainly for paddy producers and the tobacco 
industry.27 The National Paddy and Rice Authority was established in 1971 t o 
oversee a Guaranteed Minimum Price System which supported farmers by buying 
the rice from them, licensing rice millers and managing buffer stocks.28 For land 
development and resettlement of rural communities, the Federal Land Development 
Community (FELDA), complemented by the Federal Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA), affecting a large-scale rural and new settlement 
area, was put into operation.29 Up to the end of the NEP period, it was reported that 
the overall budget for poverty eradication amounted to RM 32.9 billion, or 19.1% of 
total development expenditure.30  
In brief, it was generally observed that the NEP had brought about changes to 
the Malays’ living standards, to the extent that, by 1990, poverty incidence had been 
substantially reduced, to 17%. Many Malays moved to urban areas, an estimated 30 
percent migrating to the inner cities in the late 1970s alone, and became involved in 
more lucrative economic activities such as commerce and business. Their 
involvement in middle-class occupations such as administration and management 
also rose significantly, from 22.4% in 1970 to 31.3% in 1990.31  
It is not our intention to discuss in detail the implementation of the NEP. 
What is important here is that the nature of the policy and its implementation 
favourable to the native ethnic group who are also Muslims could be seen as a policy 
indirectly helping Islam. This situation gave the government an opportunity, as we 
                                                 
27 Mehmet, Development in Malaysia, 46-48. 
28 Mehmet, Development in Malaysia, 46-48. 
29 Mehmet, Development in Malaysia, 46-48. 
30 Prime Minister’s Department, “Malaysia: 30 Years of Poverty Reduction”, 22. 
31 Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia, 29; “Second Outline Perspective Plan 1991-2000”, 
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shall see, to use religion creatively as a medium for empowering Muslims. Such a 
step seemed pertinent in facing the challenge of the Islamization wave which began 
in the 1970s.  
 
5.3.2 Islamization of society and the Infusion of Islam into government policy 
 Since the 1970s, Malay Muslims in Malaysia, due to receiving better 
treatment economically from the government through the NEP, have themselves 
been experiencing some changes in their outlook. They have displayed changes in 
behaviour due to the religious revival, which also could be regarded as the 
Islamization of Muslim society in the country. A few trends can be noted in this 
respect: namely, the proliferation of religious propagation movements and the 
increase in religious awareness among the Muslim masses, as well as a stronger 
political challenge to the ruling government. Ultimately, they called on the 
government to be concerned about Islam. 
 As a result of the pressure from society, the government since the early 1980s 
has itself introduced Islamization programs to improve the condition of Muslims 
socially and economically. In this context, the government chose to establish 
financial and educational Islamic institutions as well as to embrace Islam in 
development policies. The process has gone on steadily through the later decades in 
which, zakat has been slowly incorporated into the broader program of national 
development. 
The coming parts will clarify the slow but steady process of change in society 
as well as government, at the same time describing the milestones in the state’s 
Islamization. The first parts will describe the Islamization of society in the 1970s, 
while the second parts will clarify the Malaysian government’s Islamization strategy. 
At the end, we shall see the growing role of Islam in the country.  
1. Islamization of society: the phenomenon following the 1969 riot  
 The proliferation of dakwah (missionary) groups is an observable feature of 
the Islamization of society in Malaysia since the 1970s. The emergence of the 
movement was mainly due to the awareness in society since the 1960s, especially 
among the youth at universities, of the need to make an active effort to persuade the 
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government to resolve Malays’ problems. Having introduced the NEP after 1969, the 
movements now turned its focus onto Islam.32  
 Indeed the educational and economic orientation adopted by the government 
since independence in 1957 had focused only on m aterial development, with 
educational policy mainly centred on secular education geared towards success in the 
national promotional examination. This orientation had resulted in the persistent 
neglect of Islamic instruction, with the result that Muslims were very much 
influenced by western culture as popularized by the entertainment media.33 Such a 
situation gave the movements an incentive to revive Islamic awareness in society.34 
 There were many Islamic movements in operation during this period, such as 
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM), 
Jamaat Tabligh and Darul Arqam. ABIM was established in 1971 by several alumni 
of the National Association of Malaysian Islamic Students (PKPIM), an active 
student movement of the 1960s which urged the government to help Malays socially 
and economically and launched student activities aimed at helping poor Malays.35 
With the introduction of the NEP, they shifted towards Islam, demanding that 
economic and social development be associated with the religion.36 Since the 1970s, 
ABIM has taken the struggle of the PKPIM into the wider world beyond the 
universities, while the latter merely gave support to the former by, for example, 
organizing training programs for university students.37 
In orientation, ABIM has been demanding a greater Islamic emphasis on the 
part of government, in order to promote the establishment of a fully-fledged Islamic 
State.38 ABIM has received considerable support mainly from youth in higher 
                                                 
32 Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia, Dakwah Among Students (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk 
Publication, 1987), 16-17. 
33 Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, “Islamic Resurgence in the Periphery: A Study of Political Islam in 
Contemporary Malaysia with Special Reference to the Darul Arqam Movement”, Phd thesis, 
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1998, 102; Judith Nagata, “Islamic Revival and the Problem of 
Legitimacy Among Rural Religious Elites in Malaysia”, Man. (17)(1) (1982): 48. 
34 Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, 16-17. 
35 Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, 16; Judith Nagata, “Religious Ideology and Social Change: The Islamic 
Revival in Malaysia”, Pacific Affairs (53)(3) (1980): 424. 
36 Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, 16. 
37 Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, 17; Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam, Modern 
Religious Radicals and Their Roots (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984), 61 
38 Jomo K.Sundaram and Ahmad Shabery Cheek, “The Politics of Malaysia’s Islamic Resurgence” 
Third World Quarterly, (10)(2) (1988): 846. 
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institutions with whom it has strong relations and shared aspirations. In 1977 it was 
reported to have 20,000 members, rising to 35,000 in the mid-1980s.39  
Another movement which actively called for a return to Islam was Darul 
Arqam, established in the earlier 1970s.40 Perhaps due to its founder being a former 
member of ABIM, Darul Arqam has a similar orientation to ABIM’s, that of eagerly 
attempting to solve the nation’s problem through Islam. However, it was rather 
different from ABIM, where the movement appeared to be more apolitical. Arqam 
chose to set up pr ivate communities in many places, in which followers tended to 
adopt a certain standard of attire, resembling those of the era of the Prophet 
Muhammad.41  
Arqam also promoted economic self-sufficiency. In the 1970s the movement 
began to produce goods and services which specifically fulfilled Muslims’ needs in 
regard to dietary religious rules, in the belief that Muslims should be independent of 
non-Muslim producers. Overall, Arqam intended to create a model of the “truly 
Islamic society”, from which vantage point it aimed to Islamize the larger 
community nationally or internationally and finally to restore the Islamic caliphate.  
Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s membership grew from under 100 to 
6000.42 
The Jamaat Tabligh is another well-known group in Malaysia. The movement, 
considered pietistic in nature, was founded in Delhi by Muhammad Ilyas, a Deoband 
alumnus in 1926, and began to be introduced in Malaysia in the 1950s.43 It was 
initially followed by few Indian Muslims and could only attract Malay followers 
after 1970s. The movement has preferred to work at community level, focusing on 
reviving personal understanding of religion, and displaying no i nterest in political 
activities. In this aspect, members have emulated the practice of their Indian 
forebears by travelling in specially dispatched missionary groups. Making local 
mosques their makeshift headquarters, a group of missionaries would give lectures 
                                                 
39Sundaram and Cheek, “The Politics”, 845; Nagata, “Religious Ideology”,423. 
40 For detail account on Darul Arqam, refer: Hamid, “Islamic Resurgence”, 146-163;  Anwar, Islamic 
Revivalism, 36. 
41 Bakar, “Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia”, 1049. 
42 Hamid, “Islamic Resurgence”, 162 
43 Peter Mandaville, “Transnational Islam in Asia”, 11; Hamid, “Islamic Resurgence”, 186. 
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after the daily prayer assembly and visit local Muslims on a  door-to-door basis to 
convey the essentials of the faith and invite them to daily prayers in the nearest 
mosque.44  
Although politically, Tabligh since its formation has not so far posed as strong 
a challenge to the government, its influence on the religious awareness of the masses 
cannot be denied. The movement has been consistent in its efforts to persuade 
Muslims to fulfill their personal religious obligations such as daily prayer and 
payment of zakat, besides having been apparently successful in inspiring Muslims to 
visit local mosques regularly.  
In sum, the introduction of the NEP has to an extent led to the proliferation of 
religious movements. This however is not all there is to say about the process of 
Islamization of society in the 1970s. Apart from the movement’s active operation, 
the attraction was to a certain degree the product of socio-economic change during 
the decade. 
 It is interesting to note that the NEP brought about a continuing process of 
national modernization and rural-urban migration, presenting a new challenge for 
Muslims. In the late 1970s, for example, approximately 30 percent of Malays had 
migrated to inner cities, with some results that they were not actually ready to face. 
Traditional and communal solidarity, previously part of the culture, suddenly faded 
from their lives. Individualism and the atomized family characterized the city 
lifestyle. The nature of urban occupations has become such that an individual’s 
public personality often contradicts his or her private self, leaving a spiritual vacuum 
within.45 In the rediscovery of their identities, many Muslims eventually found 
personal redemption in the Islamic emphasis on communal solidarity and the mutual 
camaraderie promoted by Islamic movements.46 
 The situations in which Muslims were eventually attracted to a return to 
Islam did not merely arise in local settings, but also among those who studied 
                                                 
44 Ahmad Fauzi bin Abdul Hamid, “Transnational Islam in Malaysia” in Transnational Islam in South 
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abroad. It is worth noting that the government, since the introduction of the NEP, has 
sent thousands of Malay students annually to international universities, for example, 
in the United Kingdom and the United States. It involved a quite considerable 
number of students; according to one report, in early 1980s there were already 
18,000 students studying abroad.47  
 During the students’ academic sojourn, they acquired Islamic knowledge and 
shared it with their international Muslim cohorts. They were also exposed to the then 
active international Islamic student movements such as FOSIS (Federation of Islamic 
Student Societies), the Malaysian Islamic Study Group and the Islamic 
Representative Council, in which they went on to show their support for any Islamic 
cause, including the movements they joined on returning to Malaysia.48 These 
students, along with new urban dwellers, have thus been the agents and catalysts of a 
more widespread religious awareness in broader Muslim society. 
As a cl ear manifestation of the above-noted proliferation of religious 
movements, coupled with the substantial response of the masses to the religious call, 
Malaysians in the late 1970s, by contrast with the early days of independence, were 
remarkable for their highly visible Islamic consciousness, providing extensive 
evidence of a new devoutness.49 It was widely observed that more and more Muslims 
returned to mosques and surau (prayer houses).50 Friday prayers, religious lectures 
and other events are now frequently observed as regular features of young people’s 
social scene.51  
Apart from that, Islamic garb (the apparel which covers most of the female 
body) has since then been chosen by a majority of Muslim females. Such apparel, 
which in the early 1970s was merely adopted by committed members of religious 
groups, is now regarded as part of official attire in the government sector. Muslims 
have also become considerably concerned about their dietary rules, only consuming 
whatever they have been assured is halal, so that they now prefer to buy from 
                                                 
47 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997), 157. 
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49 Nagata, “Islamic Revival”, 49. 
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Muslim producers although they had previously been accustomed to buying from 
non-Muslims.52  
Perhaps worth noting here is that such a ch ange did not only take place in 
ordinary Muslim families. It has also to a certain degree impacted on important 
people in the country. For example, the third prime minister was shocked by the 
sudden change in his own daughter who covered all of her body on her return from 
studying abroad.53   
Throughout the discussion in this section so far, it is clear that that the NEP has 
provided the impetus for the emerging phenomenon of Islamization of society in the 
1970s. The change in society since the NEP has, in turn, continually strengthened the 
influence of the movements and eventually produced greater awareness of Islam 
among its followers. What is important here is that such a phenomenon did not end at 
this point but gradually posed a significant challenge to authority, later sparking a 
counter-reaction from the government.  
Politically, the movements have over time openly voiced demands that the 
ruling government should more concern over Islamic matters. ABIM, for example, 
has promoted the establishment of a fully-fledged Islamic State. The movement held 
that declaring Islam the official religion of the country, as stated in the constitution, 
was inadequate. Its members call for state law based on shari’a and an economy 
freed from interest, with the existing taxation system replaced by a thoroughly 
implemented system of religious taxation.54 
Arqam also claimed that the government was not Islamic in many respects. The 
NEP, according to them, is not a policy consistent with Islam because of its basis in 
materialism. By contrast, they demanded an empowerment mechanism by which 
Muslims could be freed, through religion, from non-Muslim economic dominance.55 
That is why they introduced their own version of a project for economic sufficiency, 
including such ventures as repair shops and garages, Muslim food production, 
                                                 
52 Hamid, “Islamic Resurgence”,116; Nagata, The Reflowering, 107. 
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publications and clinics.56 With their rejection of the government-sponsored 
approach to economic programs for empowering Malays, such moves towards 
economic self-sufficiency and autonomy could obviously be seen as indirect 
challenges to the principles of the NEP.57  
Another political challenge arose from cooperation between the movement and 
the opposition political party, as happened at the end of the 1970s, when a number of 
ABIM members ran for Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) candidature in the 1978 
general election. PAS actually was not strong enough individually to manage without 
support from other Islamic movements. 58 From the outset, PAS’s ideology has 
combined Malay nationalism with the struggle to establish an Islamic state, and it has 
been considered a chauvinist party because of its criticism of UMNO’s cooperation 
with non-Muslim, non-Malay parties.59  
After the 1969 riot, PAS in 1973 joined the extended ruling Alliance on Malay-
Muslim unity and the success of the NEP. PAS representation in the ruling 
government, however, did not last long after problems with UMNO. This crisis was a 
turning point for ABIM, which gave open support to PAS on the principle that it 
should support an Islamic party that had been undermined by the nationalist secular 
party, UMNO.60  
ABIM launched a nationwide campaign to support PAS and a number of 
former’s top leaders campaigned on the latter ticket.  The societal support for PAS 
eventually grew dramatically, especially in urban areas, where the party had initially 
been the least popular.61 The collaboration revealed the dynamism of Islamic 
movements which could be potentially threatening to the ruling party’s survival. It 
also signified the stronger demands of the Muslim population, especially when 
combined with the election results, which showed encouragingly narrow losing 
margins.  
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What we can derive from this section is that the NEP led to the Islamization of 
society in the 1970s through the proliferation of religious movements, significantly 
backed by Muslims voicing their demands for government to become Islamic. All 
these phenomena could indeed make the government nervous, with the result that it 
finally embarked on its own Islamization program in the 1980s.  
 
2. Reactive action by the government: embracing Islam 
 Initially, government seemed reluctant to bow to the movements’ demands. 
Government ministers frequently directed critical remarks at the movements, 
ridiculing them and alleging that their only concern was with the hereafter, to the 
neglect of temporal development– an emphasis which, should it attract much support, 
could jeopardize overall national development.62 The government also introduced a 
stricter Societies Act to curb or at least control the development of the movements, 
by enabling the state to monitor and control their links with international societies. 
Since it was no secret at that time that ABIM was closely associated with foreign 
Islamic movements such as Jamaat Islami of Pakistan and Ihwan al-Muslimin of 
Egypt, this measure seemed to be specifically aimed at ABIM, although it 
supposedly covered all societies.63 Indeed, government actions in the 1970s showed 
a tendency to use methods of rejection and coercion in dealing with the rising 
phenomenon. 
 In the early 1980s, when the fourth prime minister took office, the 
government turned to more co-optive measures by initiating numerous Islamization 
programs which could be seen as a political attempt to attract devout Muslims and 
simultaneously to oust the opposition. The government began its moves by taming 
religious figures. Among the greatest of the government’s successes was the co-
option of Anwar Ibrahim, the most prominent leader of ABIM in 1982. Anwar’s 
enticement by the government was believed to have been made possible by his 
personal aspiration to help the government with its Islamization agenda. He was then 
popularly viewed as a factor in the intensification of that agenda, especially in the 
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1980s and 1990s.64  Consequently, since then, ABIM has no longer been a strong 
critic of the government, eventually becoming a supporter of government policies, 
including Islamization projects. 65 
 To strengthen the government’s authority over Islamic matters, it appointed a 
number of local religious personalities as top government officials heading various 
departments and bodies. They included Mohd Yusof Noor, a former lecturer in 
Islamic Studies at a local university, who was appointed Minister of the Prime 
Minister’s Department in 1987 and Abdul Hamid Othman, a government official 
with a religious background, who was appointed in the early 1990s as a Minister 
overseeing religious affairs. Among others who actively helped the Prime Minister in 
determining the direction of Islam in government policy were Wan Mokhtar Ahmad 
(former Chief Minister of state of Terengganu) and Zainal Abidin Abdul Kadir 
(former Director of Islamic Development, Department of Malaysia).66 
 The government has also established many Islamic institutions such as 
Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, the International Islamic University, and 
the Malaysian Islamic Understanding Institute, and has strengthened the zakat 
institution. The first Islamic Bank was established in 1983. It provided an alternative 
to the secular banking system and marked the beginning of Malaysia’s current status 
as one of the leading nations in the Islamic financial sector.67 In this context, the 
government has never intended to completely replace the secular banking system 
with the Islamic one; both Islamic and conventional banks have been operating side 
by side and closely collaborating up to the present time.68 Following the Islamic 
Bank, the first Islamic Insurance (takaful) was introduced in 1984 to provide security 
for Malaysians and also to complement the Islamic banking system. The Islamic 
banks have proved to be well accepted by society, as shown by the fact that in the 
early 1990s even non- Islamic banks started to offer Islamic products. Now there are 
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16 Islamic banks and 12 takaful companies in operation in Malaysia and the Islamic 
financial sector continues to grow.69  
In the education sector, the International Islamic University of Malaysia is 
another project initiated by the government, with support from the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC). The university was actually established in 1983 with 
the aim of contributing to the enhancement of knowledge, especially among 
Muslims, to help them to be a progressive society.70 Since then, the university has 
been the centre of the country’s Islamization of knowledge, its secular courses being 
supplemented with Islamic and religious instruction. In this university, apart from 
taking secular courses like economics and engineering, students must study religious 
subjects such as basic Islam and the Arabic language, the aim being to enable 
students to acquire the necessary “worldly” skills without neglecting their religious 
obligations.71  
As for the local context, the establishment of the university was a government 
measure to give Malays more educational opportunities and thus enhance their 
academic qualifications. It has also been a centre of learning of Islamic economics, to 
which thousands of papers on that subject could be referred.72 In addition, the 
university has been the place where many students and lecturers who lean towards 
Islamic movements could be found.  
What is particularly relevant to this section is that the state which was secular 
in nature has turned to be accommodative towards religion to meet the challenge 
from society and to win people’s hearts. In this respect, the government was not, 
however, simply responding to the demand by the movements to turn the state into 
an Islamic one. On the contrary, Islam has been used by the government as a potent 
element in the nation’s economic development. The formation of Islamic banks and 
the Islamic university could be seen as part of the strategy, as noted above.  Besides 
that, we shall see that Islam has been portrayed in Malaysian economic plans as an 
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element compatible with development. Accordingly, government since the 1980s has 
been promoting a strategy popularly called “progressive Islamization”, through 
which the religion has been expected to bring about a better life for its adherents.73  
Such a strategy indeed reflected the then Prime Minister’s view on what the 
Islamic state is all about. According to him, a state is Islamic not only through its 
implementation of shari’a but also through the government’s success in upholding 
economic development, gender equality, social justice and cultural Islamization.74 In 
other words, economic development has thus been projected as something in line 
with Islamic principles. As a local writer rightly argued, Islam has been seen as 
synonymous with development, thus encouraging Malays to participate in the 
economy.75  
 
5.4 Development of the Zakat Institution in Malaysia: Channeling the Religious 
Fund for Muslims’ Development 
As mentioned earlier, zakat is an interesting institution because of its nature 
as an expression of religious piety which also has economic potential. Throughout 
this part of the chapter, it will be made clear that Islamization in Malaysia has over 
time resulted in the channelling of the fund towards  development.  
This section will elaborate on t he development of the zakat institution, 
covering the era from its formation in the early twentieth century through the end of 
the century. In Malaysia, the zakat institution has been under the control of state 
rulers, and managed mainly by state religious councils. Prior to the 1970s, as will be 
seen later, the condition of the institution was generally unsatisfactory, since the 
collection was unsystematic and disbursement was carried out mainly to enable 
religious councils to run their operation. At that time, religious councils overall 
merely perceived zakat as a religious obligation, without associating it w ith 
economic development.  
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The Islamization phenomenon taking place since the 1970s has gradually 
changed the nature of zakat administration in Malaysia. Mainly through religious 
movements and personal initiatives, in the course of time, the practice of zakat has 
been questioned, with suggestions for improving it eventually put forward. It was 
proposed that the zakat should be administered from an economic perspective, which 
emphasized collection from the rich and disbursement to the poor. Such thinking was 
slowly accepted by the government which, later in the 1990s, set up a new model for 
collection. This model was followed later by other states, resulting in a significant 
increase in collection which gave the religious councils the opportunity to use the 
fund for development and poverty eradication. Indeed, looking at development since 
the Islamization era, it appears that the role of zakat has been broadened beyond the 
sphere of religion so that it is now considered a development tool.   
This section hence, can be loosely divided into the following eras: the first, 
the era prior to Islamization (1900-1960s), during which the fund was perceived 
totally as a religious obligation; and the second, the period of later decades in which 
zakat came to be linked with development.  
 
5.4.1 1900s-1960s: The zakat institution prior to the Islamization era 
Before the twentieth century, zakat was a purely personal matter, its proceeds 
being mostly directed to the religious teacher or religious institution due to the high 
esteem in which Muslims held their religious mentors.76 It was then a normal 
practice for a group of settlers to gather around a person who was well-versed in 
Islamic knowledge or a religious teacher. They would then submit ten percent of 
their harvest, particularly rice, to the teacher in return for the religious instruction 
provided for their families.77 It was estimated that in those early days (between the 
end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century) that from a group of 50 z akat-
paying settlers, a teacher could collect approximately 2400 gantang (approximately 
2400 gallons in volume) annually.78  
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Apart from local religious teachers, the collection was mainly spent on 
mosques, including payment to those who ran them. Overall, the general 
understanding of the practice of traditional zakat suggests that, because the zakat was 
left to individual disbursement, it was perceived purely as an act of religious piety.  
A more organized collection by states commenced in the early twentieth 
century, after the establishment of state religious councils, which then became the 
main bodies entrusted with collection and distribution of zakat. The establishment of 
the councils was actually due to the diminishing power of sultans (rulers) because of 
colonialism. The colonial government, after legitimizing its power over the Malay 
states by the end of the nineteenth century, dominated almost all areas of state 
administration that had previously been under the power of the sultans, leaving the 
latter with authority only in relation to Islam and other religious matters.79 Fully 
aware of their diminishing power, the rulers consequently gained greater control over 
Islamic institutions by using instruments adopted by the British for improving state 
administration, such as the formation of councils and enactment of laws.80 Hence, to 
strengthen the religious administration, sultans in all states have gradually 
established State and Religious Councils and codified Islamic law as represented by 
enactments.81 The British believed that this step offered an opportunity to confine 
Islamic law within domains acceptable to colonial administrators. However, what 
resulted was the advancement of religious administration under the officials 
dependent on the sultan.82  
In 1916, the first religious council was established in the state of Kelantan; 
since then it has been empowered to manage zakat. Local leaders and religious 
teachers who had previously been the main collectors and distributors of the fund 
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were then asked to surrender it to the council.83 The measure began a chain reaction 
whereby other states gradually put the collection and distribution mechanism into the 
hands of their respective religious councils. A similar system was adopted in Perlis in 
1930, Johor in 1934, Kedah in 1936, Selangor in 1952, Pahang 1956, Pulau Pinang 
and Melaka in 1959 and Federal Territory in 1974.84 The system of collection and 
disbursement has been stipulated in individual states’ respective religious enactments 
which more or less resemble each other.85 The councils also have adopted broadly 
similar systems whereby zakat is governed by a unit or division under the bodies.86  
Generally speaking, the functions of the councils since their formation have 
included the management of zakat, Islamic trusts and other contributions of money or 
property from any person for the benefit of Islam. Besides that, the councils have 
been sole trustees of all mosques in their respective states, with the exclusive right to 
grant permission for the erection of new mosques.87  
The general situation since the formation of the zakat institution up to the 
decade of the 1960s could be summarized as one of little revenue and ineffective 
disbursement. Although, administratively, religious councils were formed as 
authoritative bodies for governing the fund, and were supported with necessary law, 
these measures seemed unable to convince people to pay zakat to them.  
As far as the collection was concerned, religious councils focused only on the 
most easily collected wealth. In this case, the zakat on cereal, namely, unhusked rice 
and al-fitr, had been the source the councils sought out most. 88  It is interesting to 
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remind that the al-fitr is an obligatory payment for all Muslims, without exception, to 
be paid during Ramadan.89 Muslims in Malaysia have seldom been known to evade 
the payment of al-fitr, since they regard it as an undying and unquestionable feature 
of Ramadan. In this month, Muslims tend to exhibit their commitment to Islam 
through, amongst other things, charitable acts.90 Apart from that, as a payment to the 
value of approximately two and half kilograms of rice for each individual, al-fitr is 
relatively cheap and almost all Muslims can afford to pay.91  
As the al-fitr can be easy to collect, it seemed that the religious councils took 
the opportunity presented by a duty that the majority of people had never failed to 
perform.92 Another advantage was that Muslims could assess their payment without 
any complicated estimate from the council. For the collection process, the majority 
of states appointed a l ocal agent to collect al-fitr, in return receiving a portion, 
normally one-eighth, of the collection.93 Hence, the councils did not have to appoint 
any permanent staff.  
The zakat on cereal (rice) was another type of wealth that caught the immediate 
attention of the religious councils as a resource to monitor. In 1960s, approximately 
85% of Malays still resided in rural areas where rice cultivation was a m ain 
contributor to the rural economy, showing clearly that it w as among the largest 
economic sectors associated with Muslims in the country.94  Apart from that, as 
stated above, the zakat on rice had been collected since the nineteenth century as 
payment for religious teachers. These factors explain why the religious councils 
chose rice as a key target, especially as, in this case, the council was maintaining a 
pre-existing practice. For this type of wealth, religious councils has also empowered 
local agents to make collection.95  
As to the overall practice of collection of the fund through the zakat institution 
from its establishment until the end of the 1960s, we can generally suggest that its 
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achievement was rather unsatisfactory. Perak Religious Council, for example, in 
1957 collected only RM 223,192.87, while in Negeri Sembilan, the  state religious 
council in 1960 managed to collect RM 54,233, in both states mainly derived from 
al-fitr and rice.96 Another state, Melaka, collected RM 113,281 a nd RM 109,035 
respectively in 1961 and 1962, m ore than 90% of which sums came from al-fitr 
contributions.97 These figures perhaps do not convey anything in themselves, but if 
we compare them to the collected sums discussed in later sections, we shall see how 
great the difference is and get a glimpse of the underdeveloped state of the zakat 
institution during this era. 
Like the collection side, disbursement was also ineffective. Given that zakat is 
a lucrative resource under the purview of the councils, which, as seen above, receive 
a steady income from the collection, it is easy to understand how zakat was treated as 
a religious fund to finance religious projects and maintain administrative spending. 
Such a s ituation was exacerbated by the limited or nonexistent funding from state 
governments to the respective religious councils, forcing the latter to turn to zakat as 
their main financial support.98 As a result, the major portion of the collection went on 
the expenses of administering bodies and other religious projects, such as the 
building of mosques and funding for Islamic schools, carried out within the recipient 
categories of ‘amil (zakat agent) and fi sabil allah (in the way of Allah).99 For 
instance, Kelantan, immediately following the enforcement of zakat collection under 
its religious council in 1916, had spent RM 5000 for mosque expenditure and other 
religious council spending, using only zakat money.100  A similar pattern could be 
seen in other states in later decades.  In Perak, in 1957, RM 113,426 out  of RM 
336,619 went on the religious council’s administrative expenditure.101 In addition, 
Melaka in the early 1960s used all collected zakat money, amounting to RM 57,808, 
for religious school expansion. In fact, in this state, some of the zakat money was put 
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into special account called general administration spending (pentadbiran Am), 
clearly reflecting how the money was mainly used. 102  
As is apparent from the usual collection and disbursement procedures, the 
religious councils generally did not have the knowledge required to administer and 
utilize the fund effectively. This situation indirectly suggested that the collection and 
disbursement of zakat during this era was considered purely from the religious point 
of view, as a means of enabling Muslims to fulfil their obligations. Religious 
councils at that time had yet to realize the potential of the fund beyond the religious 
perspective, especially in the economic sphere.  
Ultimately, anomalies appeared in the practice of zakat at that time. For 
example, the collection of zakat on cereal was actually a tax on the poor, despite the 
principle that zakat should flow from the rich. Such a practice indeed burdened the 
poor, especially the rice planters, who were among the country’s groups recognised 
as poor. The government estimated that in 1970, 88% of them were considered to be 
living below the poverty line.103 The problem arose when the religious councils, 
without taking account of the actual income of the producers, imposed a flat ad 
valorem rate of 10% zakat on gross rice production. Such a practice was burdensome 
to those landless tenant farmers whose operating costs were much higher than the 
costs of those who farmed independently.104   
Apart from that, there were many weaknesses such as the lack of reports and 
systematic records. Religious councils seldom disclosed collection and disbursement 
statistics, or released periodic information as to what had been done with the zakat 
money. This is actually not surprising, considering that the religious councils 
themselves did not have a clue as to how to administer the fund effectively. Many 
religious councils only relied on the local agents to disburse the collection according 
to their personal preferences before submitting the balance to the councils. Once the 
money reached the council offices, it was normally kept in the council’s account 
without being fully distributed. For example, Negeri Sembilan in 1960 only managed 
to disburse RM 2000 out of RM 54,233. Ultimately, as found by researchers in later 
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decades, the payers did not feel they were deriving any benefit from the practice, 
with the result that they mockingly referred to the zakat as zakat raja (payment given 
to the ruler).105 
Another drawback of the religious councils, as machinery under the Sultan, 
was that their primary concern was to satisfy the ruler. The disbursement of zakat 
was also sometimes determined by the rulers, on oc casion going towards less 
pressing needs, to the neglect of more serious issues. A popular example was the 
building of a state mosque in Kelantan in 1922 at a cost of approximately RM 
300,000, with the result that no por tion could be given to other beneficiaries. The 
project attracted criticism from, among many others, the former state mufti, on 
grounds of overuse of the zakat fund. Although strongly rejected, the project still 
went ahead.106 
Such collection and disbursement practices show plainly that the zakat 
administrators actually had no know ledge of economy. Had they possessed any 
economic understanding, they would have known that zakat was supposed to be 
collected from those with excess personal wealth after covering necessary expenses, 
and would not have simply imposed the zakat on the understanding that it had been 
suggested by classical jurists and was a traditionally accepted practice. As for the 
distribution, the fund should have been used for the improvement of Muslims’ living 
conditions, since poverty and destitution were then still serious problems in 
Malaysia. These flaws in the way zakat was handled were found by some researchers 
in later decades to be among the causes of zakat evasion, as we shall see.  
 In sum, the era of early twentieth-century zakat saw the setting up the official 
collection and disbursement mechanism under the religious councils. The 
management of the fund by religious councils represented however, merely a small 
shift away from the religious leaders who were previously the main beneficiaries. 
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Zakat was still collected from the majority of poor farmers on agricultural produce 
and also as al-fitr, leading to the small collection. In addition, distribution was 
directed mostly towards council administration rather than for the improvement of 
the generality of Muslims. What we can say is that Muslims’ basic understanding at 
the time was of their religious obligation to pay the zakat. From the standpoint of 
rulers and religious councils, the fund was necessary to help religious institutions to 
function. Economic significance had not yet entered the perspective of either group.  
 
5.4.2 Zakat after the Islamization era – zakat for development  
 In later decades, the practice of zakat in the country gradually changed. 
Looking back to the earlier part of the chapter, we recall the decades of the 1970s 
and 1980s, which saw the Islamization of society whereby people seemed to be 
returning to Islam in their daily lives. Zakat was also gradually shown concern by 
Muslim society. Such a progression was positively supported by the government in 
the 1990s when it set up a corporatization model that could accelerate the collection 
of the zakat. From then on, z akat was increasingly used to improve the living 
conditions of its recipients through poverty eradication and income generation.  
 This section, hence, was divided into two parts, first covering zakat in the 
1970s and 1980s and later surveying the succeeding decades. In the former era, we 
could see initiatives mainly from society and to a lesser extent from government 
towards reviving zakat. Researches in these decades began to reveal many 
malpractices and to expound the “economic side” of zakat. The latter period saw the 
more practical model of zakat administration introduced by the government in the 
1990s. This part will eventually show the closer connection of the fund with 
development.  
1. 1970s and 1980s: reviving zakat in society 
 The 1970s, were the period in which Islamic consciousness among Muslims 
in Malaysia was widely revitalized. As a result of the new phenomenon, the 
implications for the zakat institution slowly emerged. Muslims in Malaysia started to 
show their concern over the institution, as manifested in their patterns of zakat 
payment and also through frequent discussions and writings.  
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The role of the religious movement itself cannot, however, be ignored. 
Although it is not easy to measure accurately the extent to which religious 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the increase in zakat payment 
awareness, as no research was done specifically to assess the phenomenon, there are 
a few respects in which we can relate the movements to the zakat question. 
For example, among their activities for reviving religious awareness, ABIM 
has actively provided its members with religious knowledge through its circular 
discussion (usrah) and by popularizing books by international Islamic thinkers such 
as al-Mawdudi, Rashid Ridha, Sayyid Qutb and many others.107 We believe that also, 
through these activities, al-Qardawi’s book on zakat gained circulation in Malaysia; 
in the early 1980s the book was listed in an article on zakat written by a member of 
the group.108 As mentioned in an earlier chapter of this thesis, such thinkers are 
among those suggesting zakat as taxation policy for an Islamic state and associating 
the religious obligation with development. Hence, we can safely say that, in this 
respect, ABIM has to an extent helped to spread the idea among Muslims in the 
country. Indeed, in later decades, the idea of associating zakat with development was 
frequently seen in researches and writings. We shall return to this point later.  
Another local movement, Tabligh, also played its part in reminding Muslims 
to fulfil their obligation of paying zakat. A specific book, entitled “Fada’il al-
Sadaqa” (exhortation to give away) was authored by the nephew of its founder in the 
1960s. It has been translated into the Malay language, and was perhaps in circulation 
locally in the 1970s or 1980s, as suggested by the fact that it was reprinted for the 
fourth time in the 1990s.109 Frequently read by Tabligh members as a standard text 
after congregational prayers, the book h as devoted a section of almost a hundred 
pages to the subject of zakat, touching on m any important aspects, from the 
exhortation to the punishment for evading payment.110 Looking at the discussion, 
which mainly comprises a collection of hadith, we see that its general purpose is to 
remind Muslims of their obligations. As the book nowhere proposes that readers 
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fulfil their obligation through the movement, we can safely say that members or 
sympathizers responding to its exhortation would, in accordance with local practice, 
surrender their payment to the religious council.  
 Besides the propagation effort by the movements calling for an Islamic 
resurgence, in the 1970s there appeared a number of studies pertaining to the practice 
of zakat. Rogayah Ngah and Ismail Muhd Saleh in 1978, for instance, researched the 
effect of zakat on rice planters and suggested that the zakat system was a burden on 
poor farmers. Of almost 600 f armers studied, half were supposed to be exempted 
from the obligation due to their poor economic condition which was mainly that of 
landless tenants.111 That was why only 32% payment was made to the religious 
council, the majority of farmers preferring to personally disburse the payment or 
evade it altogether.112 The system of taxing 10% of gross production, according to 
the authors, seemed to impoverish the farmers. As the objective of zakat was to 
alleviate poverty, such a system of collection seemed to point in the opposite 
direction. They eventually proposed the use of net production as the basis of taxation 
to ensure that only rich farmers with excess produce would be taxed.113     
 What is interesting about this research, apart from its findings, is that it was 
presented at a seminar organized by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, a 
Muslim international organization in America which was connected with local 
religious movements, especially ABIM. Hence, we can trace a potential relation 
between the writers and the movement, either as members or at least as open to ideas 
suggested by the movement, including the association of zakat with development.  
 Besides being studied by local researchers, the practice of zakat in this period 
drew the attention of international scholars. A study was conducted by James C. 
Scott between 1978 and 1980 pertaining to the practice of zakat on rice in Kedah.114 
The discussion mainly reveals the pattern of avoidance of payment by the farmers, 
which he categorizes as an act of resistance without protest.115  
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 According to the author, dissatisfaction among contributors over the way the 
zakat was disposed of was among the main factors in the resistance. As earlier stated 
in chapter two, the fund must be dispersed to the eight groups of entitled recipients 
with the focus should be given to the more deserving poor and needy.  It was not 
however the case in the researched area where it was widely believed that the 
disbursement was often secured payment for those who were not in dire need. In his 
study, Scott briefly showed that spending of councils for religious schools in 1970 
frequently received more than 50% of the collected sum. ‘Amil (collectors) was given 
22%, far exceeding the portion surrendered to the poor who received merely 15% 
from the due.116 Such a pattern of distribution seemed to show clearly that the 
farmers’ argument was not baseless.   
 Events up to this point indicated that the 1970s were the era in which the 
religious movement revived, helping society to find a different meaning in zakat 
beyond religion.  There were also some researches yielding knowledge of the real 
problems surrounding traditional zakat practice in the country. These studies provide 
a general picture of anomalies such as taxation of the poor instead of the rich and 
disbursement to the non-poor. It was clear that the administration of zakat, based on 
the findings of these studies, should be looked at from a development perspective.  
 Perhaps due to the situation of renewed and increasing interest, from the end 
of the  1970s and throughout the 1980s the government organized several seminars 
related to zakat. In 1977, for example, through the prime minister’s department, the 
government arranged a meeting of officials from all state religious councils to 
discuss religious questions, including zakat. Among matters related to the fund was 
the need to give greater attention to disbursement for poverty eradication and to 
extend the taxation base beyond zakat on c ereal and al-fitr.117 Such ideas and 
proposals were touched on again in later seminars such as National Talk on Zakat 
1984 and the National Seminar on Coordination of Zakah and Income Tax 1988. We 
shall discuss these seminars in a later section which specifically deals with poverty 
alleviation.  
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Apart from seminars, the federal government organized a study in 1984, 
involving all state religious councils, to suggest improvement mechanisms in the 
organizations, including aspects related to zakat.118 Throughout the study, religious 
councils were generally found to have no efficient system of collection, so that the 
distribution ended up being insufficient for any societal improvement.119 The 
committee hence recommended that the management of the fund should be separated 
from the council and placed with an autonomous body which could be more 
independent and could focus on z akat administration. The committee also 
recommended that the zakat account should be kept separately from the other charity 
accounts for ensuring that the funds were spent appropriately.120 On examination, 
this suggestion can be seen as the root of the new type of organization which was to 
emerge in the next decade.  
 Due to continuous effort by the movement and the gradual process of 
religious awareness, there was a slight change in the pattern of zakat collection at the 
end of 1980s, with collection from other sources, especially business and commerce, 
becoming quite visible. Although, at this period, al-fitr in most states was still more 
than 50% of the annual total collected sum, other types of zakat to a lesser extent 
were also submitted to the body.121 Johor, for instance, collected business 
contributions of between approximately RM 200,000 and RM 300,000 from 1982 
through 1985, while for the same period Terengganu collected between RM 80,000 
and RM 160,000.122 Other states such as Federal Territory, Selangor and Negeri 
Sembilan showed a more or less similar pattern. 123 In view of the fact that during 
this period the payment had to be voluntarily submitted to the main offices of the 
religious councils, since in most states agents were still not mandated to collect 
payment from sources other than cereal and al-fitr, such an increase in the absence of 
a proper collection system indicated growing awareness among Muslims.  
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As far as disbursement was concerned, although the process had somehow 
encompassed most eligible recipients, no significant change could be seen. In Pahang 
a poor person received only about RM 60 annually in the 1970s.124 At the same time 
Selangor gave a p oor person RM 20, disbursed only once a year.125 In Kedah 
between 1981 and 1983, the disbursement for administration of the religious council 
was still three times higher than that for the poor and needy combined.126 In the end, 
most of the money went on a dministrative expenses, while the poor and needy 
received an annual sum which was not enough to meet their basic needs.127 These 
facts were unsurprising, since at this point there was still no c hange in the 
organizational setup of the councils, so that disbursement for poverty alleviation had 
yet to be put in practice, and the idea of using the fund for that purpose remained 
very much on a theoretical basis, as a subject for discussion at seminars.   
In sum, the era of the 1970s and 1980s was one in which the zakat issue began 
to receive some limited impact from Islamization. The effort to cultivate religious 
awareness had to a certain degree revived Muslims’ awareness of the need to fulfil 
their obligations. The movement also had promoted some international thinkers who 
associated the fund with development, an idea later reflected in researches and zakat 
writings.  
During this phase, as zakat was increasingly studied, traditional collection 
practices began to be questioned and better practices were suggested. In these 
researches, therefore, we could see a sign of improvement and of an ongoing process 
of finding better ways of administering zakat. 
 In the decade of the 1980s, the improvement which had been earlier initiated 
from the bottom began to receive encouraging signs of acceptance from the 
government. The government organized a study to detect any weaknesses in the 
religious councils’ administration, including the zakat mechanism. Although all the 
effort in this phase was still in many ways theoretical in nature, with no evidence of 
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prompt reaction from the councils in the form of acting upon the recommendations, 
we can trace the basic foundation of a better kind of zakat practice, which in later 
decades would prevail as the preferred model for managing the fund. More 
substantial progress eventually took place in the 1990s.  
2. 1990s onwards: zakat for development 
An important turning point for zakat administration began in the early 1990s. 
The collection system was improved through the process of corporatization, and 
disbursement was assigned a greater focus on poverty eradication, in line with 
national economic plans. The process reflected a keen effort in the context of 
Islamization to empower Muslims economically.  
Corporatization is a new model of zakat collection, through the establishment 
of a company or corporate organization managing the fund, which is autonomously 
responsible for the complete range of activities such as organizational set up, hiring 
and training staff and any activities involved in zakat collection.128 The company 
must collect a sufficiently large amount of zakat on behalf of its parent organization 
(the State Religious Council) to ensure that the organization can run viably, and in 
return the company receives the agent’s portion to a maximum of one eighth of the 
zakat sum.129 
The model was introduced by the federal government through the Islamic 
Religious Council of Federal Territory (IRCFT) in 1991. It is worth noting that 
religious affairs in the federal territories are indirectly under the federal 
government’s control, with the Minister supervising religious affairs in the Prime 
Minister’s Department holding the chairmanship of the religious council.130 The 
close interrelation between federal machinery and religious administration in Federal 
Territory has led to the improvement of religious administration in this area by the 
federal government, as it is easier to implement there than in the other states. 
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The concept of zakat corporatization was the brainchild of a former state 
chief minister, with strong support from the then minister in the Prime Minister’s 
Department. It began with a discussion between both individuals in 1989, in which 
the former voiced his opinion to the latter on how to improve the zakat collection 
system.131 In the meantime, a local magazine estimated value of zakat that could be 
collected throughout Malaysia was RM 325 million, which far exceeded the actual 
RM 18 million collected annually, suggesting that the institution was extremely 
undermanaged.132  
The statistic revealed by the magazine trickled through to evoke a positive 
response from the minister, who later granted approval from the IRCFT for an 
endowment of RM 750,000 to finance the organization’s initial establishment.133 The 
organization was set up a s a private limited company under the name of Pusat 
Pungutan Zakat (Zakat Collection Center or ZCC), a subsidiary of the IRCFT, and 
was officially launched by Prime Minister on March 1991.134 The organization then 
set a zakat collection target of RM 60 million, the sum estimated to accrue from an 
effectively managed zakat institution.135 
What the former minister and the minister introduced could actually be 
associated with the then current practice of the Malaysian government in pursuing its 
governance strategy. Since the early 1980s, the federal government has introduced 
and implemented corporatization, also called privatization, whereby it transferred its 
ownership of services, business or companies to private hands. This could be done by 
leasing, contracting or selling its ownership fully or partially, eventually shifting its 
burden to corporate companies, so that the latter could perform the duty hitherto 
carried out by the former while presumably generating profit at the same time.136 
From 1983 unt il the early 1990s, the government corporatized many previously 
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public services, including TV3, the first private broadcasting company (1983), 
Kelang Container Terminal (1986), the main port service provider at the time, 
Telekom (1987), telecommunication services, and Pos Malaysia (1992) portal 
services.137 
The government of the day preferred such a method, believing that the private 
sector could deliver more effective services, since the state sector was regarded as 
rather slow and inefficient in that respect. Apart from that, the practice could 
simultaneously accelerate the participation of Malays in the corporate sector, which 
was heavily dominated by the ubiquitous Chinese. This consideration formed part of 
an approach to the government’s objective of helping Malays. 
As the idea of corporatizing zakat issued from someone who had formerly 
been part of the government, it may have reflected events taking place at that time, so 
that perhaps regarding it as a completely new idea of his would not be appropriate. 
With due credit to the person behind the idea, it may be more accurate to say that the 
initiator was influenced by the mood of the then government, inasmuch as the action 
was expected to improve the zakat management. 
 This is not to say that the corporatization of zakat was completely akin to 
that of corporatization in Malaysia. Zakat was still held by the IRCFT without any 
involvement from outside parties, and was not expected to generate profit, or even, in 
the case of the initial establishment, to be repaid. The main similarity lies in the fact 
that the administration since then has been in the hands of people who could be 
considered more knowledgeable in fund management. 
 This is also not to suggest that corporatization is the only or best way to 
remedy inefficiency in management of an organization. In later decades, there were 
indeed a few such cases, despite the increase in effectiveness, there were also some 
adverse effects of corporatization such as the increase in costs and losses in number 
of services.138 However, in the eyes of IRCFT, the idea was undeniably a feasible 
way to make significant improvements on the traditional practice, which had been 
proven to be far from effective; and perhaps it was the most practical choice, at least 
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at the time. It is also fortunate that the performance of zakat management is much 
stronger than previously, as will be seen shortly. 
By contrast with the collection system of the traditional zakat institution, the 
collection of zakat has since been recorded in a co mputerized system with 
professionally trained staff selected from various academic backgrounds.139 The 
ZCC also has applied a methodical marketing strategy by offering zakat payers a 
convenient environment in which to pay zakat.140 It introduced a variety of ways for 
payers to submit their payment such as through collection counters, through 
associated banks, by the postal service, by salary deduction or online.141 The ZCC no 
longer relied solely on local agents. All these practices are actually approaches and 
strategies which could be encountered in a modern business and economic context.  
Besides collecting more zakat, the ZCC also aimed to increase the 
population’s awareness of their zakat obligation.142 To this end, the ZCC’s officers 
delivered up to 600 t alks and discussions annually, especially in the early years 
following its inception.143 In addition, the ZCC has from time to time published 
reports of its activities so that payers can see how much the current zakat collection 
amounts and how the money is spent. Such reports will build payers’ trust in the 
ZCC and indirectly encourage them to contribute more.  
In this context, the ZCC has used the method of persuasion rather than 
coercive legal enforcement. Looking at this approach to attracting payment, we could 
regard it as an act of propagation, creating an incentive among Muslims to contribute 
to the fund, a function previously carried out by the religious movements. Hence, this 
phase of Islamization was reflected in the government’s not merely establishing a 
proper form of zakat administration, but also seeking a stronger commitment from 
the masses to fulfill their religious obligations.  
As far as the collection base is concerned, besides the traditional sources of 
wealth such as al-fitr and cereal, the ZCC has been to a greater extent targeting the 
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wealth associated with urban based economic activities, levying zakat on 
professional income, business and savings. Indeed, in this respect, the ZCC has 
implemented the strategy proposed by researchers in earlier decades, by turning their 
attention to rich Muslims rather than taxing the non-eligible poor. Such a shift also 
suited general economic conditions among Malays in this decade, approximately 
35% of whom were already situated in urban areas and actively involved in urban-
based economic activities.144 In the early 1990s in Federal Territory alone, there 
were 480,000 Muslim Malays resident out of a total of 1.5million, giving the ZCC a 
large supply of potential payers to approach.145  
The new form of zakat management has succeeded in increasing the 
collection. In its first year of operation, for example, the ZCC attracted 11,816 
payers, with 17,326 pa yers in the subsequent year. Based on the analysis of 
collection in 1992, i t was found that 66% of the collection consisted of zakat on 
professional pay, business and savings, wealth mostly derived from the middle and 
upper class communities.146 This new focus on t he type of wealth to be sought 
seemed to be widely accepted by Muslims. 
The performance of the new organization has indeed been encouraging, 
especially when compared to the collection record under the old system, which 
reached less than RM 7 million per year. It was more than doubled in the first year 
and has consistently increased since then. The collection records from the system’s 
inception through 2008 are as follows:  









1991 13.5 2000 56.1 
1992 20 2001 70.3 
1993 25.6 2002 80.8 
1994 33.1 2003 92.9 
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1995 32.3 2004 106.7 
1996 41.3 2005 126.7 
1997 50.6 2006 143.3 
1998 43.6 2007 169.2 
1999 33.6 2008 206.3 
Sources: Pusat Pungutan Zakat, Laporan Zakat, various issues. 
  
 Looking at the table, we can clearly see that the collection has increased 
considerably every year. Between 1991 a nd 1999, the fund collection increased 
149%, while from 2000 to 2008 the increment reached as high as 267%. Indeed, the 
increase in collection as shown above represents a genuine rise in payment and a 
better collection system. To support this argument we can compare the incremental 
rate of the collection with data showing the rise over time in the national per capita 
income of Malaysians.   
 According to government records, the annual per capita income rose 45% 
during the 1990s (from RM 9852 in 1990 to RM 14317 in 1999) and 27% for the 
period from 2000 through 2008 (from RM 15221 in 2000 to RM 19296 in 2008). 
Comparing the increment shown by the two records (zakat collection and national 
income), we can see clearly that the swell in the former tremendously outweighed 
that of the latter. Had the rise in zakat collection been mostly due to improvement in 
the people’s economic condition, as might otherwise be argued, the two records 
would show a similar pattern with only a slightly varying, higher or lower, rate of 
increment.  
 Based on this brief comparison between the increase in zakat collection 
which has been at an all-time high, and the more modest rise in national per capita 
income, we can safely suggest that the significant change in the payment pattern has 
been mainly due to the better management of the fund through corporatization.147 
 In short, we could say that the corporatization of zakat collection in the 
Federal Territory marked a significant change in the zakat institution in Malaysia. It 
has also inspired other states to follow suit. The overwhelmingly positive reaction 
was evident as soon as the body was established. The ZCC received numerous group 
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visits from other state religious councils curious about the new mechanism of 
collection, and became the main reference point for states interested in improving 
their zakat institution. 148 
 Consequently, a number of states adopted a similar model a few years later. 
Penang and Selangor, for example, corporatized their zakat management in 1995, 
followed by Pahang in 1996 and Melaka and Negeri Sembilan, both in 2000.149 
Recent developments have shown that only a few states (Kelantan, Terengganu, 
Perlis and Kedah) still keep the collection under the direct control of religious 
councils. However, they too have benefited from the development by making some 
changes, including the use of comprehensive computerized systems, and gradual 
adoption of some new administration practices.150  
 After corporatization appeared to have successfully increased the fund 
collection, the government later turned to helping religious councils to disburse more 
effectively. Effective disbursement was considered a challenge to be met in order to 
sustain the rise in zakat collection, as payers were more likely to monitor closely the 
way the fund was disbursed.151 
 Ultimately, the government called for zakat to become a d evelopment 
institution for Muslims. In Federal Territory, the government helped the IRCFT to 
improve its disbursement systems by developing a computerized system in which the 
information and data of eligible recipients could be stored and easily retrieved. The 
system could also help the council to generate the necessary periodic reports.152 
Apart from that, the ZCC established a u nit to act as intermediary between the 
IRCFT and the Muslim community, through which any application for zakat funds 
could be channelled.153  
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Government ministers have also made personal appeals for the zakat to play a 
more active role in the economy. In 1998 t he minister of religious affairs, for 
example, stressed that zakat should focus on poverty eradication and release the poor 
completely from poverty.154 In 2000 the minister again issued the same call for the 
zakat institution to help the government to eradicate poverty. This time he urged that 
zakat bodies should play a more important part as Muslim development agencies 
(agensi pembangunan ummah).155 Considering such appeals, it is not surprising that 
the portion for the poor and needy has been gradually increasing over the years. The 
IRCFT the same year increased the disbursement for the poor and needy to 
approximately 26% of total disbursement.156 
Actually, since the 1990s, the government also has suggested in its economic 
plans that religious funds, including zakat, should be used for the benefit of Malay 
Muslims, to whom the government has briefly stated its commitment to give 
necessary advisory aid. In 1991 for example, the government clearly spelled out its 
intention to improve the management and the use of resources generated by Islamic 
institutions especially those relating to zakat, waqf (religious endowment) and 
baitulmal (Islamic treasury) in its long-term economic plan (1991-2000). The 
objective will ensure that the various socioeconomic programmes undertaken by 
these institutions will be more effectively integrated with the national planning 
effort. Towards this end, appropriate consultative and research works should be 
carried out to identify the potentials and opportunities for utilizing these resources 
for the progress of the Malay Muslims community.157 Indeed the introduction of 
corporatization could be seen as part of the support earlier mulled by the federal 
government. 
The pattern of fusing Islamic institutions has been continuously spelled in the 
subsequent plans. In another government long term plan (2000-2010), it was also 
suggested that religious funds should be intensified and developed so that the 
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Malays’ equity could accordingly increase. Similar to the preceding plan, the federal 
government gave proper aid through coordination and guidelines.158 In this aspect, 
the government has established Jabatan Wakaf, Zakat dan Haji (Department of Waqf, 
Zakat and Hajj), a new department under the Prime Minister’s Department in 2004, 
designed to accelerate the development of religious institutions including zakat. As a 
new department, its contribution has been particularly to standardize zakat 
institutions across the nation. Until recently its role was mainly in the sphere of 
intellectual discourse; that is, organizing various seminars and publications as well as 
conducting research.159 This is due to the fact that Islamic funds such as zakat and 
waqf were under the power of states in which federal government should handle it 
with care avoiding any unnecessary conflict with the former.   
A recent development has also shown that zakat has been suggested as a tool 
of poverty eradication in the country.160 Through his speech during the tabling of the 
motion on a short term economic plan, the then Prime Minister in 2006 called for the 
participation of religious authority to shoulder the poverty eradication of Malay 
Muslim and clearly claim it a s fard kifaya (collective duty).161 Accordingly, he 
suggested that corporatization model should be emulated by other states.162  
With the significant achievement of the corporatization model, together with 
suggestions put forward by the federal government in seminars, studies and 
economic plans, the model has to a certain degree received a positive response from 
other state religious councils. As previously mentioned, many states later adopted the 
model in their zakat management. Additionally, the disbursement through time has 
been directed more towards poverty eradication, with increased attention paid to 
developing and empowering Malays. Such improvements in disbursement will be 
further elaborated on in the coming section which focuses on income generation.  
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 Looking back on the discussion in this particular section, we can conclude 
that the development of the zakat institution in the country has been directly 
influenced by the dynamics of the Islamization phenomenon in Malaysia. The 
evolution of the institution may be understood as rooted in the early twentieth-
century form of its administration by religious councils. The religious councils at that 
time, however, simply collected and disbursed zakat without giving any thought to 
the impact of the practice on the wellbeing of Muslims. As a result, there were some 
anomalies in their practice such as taxation of poor farmers because of the focus on 
rural-based taxable wealth, leading to the small size of the collection. Ultimately, 
Muslims in general in the early and mid twentieth centuries were not keen to 
contribute to the fund, which at that time was still largely seen as a purely religious 
tradition.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Islamization of society produced a gradual 
transformation in the perception of zakat. Through the influence of religious 
movements and also of some local writings and studies on zakat, the fund has been 
gradually linked with development, revealing its potential for improving the 
recipients’ living conditions. These supporters also called for better administration of 
the fund. 
Such a cal l was gradually heard by the government, which later initiated a 
number of seminars and studies. Eventually, in the 1990s, the government initiated a 
corporatization model. The model has successfully increased the amount of funds 
collected, in turn encouraging the zakat organization to introduce better distribution 
directed towards poverty eradication.  Indeed, the Islamization process in Malaysia, 
initiated either by society or government, has gradually propelled the zakat to its role 
as a potent tool for economic development and the empowerment of Muslims.   
 
5.5 Income Generation through Zakat in Malaysia 
This section will clarify the income generation program, a distribution 
program which has emerged in Malaysia as a result of the new, expanding role of 
zakat as an institution for development and poverty eradication. It will be made clear 
that in turning the zakat tradition into a “development institution”, it is important to 
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ensure that the fund saves Muslims from poverty altogether. The frequently used 
mechanism for achieving this objective is through income generation programs. 
Hence, income generation represents the continuous effort by the institution to prove 
that zakat can empower Muslims and release them permanently from poverty.  
The discussion and implementation of income generation in Malaysia 
evolved hand in hand with the development of the zakat institution. As the first signs 
of improvement in the institution only appeared in the 1980s, to accelerate in later 
decades, in general only a few papers on the subject could be found prior to that. 
Academic studies in the 1980s were still mainly focused on the collection, alongside 
exhortations to revive the obligation to pay. Some earlier writings, however, should 
be highlighted, in order to examine the extent to which zakat was discussed in this 
era. 
The idea of using zakat for income generation has actually used to be touched 
at least in a writing for quite a long time. In 1969, for example, at the Seminar on 
Islam held in Kuala Lumpur, a local academician has discussed about zakat.  In the 
end of his paper, he has briefly suggested that zakat should be disbursed for poverty 
eradication so that Muslims would not have to rely solely on government 
expenditure. He further proposed that zakat should be spent for productive purposes. 
Such a mechanism could be created through the formation of corporations and 
business entities for the poor, along with other measures so that the initiatives could 
give employment opportunities for them.163   
It is clear that, during this period, the idea of using zakat for income 
generation remained theoretical in nature and merely a suggestion briefly mentioned 
in an academic paper. As was widely known, the awareness of Muslims regarding 
the zakat obligation was, at that time, at a low level. The focus at the time was on 
encouraging more widespread payment, emphasizing greater adherence to zakat as a 
religious obligation. Such an aim was also clearly seen through the paper in which, 
the writer throughout mainly reminded the readers by discussing about foundation of 
zakat such as definition, its taxable incomes and the eligible recipients. In this 
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context, he mainly referred to Quran and Hadith and some classical opinions.164 At 
this point, we cannot say that the recommendations reflected mass awareness, since 
the briefly expressed opinion was of only an individual, without further discussion or 
strong support from others.  
The subsequent decades (1980s and 1990s) saw a growing interest in the 
improvement of the zakat institution, leading to a proliferation of seminars and 
writings on the subject. To give but a few examples, there was the Seminar Zakat 
1980 (Zakat Seminar 1980);165 Muzakarah Zakat Peringkat Kebangsaan 1984 
(National Talk on Z akat 1980);166 Seminar Zakat dan Cukai Pendapatan 1988 
(Seminar on Zakat and Income Tax 1988);167 International Zakat Conference 
1990;168 Bengkel Agihan dan Penyelarasan Zakat Kuala Lumpur 1993 (Workshop on 
the Disbursement and Zakat Coordination 1993);169 and many others.  
In these seminars, the disbursement mechanism was among the subjects 
prominently discussed. As previously mentioned, the 1980s and 1990s were 
associated with better zakat management and greater promotion of the zakat 
institution, and the organization of numerous seminars to a certain extent signifies 
the keen efforts of society and government alike. 
In order to improve the disbursement system, the mechanism of income 
generation for the disbursal of zakat was frequently suggested. Abdullah Ibrahim, for 
example, in his paper presented in 1984, proposed that the disbursement for poverty 
must be sufficient to change the recipients’ lives. He suggested that those who were 
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able to work must be helped to do s o by the provision of capital aid or other 
necessary support.170    
In similar vein, Mahmud Saedon, a local university professor, suggested in 
his paper presented in 1993 that zakat could be given to the poor in the form of either 
a living allowance or capital for those capable of working, in order to equip them 
with the means of  striving productively. This policy would not only enrich them but 
enable them to generate wealth for the economy and ultimately to contribute to the 
zakat fund.171  
Hailani Muji Tahir, also an academician, recommended that zakat could 
provide a better way to improve the economic condition of Muslims in the country. 
In relation to giving the recipients capital, he reminded the gathering that the zakat 
body should start to focus on disbursement for productive purposes such as income 
generation. He argued that the zakat body must take into consideration the modern 
societal need to release people permanently from poverty and not merely continue 
distributing the fund for consumption as was traditionally practised.172   
The presenters also to an extent addressed income generation from a local 
economic perspective. In another paper, Khalid Mohd Zain, suggested that the 
distribution should take local economic conditions into account. Perhaps based on his 
understanding of the current situation of Muslims, he proposed that modern 
equipment should be provided for farmers and fishermen, and that cottage industries 
should be established to help women.173  
Indeed, zakat was perceived as potentially complementary to government 
economic strategy. To this end, it was suggested that the zakat institution be 
coordinated with other government agencies. Ibrahim in this respect remarked that 
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the zakat body should work closely with government bodies such as the welfare 
department, to avoid redundancy in their services.174 
Overall, in the 1980s and 1990s, discussion of the use of zakat for income 
generation emerged as part of the process of finding a better way to disburse the 
fund. This approach was also seen as consistent with the overall objective of using 
zakat as a poverty eradication mechanism. It is quite apparent from the discussion 
that zakat was envisioned as a complementary element of the government’s strategy 
for poverty alleviation.  
  As a response to the demand from society, since the early 1990s a few states 
have started disbursing the fund in line with this initiative.175 Among the earlier 
states were Kuala Lumpur, Selangor and Kedah. In Kuala Lumpur, three types of 
disbursement for income generation have been gradually introduced since 1995, 
particularly Bantuan Perniagaan (Business Aid). Unlike the collection function, the 
disbursement mechanism in Federal Territory has yet to be corporately managed and 
is still under the Federal Territory Religious Council.  
The Minister of Religious Affairs, in announcing the new initiative in 1994, 
briefly mentioned that the program was introduced in response to frequent 
applications from poor zakat recipients who expressed a preference for help that 
would enable them to work and earn a stable income.176 Although he only referred to 
the role of recipients, we cannot exclude the possibility that exhortations from the 
earlier-mentioned seminars also exerted some influence. 
Perhaps due to the urban character of the capital city, business aid was the 
preferred program. It was reported that from 1995 through 1997 the IRCFT disbursed 
respectively RM253,000, RM383,000 and RM131,000 for Business Aid.177 
Kedah began to officially disburse zakat for income generation in 1997. 
According to the report, Jabatan Zakat Kedah (Zakat Department of Kedah) helped 
those who were poor but still potentially productive to acquire the tools and other 
requisites to enable them to work. The aid, known as Bantuan Jayadiri (Personal 
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Progress Aid), provided tools for car repair, flour mixers, cooking facilities and 
sewing machines, among other things. For the years 1997, 1998 a nd 1999, i t was 
reported that RM8350, RM19,709 and RM12,300 respectively were disbursed for the 
purpose.178 The report however, did not detail the amount provided for each 
beneficiary of the income generation program. As the sum received by each poor 
person from ordinary direct distribution at that time was between RM300 and 
RM450, it is likely that a similar amount, or slightly more, was given as Bantuan 
Jayadiri.179 
 In Selangor, the disbursement was introduced in the mid-1990s through a 
number of programs, namely Bantuan Perniagaan (Business Aid), Bantuan Pertanian 
(Agricultural Aid) and Bantuan Perikanan (Fishery Aid).180 It is unfortunate that, 
perhaps because the disbursement system had not yet been corporatized and hence 
was still not systematic, the full report on the amount disbursed could not be traced. 
In 1997, however, the religious council reported that they had allocated a sum for the 
poor and needy that was directed towards help to business and petty traders, for 
which purpose in that year RM500, 000 were set aside.181 At a glance, Selangor gave 
a comparatively large portion for income generation projects. As we shall see later, 
Selangor has been in the forefront of these initiatives. 
In the 2000s, as in the preceding decades, income generation became a 
prominent and recurring theme in writings and discussions on z akat. In this era, 
seminars on z akat were most often organized by religious bodies or universities. 
Among these were the Seminar Pelaksanaan Zakat Pendapatan 2000 (Seminar on 
Zakat on Personal Income 2000), Seminar Kebangsaan Kaedah Pengagihan Dana 
Zakat 2000 ( National Seminar on Zakat Disbursement Approach 2000), National 
Muzakarah Pakar Zakat 2002 ( National Zakat Experts Discussion 2002), 
Musyawarah Perdana Ekonomi 2005 (Seminar on Mainstream Economics 2005), and 
Seminar Kebangsaan Pengurusan Harta Islam 2006 (Seminar on Islamic Wealth 
Managemant 2006). In many papers, it was suggested that the distribution of zakat be 
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modernized in accordance with the problems of society. In this context, income 
generation was commonly referred to as a suitable approach for the disbursement 
system to adopt in helping the Muslim poor. 
A few papers could perhaps be outlined here. At the National Seminar on 
Zakat Disbursement Approach in 2000, in a paper presented by the Director of the 
Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding, a government agency which actively 
promoted official Islamization projects, one of the proposed approaches to zakat 
distribution was through economic programs. The director also argued that the 
recipients should be provided with essential skills to ensure that their projects could 
succeed. In this respect, he further called on pr ofessionals to help the government 
and the zakat agency to carry out their agendas.182  
 The discussion of zakat for income generation in the 2000s, although not 
detailed, and to a great extent still theoretical in nature, has started to include initial 
efforts by the authors to look at and link their ideas to what was happening on the 
ground. In a seminar organized in 2002, f or example, a few papers touched on 
disbursement issues. Shukri Salleh and Zainal Abidin in their papers briefly 
mentioned the practice of fund management in a number of states. Looking at the 
disbursement practice for the poor, the former felt that officials were assumed to 
have a clear view of the poverty problem, but that, according to his findings, this 
might not be the case. As for improving the system, Salleh proposed that the 
disbursement should focus on the local area from which the fund was drawn. It must 
be distributed as soon as possible to local needy people, within any initiative 
including income generation, before any sum was allocated to be sent to central 
office.183 As for the latter writer, based on hi s brief survey on the practice of the 
zakat body in Federal Territory, he observed that to a certain extent the poor and 
needy had been given attention, although in many cases distribution was still not 
effective. Noting that the distribution primarily went on consumption, he proposed 
that the fund be given in such a way as to help recipients to generate revenue 
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(berdikari) and thus be able to sustain themselves (kemampanan).184 In brief, both 
writers found that, by looking at the practice of local zakat bodies, they gained some 
idea of how to achieve better distribution.  
At a later seminar in 2006, a  paper on t he role of zakat in developing 
entrepreneurship was discussed. Looking at some cases of existing practice, in which 
zakat bodies had started to provide zakat to help petty traders, he expanded on his 
theoretical proposal by outlining steps that a zakat body could take towards helping 
recipients to be more productive and independent through entrepreneurship, a critical 
skill which Muslims in Malaysia needed more of. In this aspect, the aid should also 
include other initiatives such as training, business consultation and monitoring.185  
Looking at the pattern of discussion, which shows that income generation 
through zakat has seldom been neglected by zakat theorists, we can conclude that the 
program is something that most writers hope will be introduced by all zakat bodies. 
We can see, moreover, that through time the theoretical suggestions were no longer 
limited to the distribution of financial aid, but extended to complementary programs 
such as training and advisory assistance to ensure the success of the projects. The 
focus was then not merely on disbursing the fund in accordance with Islamic law, but 
also on doing so by more effective methods.  
Besides this, none of the writers omitted to mention, at least briefly, the 
possible use of zakat for generating income, arguing in that connection that the 
proposed distribution could finally turn the recipients into payers. Although the 
practice was not described as an unqualified success, one could understand from the 
writers’ examination of it, together with their constructive suggestions and 
sympathetic comments, that they saw the potential of Malaysian zakat. Moreover, the 
association of zakat with modern concepts like entrepreneurship and business 
development indicated that they acknowledged zakat’s economic value.  
 Due to the larger collected fund yielded by corporatization and improved 
collection systems, it is  now easier to put the programs into effect. In Federal 
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Territory, unlike in the 1990s, a substantial amount has been disbursed under these 
programs. Apart from the business aid introduced earlier, the IRCFT added a f ew 
other schemes such as Deposit Teksi (deposit for purchasing taxis) and Deposit Bas 
Sekolah (deposit for purchasing school buses).186 The latter two schemes are 
designed for poor zakat recipients who are interested in becoming taxi drivers or 
school bus drivers, as those services are currently in great demand, with good 
potential for generating a stable income. For these programs, IRCFT gave the 
recipient the initial capital needed to acquire a vehicle. The subsequent monthly 
payments, however, must be met by the recipients out of their earnings. From 2006 
to 2008, t he IRCFT disbursed approximately RM1.5 million, RM2.5 million and 
RM3 million respectively for these three programs combined.187                                
Apart from that, the IRCFT has provided eligible recipients with 
entrepreneurial courses offered occasionally according to demand and applications 
from recipients, although the IRCFT could not monitor each recipient, but left 
success in the courses to their own abilities. This restriction was due to limited staff, 
since only a handful of officers were available to deal specifically with this form of 
disbursement.  
In Kedah, also, the programs have continued. More recent reports from the 
zakat department have indicated that in 2007 the department managed to give away 
RM80,190188 followed by RM155,748 in 2008.189 After more than two decades, 
however, there was not much change in the practice of aid, except that the maximum 
amount was raised to suit changing needs and the higher prices of basic tools. From 
merely a few hundred in the 1990s, the current disbursement limit has risen to 
RM5000, with the majority of recipients normally receiving between RM1000 and 
RM2000.190 
Selangor is the most advanced state in this respect. Since early 2000, the 
Zakat Board of Selangor (ZBS), the body managing the fund in the state, has been 
gradually improving the programs for income generation. The body offers a wide 
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range of integrated programs, including training, monitoring and support services, for 
which purposes it recently disbursed more than RM5 million. It also established a 
special unit to run and monitor productive disbursement. With strong support from 
the state government and the Muslim populace, the ZBS is currently one of the main 
institutions actively promoting income generation programs for reducing poverty in 
Selangor.191 As this research will focus on the practice of Selangor, full deliberation 
on the subject will be presented in the following chapters.  
Apart from the above-mentioned states which have introduced the programs 
since the 1990s, many states began to offer income generation programs after 2000. 
Negeri Sembilan, for example, introduced income generation in early 2000. From 
time to time the state’s religious council has selected eligible recipients with the 
potential and skills to generate their own income. These recipients will be helped on 
the basis of their skills and special needs.  The religious council commonly gives 
priority to those who have experience in and potential for running small businesses, 
for which they will be given financial capital and necessary tools. According to the 
disbursement record, from 2005 t hrough 2008 the religious council of Negeri 
Sembilan spent in the respective years approximately RM197,000, RM357,000, 
RM289,000 and RM371,000.192  
Kelantan and Johor are states which have recently introduced disbursement 
for income generation, the former in 2006 and the latter in 2008. In Kelantan, 
recipients eligible for income generation will be given from RM3000 to RM5000 to 
initiate their economic activities. There are a few such activities which the religious 
council considers to have particularly strong potential in current economic 
conditions, namely, automotive and tailoring workshops. Apart from giving financial 
aid, the council helps those who lack experience to acquire necessary technical skills 
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by enabling them to enter selected technical institutions. This is to ensure that the 
poor, especially those who are still young, will not be left unemployed.193  
Like Kelantan, Johor offers a variety of programs including Jana Asnaf Niaga 
(Business Aid), Jana Asnaf Chef (Food and Catering Aid), and Jana Asnaf Menjahit 
(Sewing and Tailoring Aid). Each person receiving zakat under these schemes will 
also be given a sum ranging from approximately RM3000 up to RM5000. Should the 
recipients need training, relevant courses can be arranged.194   
Looking at the actual implementation of the programs, it appears that many 
states  h ave introduced income generation through zakat, demonstrating clear 
progress in the practical realization of what had often been advocated in theoretical 
writings. With the programs so widely offered, one can hardly say that income 
generation has been neglected in discussions of zakat distribution for poverty 
eradication.  
The trend towards greater concern for productive disbursement by zakat 
institutions has fostered greater interest among academics and researchers in 
focusing on di sbursement. Many writers have shown strong interest in this area, 
including, among others, Abu Sufian Abu Bakar,195 Nor Ghani Md Nor et al,196 
Mohd Abdul Wahab Fatoni Mohd Balwi et al,197 Hisham Sabri and Zulkifli 
Hasan,198 and Wan Sabri Wan Hussin.199 In their writings, income generation 
programs through zakat are associated with concepts such as empowerment, 
independence, or entrepreneurship. In this respect, the distribution of zakat through 
income generation is perceived as a development program helping to turn the poor 
into businessmen and entrepreneurs. We will touch on t hese writings in the next 
chapter which deals directly with zakat in Selangor. 
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 What is particularly interesting in its implications is that the state given the 
greatest attention is Selangor, which the writers normally describe as the most 
comprehensive or advanced in regard to this initiative. Hussin in his paper clearly 
stated that Selangor is the leading state (juara) in its approach to income generation 
programs. Throughout his paper, he justified his preference in terms of the amounts 
disbursed and number of programs introduced by Selangor’s zakat body.200 Another 
writer, Wahab Fatoni, also mentioned that Selangor offers the most comprehensive 
programs for generating income. In his discussion, focusing on e fforts to help the 
poor to become involved in business, he surveyed many income generation programs 
provided by the Selangor zakat body. He eventually asserted that the body has made 
the strongest effort to improve the economic conditions of the poor.201   
Indeed, based on the discussion, we can see that Selangor is the foremost 
state in providing zakat for income generation. There is no writing, however, which 
specifically asks why this situation arose. Since the present thesis associates income 
generation with Islamization, we believe that the latter phenomenon has to a certain 
extent promoted the emergence of the former.  
 
5.6 Conclusion   
The development of the zakat institution in Malaysia cannot be dissociated 
from the Islamization phenomenon in the country. Islamization in Malaysia has been 
associated with the dynamic of the national socio-economic scenario. The racial 
composition of the country, inherited from the pre-independence era, resulted in an 
economic imbalance between races whereby native Malays were relatively poor 
compared to other, non-native races. This imbalance led to distrust between races, 
culminating in a tragic racial riot which broke out in 1969. As a reaction to the riot, 
the government introduced economic policies favouring the Muslim Malay majority 
in the population, in the belief that social stability would only be achieved when the 
majority was not neglected.  
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The implementation of the new economic policy in the 1970s gradually gave 
Malays access to higher education and urbanization, leading to a shift in their 
outlook. Educated Muslims then argued that the government should not merely 
strengthen Malays economically but must also be concerned with their religion. They 
established movements to revive religious practice and to challenge the government 
politically. The movements also to an extent successfully attracted urban Muslims 
who were exposed to their appeals and eventually displayed greater religious 
awareness. To meet the challenge, the government initiated Islamization programs 
through which Islamic institutions were established and strengthened. The 
government, however, had its own concept of Islamization, within which the 
intention was not to turn the country into an Islamic one but instead to improve the 
majority Malay Muslims economically, an approach which seemed in line with 
earlier national policy.  
As far as zakat in Malaysia is concerned, the institution had been under the 
control of the sultan (state ruler). State religious councils had been collecting and 
disbursing zakat funds in their respective localities since the early twentieth century. 
But the institution did not function well, the collected fund being minuscule and the 
payment still dependent on pe rsonal preference, almost as though there were no 
official institution. There were anomalies in the practice of zakat in this era, such as 
taxing the rice farmers despite their generally poor circumstances and giving little or 
no attention to distribution of the collected fund to the poor and needy.  
The Islamization process in the country slowly changed the position of zakat. 
At the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s, writings and studies on z akat practice 
began to proliferate, questioning traditional practice and suggesting better methods. 
In a positive reaction, government also gradually began to show its concern by 
organizing discussions and studies of how to improve the system of zakat 
management. Eventually, in the 1990s, the government introduced “corporatization”, 
a new method which later successfully increased the collection, in turn creating the 
opportunity to develop a better distribution system. It was proposed that zakat act as 
a development agency with an emphasis on p overty eradication. Ultimately, the 
Islamization phenomenon had transformed zakat from a solely religious tradition to a 
development institution.  
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Looking at the pattern emerging from this discussion of zakat, it is evident 
that income generation has slowly become a disbursement system given priority by 
the religious councils. Income generation programs can prove that zakat is workable 
and that to a certain extent it can complement the government policy of empowering 
Malays. From the 1990s, many states have offered such programs, featured as a 
nationwide initiative. Selangor was among the first and appeared to be the most 
active and advanced state in offering the programs. Hence, the state merits more 
attention in later chapters.  
 Throughout the chapter, it has appeared that the Islamization process 
affecting the development of zakat in Malaysia has been initiated from the top 
(government) as well as from the bottom (society). Islamization of society, 
expressing the desire to revive religious awareness, led to the government becoming 
more accommodating to Islam, despite its original secular character. Through these 






CHAPTER 6  
ZAKAT ADMINISTRATION AND ISLAMIZATION  
IN SELANGOR 
6.1 Introduction 
As previously discussed, since the 1990s, the corporatization mechanism has 
given rise to further development in zakat management. Additionally, on the basis of 
what was outlined in the economic plans, it seems that zakat has been converging 
with the country’s economic policy. The federal government has, over time, provided 
an environment conducive to the improvement of the zakat institution. All these 
events illustrate the government’s Islamization program.  
The state governments responded positively by replicating the model, which 
subsequently produced higher collections in their territories. In this respect, Selangor 
is the state most meriting examination. Its collection has been the highest; its 
corporatization has extended to distribution and has established sound 
administration. The state has also been the most advanced in offering the income 
generation program.  
 This chapter, hence, aims to discuss the overall practice and administration of 
zakat in Selangor and the way Islamization in the state has influenced the institution. 
The chapter will elucidate the underlying situation in the state before further 
deliberating, in the next chapter, on t he implementation of income generation. 
Through the discussion, the fourth objective, which is to explore the implementation 
of income generation, may be partly achieved.    
 The chapter is divided into three sections. The first ventures into the general 
socio-political and economic background of the state. The section will show that, in 
many aspects, the social politics of Selangor resemble those of Malaysia. As a state 
in a federal country, Selangor has also been following the financial and poverty 
eradication policies of the federal government. Here the state has assumed the 
supporting role of helping the government to implement its policy. Such an 
arrangement, however, does not prevent the state from introducing its supplementary 
programs. Thus, it has embarked on many income generation programs. With limited 
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money for development, the state was receptive to any possible sources of finance, 
including zakat.  
 The next section describes the Islamic religious council, the body which has 
played an important role in the official management of zakat and in general Islamic 
administration. The council is responsible for advising the ruler on Islamic matters in 
the state. Zakat is one of its principal financial resources, as the body is not funded 
by the state. Although basically it is accountable to the ruler, the members of the 
council, many of whom were government officials, tend to steer the body in a 
direction consistent with government aims. Besides the religious council, the Mufti 
is important in zakat administration. In this context, any change or new legal rulings 
pertaining to zakat must be endorsed by the Mufti.  
 The final section explores the development of zakat from its inception in the 
1950s to the present time. The institution was initially a merely religious one having 
no potential for development. The Islamization phenomenon gradually swelled the 
collected fund, eventually leading to the current administration’s focus on poverty 
eradication, supported by more systematic and proper disbursement. Thus, the state 
government appeared to uphold the institution by using the fund for poverty 
eradication. Indeed, its policy is similar to the federal government’s initial proposal 
in the Malaysian plan, as discussed in the previous chapter.  
 Altogether, the chapter shows the gradual development of zakat in the state. 
The implementation of income generation as one of the state’s poverty eradication 
mechanisms will be discussed in greater detail in the coming chapter.  
 
6.2 The Background of Zakat Administration in Selangor  
 The introduction of a better way of zakat distribution in Selangor is related to 
the broader development perspective, aimed at empowering Malays, as well as to the 
Islamization phenomenon. The development and improvement of zakat is also 
associated with socio-economic change in Selangor. Hence, perusal of the basic 
socio-political and economic background, in which we can see the typical pattern of 
racial composition, is pertinent before venturing further.  
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 Economically, the state government relies on the federal government, which 
holds much of the financial power in the country. Thus, the state government 
contributes supportive action by implementing economic policy outlined at the 
federal level. The result is that the state government has only limited financial 
resources, so that zakat as a source of funds could complement state strategies for 
poverty eradication.  
 Another factor is that zakat administration has been under state rule, managed 
by the religious council. As we shall see, the members of the council are also 
government officials, which shows that government policies to a certain extent 
influence it. As a consequence, an opportunity exists for the state government, in 
collaboration with the religious council, to use the zakat fund for development in the 
state. 
 Another aspect we need to consider is that, the zakat being a religious fund, 
any changes in its practice must be in accordance with Islamic law, which is 
ultimately decided by the state Mufti. Hence, this feature of zakat administration is a 
further subject of discussion in the present section.  
 The section is divided into two parts, the first focusing on the state 
background and the second on the background of the zakat bureaucracy and its legal 
aspect. From both sections we should obtain a picture of the state’s limited capability 
in initiating development projects. However, its connection with the religious council 
could be a potential source of financial support through zakat, provided that any use 
of the fund is in line with Islamic law.  
 
6.2.1 Background of the state 
 Selangor is a s tate on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia and 
geographically is bordered by the state of Perak to the north, Pahang to the east, 
Negeri Sembilan to the south and the Strait of Malacca to the west. With an area of 
7956 sq km, it surrounds the federal territory of Kuala Lumpur, the capital city of 
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Malaysia of which was once under Selangor's sovereignty.1 Its current capital city is 
a rather newly emerged, Shah Alam, 25 kilometers from Kuala Lumpur, which it 
replaced as state capital in 1978, a fter Kuala Lumpur had been granted federal 
territory status in 1974 as Malaysia’s capital city.2  
 As of 2009, Selangor had a multiracial population of approximately five 
million, comprising around 2.7 m illion people of Malay ethnicity as well as 
respectively 1.38 million and 0.66 million Chinese and Indians.3 The state contains 
nine districts, four of which are categorically urban and the rest are still considered 
rural. A majority, approximately 88%, of the population reside in urban areas.4 
Economically, Selangor is among the most developed states in Malaysia, relying on 
multiple industries including manufacturing, business and sales, and government and 
private services.5 Indeed, with the state’s location at the centre of West Malaysia 
next to Federal Territory, its urbanization and economic development are undeniable 
results of federal influence in terms of ready access and superior infrastructure. 
 The state’s ethnic composition resembles the overall national demographic 
pattern discussed in the previous chapter. Apart from that, it is interesting to note that 
the 1969 riot took place in Kuala Lumpur which was still under Selangor’s rule. In 
addition, the former chief minister was among those directly involved in the riot.6 
Hence, it is unsurprising that the state government has strongly supported the federal 
initiative for empowering Malays so as to put that race on an equal footing with non-
native races in the state. 
 The federal system in Malaysia renders the state government in many 
respects reliant on the federal government. Major sources of finance, for example, 
                                                 
1 The Selangor State Economic Planning Unit (UPEN), State and Local Authority (LA) Demographic 
Data for Selangor Darul Ehsan 2006 (Shah Alam: UPEN, 2006), 2.  
2 http://www.selangor.gov.my/main.php?Content=vertsectiondetails&VsItemID=3&VertSectionID= 
375& CurLocation=44&Page=1 (22, November 2010) 
3 The State of Selangor, Governing Selangor: Policies, Programmes and Facts (Shah Alam: The State 
of Selangor, 2008), 9; UPEN, State and Local Authority, 63. 
4 Selangor defined that urban districts are the districts with more than 51 percent of the population 
reside in urban areas. Refer Patmawati Ibrahim, “Economic Role of Zakat in Reducing Income 
Equality and Poverty in Selangor”, Phd Thesis, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 2006, 6.1; The State of 
Selangor, Governing Selangor, 9.  
5 In 2008 for example, the state economy mainly generated by manufacturing sector(24%), business 
and retailing (22.7%), government services (14.2%), financial services (11.6%) and agricultural and 
fisheries (3%). The State of Selangor, Governing Selangor, 9. 
6 Tunku Abdul Rahman, 13 Mei Sebelum dan Selepas (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication, 2007), 83. 
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including the collection of individual and corporate income taxes, are under federal 
power. State governments are only eligible for rather minor financial roles, such as 
collecting land and local council taxes within their respective territories. Such 
revenue sources are certainly insufficient to cover all their expenses. Thus, in 
running its bureaucracy, the state government has continued to rely on the annual 
federal grant and also on loans from the federal government. Selangor is one 
example, having received, in 2010, federal support amounting to more than RM500 
million for its administrative and local development expenditure. The state is also 
carrying more than RM1 billion in loans from the federal government for a number 
of its long-term development projects.7  
   Since the state governments have less income than the federal government, 
initiatives for the economic improvement of society have been mainly implemented 
by federal bodies. For instance, to raise the conditions of rice planters in the country, 
the government through the Ministry of Agriculture has been paying incentive 
money under the Rice Price Subsidy Scheme (Skim Subsidi Harga Padi) whereby the 
ministry paid them an extra RM248 for every ton of produced husked rice. Between 
2004 and 2006, the ministry spent more than RM1.37 billion on this scheme across 
the country. In Selangor, more than 10,000 rice planters benefited from the program, 
which cost approximately RM90 million.8  
 Apart from that, the Social Welfare Department of Malaysia has continuously 
provided programs and support for the elderly, poor children and the disabled. In 
2005 and 2006, the department spent more than RM30 million, obviously from the 
federal financial budget, on Selangor.9 It is clear that the federal government, having 
                                                 
7 Jabatan Audit Negara Malaysia, Laporan Audit Negara 2010 (Putrajaya: Jabatan Audit Negara, 
2011), 29, 42. 
8 For the three years, Selangor has produced 90.5 million metric tonnes of rice. Jabatan Audit Negara 
Malaysia, Laporan Audit Negara 2006 (Putrajaya: Jabatan Audit Negara, 2007), 172, 166. 
9 According to the Social Welfare Department’s Report, the spending in Selangor for its programs in 
2005 and 2006 are as follows: 
Programs  2005  
(RM in Millions) 
2006 
(RM in Millions) 
Children Aid 3.9 3.2 
Elderly Aid 2.9 4.8 
General Aid 5.3 4.0 
Natural Disaster Aid 0.3 0.17 
Aid for artificial limb 0.3 0.08 
Allowance for working disables 2.9 3.5 
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greater resources, has initiated many projects and made substantial provision for 
them.  
 In fact, poverty is relative to local conditions. Although the federal 
government could make more substantial provision for the development of the state, 
the state government has detailed insight into the situation in its territory. That is why 
the federal government has been deploying state officials in a monitoring role to 
ensure that projects under its auspices are running well. The progress and 
achievement of the projects are overseen by district officers who report to the 
Chairman of the State Development Committee, this person being also the Chief 
Minister of the individual state.10 The role of the state government thus appears to be 
merely that of a monitoring agent, not directly involved in the implementation of 
programs; which suggests that its functions are of secondary importance.  
 In 2009, the federal government estimated that poverty in Selangor was 
around 0.7 percent, which equals approximately 35,000 poor  households. Looking 
back to the poverty situation in the 1970s, with 30% in poverty, such an achievement 
might be considered impressive.11 
 However, due to rapid urbanization, leading to the escalation of living costs, 
such figures do not necessarily give a true picture of overall poverty in the state. The 
Selangor state government, therefore, besides being active in promoting federal 
government programs, also offers complementary initiatives through its own 
departments and local authorities.  
 The Selangor government, for example, introduced a p rogram called 
Kerajaan Perihatin (Concerned Government) in the mid-1990s to provide new 
accommodation and repair existing houses for the poor. Through the program, each 
recipient will receive either a basic house in a specified relocation area, or a specified 
                                                                                                                                          
Refer to http://www.jkm.gov.my/jkm/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=314&task=View 
category&catid=45&lang=ms (accessed February 11, 2011). 
10 Prime Minister’s Department, “Malaysia: 30 Years of Poverty Reduction”, 11-13; 41-42; 
Government of Selangor, Blue Print Membasmi Kemiskinan Di Negeri Selangor (Shah Alam:UPEN, 
2006), 2-4. 
11 Government of Malaysia, Tenth Malaysian Plan 2011-2015 (Putrajaya: Government Printers, 
2011), 417; http://www.epu.gov.my/html/themes/epu/html/RMKE10/img/pdf/bm/lampiran.pdf 
(accessed 12 July, 2012).  
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amount up to RM7000 to repair the currently occupied home.12  
 Apart from providing accommodation, the state government has introduced 
income generation programs since the early 2000s. Through Program Dana Nelayan 
(Fisheries Fund Program) for example, individual fishermen are helped to acquire 
new fishing equipment, normally with a sum of about RM5000. The government also 
improved the basic requirements of fishing activity in the state, such as jetties or 
docks where the fishermen could disembark and unload their goods.13 
 State government also, introduced a program called Entrepreneurship Fund 
which focused on helping through business aid. The selected individuals are helped 
to become actively involved in small businesses, through being provided with 
monetary capital aid and other necessary facilities. A report indicated that until mid 
of 2000s RM 4.4 million has been disbursed in the form of grant and loan.14  
 On the basis of what the state government has offered, we can suggest that it 
prefers to rectify economic imbalance in society by the relatively long-term approach 
of empowering the poor through income generation programs. As the government 
has a limited budget, the provision for each individual is normally restricted to a 
maximum of RM5000. The government also needs support from other agencies; for 
example, the “Kerajaan Perihatin” project involves collaboration between the 
government and other agencies. 
 In conclusion, this brief discussion has shown that Selangor is a multiracial 
state, which suggests that it is not exceptional in regard to facing the racial challenge. 
As a state in a federal country, the distribution of power between state and federal 
regimes places Selangor’s economic management in federal hands. The state must 
cooperate with the federal administration in implementing national economic policy. 
Since the financial budget mainly comes from the federal government, plans for  
development and poverty eradication have mainly originated with it. The state, 
meanwhile, plays a secondary role by closely monitoring any federal projects to 
                                                 
12 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Laporan Seminar Pembasmian Kemiskinan Bandar dan Luar Bandar”, Shah 
Alam, 13 May 2004, 16; Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Selangor (UPEN), Rancangan Malaysia 
Ke-9 Selangor Darul Ehsan 2006-2010 (Shah Alam: UPEN, 2007),  48. 
13 UPEN, Rancangan Malaysia Ke-9, 49; “Pelbagai Skim Disedia Tingkat Taraf Hidup”, Berita 
Minggu, December 9, 2007; “Dana Nelayan Diperluas Seluruh Negeri”, Berita Harian, July 30, 2004.  
14 Azizan Mohd Sidin, “Pembasmian Kemiskinan di Selangor Dalam Tempoh RM ke 8” in 
Pembasmian Kemiskinan Bandar dan Luar Bandar (Petaling Jaya: INMIND,  2005), 170.  
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ensure that they are correctly implemented.  
 However, the nationwide basis on w hich poverty eradication is undertaken 
cannot always accurately depict the pattern of poverty. Therefore, the state 
government has initiated several projects, mostly in the form of income generation. 
These are considered complementary programs, dependent on the financial capability 
of the state government. Indeed, finances being rather limited, the state has had to 
cooperate with other agencies and find other financial resources. This necessity 
eventually led to the proactive initiative of adopting zakat as an official instrument 
with which to pursue the state’s objectives, as we shall see in the following sections.  
 
6.2.2 Bureaucratic and legal aspect of zakat in Selangor  
 Regarding the state’s management, the sultan (ruler) is the highest authority, 
with administration mainly carried out by the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister is 
head of the state executive, assisted by the State Executive Council whose members 
are elected in a state poll held once every five years.15 
 Since the ruler is the head of Islam in the state, the development of Islamic 
institutions, including zakat, has been promoted on his initiative. On the one hand, 
this could be seen as a personal effort to control and maintain Muslims’ 
understanding of their own religion. On the other, it could be seen as a reactive move 
towards building a larger and stronger organization following a decline in his 
power.16  In this context, a brief history of the Selangor sultanate perhaps merits 
elaboration.  
 The power of the currently reigning ruler can be traced back to the eighteenth 
century, when Raja Lumu, the first ruler, from a b ranch of the Bugis family 
established at Riau, south of Singapore, started to rule Selangor in 1742.17 In the 
nineteenth century, the power struggle between royal families claiming lucrative 
areas of tin mining (the then booming industry) threatened the political stability of 
                                                 
15 Muhammad Agus Yusoff,  Malaysian Federalism, Conflict or Consensus (Bangi: Penerbit UKM, 
2006), 69. 
16 Roff, “Patterns of Islamization”, 212. 
17 J.M Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya (London: The Athlone Press, 1958), 
14; R.J Wilkinson, A History of the Peninsular Malays with Chapters on Perak and Selangor 
(Singapore: Kelly and Walsh Limited, 1923), 141. 
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the state.18 To protect their economic interests in the state, the British took charge of 
restoring peace in the state and consequently became directly involved in local 
politics. By early 1875, British officials succeeded in persuading the sultan to accept 
a Resident and an Assistant Resident.19  
 In 1948, as a step towards facilitating the administration of Malay states, the 
British introduced the Federation of Malaya, a type of governance combining eleven 
Malay states under a single federal administration headed by a British High 
Commissioner. This new arrangement, however, did not make much difference to the 
division of power, whereby the federal government controlled a w ide range of 
national activities such as finance, citizenship, defence and foreign affairs. State 
rulers, assisted by the state Chief Minister, held power mainly related to religious 
affairs and other matters pertaining to land and local customs within their respective 
territories.20This type of federal administration has been inherited and maintained up 
to the present time by independent Malaysia. 
 What we can observe is that, as a result of the process of political division, 
the appointment of residents, and later the formation of a federated type of 
government, the power of sultans was reduced considerably. The British through 
their residents took over almost all aspects of state administration such as tax 
collection and other functions which had previously been under the rulers’ auspices. 
Eventually, the ruler was merely looking after religious affairs and Malay customs. 
This is why religion became the object of the rulers’ greatest concern, with its 
administration being strengthened over time.     
 In Selangor, Sultan Alauddin Sulaiman Shah (1938-1942) and Sultan 
Hishamuddin Alam Shah (1945-1960) were among rulers who actively enhanced 
Islamic administration in the state during their reigns. Sultan Alauddin in his time, 
for example, introduced the teaching of the Quran in Malay schools and established 
two Arabic schools.21 In 1931, he also appointed a religious advisor to consult on 
                                                 
18 Khalid, “Islamic Law and Land”, 47 
19 Khalid, “Islamic Law and Land”, 50. 
20 “The Constitution of Malaysia”, Ninth Schedule; Yusoff,  Malaysian Federalism,70-71. 
21 Ahmad Rafei Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam dan 
Majlis Ugama Islam Negeri Selangor”, B.A Dissertation, University of Malaya, 1970/1971, 23. 
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religious questions and delivered religious speeches throughout the state. 22 
 Another important initiative was the inception of the religious department in 
1945 in Selangor by Sultan Hishamuddin. He was personally worried about the 
possible threat of communism following the Japanese invasion of Malay states 
(1941-1945), which he feared might cause the people to be misled by an ideology 
that decidedly contradicted the teachings of Islam.23 He argued for a department to 
deal with Islamic affairs in the state. In order to finance the new department he used 
the royal allowance to pay its staff and allocated his own office to it.24 This effort 
was well received by the British as such a project was obviously in line with the 
colonial government’s interest in turning the people’s hearts against the 
communists.25  
 The call from the ruler has paved the way for the establishment of the Islamic 
Religion Department of Selangor (Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor or IRDS) in 1948 
as one of the official mechanisms of the state government.26 A few years later, in 
1952, the Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (Islamic Religious Council of Selangor or 
IRCS) was established. Its purpose was mainly to advise the ruler in determining the 
direction of religious administration in the state.  Hence, in the relationship between 
the IRCS and IRDS, the former is chiefly associated with policy- making while the 
latter is charged with the day-to-day operation and implementation of policy.27 The 
IRCS, in this respect, could be considered the cementing factor between the ruler and 
Islamic concerns in the state.28  
 The role and nature of the IRCS were clearly defined in the Administration of 
Muslim Law Enactment 1952, a gazetted legal document describing all aspects of the 
                                                 
22 Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”, 24. 
23 “ Sejarah Latar Belakang Penubuhan JAIS”, http://www.jais.gov.my/index. php?option=com 
_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=52, (accessed November 23, 2010);  Khalid, “Islamic Law and 
Land”, 128; Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”, 26-27. 
24 Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”, 27. 
25 Khalid, “Islamic Law and Land”, 128; For more information about the then government strategies 
to counter the communist insurgency in Malaya, please refer to: Riley Sunderland, Winning the 
Hearts and Mind of the People: Malaya: 1948-1960 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1964). 
26 “ Sejarah Latar Belakang Penubuhan JAIS”, http://www.jais.gov.my/index.php?option =com_ 
content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=52, (accessed November 23, 2010). 
27 Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Malaya , 151. 
28 Khalid, “Islamic Law and Land”, 129. 
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council such as its constitution, membership and powers.29 At its start, the IRCS 
consisted of at least eight members selected by the state ruler, and from time to time 
was required to call a meeting to discuss religious matters under its control.30  
 Financially, it was understood that the IRCS, as a corporate advisory body, 
must have its own resources without relying on government assistance. In this 
context, the enactment, within its financial section, stated that the IRCS could 
manage the Muslim fund called Baitulmal.  
A Fund to be known as Baitulmal is hereby established. Such Fund shall 
consist of all money and property, movable or immovable, which by 
Muslim law or under the provisions of this Enactment or rules made here 
under accrues or is contributed by any person to the Fund. 31 
 
 Through the Baitulmal, the IRCS has been able to generate financial 
resources with which to sustain the body. From the early days of its formation until 
the end of the 1960s, for instance, the overall assets of the division amounted to 
approximately RM 500,000, mainly from donations and unclaimable inheritances of 
Muslims in the state.32  
 Apart from Baitulmal, the role of zakat administration in the state of Selangor 
was also conferred on the IRCS. It thus became the only body empowered to collect 
the zakat and al- fitr from every Muslim in the state on be half of His Royal 
Highness. The relevant provision of the enactment reads: 
The Majlis shall have the power, and shall be under the duty, to 
collect on behalf of His Highness the Sultan, and to dispose of as the 
Majlis with the approval of His Highness may, subject to the 
provisions of this Enactment, direct, all zakat and al-fitrah payable in 
the State in accordance with Muslim law.33 
 
 Since its formation, the IRCS has collected and distributed the money in a 
number of ways. Initially, the council itself took the initiative by setting up a unit for 
the purpose. In the mid-1990s the IRCS introduced a corporate body to manage the 
                                                 
29 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (State of Selangor) 1952; Administration of the Religion 
of Islam Enactment (State of Selangor) 2003, Section 5. 
30 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (State of Selangor) 1952. 
31 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (State of Selangor) 1952, Section 94. 
32 Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”, 106-109. 
33 Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment (State of Selangor) 2003, Section 86.  
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fund on its behalf. This new development in zakat administration in the state will be 
discussed in a later section.    
 From what has been discussed so far, we can see that colonialism diminished 
the power of state rulers, who then directed their focus towards their particular 
remits, especially religion. To this end, the rulers in Selangor have established 
religious administrative institutions, namely the IRDS and IRCS. The IRDS is a state 
instrument financed by government mainly as an implementing body for government 
policy pertaining to religious affairs. The IRCS is an advisory body reporting directly 
to the ruler and responsible for zakat administration.  
 At a glance, it would appear that the IRCS is purely answerable to the ruler. If 
that were so, the state government would not have the opportunity to absorb the body 
and take advantage of its financial resources for the development of the state. This, 
however, is not the case, because, as we look at the members of the IRCS, we can see 
that the body has been regularly composed of government officials. Since the 
inception of the IRDS, its director, a government official, has been a member of the 
body. The IRDS director was made president (from 1952 to 1989), and thereafter 
appointed secretary, of the IRCS.34 In addition, other high-ranking state personnel 
such as state secretary, legal advisor, and state financial officer, are among the ex-
officio designated members. Indeed, such appointments show that the IRCS is 
closely linked with the state government, an arrangement which enables the two 
parties to move in the same direction.  
 It is not an exaggeration, therefore, to suggest that the IRCS has to a certain 
extent been influenced by government development policy, within which the IRCS 
could serve as a potential source of government finance. In the 1970s, the IRCS for 
example, invested its Baitulmal money in shares offered by the state and federal 
government in enterprises such as the Amanah Saham Nasional (Mutual Fund 
specially design for native races) and the Tabung Haji (Pilgrimage Fund). It was 
reported in 1974 that the total IRCS investment amounted to almost RM500,000.35  
Besides that, the IRCS has also spent zakat fund on development programs which 
                                                 
34 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (State of Selangor) 1952, Section 13; Enakmen 
Pentadbiran Perundangan Islam 1989, Seksyen 11. 
35 Khalid, “Islamic Law and Land”, 279. 
211 
 
partially supplemented that of the state government, as we shall see in later section. 
As the previous section indicated, the state government needs more financial 
resources for development, providing an opportunity for the IRCS to offer its 
assistance.  
 Based on the enactment’s provisions concerning zakat, we can say that the 
IRCS has the prerogative of ensuring better management in the collection and 
distribution of the fund. The scope of the IRCS pertaining to zakat encompasses, 
among other functions, prescribing from time to time the amount of zakat and  al- 
fitr to be paid by all Muslims, determining the method of fund collection and 
disbursement as well as appointing collection agents.36  
 What is interesting to note, however, is that the above provisions also include 
the clear condition that the fund’s management must be in accordance with “Muslim 
law”. “Muslim law” in this case actually means “Hukum Syarak” or Islamic law. In 
other parts of the enactment, it is indicated that any question regarding Islamic law 
must be referred to the Mufti (known as Mufti in Arabic which is literally known as 
the expounder of Islamic law).37 In this case, the Mufti is not merely a member of the 
IRCS but also an important individual in his capacity as the ruler’s advisor on 
Islamic jurisdiction.  
 It is worth discussing the role of the Mufti and his legal expedients as issues 
directly related to the administration of zakat. Any improvement or changes in zakat 
collection or disbursement must be referred to the Mufti for clarification. Within this 
thesis, such processes of legal deliberation will enter into our discussion on t he 
implementation of income generation in a later chapter.    
 As for procedural guidelines on issuing a fatwa, the enactment briefly stated 
the extent to which the Mufti can implement his opinion of a particular problem. 
Initially, the Mufti, assisted by a special fatwa committee, must follow the views of 
the Shafi’i school of law. If the view of this particular school might lead to an 
outcome inimical to the public interest, then the other three established schools, 
namely Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali can be consulted, or alternatively he can employ 
                                                 
36 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (State of Selangor) 1952, Section 107, 108. 
37 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (State of Selangor) 1952, Section 38; Administration of 
the Religion of Islam Enactment (State of Selangor) 2003, Seksyen 6, 45. 
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ijtihad without being strictly bound b y any established Sunnite school.38 The 
decision-making process, as outlined in the enactment, suggests that, although the 
Mufti may still rely strongly on a particular school, especially Shafi’i, as a dominant 
school, a tendency to use ijtihad is not ruled out.   
 From the discussion in this section, it could be inferred that the establishment 
of the IRCS represents an endeavour to help the state’s ruler play his role effectively 
as a paramount power in Islam. With its membership drawn from government 
officials, the direction of the body is indirectly influenced by government policy. 
What is pertinent here is that the nature of zakat as a f inancial resource under the 
IRCS is also a potential source of funds for development. Another important 
consideration in zakat management is the legal aspect. Where such questions arise, 
the Mufti has the power to advise the ruler as to the law.  
 
6.3 Development of the Zakat Institution in Selangor  
 This section will discuss about the development of zakat institution in 
Selangor from its inception through the era of corporatization. It comprises three 
parts. The first part will elaborate the development of the institution in 1950s and 
1960s. The second parts will elaborate what happened to the institution during 1970s 
and 1980s, where the Islamization phenomenon started to usher. The final part will 
focus on its development after corporatization. In general, it will be made clear that 
zakat has been transformed from merely a religious tradition to a potential fund for 
poverty eradication in Selangor.  
1. 1953-1969- The formation period 
  The IRCS began collecting and disbursing zakat from Muslims in the state in 
1953. From the commencement of the operation, the responsibility lay with the 
Secretary of the IRCS, aided by his clerical staff at the centre. At the district level, 
administration was mainly in the hands of religious officers such as the religious 
teachers’ supervisors (nazir guru agama) and the kadhi (district judge), who 
                                                 
38 Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment (State of Selangor) 2003, Section 48;  Mazni 
Abdul Wahab, “Pentadbiran Fatwa Di Negeri Selangor: Kajian Terhadap Enakmen Pentadbiran 
Perundangan Islam Selangor 1989”, Master Dissertation, University of Malaya, 2001, 77, 81; Hasnan 
Kasan, Institusi Fatwa di Malaysia ( Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2008), 77. 
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monitored the activities of local agents. All these officers were under the IRDS.39 
The actual collection of the fund was mainly carried out by the appointed local 
agents.40 Between the 1950s and the 1960s there were approximately 1000 local 
agents throughout the state.41 It appeared that the zakat operation relied primarily on 
these agents, helped considerably by the government, inasmuch as the district 
officers were with the IRDS, a government department. Due to limited financial 
income, as it was still newly formed, the IRCS did not have its own officers for 
dealing specifically with the fund.  
 The collection and disbursement system during this phase was also rather 
unsystematic. In the early years of its formation, only two types of zakat, namely al- 
fitr and zakat on cereal (rice), were subject to mandatory payment to the IRCS. Up to 
1954, payment from other sources of wealth was still a matter of personal 
prerogative.42 In 1955, perhaps in order to increase zakat collection, payment from 
types of wealth other than al-fitr and cereals also had to be made to the IRCS. Unlike 
zakat on cereals, forms of wealth such as business and personal savings, however 
could only be submitted to the zakat offices, as local agents had no power over them. 
As a result, this modification did not bring any significant change.43 In the end, the 
collection was not encouraging, the fund gathered from business up to the end of the 
1960s amounting to only RM16,790.44      
 In dispersing the fund, the agents did not have to surrender all the collection 
to the zakat unit but could disburse some of it locally for the benefit of the poor and 
the mosques. From the beginning of the zakat operation until the end of the 1960s, 
for example, it was reported that the agents had to surrender only half the collection 
of al- fitr and three-eighths of the zakat on cereal. In the case of al- fitr, an eighth of 
the total collection was first subtracted for the agent’s fee. Two-eighths were then 
given to the poor and needy, and another eighth to the local mosques under the 
heading of fi sabil allah (in the path of Allah). In the case of cereal, only three-
eighths had to be remitted to the IRCS. The balance went to the agents, the local poor 
                                                 
39 Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”, 98. 
40 Khalid, “Islamic Law and Land”, 270. 
41 Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”, 99. 
42 The Administration of Muslim Law (Fitrah and Zakat) Rules 1953, No 2, No 9. 
43 Administration of Muslim Law (Fitrah and Zakat) (Amendment) Rules 1955, No. 14, No. 15. 
44 Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”,  101. 
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and needy (two-eighth each), and another three-eighth for the mosques and zakat 
agents and supervisors. 45  
 Leaving the disbursement to the agent could be seen as a way of ensuring that 
local people, especially the poor, would benefit from the collected fund. However, 
excessive power in the agents’ hands exposed the fund to the possibility of abuse. 
Consequently, in the 1950s, there were cases in the state of the agent failing to remit 
the collected fund to the IRCS. In 1955, for instance, a case was reported in an 
agricultural area of Selangor in which, from a total collection of RM334,980 of zakat 
on rice that was supposed to be submitted to the office, only RM167,490 was 
actually handed in on time. The problem was still occurring in the 1960s. In 1961, 
there was another case in which an agent failed to submit in full the amount that he 
received from the payers.46 
 Perhaps due to mismanagement of the fund by the agent, leading to a lack of 
trust in IRCS collection, farmers were not persuaded to surrender their payment. 
Eventually, the collection of zakat on cereal declined from RM21,000 in 1954 to 
under RM9000 in 1959. It declined further in the 1960s, to approximately RM2000 
in 1969. Until the end of the decade, the IRCS appeared to be struggling with the 
administration of the fund. The collection relied solely on al- fitr, which in 1969 
contributed RM273,000 of the total RM292,000 collected fund.47   
 For a view of the overall situation in the 1950s and 1960s, it is worth 
mentioning an academic exercise submitted in 1971 by a local writer on the subject 
of the religious administration in Selangor. In his discussion of religious institutions, 
particularly the IRDS and IRCS, he devoted a small section to the zakat operation in 
Selangor between 1953 and 1969.48 Although, in general, he merely described the 
process of collection and disbursement of the fund and gave some related statistics 
(such as those presented above), it is interesting to look at his opinion of the overall 
condition of the institution.   
  He admits that the collection was rather unsatisfactory (kurang memuaskan) 
                                                 
45 For the complete procedure of disbursement, refer Peraturan Kutipan dan Pembahagian Zakat Fitrah 
Selangor (Pindaan) 1973; Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”, 99-103  
46 Nasir, “Development of the Secular and Religious Taxation”, 246. 
47 Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”,  104. 
48Abdullah, “Struktur, Organisasi dan Fungsi Jabatan”, 97-104.  
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and offers a few reasons why. According to him, the failure of the IRCS to collect a 
more satisfactory amount occurred because the Muslims at that time were still 
unaware of their new obligation to submit the payment to the IRCS or its local 
agents. The IRCS, for its part, lacked the initiative to promote its role for the purpose 
of attracting payment. Those who were aware of the mandatory payment simply 
evaded it, believing that it would not benefit them, since no economic projects in 
their interests had been carried out by the IRCS in return for their payments.49  
 In sum, it appeared that the condition of zakat administration was still far 
from satisfactory, despite the fact that the regulation for mandatory payment to the 
IRCS was already in force. The administrative machinery faced a shortage of 
competent human resources. Local agents seemed insufficiently competent to collect 
and disburse the fund at the local level. In the centre, the IRCS was mainly helped by 
officials from the IRDS. As those officials had their own concurrent responsibilities, 
it seemed that zakat administration was simply an extra burden for them. Eventually, 
the collection was mainly drawn from zakat al- fitr alone. Other types of wealth, 
including rice, did not apparently contribute much to the total collection. If we refer 
to the preceding chapter, we can see that this circumstance is consistent with the fact 
that the economic condition of Muslims during this period was mostly one of 
poverty. Such a state of affairs exacerbated the difficulty of zakat collection. 
Altogether, as with the zakat situation in other states, the zakat fund was still far from 
being a potential financial resource for development.  
 
2. 1970s and 1980s – The force of Islamization and the attempt to improve 
zakat 
 As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Islamization phenomenon in the 
country and the improvement in Malays’ living conditions to a certain extent affected 
the zakat institution. It was the same in Selangor as elsewhere. In consequence, the 
collection of zakat in Selangor has slightly improved, especially in relation to the 
wealth associated with urban activities such as business and commerce. 
 As also earlier discussed, the federal government initiated seminars and 
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discussions in order to find better ways of improving zakat management. The IRCS 
supported the effort, not merely offering cooperation but also organizing its own 
seminars, as we shall see later. It can be asserted that the IRCS in the 1980s showed 
itself keen to make some improvements and open to all ideas. Perhaps it was because 
no suitable model had yet been adopted that no significant change could be seen in 
the overall administration. That is why, in the following decades, the body did not 
hesitate to adopt the corporatization model, for disbursement as well as collection.  
 During the Islamization of society in the 1970s, Selangor was the area of 
Malaysia in which religious movements were most noticeable. ABIM, for example, 
was very popular among university students. One writer estimated that the ABIM in 
the 1970s was supported by between 10% and 40% of students at the National 
University of Malaysia, the University of Malaya and the University of 
Agriculture.50 What is interesting here is that all these institutions were located in 
Selangor. As ABIM has many activities to offer the wider society apart from 
university students, such as educational centres for children and school leavers and 
religious discussion circles open to the public, it might be surmised that the local 
population was to an extent potentially influenced by the groups.    
 Two other movements, al-Arqam and Tabligh, were also active in the state. 
Selangor is the main centre of the al-Arqam movement, its first residential commune 
having been set up i n the 1970s in Sungai Penchala, an area just outside Kuala 
Lumpur. Although the movement had its special location in which to organize most 
of its activities, it was not completely withdrawn from society. Al-Arqam has 
actively conveyed its ideas to the wider society through its founder’s talks, recorded 
and sold in the form of radio cassettes, and also through publications sold to the 
community at large. The group also ran schools and kindergartens offering basic 
education to all interested members of the public. The organization also maintained 
factories chiefly producing foods, garages for mending vehicles and also clinics 
specializing in maternity services and staffed exclusively by women doctors and 
nurses.51 All these activities illustrate the group’s mutual relationship not only with 
its members but also with the wider community. In this respect, since Selangor was 
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the first and most important location for the movement’s activities, we can safely say 
that there its impact was probably felt the most.    
 Tabligh, like the other two movements discussed, has been an active presence 
in Selangor. As previously mentioned, its focus is on persuading Muslims generally 
to be more observant and devoted, to fulfil their duties as followers and to avoid any 
wrongdoing in terms of the tenets of Islam. Selangor has been an important centre of 
the movement since the 1970s. Since Tabligh originated in India, prior to the 1970s, 
when Malays were still not familiar with any religious movement, the group merely 
comprised a few members of the Indian Muslim community, especially in Kuala 
Lumpur. In the early 1970s, as the Tabligh started to invite Malay religious figures 
(including al-Arqam’s founder) to give talks, it was gradually accepted by Malay 
Muslims, especially in Kuala Lumpur (still under Selangor), where many mosques in 
the area became its headquarters.52 The main headquarters occupied Masjid India 
(Indian Mosque) in the heart of Kuala Lumpur, before moving to a better and bigger 
mosque in Seri Petaling, another section of Selangor, in the early 1990s. 
  As noted earlier, the zakat collection was also influenced by the economic 
improvement experienced by Malays. The Malaysian government in the mid-1970s 
encouraged migration from rural to urban areas as a strategy for freeing Malays from 
overdependence on subsistence agriculture. As a result, the decades of the 1970s and 
1980s saw the rise of urbanization in Malaysia in general and Selangor in particular. 
Selangor in these decades was the fastest-growing state in the country in terms of 
urban population. A number of towns in Selangor, such as Petaling Jaya, Shah Alam, 
and Ampang, have since been among the most densely populated areas in Malaysia 
due to the abundant job opportunities there.53 During the 1980s, more than half a 
million people, mainly from predominantly Malay states such as Kelantan, Negeri 
Sembilan and Johor, moved into Selangor.54 In addition, average annual income in 
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the state increased from RM3363 in 1970s to RM4668 in 1980, which meant that the 
economic conditions of the population as a whole had improved.55 
 The changes in people’s attitudes towards religion, as well as in their 
economic circumstances, probably sparked awareness in the IRCS, as a result of 
which the body made some changes in zakat administration in the state. In the early 
1970s, for example, by contrast with previous decades when the administration of 
zakat was the personal responsibility of the Secretary of the IRCS, a zakat unit was 
now established in the centre, manned by a few staff members who administered the 
fund.56  
 The IRCS also introduced some changes in its collection and disbursement 
procedures, in order to improve the collection and boost the people’s confidence in 
the body. For instance, the IRCS, rather than appointing agents unilaterally, set up a 
committee in every village to nominate them. The agent also no longer had the power 
to disburse the collected fund personally, but was required submit it all to the centre 
after deducting his portion (one-eighth).57 Apart from that, at the central office and 
each district office, the IRCS empowered the secretary or district judge to scrutinize 
the financial accounts of every business belonging to Muslims in his area.58  
 Eventually the fund collected in this era was slightly higher than that which 
had been raised previously. By the end of the 1970s, the zakat collection amounted to 
more than RM1 million. And, in keeping with the above analysis pertaining to 
urbanization in the state, the zakat fund collected in urban areas was higher than that 
collected in rural areas. In 1978, the collection in the urban IRCS offices in Klang 
and Shah Alam amounted to respectively RM270,000 and RM104,000, much higher 
than in the rurally based offices of Sabak Bernam and Kuala Selangor, where the 
collection totalled only RM58,000 and RM78,000.59    
 According to a number of reports, the zakat collection in the state also 
gradually increased in the 1980s, as outlined below:  
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Table 6.1: Zakat Collection in Selangor According to the Type of Wealth  
from 1980 to 1988 (in RM) 
Year al- Fitr Zakat on business 
and property 
Paddy Amount 
1980 1180338 179571 38572 1398481 
1981 1248711 384841 44839 1678391 
1982 1403302 369536 55392 1828230 
1983 1537181 483178 29373 2049732 
1984 1577708 1089292 23324 2667000 
1985 1785030 900000 23000 2685030 
1986 1961030 1160000 3121030 
1987 1715300 1700000 3415300 
1988 1855000 2060000 3915000 
Sources: Adapted from Khalid, “Islamic Law and Land” 348; Wahab et.al, “Case Study:  Malaysia”, 
361; Tarimin, Zakat Pertanian, 60. 
 On the basis of the table, we can offer a few observations. There was clearly a 
particular increase in collection from the types of wealth related to commerce and 
trade, a change indicating the urbanization and economic betterment of city-dwelling 
Muslims. It also suggests a higher level of religious awareness among them, since 
payers of zakat on this type of wealth were required to submit their payment 
personally to the IRCS offices, a procedure which at that time could entail 
considerable effort. In this regard, although the IRDS had the power to force business 
owners to pay zakat, having scrutinized their financial accounts, we doubt that such a 
situation ever actually arose. Since the district judge and the Secretary of the IRCS 
(who was also the Director of the IRDS) were understood to have their own key 
responsibilities, it would have been quite impossible for them to monitor all 
businesses in the district personally.  
 As for the increase in collection of zakat on rice, the changes in collection 
practice, earlier introduced by the IRCS, could to a certain degree have succeeded in 
encouraging people to pay. Apart from that, we cannot reject the possibility of a 
change in rural Muslims’ attitude towards their religion. After being in operation for 
a decade, the religious groups might well have penetrated into rural areas. But the 
collection from this type of wealth could not be expected to have exceeded that from 
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business and commerce, since the rural farmers, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, were regarded as lagging behind the urban dwellers economically.  
  The higher collection, however, was not followed by better distribution, in 
particular for poverty alleviation. Annually, each poor person received no more than 
a mere RM40. In 1977, for example, the poor received RM7 annually while the 
needy were allocated RM20 each. In 1982, t he allocation was slightly raised to 
RM15 for the former and RM38 for the latter group.60 Such amounts would 
definitely not change their economic conditions, as RM38 in the 1980s could only 
pay for approximately 20 kilograms of rice. We calculate that such a sum might 
suffice for a poor family for perhaps a month or two.  
 Since the IRCS has hardly ever released an annual report showing how the 
fund was disbursed, we believe that most of it was used for other purposes such as 
administration and other IRCS activities. Such disbursement has been broadly 
categorized in the state as fi sabil allah (in the way of Allah), Muallaf qulubihim 
(those whose hearts are reconciled) and al-Riqab (converts or those who are bonded). 
The disbursement under these headings were usually in the form of religious 
programs and classes, scholarships for religious education, financial assistance for 
mosques and many other IRCS programs.61 In 1986, for instance, from a total 
disbursement of RM2,228,914, only RM404,358 went to the poor and needy.62   
 Although there were still many weaknesses in the IRCS operation, the body 
generally began to make a visible effort to improve its administration. Besides fully 
supporting the research and seminars arranged by the federal government, the IRCS 
started organizing its own seminars, inviting scholars from outside as well as from 
within the state. In January 1980, for example, it organized a seminar on zakat, at 
which five papers were presented. They mainly discussed the problems of zakat 
collection not only in Selangor but also in Malaysia as a whole.63 Another seminar, 
under the title of Zakat Selangor, was organized in 1988. Three papers were 
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discussed at this event, all of them related to the collection mechanism and 
challenges posed by the process.64  
 What is important here is that the IRCS was not merely receptive to efforts of 
the federal government, but initiated its own projects. Together with some changes 
introduced earlier by the body, these moves indicated its keenness to improve the 
administration of the fund and adequately demonstrated the body’s openness to 
positive change.   
 Based on the discussion in this section, we can thus summarize by saying that 
the development of the zakat institution in Selangor in the 1970s and 1980s was 
aided by the Islamization of society and to a certain extent was concomitant with the 
improvement in Muslims’ economic conditions. The collection of the fund in this 
period appeared to increase slightly, especially in relation to the wealth derived from 
business and commerce. 
 In response to these developments, the IRCS made some changes in its 
operation and also organized a few seminars to investigate ways of improving its 
performance. The overall enhancement of zakat management, however, had not yet 
materialized in this phase, as the body was still searching for ideas and seemed 
receptive to any potential solution. Significant change in zakat administration only 
materialized when the following decade was ushered in.  
  
3. Corporatization of zakat in Selangor – zakat for financial source of 
development  
 In the 1990s, the IRCS continuously showed its interest in improving the 
zakat operational system. The corporatization in Federal Territory indeed opened the 
eyes of the IRCS to the possibility of employing similar mechanisms for zakat 
management. Eventually, Selangor became the second state, following Federal 
Territory, to apply such an initiative.  
 The registration of the corporate zakat body as a private limited company 
called MAIS Zakat Sdn Bhd was carried out in early October 1995.65 The process of 
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corporatizing the organization cost the IRCS approximately RM500,000.66 For the 
first few years, the company was known as Pusat Pungutan Zakat (PPZ MAIS). To 
avoid confusion with the neighbouring state’s zakat institution, its name was later 
changed to the Selangor Zakat Centre (Pusat Zakat Selangor or SZC), on 30 October 
1996.67  
 The corporatization approach was chosen for its actively proven effectiveness 
in Federal Territory. Additionally, the ICRS regarded such an initiative as the best 
choice in that it freed the body from reliance on IRDS support. The IRCS realized 
that the limited financial provision from Selangor’s state government for religious 
administration (through the IRDS) meant that no extra funds could be used for the 
improvement of zakat administration. Hence, corporatization not only was ideal 
because of its potential for collecting more funds, but also suited the financial 
capacities of the IRCS and of the state government.68  
 Regarding the establishment of corporate administration of zakat in Selangor, 
there were a few indications that the state’s project was related to and to some extent 
benefited from the earlier development of the zakat institution in Kuala Lumpur: 
1. The idea and practical source was the Islamic Religious Council of Federal 
Territory (IRCFT), the only council that had introduced corporate collection. 
On 18 May 1993, a group of IRDS representatives, comprised of its director 
and members of a special committee formed to study the zakat organization 
in Selangor, paid a visit to the Zakat Collection Centre of Federal Territory to 
have a closer look at the running of the newly corporatized zakat institution.69 
The person behind the process was the IRDS Director/IRCS Secretary at the 
                                                                                                                                          
65 Normala M. Sa’ad, “Tahniah Pusat Zakat Selangor Kini 10 Tahun” Asnaf, 1/2004, 4; Pusat Zakat 
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time, who had convinced IRCS members to adopt the new mechanism of 
zakat management in the state.70 
2. The key officers, including the first Chief Executive Officer of Selangor 
Zakat Centre, were former executives of the Zakat Collection Centre of 
Federal Territory. As a former officer in the centre, he was head of Business 
Owners (a unit focusing on c ollecting zakat on business) in 1994.71 Apart 
from him, there was also a former staff member of a similar organization, 
who went on to hold the highest position in the collection department.72  
 Administratively, the SZC at its infant stage had been under the direction of a 
handful of officers in Petaling Jaya. From 1994 unt il 1997, the SZC was only 
responsible for collection activities, with the disbursement function still being 
handled by the IRCS zakat unit. Both the collection and disbursement systems were 
handed over to the SZC only after 1998.73 Indeed, Selangor was the first state to take 
the bold step of placing both collection and distribution within one corporate entity. 
This was made possible by the confidence of the IRCS that, under the corporate 
operation, the development of the zakat institution could be accelerated. 
 The SZC existed until the mid-2000s, the entity being slightly changed when 
the IRCS saw that the collection was nearly RM100 million, a huge amount for a 
small private limited company. In 2006, the body was changed into a trust entity 
known as Lembaga Zakat Selangor (Zakat Board of Selangor or ZBS).74 This action 
represented a step further towards instilling the confidence to prepare 
organizationally for the greater role of zakat in the state. 75   
 The change in the organizational structure of zakat (from SZC to ZBS) was 
an IRCS measure which kept the body securely under its power, giving the zakat 
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Tahunan 2000, 3. 
74 The new body was registered under Trustee (incorporation) Act 1952. Ima Syuhada Ismail and 
Norazimah Mohd Rayes, “LZS (MAIS): Satu Transformasi”, Asnaf, 1/2006, 10.   
75 Normala Md. Sa’ad, “Lembaga Zakat Selangor Lembaran Baru PZS”, Asnaf, 1/2006, 6; Normala 
Md. Sa’ad and Akhtar Sahari, “Naik Taraf LZS (MAIS) Pengiktirafan Tidak Ternilai”, Asnaf, 1/2006, 
8; Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2006 (Shah Alam: LZS, 2007), 10.  
224 
 
body more room to make its own decisions. In this respect, the ZBS is governed by 
trustees appointed by the ruler at the corporate level. The fact that many of them hold 
IRCS membership at the same time shows that the ZBS is still under the auspices of 
that organization.76  
 Besides this, six committees were formed to help both trustee members and 
operational officials in determining the direction of the organization and 
simultaneously making important decisions. These committees are also responsible 
for supervising all activities of the ZBS and ensuring that the process of overall zakat 
administration is run smoothly, in accordance with what is outlined in the operating 
procedures.77 
 The formation of these committees led to the ZBS having more power to 
make decisions and fewer bureaucratic problems. For example, the ZBS, with the 
approval of its human resource committee, has over time easily expanded its 
workforce to about 200; prior to that, under the SZC, it had only about 100 staff. 78 
As for financial matters, the new body, with its committee’s approval, can make 
payments to any zakat recipients or meet corporate expenses, up to RM500,000, 
without necessarily meeting with the IRCS.79     
 Another interesting point worth mentioning is that the establishment of the 
ZBS was actually part of a continuous effort by the IRCS to strengthen the 
organization with the aim of forming a poverty eradication body. This strategy 
reflected the objective of the new management as compared to that of the old.  
  The stipulated objective of the old body (SZC) was merely to improve zakat 
administration, in the hope of eventually gaining society’s confidence in the zakat 
institution.80 No specific statement was made about poverty eradication. It therefore 
seemed that the IRCS was focused more on ensuring that the newly established SZC 
could increase its zakat collection.  
                                                 
76 Ahmad Shahir Makhtar, “Strategi Lembaga Pengelola Zakat Dalam Mengurangi Kemiskinan” in 
Southeast Asia Zakat Movement, ed. M. Ariffin Purwakananta and Noor Aflah (Jakarta: Forum Zakat, 
2008), 177; Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2006, 2.  
77 Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2006, 10-11; Lembaga Zakat 
Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2007 (Shah Alam: LZS, 2008), 15. 
78 “Sejarah”, http://www.e-zakat.com.my/sejarah-lzs/ (accessed June 3, 2011). 
79 Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2009 (Shah Alam: LZS, 2010), 19. 
80 Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Tahunan 2000, 4. 
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 By contrast with the former, the ZBS currently strives to achieve five 
objectives:  s trengthening zakat management, maximising the collection potential, 
eradicating poverty, improving the socio-economic conditions of the Muslims, and 
providing a quality service.81 The clear stipulation of poverty eradication as an aim 
indicated a serious effort by the new organization to reduce poverty through better 
disbursement.82 Indeed, the gradual development of zakat corporatization by the state 
could be considered an Islamization initiative towards the goal of poverty 
eradication. The collection and disbursement of the fund under the corporatized 
administration will be further discussed below. 
a. The better collection  
 Since its formation, the ZBS (and also the SZC) has been using a persuasive 
approach to attracting payers. This factor is important, since the body, although 
mandated as sole collector in the state, has no right to scrutinize an individual’s bank 
account; hence the zakat payment still depends mainly on individual willingness. To 
this end, the ZBS has implemented innovative programmes such as lectures and 
informative briefings as well as promotion and advertising. In lectures and 
informative briefings, the ZBS cultivates awareness and reminds people of their 
obligation to pay zakat. The potential payers will also be shown how to calculate 
their zakat on the basis of their personal revenue before making any payment to the 
ZBS.83  
 The ZBS has also, through time, been organizing promotional activities and 
advertising in local media. In this context, the body has collaborated with local 
newspapers and TV to publish news about the development of zakat in the state. This 
project is important for informing Muslims about the enterprises related to zakat.84 
What the ZBS has done in these areas could be seen as a continuation of the 
propagation activities carried out earlier by the religious movements, although 
                                                 
81 Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2007, ii. 
82 Makhtar, “Strategi Lembaga Pengelola”, 178; Sa’ad, “Lembaga Zakat Selangor”, 7; Sahadan Ishak, 
“PZS (MAIS) Ke LZS (MAIS): Satu Titik Perubahan”, Asnaf, 1/2006, 4; Sa’ad and Sahari, “Naik 
Taraf LZS (MAIS)”, 8. 
83 Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2006, 20-21; Syawal Kasam, 
“Governing Zakat as a S ocial Institution: the Malaysian Perspective”, in Southeast Asia Zakat 
Movement, ed. M. A riffin Purwakananta and Noor Aflah. (Jakarta: Forum Zakat, 2008), 115; 
Noormala Mohd Sa’ad and M. Azizan Abdullah, “Syukur RM108 juta”, Asnaf, 1/2005, 28. 
84 “DYMM Sultan Selangor Lancar Bulan Zakat Negeri Selangor”, Asnaf, 1/2007, 22; Pusat Zakat 
Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2005 (Shah Alam: PZS, 2006), 28-29. 
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perhaps in slightly different form. In fact, the ZBS has formed a unit named Dakwah 
Unit (the call/propagation unit) to implement all the above activities. For local 
people, Dakwah is actually a popular term associated with the religious movements, 
with reference to their propagation ventures.85 
 To relieve the payers of the need to visit the ZBS offices personally to make 
payment, the body has appointed professional collection agents.86 From early in its 
formation up to 2010, more than ten banks and financial institutions have become 
agents of collection. Besides that, payment by other means such as internet, post and 
direct deduction from personal monthly salaries has been introduced.87 It is hoped 
that the wide range of convenient payment methods will induce the prospective 
contributors to be more willing to pay.   
  Besides propagation and improved collection mechanisms, the ZBS believes 
that contributors should be informed as to how the fund is spent. This action is 
important for retaining the loyalty of existing payers so that they might become long-
term contributors. The chief method for keeping them informed is through the 
organization’s key publications and media, namely Asnaf, a quarterly magazine, the 
Annual Zakat Report, and the organization’s official website. Through these means, 
activities of the organization, including distribution statistics, will over time be 
reported as part of its commitment to transparency.  
 In short, many changes have been initiated to attract zakat payers. The 
measures introduced have actually been aimed predominantly at attracting 
accelerated payment from urban middle-income people, focusing on sources such as 
professional salaries, personal savings and business revenue. Such special attention 
can be observed in the campaign and information briefings, as these programs are 
commonly arranged in association with companies and targeted on professional 
income earners. On top of that, as rural dwellers have the local agents to collect 
zakat, the innovative appointment of financial institutions and the introduction of 
numerous other ways to pay zakat could be seen as efforts to make it easier for 
Muslim professionals to meet their obligations. In this context, it is evident that the 
                                                 
85 Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, 15. 
86 Kasam, “Governing Zakat”, 115; “LZS Lantik Angkasa Sebagai Agen kutipan Zakat”, Asnaf, 
2/2009, 27; Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2005, 34. 
87 Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2010(Shah Alam: ZBS, 2011), 23. 
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internet, direct salary deduction and banks are methods and institutions commonly 
associated with middle-income society.   
 After corporatization, zakat collection soared to approximately RM11 million 
in 1994 from merely RM8 million in 1993, and has consistently increased since 
then.88 The annual performance of the collection from 1994 through 2008 can be 
observed in the following table: 
Table 6.2: Collection amount of zakat after corporatization  
1994-2008 (in RM) 
Year  al- Fitr Zakat  Collection 
 
1994 2910376 8621006 11 531 382 
1995 3140022 12755296 15 895 318 
1996 3650595 24976271 28 626 866 
1997 4998379 26351771 31 350 149 
1998 4435486 32932815 37 368 301 
1999 4526309 30739166 35 265 475 
2000 11379998 39966873 51 346 871 
2001 6271942 55160808 61 432 751 
2002 7968825 70937301 78 906 126 
2003 8277365 78016867 86 294 232 
2004 9085932 98734674 107 820 606 
2005 9338255 123818131 133 156 386 
2006 9896315 150037698 159 934 013 
2007 11554176 190534968 202 089 144 
2008 12267963 232204921 244 472 884 
Sources: Asnaf, various issues; Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan 
Pengurusan Zakat Selangor, various issues; Lembaga Zakat Selangor, 
Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor, various issues;  Kasam, 
“Governing Zakat” 113-114. 
 
 The record of consistent increase in collection indicates that the 
corporatization mechanism adopted from the neighbouring Zakat Collection Centre 
of Federal Territory has successfully improved the zakat system in Selangor. If we 
examine the table, we find that, unlike zakat collection prior to corporatization, 
which was mostly derived from al- fitr, this type of wealth is no l onger the main 
                                                 
88 Rozita Marsidi, “Zakat dan Peranannya dalam Meningkatkan Taraf Ekonomi Umat Islam, Kajian 
Khusus di Negeri Selangor”, BA dissertation, University of Malaya, 1994, appendix 16. 
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contributor to the overall collection.89 Although the amount of al- fitr collected has 
indeed been growing steadily, the increase is merely a r eflection of the growing 
population.90 
 More detailed statistics of zakat collection by the ZBS from 2000 to 2008 can 
be found in Appendix 1. As we can see from the table, professional income 
contributed considerably to the total fund, amounting to between 27% and over 50%. 
The greater portion of zakat revenue from this type of wealth indicates, as earlier 
mentioned, that, due to urbanization and economic development in the state, more 
Muslims have become involved in urban-based economic activities. Indeed the 
greater attention paid by the ZBS to this segment of the population is a reflection of 
such phenomena.  
 By contrast, the collection of zakat on cereal (rice), which was among the 
main sources of wealth prior to corporatization, never reached 2% in this particular 
recorded period. In this respect, unlike the pattern in the 1950s and 1960s, when 
farmers were ignorant of their responsibility or simply evaded it because of mistrust 
of the IRCS, the situation changed after corporatization. The farmers are now 
considerably observant of their religious obligation, as the record shows a slight 
increase in collection of this type of wealth, as well as a higher collected sum than in 
the period prior to corporatization. 
 The more substantial reason for this situation is the general economic 
condition of farmers, which has lagged behind that of urban middle-class income 
earners. Although their living conditions are now improved over those of the 
previous decades, they still rely on support and help from the government. Price 
subsidies on rice and other forms of government agricultural support, such as 
fertilisers and pesticides, suggest that farmers are still among groups who require 
                                                 
89 Zakat collection in Selangor in 1970-s and 1980-s had been dominated by al- fitr. The al- fitr was 
then about between 60 to 80 percent from overall collection. Ghazali, “Zakat Administration”, 98; 
Khalid, “Islamic Law and Land”, 295.  
90  
Year 2004 2005 2006 
Al- fitr payer (million) 1.933 1.986 2.105 
Malay population (million) 2.396 2.471 2.542 
The table shows the statistic of Malay population in the state and total al- fitr payers between 2004 to 
2006. The gradual increment of both variables could fairly indicate that the payer of al-fitr increased 
as the total Malays went up. Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor, various 
issues; UPEN, State and Local Authority, 1. 
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help and should not be burdened with the need to pay taxes, including zakat. Indeed, 
in this aspect of the collection, the ZBS approach of giving extra attention to richer 
Muslims in the urban areas shows that the body clearly understands the modern 
development approach, whereby taxation should take account of economic 
conditions in society.  
 To sum up, the corporatization of zakat in Selangor has successfully raised 
the total collection of zakat in the state. The corporatization was an Islamization 
project on the part of the IRCS and the state of Selangor in response to the increase 
in religious awareness in society in the 1980s. Many improvements in the collection 
system have been initiated, focusing on t he better-off urban population, with the 
result that the zakat has been derived mainly from personal income and business.  
 The increase in collection, however, imposes greater responsibility on the 
ZBS. To ensure a sustainable collection, the organization must show a stronger 
commitment to more effective disbursement of the fund. In this context, poverty 
eradication is one of the main approaches towards which the ZBS is intensifying its 
efforts.  
b. Disbursement for poverty eradication  
 Corporatization not only brought about better fund collection. The new 
management approach improved the disbursement system, directing it towards 
greater use of the fund for poverty eradication.  
 Before corporatization, the IRCS in its distribution mechanism seemed to 
give only scant attention to poverty eradication, the fund being substantially used for 
administrative and other IRCS costs. The body did not have clear guidelines and 
policies which would enable the disbursement function to be exercised effectively. 
As the zakat unit did not have sufficient staff, it mainly relied on local agents to 
determine and name eligible recipients, especially from among the poor people in 
their respective localities. Eventually, as also stated in the preceding section, the 
disbursement, particularly for the poor, was only in the form of money given to them 
once annually during Ramadan. After all, the role of the IRCS was regarded as 
merely one of distribution, without consideration of the fund’s potential for 
developing the recipients economically.   
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 The disbursement function that was later corporatized in 1998. Soon after 
receiving a fresh mandate for distribution, the ZBS realized that the system should be 
updated and reorganized. The body was also aware that there was a sum of 
approximately RM19 million in undistributed funds, putting pressure on the newly 
mandated corporate organization to find a better way to solve the problem.91 It was 
actually from this point in time, that the ZBS began to grasp the importance of 
directing zakat more towards poverty eradication.  
  As a measure to improve its distribution system, the ZBS sought views from 
various local scholars through a workshop organized in December 1999. At this 
workshop, the panels discussed many aspects of disbursement such as its mechanism, 
the definition of recipients and the disbursal programs. The workshop eventually 
made some suggestions as to how to improve the disbursement system.92  
 The workshop suggested that disbursement, although it must be inclusive of 
all eligible recipients, must give priority to poverty eradication ahead of other 
expenditure. Such a prioritization is consistent with God’s ruling in the Quran, which 
clearly puts the poor and needy in first place.93Stemming from the resolution 
outlined by the workshop, the ZBS in 2002 issued a book entitled Fatwa Pengurusan 
Agihan Zakat Negeri Selangor (Fatwa on A dministration of the State of Selangor 
Zakat Disbursement) as general guideline and policy statement for the ZBS in 
administering the fund.94 Through the book, the ZBS outlined an improved guideline 
for determining which recipients were entitled to aid. 
 In order to properly assess a person’s eligibility to be considered poor, the 
ZBS introduced the had al-kifaya or subsistence limit.  The formula is based on the 
minimum amount of money one requires for necessities, encompassing six essential 
                                                 
91 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas Bengkel Mengemaskini Sistem Agihan Zakat Negeri 
Selangor”, Workshop on Improving Zakat Disbursement System, Ampang, 4 and 5 December 1999, 
21; “ Sistem  Agihan Zakat Diberi Nafas Baru”, Asnaf, 1/2000, 1.  
92 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”. 
93 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”. 
94 Jabatan Mufti Selangor, “Fatwa Committee  Meet ing Minute”, No. Mesyuarat J/Fatwa 5/2001; 
Zarina Jantan, “Takrif Fakir  dan Miskin Menurut Haddul Kifayah”, Asnaf, 2/2004, 24; Lembaga 
Zakat Selangor, “Kertas Cadangan Fatwa Penetapan Had Kifayah Negeri Selangor 2007-2010”, 
Proposal submitted to Fatwa Committee, 1/4/07; Azhana Abdul Mutalib, “Keciciran Fakir Miskin 
Punca dan Menanganinya”, Asnaf, 2/2004, 4. 
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elements of life: food, shelter, education, transportation, clothing and medication.95  
Using this indicator, the ZBS calculated that the minimum monthly income for an 
individual was between RM130 for an infant and RM680 for the head of a family.96 
Having less than the specified limit, one could be categorized as poor and qualify for 
aid from the zakat fund. Appendix 2 clarifies how the formula works.  
 The poor (miskin), for example, are defined as Muslims whose wealth or 
income barely suffices to cover 50% or more of their needs and those of their 
dependents. The needy or poorest (faqir) category of recipients technically refers to 
Muslims who have no wealth or income at all, or less than 50% of the amount 
required to meet their own and their dependents’ needs. Apart from that, it could 
refer to those without a lawful vocation. For this group of recipients the similar 
indicator of had al-kifaya will be applied.97 The establishment of the formula is 
crucial to easing the process of zakat application, whereby the ZBS can identify the 
position of the applicants straight away and determine whether they are poor or 
poorest. The standard focuses on the main breadwinner in a family; consequently 
those with more dependents would have a higher sufficiency limit.98   
 From the above guidelines and policy statement, it seemed that the 
disbursement for the poor and needy had to be given more attention. Apart from that, 
the guidelines also suggested that the disbursement should not merely aid the poor 
temporarily but also empower them permanently. Empowerment here means helping 
the recipients to improve their capabilities so that they need not continue to depend 
on zakat money. We will discuss about it again later.  
 Improvement of the disbursement practice could not materialize, however, 
only through new formulas and guidelines. Thus, the ZBS made changes to the 
handling of selection and application approval. After the corporatization of fund 
                                                 
95 The determination of the had al-kifaya was based on the study carried out by SZC in 2001. The 
study revealed that the cost of living in the urban and rural area was respectively RM900 and RM750. 
Ibrahim, “Economic Role of Zakat”, 6.22; Mohd Zool Fadli Mohd Noor, “Apa Itu Had Kifayah”, 
Asnaf, 3/2009, 29. 
96 Lembaga Zakat Selangor, “Penentuan Had Kifayah Selangor 2006-2010”, Working paper submitted 
to Fatwa Committee, No. 1/5/2006; Jantan, “Takrif Fakir  dan Miskin”, 24. 
97 Jabatan Mufti Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan Zakat Negeri Selangor”, Unpublished book for 
ZBS internal guideline, 7-21; Noormala Mohd Sa’ad, “Bantuan Khusus Fakir, Miskin dan Muallaf”, 
Asnaf, 2/2005, 31; Akhtar Sahari, “Zakat Membela Golongan Muallaf”, Asnaf, 3/2005, 31, Sahadan 
Ishak, “Asnaf Riqab- Pembebasan Daripada Terbelenggu”, Asnaf, 4/2005, 31.  
98 Mutalib, “Keciciran Fakir Miskin”, 4; Ibrahim, “Economic Role of Zakat”, 6.21. 
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disbursal, the ZBS did not rely entirely on local agents; the ZBS officers at district 
level were considerably empowered. Local agents would suggest names of those they 
deemed eligible for the zakat fund and ask them to fill out application forms. Zakat 
officers, upon receiving the proposed names (through the application forms), would 
visit and investigate each individual before deciding whether to approve or reject the 
application. Additionally, the officers could call on the local zakat committee, 
comprising local agents and the head of the village, to help in making the decision.99 
Hence, in a departure from previous practice, which was dominated by the local 
agents’ personal opinions, the decision on z akat recipients now involves many 
individuals and is closely monitored by the ZBS.  
 To ensure that the recipients can effectively utilize the given money and be 
permanently released from the poverty trap, the ZBS no longer merely distributes the 
fund but also concurrently promotes the individual development of the recipients. In 
this respect, the recipients’ individual needs will be ascertained. In addition to 
monetary aid and other basic necessities such as food and education, those with the 
potential for any economic activities will be given help in accordance with their 
expertise. Since corporatization, the disbursement of business capital and basic tools 
for agricultural or fishing activities have been among the popular fund distribution 
practices brought in by the ZBS. Indeed, the ZBS’s introduction of its improved 
disbursement policies and guidelines has been expanded into the greater attention 
given to poverty eradication and eventually to the initiation of income generation 
programs.  The whole process and accompanying analysis of income generation in 
Selangor will be further detailed in the next chapter.  
 Besides the increased concern with disbursal for poverty eradication, the 
amount given to the groups of poor and needy was also raised after the 
corporatization. We should not, however, jump to the conclusion that fund disbursal 
after corporatization would always provide the poor and needy with the highest 
amount compared to the other groups. As a body under the IRCS, the ZBS found it 
hard to repeal all the old practices. The zakat fund is still used for financing IRCS 
activities, mainly under the heading of fi sabil allah (in the way of Allah). In 
Selangor, under this category the fund normally goes to wide range of spending such 
                                                 
99 Mutalib, “Keciciran Fakir Miskin”, 4-5. 
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as religious schools expenditures, mosques building and maintenance, variety of 
dakwah and religious programs, education scholarships as well as religious officials’ 
salary and allowance. 100 In this context, thanks to the significant jump in funds from 
the constantly growing collection, the provision for the poor and needy could be 
increased, but without cost to other groups.  
Table 6.3: Zakat distribution from 1999 to 2008 
Year Amount in RM 
1999 31 673 722.25 
2000 32 045 744.98 
2001 52 529 725.65 
2002 66 843 412.58 
2003 85 240 949.41 
2004 100 937 028.00 
2005 114 170 658.14 
2006 146 905 517.00 
2007 176 979 357.00 
2008 188 998 771.00 
Sources: Asnaf, various issues; Pusat Zakat Selangor, 
Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor, various issues; 
Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat 
Selangor, various issues 
 
 The above table gives the basic statistics showing the continuous increment in 
the disbursement since the early corporatization period. The consistency of the fund 
to be disbursed shows the strength of the corporatization system.  
 The ZBS has been distributing the fund to all eight eligible recipients as 
outlined in the Quran without any exception. The detailed statistics of annual 
disbursement from 2000 through 2008, b ased on the eligible recipients, can be 
referred to in Appendix 3. They clearly show that the disbursement went to a greater 
extent to three main groups: namely, fi sabil allah, the poor, and the zakat agents. 
  As indicated in the table, the allocation for fi sabil allah has been the highest 
in every year. Zakat, as mentioned earlier, has been the main contributor to the 
financial resources of Islamic activities in Selangor. This is an ongoing obligation 
                                                 
100 Refer annual reports for complete distribution programs: Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan 
Pengurusan Zakat Selangor, various issues.       
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and part of the traditional expenditure of the IRCS. However, the records show that, 
from 2006, there was no significant increase in allocation for this group, indicating 
that the ZBS has no pl ans to give more attention to this group or to widen the 
definition of fi sabil allah.  
 In proportion, as the appendix clearly shows, the allocation for the poor has 
increased from less than 20% in 2000 to between 25% and 30% after that. On top of 
that, since 2008, the allocation for the poor and needy together exceeded the 
provision for other groups including fi sabil allah. Thus, the ZBS has confirmed its 
commitment and outlined the eradication of poverty as a clear target.  
 In sum, the corporatization of zakat disbursal under the ZBS has led to the 
improvement of the distribution function. The ZBS, in this context, has made efforts 
such as the introduction of guidelines and policies for the disbursement system. 
Realizing that zakat should be used for poverty eradication, the body has given 
attention to the disbursement for this group without neglecting other groups.   
c. Engendering zakat as financial source for state development 
 As the corporatization seemed fruitful in inducing zakat payment, the 
institution has been slowly projected as playing a broader role in economic policy in 
the state of Selangor. The ZBS has increasingly become the focal point of state 
government in its approach to state poverty eradication.   
 The recognition of the institution by the state government actually goes back 
as far as early 1995. During that year, the IRCS used zakat money to contribute to 
the state government’s project to build accommodation for poor households. This 
initiative was a joint venture among a number of government and corporate bodies, 
involving district councils, a power company, and a trust body under government 
supervision.101   
 Since, during this period, poverty eradication had yet to become the main 
target of the IRCS, it seemed that such steps were still regarded as occasional 
                                                 
101 Normala Mohd Sa’ad, “Penempatan Asnaf Dahulu dan Sekarang”, Asnaf, 3/2007, 10. 
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supports for government projects. In this project, the IRCS contribution amounted to 
only RM5000 for each house with involvement in only 22 houses.102 
  The intention to give the ZBS a more active role in reducing poverty in the 
state was not merely voiced by the government but also positively responded to by 
the IRCS. In this context, the Selangor Chief Minister, during a ceremony organized 
by the ZBS in 1999, called for a more proactive way of using zakat money, and 
suggested that the body be more active in poverty eradication.103 Such a cal l was 
later endorsed and positively answered by the IRCS Chairperson and also by the 
Chief Executive Officer of the ZBS. In 2000, for example, the chairperson of IRCS, 
as stated in the ZBS annual report, expressed the hope that the body could solve 
Muslims’ problems in the state, especially that of poverty. Such an intention was also 
frequently reiterated in later annual reports.104 Eventually, in the organization’s 
magazine in 2004, the ZBS Chief Executive Officer clearly agreed that the fund had 
gradually become the government’s main resource for eradicating poverty in the 
state.105 
  Indeed, both sides showed great understanding that they were moving 
towards a common objective. Such a situation was easily arrived at in view of the 
fact, as earlier mentioned, that the head of the IRCS and many of its members were 
government officials. 
 ZBS from then on has been considered a main player in poverty eradication. 
In many instances the government has incorporated the body within its development 
and poverty alleviation projects in the state. In an advisory capacity, the ZBS over 
time contributed input to the government. Since early 2000, for instance, the body 
has been one of the government’s main sources of data about the poor and needy in 
the state. This is because the ZBS, since corporatization, has computerized its data on 
zakat recipients and from time to time updated the information. Besides that, the ZBS 
is one of the bodies invited to contribute ideas at seminars on pove rty eradication 
organized by the state government. In 2004, for example, the Selangor government 
organized a seminar to determine the mechanism that should be adopted by the state. 
                                                 
102 Sa’ad, “Penempatan Asnaf”, 10 
103 “Kempen Pembayaran Zakat Gaji Peringkat Negeri Selangor”, Asnaf, 2/99, 1. 
104 Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Tahunan 2000, 8. 
105 Sa’ad, “Tahniah Pusat Zakat”, 45. 
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The Director of the ZBS was invited and presented a paper on how the ZBS could 
contribute to solving such a problem.  
 As far as the implementation of projects is concerned, the ZBS has been in 
many cases included in government initiatives. In the project of providing houses for 
the poor, for example, the ZBS after corporatization has continued to collaborate 
with other agencies under the state government. In this project, the ZBS has become 
the main contributor to construction of the houses, with the government district 
office merely providing land. From only RM5000 as a one-off contribution in 1995, 
the ZBS now provides over RM20,000 for each house. By 2007,  approximately 500 
houses were built through this project.106 Apart from that, the ZBS also, in 2005, 
contributed approximately RM30,000 for poverty eradication programs under State 
Development Planning Unit.107 
 Besides the constant efforts of the ZBS, the government of Selangor has to a 
certain extent helped the organization to achieve a higher collection.  In 2004, the 
state government introduced an automatic deduction from its staff’s salaries.108 
However, those who were unwilling to participate were exempted.109 In this case, we 
should first examine the motive behind such a scheme. The Selangor government’s 
agreement to facilitating zakat payment by its staff, as clearly stipulated by the state 
secretary, was mainly to encourage its employees to help the poor and needy through 
zakat. 110 But what is important here is that the state government’s initiative was not 
merely meant to increase the collection of zakat, but to reach a “win-win situation” in 
which the ZBS might be motivated to give more support to the government.  
 From the above discussion, it can be inferred that poverty eradication is one 
of the ZBS’s priorities. With clear guidelines and procedures for disbursement, it 
seems that in the early years of the 21st century the disbursement system has been in 
                                                 
106 Normala Mohd Sa’ad and Ima Syuhada Ismail, “Pelbagai Perlindungan Untuk Asnaf”, Asnaf, 
3/2007, 12; Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2007, 25. 
107 “Statistik”, Asnaf, 1/2006, 15 
108 “Selangor Wajib Kakitangan sertai Potongan Gaji”, Asnaf, 2/2004, 12; Pusat Zakat Selangor, 
Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2004 (Shah Alam: PZS, 2005) 34; Pusat Zakat Selangor, 
Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2005, 32.  
109 As’Ari Hashim and Sahadan Ishak, “Pekeliling Kerajaan Wajib Tapi Bukan Paksaan”, Asnaf, 
3/2004, 3; Ima Syuhada Ismail, “Pekeliling Kerajaan Ada Pilihan”, Asnaf, 3/2004, 4.  
110 Ismail, “Pekeliling Kerajaan”, 4. 
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a phase of significant improvement. It is evident that corporatization has led to 
advances not only in collection but also in disbursement.  
 The interest in poverty eradication has impelled the ZBS to venture further 
into an income generation program. This program is considered a means of 
permanently releasing the recipients from poverty through a combination of financial 
and non-financial aid. In offering such a comprehensive mechanism, the ZBS has 
also been cooperating with other government agencies.111 Thus the government, over 
time, has incorporated zakat as one of its official instruments for achieving its 
objectives. From the broader perspective of development, such a measure by the ZBS 
might be seen as propulsion of zakat into a broader economic role, engendering the 
fund a financial source for state development.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 In sum, the chapter has outlined the evolution of the zakat institution in 
Selangor from merely a religious institution to a development body in the state. 
Selangor is multiracial and is among the most developed states in Malaysia. In the 
Malaysian Federation, powers pertaining to development and poverty eradication 
have been mainly federal, with states playing a supporting role in implementation 
and monitoring. Such a separation of powers, however, did not prevent states, in this 
case Selangor, from helping its citizens to improve their living conditions, since the 
state has a clearer picture of conditions in its own territory. In this respect, the state, 
with its limited financial capacity, must look for any potential resources, including 
help from the religious fund.  
 Zakat in Selangor has been managed by the IRCS, an advisory council for the 
ruler  r egarding religious administration in the state, since its establishment in the 
1950s. As its bureaucracy has mainly involved government officials, the religious 
fund under its administration, including zakat, could be a potential resource for the 
state government. However, the administration of the fund at the beginning of its 
formation was unsystematic, resulting in a small collection. During this period, the 
                                                 
111 Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2004, 6. 
238 
 
IRCS merely made it easier for Muslims to observe their obligation, without using 
the collected fund effectively for development.  
 Islamization in Selangor has to a degree reflected what had been happening in 
Malaysia as a whole. The Islamization of society in the 1970s and 1980s through the 
proliferation of religious movements encouraged Muslims to fulfil their zakat duty. 
This phenomenon in turn induced the IRCS to find, mainly through seminars and 
discussions, ways to improve zakat management. The improvement, however, was 
not substantial enough to bring about a significant increase in collection during the 
period in question.  
  Finally, in the mid-1990s, the IRCS adopted the corporatization model, an 
Islamization measure earlier introduced by the zakat body in Federal Territory. In 
this case, the corporatization was not limited to fund collection but also, a few years 
later, involved disbursement. Corporatization proved to be an effective mechanism 
for appealing to payers to pay their zakat. Aware that merely relying on the zakat 
laws was no l onger effective, the IRCS turned to the propagation approach of 
appealing to Muslims, with a focus on the richer urban community. The acceptance 
of this appeal and the constant increase in collection can be understood as reflecting 
both growing awareness among Muslims and their confidence that the IRCS had 
gradually improved.  
 After corporatization, the new management body (the ZBS), while having 
more resources to disburse, also faced the new challenge of sustaining the fund’s 
increment. Recognizing this situation, the ZBS, on the understanding that Muslims 
would contribute more once they saw the benefits accruing from the payment, 
improved the distribution system to place more emphasis on poverty eradication and 
income generation programs. 
 Through various activities and considerable amounts of disbursement for the 
poor, the state government has shown its interest in incorporating the institution as 
part of the state mechanism for eradicating poverty. By encouraging its staff to 
contribute, the state has also shown its commitment to helping the organization 
increase its collection. It seems that the corporatization has brought about a new 
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dimension in zakat management in the state of Selangor. The process of continuous 
advancement is still going on and seems unlikely to cease, at least in the near future.  
 
 







ANALYSIS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF INCOME GENERATION 
THROUGH ZAKAT IN SELANGOR AND ITS IMPACT  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 The Islamization phenomenon has enhanced the function of zakat institution 
and the government has gradually embraced the institution as a source of poverty 
eradication. In this aspect, income generation is among the poverty eradication 
mechanisms commonly recommended by religious scholars and academicians in 
their writings and also supported by Muslims in general. With the increased 
collection, the ZBS, encouraged by both society and government, has gradually 
directed its energy towards provision of such a program.  
 This chapter thus aims to discuss and analyse the implementation of the 
income generation program, manifesting the Islamization phenomenon in the state. 
In this case, the ZBS has introduced many income generation programs, 
incorporating financial as well as non-financial aid to empower the poor recipients. 
Through the analysis carried out in this chapter, together with a complete picture of 
how income generation is being implemented in Selangor, it is hoped that objective 
four will be fully achieved.  
 The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first discusses the factor 
contributing to the implementation of income generation. From the early 1980s, 
when the Islamization phenomenon began to be noticed, society issued exhortations 
and suggestions that zakat be used for income generation. It later emerged that the 
government encouraged a similar approach to disbursement, having seen that the 
collected fund could play a significant role in development. Its endorsement in turn 
led the ZBS to make a commitment to realization of the program.  
 In the second section, we shall observe the wide range of programs offered by 
the ZBS. They fall into three categories: financial assistance, advisory aid and 
support services, together providing a clear picture of how the initiatives are carried 
out. In offering the program, the ZBS has steadily shifted its role from that of simple 
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disbursal agent to that of active supervisor. This practice changed the way the zakat 
fund was spent even after it reached the hands of recipients.  
  In the third section, another important element of the implementation of 
income generation, namely the changes in religious rulings, is discussed. Zakat, as a 
religious fund, must not be disbursed haphazardly without consent from the Mufti, 
the highest authority in the state. From the discussion we can see the close 
cooperation between the ZBS and the Mufti whereby, in accommodating the changes 
in zakat distribution practice, new rulings were introduced. It is clear from the 
examination that ijtihad, the process by which new rulings are derived, especially 
with reference to the disbursal for income generation, has been influenced by the 
current economic and social needs of the community.  
 In the forth section, the impact of the implementation of income generation 
through zakat is discussed. The impact can be observed from material and non-
material perspectives. Materially, the initiative can certainly help the recipients, as 
established later in the section, on t he basis of several accounts. From the non-
material point of view, the impact can be seen in the structural change of zakat 
practice and organization in the state. In addition, the legal aspect of zakat has altered 
considerably in accordance with current needs and circumstances. As pertaining to 
the legal aspect, we also devote a small section (the final one) which surveys whether 
the development in Selangor has spread to other states and the extent to which 
rationalism and public interest (Maslaha) could be probably embraced by legal 
authority in determining any new decision about zakat in the near future.    
 In all, the distribution of the fund for income generation is a new practice 
which differs in many ways from the traditional disbursement. The practice has 
generated many issues which the ZBS, as implementer, must be aware of in order to 
come up w ith satisfactory solutions within the acceptable boundaries of its power 






7.2 Continuous Islamization Forces for Income Generation through Zakat in 
Selangor 
 As mentioned earlier, the ZBS has for some time been keen to improve its 
disbursement system, giving special attention to poverty eradication. In doing so, the 
ZBS generally classifies distribution into two broad areas: consumption and income 
generation.1 Consumption is disbursement to satisfy basic needs which, according to 
the ZBS standard, includes shelter, food, medical help, clothing, education and 
transportation.2 The expenditure for consumption only fulfils the immediate needs of 
recipients and for a certain interval; hence the aid needs to be repeated. Accordingly, 
to enable the recipients to be permanently relieved of poverty, the ZBS offers income 
generation aid, known as capital disbursement which involves the distribution of 
capital for productive recipients, based on t heir respective expertise and existing 
vocations.3 
 The government and IRCS, since 1980s, have also tried to enhance the zakat 
administration. From then on, the idea of income generation is clearly reflected in 
many academic discussions in seminars and publications pertaining to zakat. The 
exhortations and academic discussions on t he matter will be further elaborated 
below. 
 Apart from that, the ZBS also needs to improve its distribution system in 
order to show that it can manage the fund effectively. The good image of the zakat 
institution in the eyes of Muslims in regard to effective fund management could 
potentially attract more payment. Thus, the income generation initiative should be 
introduced as a strategic measure in the interests of more effective distribution.  
 Greater concern and desire to show zakat as more functional in society is 
indeed a manifestation of Islamization. On the societal level, it r eflects the 
proliferation of discussion on z akat, including the proposal of income generation. 
This however could not materialize without a positive reaction from government. 
The following subsection hence tries to shed light on these matters, with particular 
reference to the State of Selangor.   
                                                          
1 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”, 21; “ Sistem  Agihan Zakat Diberi Nafas Baru”, 10. 
2 Zool Fadli Mohd Nor, “Memahami Haddul Kifayah”, Asnaf, 1/2010, 29.  
3 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”, 21.  
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7.2.1 Forces from society for a more systematic disbursement 
 Looking back at the stage development of zakat in Malaysia in general, there 
were many national seminars and discussions pertaining to zakat have been 
organized since 1980s. During this time, the Islamic Religious Council of Selangor 
and the ZBS have, over time, act similarly. Through these seminars, similar to that of 
happened in national level, the exhortation for zakat to be distributed as income 
generation projects was frequently heard. In 1988, for example, Ahmad Ibrahim, a 
renowned professor in law, stressed the need to use zakat to liberate Muslims from 
being trapped in poverty. According to him, the fund should be disbursed in such a 
way as to “memulihkan” – rehabilitate them. For this purpose, the fund should 
provide supportive mechanisms for the rightful recipients through their respective 
vocations, thus helping them to be permanently free from poverty. 4  
 Another important seminar was organized in 1997, a few years after zakat in 
the state was corporatized.5 There are several papers in this seminar merit discussion, 
as they proposed a direction in which ZBS in particular should be heading.  
 Nik Mustafa Nik Hassan6 and Hailani Muji Tahir7 were among the presenters 
in the seminar who touched on the possibility of adopting distribution for income 
generation in Selangor. Hassan in his paper plainly stipulated that zakat should be an 
important tool in state economic policy for poverty eradication and economic justice. 
Poor people should be given greater opportunities for embarking upon any economic 
activities that could give them a better quality of life. He suggested the distribution 
system should also be improved in such a manner as to enable the disbursed fund to 
be utilized optimally by the recipient. The zakat institution in this respect should 
acquire the latest knowledge concerning fund management to produce a dynamic 
                                                          
4 Ahmad Ibrahim, “Pelaksanaan Kutipan Zakat Hambatan –Hambatan dan Cara Mengatasinya”, Paper 
presented in  Seminar Zakat Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, 17 December 1988, Shah Alam, 5. 
5 The seminar entitled Persidangan Pemantapan Institusi Zakat was organized by Selangor Zakat 
Center with collaboration with Selangor state government.  
6 Nik Mustafa Nik Hassan has been an active researcher on zakat and currently one of ZBS 
Distribution Committee members. See Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat 
Selangor 2009 , 18. 
7 Hailani Muji Tahir is an Associate Professor in Faculty of Islamic Studies, National University of 
Malaysia and currently one of  ZBS members of trustee. For his personal biography refer:  Lembaga 
Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2009, 7. 
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system of expenditure.8  From the broader context of his discussion, it could be 
clearly understood that he wanted the zakat to be dispersed in a productive way, 
although he did not specifically say so. 
 Slightly different from Hassan, Tahir in speaking of defining rightful 
recipients according to current needs in Malaysia (which his paper was mainly 
related to), broadly discussed zakat with reference to three major themes, namely, 
legal opinions of classical scholars pertaining to distribution issues, practical issues 
related to ZBS (at that time the Selangor Zakat Centre) and finally, the level of 
effectiveness that zakat disbursement should achieve. Through his analysis, he 
however similarly expressed the opinion that the disbursement should reflect greater 
concern with effectiveness. Accordingly, he recommended that zakat be spent on 
helping the poor to acquire capital for their economic activities.9   
 Examining the essence of the writers discussion, it is interesting to note that 
the corporatized zakat institution, as described, should employ a more 
comprehensive management of fund. We can see that they have also all encouraged 
the use of zakat for developing the recipients, so that the poor could not only become 
independent but could also once more contribute to society. Hassan, considering the 
issue from an economist’s point of view, suggested that the recipients should be 
empowered so as ultimately to become positive contributors to the economy 
(penyumbang yang positif kepada ekonomi).10 And Tahir, for his part, applying the 
fiqh perspective to the question of the fund’s disbursal, argued that it should be suited 
to the current needs and interests of society, rather than conforming indefinitely to 
classical opinions.11   
    The 1997 seminar on zakat, besides presenting theoretical discussions from 
legal and economic perspectives, offered another interesting aspect through a 
presentation by the chief executive officer of Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM), a 
well-established NGO which actively provides income generation for poverty 
                                                          
8 Nik Mustafa Nik Hassan, “Justifikasi Dalam Pengkorporatan Institusi Zakat”, Paper presented in 
Persidangan Pemantapan Institusi Zakat, Shah Alam, June 19, 1997, 3.  
9 Tahir, “Penafsiran Golongan Asnaf” 8, 11. 
10 Hassan, “Justifikasi Dalam Pengkorporatan”, 2. 
11 Tahir, “Penafsiran Golongan Asnaf” 10. 
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eradication.12 The AIM is a body established in 1980s backed by grant provided by 
federal and state governments to give loans for the poor through income generation 
projects. So far, the body has achieved a s ignificant successful rate among its 
members (between 55% to 98% based on several studies).13  
 In this seminar, the officer suggested that a s imilar mechanism could be 
practised by the Selangor Zakat Centre, and also recommended that zakat and AIM 
should collaborate so that the fund could be administered by the same 
mechanism.14Although he realized that this was not something that could easily be 
implemented, inasmuch as zakat could not be disbursed in the form of loans, he 
personally was still optimistic that the ZBS might be willing to change the system. 
As another practical alternative, he then proposed that the fund could be invested in 
AIM, as a result of which option the ZBS would become one of the owners of 
AIM.15     
 The presence of a high official of AIM at the seminar is an interesting fact to 
ponder upon. As AIM is the best-known income generation program in the country, 
with a good track record, it can be understood that, where zakat is concerned, there 
must be something to be learned from AIM. That is perhaps why the ZBS invited a 
presenter from AIM to share his ideas. Since the other presenters, as mentioned 
above, also suggested that zakat should be used for income generation initiatives, it is 
not impossible that they learnt about the workability of the practice for poverty 
eradication in the country from the existence of AIM, which has been in operation 
since the mid 1980s. Realizing that the collected fund had begun to expand following 
corporatization, the ZBS and people in general found it easier to think creatively 
about how to use the zakat effectively and efficiently, through looking at the living 
example present in their surroundings.   
                                                          
12 For more information about AIM refer: Chamhuri Siwar et.al, “Kajian Impak Enonomi Sosial Skim 
Pinjaman (SPI) Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia”, Bangi, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2000. 2.1-2.10.  
13 For brief survey of researches pertaining to AIM please refer: Abdullah Al- Mamun, “Empirical 
Investigation on the Effect of Microfinance Program of Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia on Quality of Life 
in Urban Peninsular Malaysia”, European Journal of Economics, Finance And Administrative 
Sciences,  (39) (2011): 104. 
14 Mukhtar Ramli, “Keberkesanan Program Agihan Zakat Dalam Pembasmian Kemiskinan”, Paper 
presented in Persidangan Pemantapan Institusi Zakat, Shah Alam, June 19, 1997, 7.  
15 Ramli, “Keberkesanan Program”, 6. 
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 Following the 1997 s eminar, another workshop organized by the ZBS in 
1999, right after the centre was responsible for fund distribution, also merits 
examination. This workshop featured a number of local religious scholars who were 
consulted with regard to revising the distribution mechanism, a proposal which was 
later presented to the Mufti for consideration.16   
 Poverty eradication was among the subjects given considerable attention. As 
the main principle of distribution, the workshop concluded that distribution to the 
poor and needy must have the highest priority.17 In keeping with the suggestion of 
the previous seminar, poverty eradication through income generation were brought 
into sharp focus in the discussion. The workshop’s panels suggested that 
disbursement for the poor and needy should be placed into two broad categories, 
namely, istihlaki (consumption) and istithmari (capital). Although they generally 
agreed that the consumption disbursement should continue as it was, capital 
disbursement must concomitantly be given greater attention. As a matter of principle, 
the disbursed fund must at first fulfil immediate needs such as food, shelter and 
clothing. Those who were able-bodied and entitled to receive capital distribution 
should be given adequate help as appropriate to their profession and expertise.18 To 
ensure that the aided poor could effectively utilize the fund and could ultimately 
succeed in their chosen income-generation activities, monitoring and training should 
be provided.19 From what has been discussed and proposed, it is evident to us that 
the seminars and workshop to a certain extent shed light on the direction in which the 
ZBS should steer. All of these seminars were organized in Selangor and by the IRCS. 
As the organizer and advice seeker, the IRCS need to carefully listen to their 
exhortation. It is not unsurprising that the IRCS was influenced by these seminars. 
 For the forces to become more influential, it is interesting to note that some of 
the presenters of the ideas have been absorbed in the management of IRCS and ZBS. 
Tahir for example has been a member of IRCS and also a trustee for the ZBS since 
                                                          
16 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”, 1; “Sistem  Agihan Zakat Diberi Nafas Baru”, 10.  
17 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”,  4 ; Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Kertas Cadangan 
Mengemaskini Sistem Agihan Zakat Negeri Selangor”, Proposal presented in Selangor Fatwa 
Committee meeting, July 18, 2000.  
18 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”, 21. 
19 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”, 37. 
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early 2000s. Hassan has also been one the ZBS advisors for the disbursement section 
since mid of 2000s.  
 Academic discussion of the practice in Selangor has obviously not stopped at 
this point. In many later seminars and publications, the Selangor disbursement 
system has again been referred to. The focus of the discussion, however, has been 
rather different as compared to that of the 1990s, as many contributors talk about the 
program’s practical implementation and its achievements, and offer suggestions as to 
how it should be enhanced. Some of these writings will be referred to in the coming 
sections.   
 The demand from society came not merely from academicians and religious 
scholars participating in seminars and workshops. There is evidence that Muslim 
society in general shared a similar view. The two studies outlined below indicated 
that in order to increase collection the zakat organization needed to improve its 
disbursement practice favourably through income generation. Although the studies 
came later, it could show general view of society and reassure that the effort has been 
taken earlier by the ZBS could be continued without doubt.  
  Hairunnizam Wahid and Sanep Ahmad, in their survey in 2005, clearly 
showed the extent to which the disbursement system could affect the willingness of 
society to pay zakat through a formal zakat institution (like ZBS). The survey 
involved a sample of 2588 payers, 672 of  whom resided in Selangor.20 Asked how 
they perceived the disbursement system of the ZBS, 66% of the respondents 
considered that disbursement was still not fully satisfied  with the implementation. 
Statistical analysis by the researchers proved that there is a strong relation between 
the payment of zakat and personal perception of the fund’s distribution, which 
clearly found that the zakat institution must improve its disbursement system so as to 
induce more potential payers to contribute more.21 If the ZBS could convince people 
to do so by means of a better distribution system and improve the perception among 
the potential payers, the higher amount of collection might be achieved. 
                                                          
20 Sanep Ahmad and Hairunnizam Wahid, “Persepsi Agihan Zakat dan Kesannya Terhadap 
Pembayaran Zakat Melalui Institusi Formal”, Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, (35) (2005): 59, 64. 
21 Ahmad and Wahid, “Persepsi Agihan”, 64-67. 
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 In order to clarify the reasons behind such a situation, an extensive study was 
carried out in 2009.  W ahid et.al in their second survey selected 700 r espondents 
throughout Malaysia, including 190 residing in Selangor.22 The study found that the 
respondents were less than satisfied for a number of reasons, namely, insufficient 
disbursed funds, unsystematic distribution systems and limited publication. A 
majority of the respondents agreed with the suggestion that poverty eradication 
should be given priority over other recipients. Asked about the type of disbursement, 
especially for able-bodied recipients, 38.2% of respondents in Selangor preferred to 
give capital accompanied by training and monitoring services. The rest, respectively 
24.1% and 28%, preferred disbursement for either capital or training. In all, a 
majority of the respondents plainly showed their preference for productive rather 
than consumptive disbursement for the betterment of the recipients. 23  This study 
shed a light on how  disbursement should be handled in order to persuade existing 
and prospective payers to contribute. In sum, the enhancement of the disbursement 
system through income generation is something that society wants rather than a 
product of theoretical imagination.  
7.2.2 Government’s positive reaction and support   
 The introduction of the new disbursement mechanism has been indeed 
supported not only by society but also by the state government. In this aspect, both 
the Ruler and Chief Minister have repeatedly asked, at a personal level, for more 
active involvement of zakat in poverty eradication. They have voiced support on 
many occasions and at a ceremony connected with zakat collection and distribution. 
The Chief Minister has often said in his speeches and interviews that the ZBS should 
be more proactive in disbursement, which would enable it to play an important role 
in developing Muslims economy especially through poverty eradication.24 
 A similar exhortation has also come from the sultan, the highest authority in 
religion in the state. The sultan has been one who often appeared in ceremonies 
                                                          
22 Hairunnizam Wahid et.al , “Pengagihan Zakat oleh Institusi Zakat di Malaysia: Mengapa 
Masyarakat Islam Tidak Berpuas Hati” Jurnal Syariah, (17)(1) (2009): 99. 
23 Wahid et.al, “Pengagihan Zakat” 104. 
24 “Zakat Bantu Tingkatkan Ekonomi Masyarakat”, Harian Metro, April 16, 2004; “LZS Sumbang 
Peningkatan Kecekapan Ke Tahap Cemerlang, Gemilang Dan Terbilang”, Asnaf, 1/2006,12; “MB 
Selangor Puji Kecekapan Agihan Zakat”, Asnaf, 4/2001, 12. 
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involving ZBS such as official functions for fund collection or disbursement. He also 
has made visits to zakat recipients’ projects under income generation initiatives.25 
Such an act by the ruler indeed could be considered a blessing on what have been 
implemented.  S uch a blessing has been overtly reconfirmed lately. In his official 
speech at the new ZBS building’s opening ceremony in early 2011 for example, he 
clearly stipulated that zakat should be further employed to eradicate poverty. In 
addition, according to him, the ZBS must direct attention towards long-term 
empowerment initiatives, rather than merely giving short-term aid to recipients.26 
Coming from the highest personage, such a personal view was something that the 
ZBS could not take lightly.     
 Perhaps aware of the exhortation from highest persons in the state 
government and also from society, the Chief Executive Officer of ZBS in 2004 
clearly demonstrating the commitment of the organization to implementing such an 
initiative said that the economic development of recipients is the best means of 
poverty eradication. He stated:  
 “The best method to eradicate poverty among recipients is to increase 
their economy. Therefore, under the Economic Development 
Programme that is organized by ZBS, the poor and needy who are 
proactive and possess a business skill are given initial capital to start.” 
(translation)27   
The remark could be understood as resulting from a perception that zakat disbursal 
through income generation is better than ordinary distribution for consumption. It 
could be also understood as the acceptance of the exhortation.  
 The state government also most of the time gave indirect support to ZBS, 
including, as previously stated, help provided by the former through direct deduction 
from the monthly salary of state officials. On the other hand, the role of latter has 
become increasingly important, to the extent that the body, where it comes to 
poverty, is the institution most frequently referred to. On top of that, a r ecent 
development has indicated that the ZBS currently holds the most complete database 
                                                          
25 “DYMM Pemangku Raja Selangor Bersama Rakyat Fakir dan Miskin di Sepang”, Asnaf, 4/99, 1; 
Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Zakat 2004 (Shah Alam: PZS, 2005), 54; “Lensa Prihatin”, Asnaf, 
1/2006, 17. 
26 “Titah Sultan Selangor”, Asnaf, 1/2011, 20.  
27 Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Zakat 2004, 43; “PZS Memikul Amanah Membangun Ekonomi 
Ummah”, Berita Harian, March 8, 2005.   
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of poverty in the state.28 Although this, to a certain extent, puts tremendous pressure 
on the ZBS, it clearly indicates that the government sees its potential for playing a 
greater role in state development. It also undeniably provides an inducement for the 
ZBS to improve its practice and to develop better means of disbursal.    
 From the above discussion, it is clear that the decision to disburse the fund 
through income generation initiative has been influenced by society and government. 
The suggestions for the disbursement have been voiced through seminars and 
workshops. The embracement of some of those who made suggestion has also 
strengthened the force for the ZBS to implement such a distribution. On the other 
hand, government also did similarly as they see a potential of helping them 
eradicating poverty in the state 
 In all, it can be seen as a gradual acceptance of the greater role of zakat in 
solving social and economic problems, which reflects concurrently a clear pattern of 
greater Islamization from both sides. Ultimately, confidence in zakat has been 
increasing in the belief that it c an contribute more effectively to the nation’s 
economic development.  
 The coming subsection will discuss structural changes in the way income 
generation through the zakat initiative has been put into practice in the real world. It 
will also show how the initiative has been accompanied by change in the fatwa and 
in legal aspects, a phenomenon which is undeniably important as illustrating how the 
overall religious practice is shifting.   
 
7.3 Implementation of Income Generation: Complementing State Policy 
 As outlined in the earlier chapter, the income generation initiative consists of 
giving the eligible productive recipients financial and also non-financial support. As 
far as the ZBS distribution mechanism is concerned, the program has evolved 
through time, from merely giving money to enable poor recipients to improve their 
                                                          
28 Ahmad Shahir Makhtar et.al , “Pengurusan Zakat di Negeri Selangor: Isu dan Cabaran”, Paper 
presented in Konvensyen Kebangsaan Perancangan dan Pengurusan Harta Dalam Islam, Bangi, July 
14, 2010, 25; Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor, Laporan Retreat 2007, (Shah Alam: 
UPEN, 2007), 317; Interview with Abdul Samad Ibrahim, Head of Asnaf Development Department, 
ZBS, Klang, May 14, 2010. 
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income through their existing profession, to a more complex and non-financial 
strategy. This evolution illustrates the gradually expanding role of zakat in 
accordance with the current needs of Muslims.   
 The effort by the ZBS to provide income generation aid to recipients has been 
mainly based on the belief that the poor are disadvantaged in that, although they are 
productive, they are unable to increase their personal income. Hence, they could be 
clinging to zakat aid all their lives if no c oncrete step is taken to improve their 
situation.29 From the experience and observation of the ZBS, among impediments to 
progress are insufficient capital, insufficient business knowledge including financial 
management and marketing, lack of supervision and lower level of determination to 
succeed and of good personal values.30 Responding to the above situation and 
recipients’ problems, the ZBS has outlined several initiatives including material and 
non-material contributions. 
 Discussion of such an initiative can be divided into two broad categories, 
namely, personal capital distribution and collective projects. In the first category, all 
three elements (financial, training and support services) of income generation aid 
will be briefly discussed. For the personal disbursement category, the three elements 
are offered separately and may or may not be offered to every recipient. However, 
this is not the case for the group projects, which are more comprehensive in nature, 
and in which all these elements are offered and must be strictly followed by each 
participant.  
 From a broader perspective, the process of implementation of each program 
was actually in reaction to external forces, especially the government. In this respect, 
the programs could perhaps be portrayed as complementary to what the government 
had done. The pattern will be reflected in the discussion which follows. 
 7.3.1 Personal capital disbursement 
1. Financial assistance 
                                                          
29 Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf, 137; Normala Mohd Sa’ad and Ima Syuhada Ismail, 
“Program Pembangunan Ekonomi LZS (MAIS)”, Asnaf, 1/2007, 9; Aktar Sahari, “Program 
Keusahawanan Cerahkan Masa Depan Asnaf”, Asnaf, 1/2007, 6.  
30 The determined factors are based on the observation and experience of ZBS.  M akhtar et.al , 
“Pengurusan Zakat”, 11; Hailani Muji Tahir, “Konsep Agihan Zakat dan Aplikasi Semasa”, Jurnal 
Pengurusan Jawhar, (1) (3) (2009): 46.  
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 Financial assistance for zakat recipients is the basic and most common 
method of disbursement for income generation. Its initial approval for such an 
introduction first appeared in state fatwa published in August 1994. In the section 
devoted to the poor (miskin) and needy (faqir), the income generation distribution 
was stipulated briefly as among the means of disbursement. In this aspect, they can 
be monetary capital, acquisition of facilities such as movable stalls, and intangible 
assets such as business studies and skills.31 It is evident that the stipulation in the 
fatwa was just a preliminary permission which might be implemented later by the 
ZBS. The distribution was not put into operation straightway at that time, as the 
disbursement record in 1994 did not yet show any amount devoted to it.32 
 The evidence that the ZBS had begun to offer income generation could only 
be clearly observed a few years later. In 1999, for example, the ZBS devoted a few 
columns in its zakat magazine (Asnaf) to relating some experiences of a number of 
poor recipients who had secured such a disbursement.33 From the reporting and 
accounting point of view, however, this was treated in the same way as other 
disbursements. There was also, by then, no special monitoring systems for those who 
received the fund.34  
 Although a systematic procedure had not yet emerged by the end of the 
1990s, when the twenty-first century was ushered in, the new distribution system 
under the ZBS reflected greater interest in disbursement. It is worth recalling that the 
ZBS was newly given the role of disbursement in 1998. Such a fresh mandate could 
be regarded as a substantial sign of recognition by the IRCS and the government in 
general. It is not surprising that the ZBS during this time had increased its effort to 
demonstrate its ability and thus to prove that it was better than the previous 
management. In an interview, the then CEO of the ZBS pledged his commitment to 
raising the system to a standard that would enable zakat to solve societal problems.35 
                                                          
31 Mufti Negeri Selangor, Fatwa Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan 1991 Hingga 1997 
(Shah Alam:  Pejabat Mufti Negeri Selangor), 15. 
32 Marsidi, “Zakat dan Peranannya”, Appendix 18.  
33 “Dimana Ada Kemahuan”, Asnaf, 1/1999, 10; “Cuci Kereta Sara Keluarga”, Asnaf, 2/1999, 10.  
34 “Statistik Agihan Zakat”, Asnaf 1/2000, 6; Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Tahunan 2000 , 14. 
35 “PZS Menempa Sejarah Zakat”, Asnaf, 1/2000, 8. 
254 
 
It was then also that, for the first time, the ZBS identified poverty eradication as one 
of the visions it hoped to realize.36  
 As discussed in the previous section, as part of its measure to improve the 
overall distribution system, the ZBS in 1999 had consulted local religious scholars. 
As a positive result of the consultation, the disbursement for income generation has 
been gradually stressed as not being restricted to financial aid but as also 
encompassing several non-financial activities. 37  
  The ZBS has been processing financial assistance according to previous 
practice. The capital aid encompasses four main economic activities namely, 
business, agricultural, fisheries and livestock rearing.38 The programs are designed as 
such according to the main economic sectors of the state, which are relevant to many 
of the poor recipients.39 For a prospective recipient to qualify for aid, he/she must 
first make an application and be selected and confirmed by the ZBS as poor and 
entitled to zakat funds. Besides offering the aid to selected new recipients, the ZBS, 
as a common practice, offers it to those who have received zakat before. 40 
 Financially, since 2000, a successful applicant can receive up to RM5000 at 
first, in the form of cash or other equipment, with the opportunity to obtain additional 
funds if the business or project is a success.41 The amount of the disbursement, 
however, varies according to assessment of the activity’s actual start-up needs and its 
potential for profit. The disbursement for income generation is on a one-off basis. It 
is interesting to note that, as the ZBS has not set a certain maximum amount for each 
recipient. In this aspect, it is possible for a recipient to have received additional aid 
                                                          
36  Pusat Zakat Selangor,  Laporan Tahunan 2000, 4. 
37 “Sistem  Agihan Zakat Diberi Nafas Baru”, 10. 
38 Mufti Negeri Selangor, Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan Zakat Selangor, 11; Tahir, “Konsep Agihan”, 
47-48; Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf, 141.   
39 Interview with Abdul Samad Ibrahim, Head of Asnaf Development Department, ZBS, Klang, May 
14, 2010; “Mengatasi Barah yang Semakin Parah”, Asnaf, 4/2001, 3.  
40 Noormala Mohd Sa’ad and Sahadan Ishak, “Pembelaan Mualaf Peranan Zakat vs Masyarakat” 
Asnaf, 3/2005, 6 ; Ima Syuhada Ismail and Sahadan Ishak, “Pelihara Aqidah Mualaf Antara Peranan 
dan Tanggungjawab”, Asnaf, 3/2005, 10. 
41 Makhtar et.al , “Pengurusan Zakat”, 12; Tahir, “Konsep Agihan”, 47; Balwi et.al, Pewujudan 
Usahawan Asnaf, 141; Sity Fatimah Azzuhara Sidek, “Usahawan Asnaf Zakat, Bukan Sekadar Terima 
Bantuan” Asnaf, 1/2007, 10.  
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such as an annual disbursement or education allowance for children.42 This is to 
ensure that the fund disbursed will not be directed towards consumption, which 
would jeopardize the main objective of the disbursement.   
 As to the amounts of financial aid disbursed through income generation 
programs across the four sectors listed above, ZBS reports from 2002 to 2009 
indicated as follows:  
Table 7.1: Disbursement for income generation programs (2002-2009)  
(Personal recipients) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Programs RM RM RM RM RM RM RM RM 
Business 181281 378550 607466 663437 921570 921372 1641423 2021484 
Agricultural 5380 5845 8500 19550 34200 53298 52066 76922 
Fisheries 6000  74100 102300 251800 140238 61663 176892 
Livestock 7800 8500 19994 6400 13000 598922 51601 318192 
Total  200461 392895 710060 791687 1189790 1713830 1806753 2593490 
Sources: ZBS, Annual Reports, various issues ; Asnaf, various issues. 
  As clearly shown in the above table, capital aid devoted to business activities 
has exceeded other types of distribution. The rationalization underlying this pattern 
can be understood from a statement of 2004 by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
the ZBS, to the effect that the poor are mainly landless. 43  It was clear that one could 
not find opportunities in the agricultural and fishing sectors if one had nowhere to 
live.  
 Apart from that, extensive disbursement for business could be associated with 
the rise of urbanization in Selangor. In recognition of this factor, the ZBS focused on 
business assistance, an initiative better suited to the urban poor whose numbers, the 
ZBS realized, were increasing over time. Hence, according to the CEO, the ZBS 
encouraged the poor in cities like Klang and Petaling Jaya to apply for aid with 
which to pursue business opportunities in the many sectors such as retail, food and 
                                                          
42 Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf, 141; Interview with Abdul Samad Ibrahim, Head of 
Asnaf Development Department, ZBS, Klang, May 14, 2010; Ibrahim, “Economic Role of Zakat”, 
6.25.  
43 “Kemiskinan di Bandar Kian Meruncing: PZS”, Berita Harian, March 26, 2004. 
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services which operated in these locations.44 The inclinations of the ZBS could also 
be indirectly related to encouragement from the government, as will be discussed in a 
later part of this section.  
 In general, the focus of the ZBS up to 2003 was only on financial assistance. 
Although the ZBS prior to that would briefly mention in its reports that it also 
provided some training for the recipients of financial aid, the body did not explain 
specifically how this initiative was carried out. Thus, it is perhaps safe to suggest that 
training and other forms of advisory aid had yet to receive significant attention from 
the ZBS.  
 
2.  Advisory/Monitoring Services   
 There were many things happened in 2004 could accelerate the development 
of ZBS in general and income generation in particular. Federal government, at that 
time has established Department of Zakat, Waqf and Hajj. In this aspect, Chairman 
Board of Directors of ZBS stated that such an effort shows a strong government 
political will to put zakat as one of complementary element in national fiscal policy 
(elemen sokongan dasar fiskal). He accordingly urged that ZBS must increase it 
efficiency, not only in fund collection but also disbursement.45 
  In the state level, Selangor has set up a committee, under State Economic 
Planning Unit, chaired by Chief Minister specifically deal with poverty eradication in 
the state. The committee has incorporated many agencies which related directly or 
indirectly to the poverty alleviation such as Welfare Department, Local Councils, 
Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia, Poverty Eradication Foundation and ZBS. The 
establishment of the committee is to organize and coordinate the activities of the 
incorporated agencies to reduce redundancy and improve their effectiveness in 
fighting poverty.46  
 The committee, in the middle of 2004, has organized a seminar giving the 
opportunity for the CEO of ZBS to deliver his paper.  In the presentation, he 
                                                          
44 “Mengatasi Barah Yang Semakin Parah”, 3; “Kemiskinan di Bandar Kian Meruncing: PZS”. 
45 Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Tahunan 2004, 7 
46 Interview with Abdul Samad Ibrahim, Head of Asnaf Development Department, ZBS, Klang, May 




introduced an “integrated approach to poverty eradication” which he named as 
JIWA- an abbreviation from elements or traits of Jatidiri (Personal Identity), Ilmu 
(knowledge), Wawasan (vision) and Aqidah (Belief). According to him, zakat 
recipients must be instilled with the above four elements in order to free themselves 
from the poverty cycle. Hence, the distributed fund must be supplemented with a 
program or training to provide of a wide range of knowledge and skills that are 
necessary to enable them to flourish and eventually stand on their own feet.47 
 The inclusion of the ZBS under the committee could be seen as recognition of 
the body as part of the poverty eradication effort. Although the committee is merely 
advisory and the ZBS is only part of it, its inclusion provided a psychological 
incentive for the body to be more active in channelling its measures for poverty 
eradication. The subsequent change in the ZBS might support this argument.   
 Following the formation of the committee, the ZBS appears to have made 
some improvements in its activities, especially in relation to income generation. In 
fact, in its annual report in the same year, it identified income generation as the best 
disbursement approach, which from now on should be given serious attention by the 
body.   
 Complementing the capital distribution which had been introduced earlier, 
non- financial aid through courses and advisory services since then has been 
multiplied. For example, the ZBS from then offered a short course for women 
recipients who participated in several income-generation activities such as crafts 
production and tailoring. The courses were offered in order to equip them with 
necessary skills suitable for their main role as homemakers.48 Unlike previous years, 
in 2004, t here were 4 types of courses related to income generation have been 
organised involving more than 300 recipients.49  
 In the same year, Zakat Recipient Development Department (Jabatan 
Pembangunan Asnaf), a new unit specializing in administering training and advisory 
                                                          
47 Mohd Safri Mahat, “Formula JIWA Basmi Kemiskinan”, Asnaf, 1/2004, 12-13.  
48 Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Tahunan 2002 (Shah Alam: PZS, 2003), 37.  
49 Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Tahunan 2002, 47. 
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programs has also been established.50 Under this new unit, the ZBS since 2005, has 
been providing more courses and training schemes, including:  
a. Preliminary and general courses: courses designed to motivate and encourage 
recipients to work and strive harder. Basically the courses try to recognize the 
personal potential in each individual recipient. Among the courses frequently 
held in this category are named as Suq al- Ukaz and Suq al-Majinah, which 
are taken from names of markets in Medina during Prophet Muhammad era.51  
 These two courses are offered for those who are interested in applying 
income generation distribution. The participants will be exposed to the 
potential of income generation initiatives, particularly in business activities. 
In view of the fact that they are still productive, the courses will motivate 
participants, whatever their current profession, to do t heir utmost to 
succeed.52   
 Apart from introducing new skills, the courses also try to instil a 
positive view of income generation as a religious obligation. Through these 
courses, for example, the poor are educated as to the ultimate objective of 
zakat, which must not be perceived as a s ource of income.53 Despite 
receiving zakat fund, they are also expected to raise their economic condition 
to the level at which they in turn could contribute to the zakat fund as zakat 
payers. In this context, consistent manoeuvring to achieve that objective is 
considered a religious duty (ibada) which they as Muslims should 
accordingly observe.54   
 All the courses are designed so as not only to introduce the poor to 
new skills but also to promote understanding of the new paradigm whereby 
income generation is incorporated into a broader religious perspective.  
                                                          
50 Sahari, “Program Keusahawanan”, 6. 
51 Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf, 146-148; Mohd Sabri Mat Nor, “Latihan: Wadah Asnaf 
Berdikari”, Asnaf, 1/2008, 12-13.  
52 Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf, 146-148; Nor, “Latihan: Wadah Asnaf Berdikari”, 12; 
See Module of  Suq al-Majinah produced by ZBS.   
53 Nor, “Latihan: Wadah Asnaf Berdikari”, 12; “Pengenalan Program” in Module of Suq- al-Majinah, 
4;  
54 “Kuliah 2: Tingkah Laku Usahawan; Niat Kerana Allah dan Budi Pekerti Yang Luhur” in Module 




b. Technical courses: such courses will be offered according to the recipients’ 
need and suitability. Among the courses frequently offered are basic 
accounting and bookkeeping, marketing, and other types of technical training 
meeting the specific individual needs of recipients, such as food catering, 
tailoring and crafts production.55 The courses have normally been offered to 
those who already receive capital distribution. Usually offered between one 
and four times a year and involving approximately 20 recipients, each session 
is presented according to need and demand. The courses are provided as a 
strategy for improving recipients’ working attitude while exposing them to 
new skills and knowledge.56 
 Apart from courses, monitoring is another non-financial service within the 
income generation program. This service is pertinent as to measure the performance 
or achievement made by the fund recipient besides avoiding any tendency of misuse 
of the disbursed fund. Monitoring activities have been carried out through direct and 
indirect means. Directly it is  conducted by district zakat officials who sometimes 
visit the recipients to determine their condition over time. As the number of officials 
is not enough to visit all the recipients, it is normal practice that the monitoring will 
take place during the recipients’ attendance at courses.57 Due to the limited number 
of officials and the fact that the monitoring task is rather costly, the ZBS has been for 
sometime trying to find a better way to conduct it. Significant results for this 
practice, however, have yet to be observed. 58 
3.  Support Services 
  In order to bring the recipients together so that they can share knowledge and 
experience, ZBS in 2004, has also introduced a club named Group of Zakat Recipients 
Entrepreneurs (Kumpulan Usahawan Asnaf Zakat or KUAZ).59 The group is open to 
                                                          
55 Tahir, “Konsep Agihan”, 47, 50; Pusat Zakat Selangor, Laporan Tahunan 2003 (Shah Alam: PZS), 
47-48; “Bengkel Bantu Wanita Urus Wang”, Harian Metro, May 14, 2004. 
56 Nor, “Latihan: Wadah Asnaf Berdikari”, 12; Interview with Abdul Samad Ibrahim, Head of Asnaf 
Development Department, ZBS, Klang, May 14, 2010. 
57 Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf,145; Sahari, “Program Keusahawanan”, 7. 
58 From approximately 250 monitored recipients in 2007, only about 60 could be considered sucessful. 
Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf,149; Sidek, “Usahawan Asnaf Zakat” 11; Report of 
monitoring services provided by Department of Asnaf Development, ZBS.  
59 Makhtar et.al , “Pengurusan Zakat”, 12; Sidek, “Usahawan Asnaf Zakat” 11.  
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those who received income-generation aid from the ZBS. KUAZ in 2010 had more 
than 500 registered members producing many goods.60  
  KUAZ with the Zakat Recipient Development Department collaborate to 
organized programs for their interest. Carnivals and exhibitions are the main media 
that the ZBS has usually chosen for providing recipients with an opportunity to market 
their products.61 Carnivals have been organized annually since 2008 where the ZBS 
spending approximately RM50,000 each year on such occasions. In these exhibitions, 
recipients’ products will be displayed to promote sales.62 The exhibitions have been 
given a warm welcome by private and government sectors.  
 Apart from that, the KUAZ has also managed to collaborate with public to 
organize its activities. In 2010, for example, another carnival was organized and was 
supported by a big local retail company and a local entrepreneurs association which 
successfully attracted thousands of visitors and introduced the public to the existence 
of the recipients’ products.63  
 All the above measures show the growing commitment of the ZBS to 
empowering recipients through income generation programs, especially after 2004. 
In this aspect, ZBS has helped through a number of initiatives ranging from  financial 
aid to assistance in marketing their products. These steps will directly and indirectly 
help them to survive in the real world.  
7.3.2 Group projects  
 After 2004, a number of collective programs (program berkelompok) were 
also introduced. An important element reflected in the collective programs is the 
greater involvement of the ZBS in the offered projects. Unlike the ordinary capital 
distribution discussed earlier, in which the ZBS merely selects and indirectly 
monitors the achievement of the eligible recipients, the function of the organization 
in these projects is to directly manage the fund. The ZBS being the main manager on 
                                                          
60 Information given by Research and Development Unit, ZBS.   
61 “Lebih 1000 Usahawan Didedah Ruang Berniaga”, Asnaf, 1/2008, 24;  
62 “Lebih 1000 Usahawan Didedah Ruang Berniaga”, 24; Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Tahunan 
2008 (Shah Alam: ZBS, 2009), 36; Interview with Fauzi Masdan, Head of Department, 
Entrepreneurial Development Unit, ZBS, Shah Alam, May 20,2010.  
63 “Karnival Himpunan Usahawan Asnaf Selangor Bukti Kemampuan Golongan Fakir Miskin 




behalf of the poor, in some projects the poor are simply employed temporarily or 
permanently and the recipients receive remuneration based on their productivity.  
 In this case, we can observe the implementation of projects coming closest to 
realization of the theoretical idea put forward by the CEO of the ZBS in his earlier-
mentioned presentation in 2004, a lthough the body has never made that particular 
claim. Indeed, it would not be surprising if the body put its utmost effort into 
fulfilling its own leader’s vision. 
 In respect of the group projects, the ZBS, according to its annual reports, has 
spent a considerable amount of money, as listed below: 
Table 7.2: Distribution for group projects 









   Sources: ZBS, Annual Report, various issues 
*The amount shown is total disbursement for 
group projects, which comprises (modal 
kelompok), funds for poor (dana asnaf miskin) 
and also the sewing workshop (bengkel jahitan).  
 
The spending detailed above goes to several projects, as follows: 
1. Sewing workshop 
 The sewing workshop is the ZBS’s earliest project, dating back to 1997. 
Since at that time the ZBS required 8000 s ets of school uniform annually, to be 
distributed to poor children, the workshop was established to fulfil this pressing 
need. 64 Needing a workforce to keep the production line running, the ZBS hired 10 
                                                          
64 Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf,142; Tahir, “Konsep Agihan”, 51;  Information given by 
Hairudin Ahmad, ZBS sewing workshop supervisor, Tanjong Karang, May 5, 2010. 
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poor individuals, paid according to their productivity.65 By this method, the ZBS 
could not only manufacture its own product but at the same time give the local poor 
the opportunity to obtain additional income. 
 Basically, the sewing workshop project was initially not designed as an 
income generation project, but only as a cheaper way of producing school uniforms. 
That is why, until 2004, the ZBS did not expand the workshop but kept it as it was.  
 The sewing workshop project was considerably extended after 2004. F rom 
then on, it was regarded as a group of projects. In 2004, the ZBS built another two 
workshops, followed by two more in 2007, making five already built across the state. 
Altogether, in 2010, the workshops were producing 23,000 school uniforms a year.66 
 The rapid expansion and sharper focus of recent years has indicated that the 
ZBS recognizes its huge potential for income generation. The workshops have over 
time not merely produced uniforms but also played an important role as training 
centers, providing the selected poor with sewing skills in addition to stable 
incomes.67   
 The sewing workshop initiative demonstrated that the ZBS can creatively use 
the fund to create job opportunities. The disbursement for the poor in this case is in 
the form of wages and also training. The ZBS chose to manufacture goods through 
its own production system which concomitantly provides job opportunities for the 
poor. This shows that the ZBS hold immense power to manage and spend the zakat 
fund, while the poor receive their portion in the form of pay. Proud of such a model 
of disbursement, the ZBS prominently publicizes this scheme as a model of 
development and empowerment for the poor.68  
2. Craft /Souvenirs project 
                                                          
65 Mohd Fauzi Masdan, “Pembanguan Usahawan Asnaf: Pengalaman Pusat Pembangunan Usahawan, 
Lembaga Zakat Selangor” Paper presented in Sumbangsaran Program Pembangunan Ekonomi Asnaf, 
November 10, 2009, Shah Alam. 
66 Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf,142; Interview with Abdul Samad Ibrahim, Head of Asnaf 
Development Department, ZBS, Klang, May 14, 2010. 
67 See objectives of sewing workshop establishment. Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf,142. 
68 “Delegasi Keda Kagum Pengurusan Zakat PZS”, Asnaf, 3/2004, 14; “Permaisuri Agong Lawat Desa 
Ehsan PZS”, Asnaf, 3/2004, 14; Ahmad Shahir Makhtar, “ Cabaran dan Transformasi Agihan Zakat 
Dalam Pembasmian Kemiskinan: Pengalaman Lembaga Zakat Selangor” in ed.Muhammad Syukri 
Salleh, Transformasi Zakat Daripada Zakat Saradiri Kepada Zakat Produktif (Penang: Pusat Urus 




 Another project on a  model similar to that of the sewing workshop is the 
craft-making project. It was begun in 2005 and targeted poor single mothers or 
homemakers whom it provided with a profitable economic activity conducted from 
home.69 The participants are provided with necessary trainings, which commonly 
held in nearby community centres. The project is based on c ollaboration whereby 
they are given individual tasks to complete in a group or in their respective houses, 
the results being later assembled in community centres. The projects are currently 
focusing on crafts made of discarded material such as newspapers or local 
agricultural by-products. For remuneration, each participant could receive between 
RM200 to RM1000 based on personal output. 70  
 The project is not, however, a profit-based enterprise, since the investment is 
still derived from zakat. The ZBS only sell the products to pay for raw material for 
the operation so as to keep it continuously running. Until 2010, there were 200 
participants involved in this project, turning out four main craft products. Mainly 
sold from its showroom in Shah Alam and through other exhibitions organized from 
time to time by the ZBS, these crafts represent another project that the ZBS 
frequently displays to the public as an innovative model for helping recipients.71  
3. Pasar Asnaf (zakat recipients’ bazaar) 
 Pasar Asnaf or bazaar for zakat recipients was established in 2007 as part of 
the ZBS commitment to promoting income generation through entrepreneurship, 
with the particular aim of reducing poverty in urban areas.72 In the first project, 
located next to a property belonging to IRCS in the heart of Shah Alam, the state 
capital city of Selangor, the bazaar was able to accommodate 20 participants selling 
cooked foods, vegetables and other groceries.73 Financially, the ZBS gave each 
individual start-up capital of between RM500 and RM2000, together with other basic 
equipment. Prior to its launch, the ZBS had spent overall about 30,000 for initial 
                                                          
69 Balwi et.al, Pewujudan Usahawan Asnaf,143; Masdan, “Pembanguan Usahawan Asnaf” 2.  
70 The information regarding the process and procedure craft making is provided by Norazrina 
Rahman, ZBS monitoring officer, Shah Alam, May 21, 2010.  
71 Masdan, “Pembangunan Usahawan Asnaf”, 2;  
72 Masdan, “Pembangunan Usahawan Asnaf”, 4; “LZS Sedia RM100 000 Anjur Pasar Rakyat Asnaf” 
Harian Metro, March 12, 2007;  
73 Sidek, “Usahawan Asnaf Zakat” 11;  
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investment.74 Officially launched in Mac 2007, the bazaar has since been open every 
Saturday from 7am to 1 pm and also during the whole month of ramadan.75  
 The success in first bazaar led the ZBS to extend its range to other areas. In 
2009 another market was established to accommodate a further 39 zakat recipients as 
vendors. This move was stimulated by the ZBS’s observation that, at the first bazaar, 
the monthly income of the seller could reach between RM1000 and RM3000. 76  
 From the initiation of this program, it shows, besides direct spending of the 
zakat fund on eligible recipients, a significant degree of ZBS involvement. These two 
markets have been established specifically for poor sellers under the auspices of the 
ZBS in collaboration with the local authority of Shah Alam.77 It is evident that such a 
marketplace could not be established without the active involvement of the ZBS. 
 The vendors in this project are under close supervision and monitoring by a 
special supervisor appointed by the ZBS. In addition, they are subject to standard 
requirements determined by the ZBS, such as the use of standard equipment and the 
sale of only those goods which have been mutually agreed on. Overall, the ZBS has 
considerable influence on the projects beyond disbursing zakat.   
4. Mobile entrepreneur 
 In the same year that the Asnaf Bazaar project was introduced, the ZBS 
initiated the Mobile Entrepreneur project, a trial scheme which gives each recipient a 
small van with which to conduct a mobile business, a popular local practice 
especially among those who have no p ermanent business outlet. The ZBS spent 
RM300,000 on the scheme, the largest sum ever disbursed for a project. In 2007 
seven poor people were selected and provided with vans containing the necessary 
equipment for selling cooked food and beverages.78  
                                                          
74 Sidek, “Usahawan Asnaf Zakat” 11; “Orang Miskin Jadi Usahawan” Berita Harian, July 6, 2007. 
75 “Keunikan Bazar Ramadhan LZS”, Berita Harian, September 25, 2007; “LZS Bantu Asnaf Miskin 
Berniaga”, Berita Harian, September 18, 2007. 
76 Masdan, “Pembangunan Usahawan Asnaf”, 4.  
77 “LZS Sedia RM100 000 Anjur Pasar Rakyat Asnaf” Harian Metro, March 12, 2007. 
78 Masdan, “Pembangunan Usahawan Asnaf”, 3; “Laporan Program Pembasmian Kemiskinan Oleh 
Bahagian Pembangunan Ekonomi, Jabatan Pembangunan Asnaf LZS”, Report paper for the period of 
July to September 2007,  provided by Department of Asnaf Development, ZBS;  “Orang Miskin Jadi 
Usahawan”, Berita Harian, July 6, 2007; “Usahawan Bergerak Bantu Fakir miskin Tambah Rezeki”, 
Berita Harian, July 12, 2007;  Sidek, “Usahawan Asnaf Zakat”, 11. 
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 What is interesting about this project is that the poor were not granted 
complete ownership of the vehicles provided, but were required to pay a monthly 
rental fee of about RM500 for their use. A van would be handed over only if the 
participant could completely service the rent over a specified period of time 
(normally 5 years). 79 
 The mechanism of the project is to a certain extent similar to that of the Asnaf 
Bazaar, in that both are profit-based schemes focusing on bus iness activities. The 
later project, however, has the distinct feature that ZBS in this case facilitates the 
acquisition of the van by making the initial purchase. This is a new means of zakat 
disbursement, akin to a loan. The project is still in the trial stage and will be 
gradually expanded. Should there be positive change for the recipients involved in 
the project, the ZBS will surely extend the program in future.  
 From the discussion of the complete range of income generation programs, 
we can infer that the ZBS has through time shown great concern for improving the 
condition of recipients through providing them with better opportunities to flourish. 
Viewing the pattern of disbursement for income generation since the end of the 
1990s, we can see that the programs have been gradually expanded. At the end of the 
1990s the disbursement merely involved monetary capital aid, which was later 
gradually complemented with non-monetary financial capital such as training and 
advisory services. Still, at this stage, the schemes are not necessarily all offered 
simultaneously, apart from the limited involvement of the ZBS in the initiative.   
 After the state government’s inclusion of the ZBS under the poverty 
eradication agencies in 2004, the ZBS does not only continue to offer the existing 
personal distribution, but also gives greater attention to collective projects. In these 
projects, by contrast with previous practice, the ZBS is substantially involved with 
the distributed fund. As discussed above, two projects were established specifically 
for enhancing the recipients’ skills while another two focused on de velopment 
through business.  
                                                          
79Lembaga Zakat Selangor, Laporan Pengurusan Zakat Selangor 2006, 34;  Interview with Abdul 
Samad Ibrahim, Head of Asnaf Development Department, ZBS, Klang, May 14, 2010.  
266 
 
 In sum, the distribution of zakat for income generation means not merely 
transferring zakat funds to the poor but also empowering the latter to enrich 
themselves and eventually to contribute to society. To achieve this objective, the 
ZBS has consistently and creatively improved its distribution systems over the years. 
The state government steps to incorporate the ZBS under the poverty eradication 
committee led by the chief minister has created additional momentum. Many income 
generation projects have been launched since then. The ZBS then has regarded 
income generation as the best program to focus on and has experimented with many 
initiatives to ensure that such projects achieve their aims. What has been done by the 
ZBS in this area could be regarded as complementing the state effort. 
 Such a process is certainly bound to continue, enabling zakat to serve the 
community in keeping with people’s current needs, and simultaneously 
demonstrating the greater role that zakat can play in modern economic development. 
This, however, depends on s upport from the community, as the government can 
merely give advice and non-monetary help. Society’s contribution, in forms (briefly 
touched upon earlier) such as warm acceptance during carnivals and increased 
donations to the fund, is more important. A positive reaction from society will indeed 
motivate the ZBS to be more creative in improving its income generation projects.  
  
7.4  Fatwa on Zakat – Accommodative Ijtihad 
 As earlier mentioned, the fatwa and the Mufti are important integral parts of 
the overall zakat administration system. Although the ZBS, as a body responsible for 
the zakat fund, has considerable power over distribution, in certain respects it cannot 
act all by itself without the consent of the Mufti.80 Looking back at the introduction 
of distribution for income generation and its pattern of development through the end 
of the 1990s and 2000s, it is certain that the fatwa exerts a certain degree of influence 
on it.  
 This is important because the introduction of income generation through 
zakat in Selangor complements the state effort to eradicate poverty, so that the fatwa, 
                                                          
80 Mufti Negeri Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan Zakat Negeri Selangor”, 5.  
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too, must accommodate these changes. In this case, the Mufti must not merely restate 
classical opinions, but must approach the new ruling in terms of the new demand.  
 The Mufti is the most authoritative religious personage in the state. It is 
accordingly a requirement of state religious enactments that he must be consulted 
should any issue arise that pertains to Islam, including zakat.81 It is also pertinent for 
ensuring that the ZBS be seen as free from any hidden agenda, especially when a 
new way of fund disbursement, with which the masses are still not familiar, is about 
to be launched.82  
 To reach a desired decision, the process of ijtihad may involve only an 
individual Mufti, but he can also seek advice from other qualified individuals. As far 
as the process of ijtihad to deliver fatwas in Selangor is concerned, the Mufti 
normally will take into consideration the opinions of the fatwa committee’s 
members. It is however up to him either to agree with them or to come up with his 
own final decision.83  
 The process of producing a fatwa regarding zakat normally starts with new 
issues raised by the ZBS. For this purpose, the ZBS has to submit a working paper, 
mentioning the problems about which it wishes to be enlightened, complete with 
justifications and any necessary references backing up its arguments.84 These 
materials will accordingly be deliberated on by the Mufti, who will then deliver his 
decision, either clearly consenting to the request or rejecting the application and 
giving reasons.  
 The fatwa concerning zakat is associated with the context and needs of the 
zakat institution, especially where any new problematic issue demands clarification. 
Prior to the introduction of productive disbursement, the question of zakat 
distribution was seldom discussed. This is not surprising as the disbursement 
                                                          
81 Refer to previous chapter; Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment (State of Selangor) 
2003, Section 48.  
82 Sahadan Ishak, “Pengagihan Zakat Saksama Keadilan Sosial Terbela”, Asnaf, 2/2005, 4; Normala 
Mohd Sa’ad and Sahadan Ishak, “Teluskah Agihan Zakat di  Selangor”, Asnaf, 2/2005, 8. 
83 Ahmad Hidayat Buang, “Penyediaan Dan Pengeluaran Fatwa”, in Fatwa di Malaysia, ed. Ahmad 
Hidayat Buang (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-undang APIUM, 2004), 97-101; 
Kasnan, Institusi Fatwa di Malaysia, 68; Wahab, “Pentadbiran Fatwa di Negeri Selangor”, 74-75.  
84 The process of producing a fatwa and preparation of working paper are briefly discussed in Buang, 
“Penyediaan Dan Pengeluaran Fatwa”,101, 108;  
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consisted mainly of direct distribution of money to the poor; hence there was no 
serious problem requiring a new fatwa. 
 However, a f ew fatwas on zakat disbursement were recorded prior to the 
1990s. In the 1980s, for example, there was a fatwa for disbursement of the fund to 
refugees from Afganistan, and a question arose concerning distribution under the 
heading of fi sabil allah. In the former case, the Mufti gave an affirmative answer.85 
As for the latter, the fatwa said that the fund could be channelled towards, among 
other things, religious schools, mosque building and educational scholarships. 
However, the fatwa stressed that the distribution must be managed by the zakat 
body.86  
 The earlier fatwa on zakat disbursement, which provided a preliminary 
framework for the permissibility of income generation disbursement, was only 
produced in 1994. Since the zakat body was corporatized in the same year, such a 
fatwa was perhaps part of the process of giving the new organization basic guidelines 
on zakat. The fatwa gave some examples of how zakat could be given to the poor, 
including the provision of business capital and tools which could help them to 
prosper.87Considering the fact that, during the decade of the 1990s, the zakat 
collection was still low and the disbursement was still inefficient, the fatwa seemed 
not to offer any very propitious options. 
 As will be seen later in this section, the income generation issues are more 
prominently reflected in the fatwa on zakat disbursement produced in 2002, which 
was also used as a distribution guideline for the ZBS. This guideline is more detailed 
than any previously published fatwa on disbursement. The 2002 guideline comprises 
a few sections covering the general principle of distribution, the programs the ZBS 
should offer to each group of recipients, and also the legal evidence from which the 
rulings are derived.88 The guideline was revised in 2008, since it is the policy of the 
ZBS to keep revising it to enable the system to accommodate the ever-changing 
                                                          
85 Jawatankuasa Fatwa Selangor, “ Keputusan Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Fatwa Negeri Selangor Tahun 
1987”, 23. 
86 Wahab, “Pentadbiran Fatwa”, 95. 
87 Mufti Negeri Selangor, Fatwa Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan 1991 Hingga 1997, 
15. 
88 Mufti Negeri Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan Zakat Negeri Selangor”; Jabatan Mufti 
Selangor, Meeting minute of Fatwa Committee, File no. Mesyuarat J/Fatwa 5/2001. 
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conditions of Muslim society.89 Apart from the guidelines, many other related issues  
have been discussed in fatwa meetings from time to time. These fatwas were based 
on questions brought earlier by the LZS, in case any issues arising from them should 
need to be clarified.  
 As regards income generation through zakat distribution and its related 
issues, apart from the 2002 guideline, these matters have been directly and indirectly 
discussed in fatwas produced later, as well as in some papers and interviews with the 
Mufti. Discussion of the fatwa can be divided into several issues as follows: 
7.4.1 Issue of disbursal priority in poverty eradication and income generation 
 The establishment of the 2002 g uideline was basically a response to the 
proposal earlier submitted based on some suggestions made by workshop panels held 
in 1999. A s earlier mentioned, the workshop was held by the ZBS right after the 
body became responsible for fund disbursement. Its purpose was to acquire a more 
comprehensive directive, establishing principles of distribution which would make it 
easier for the body to conduct its day-to-day operations.90 
 The Mufti eventually approved a fatwa on zakat distribution which was also a 
primary guideline for the ZBS to refer to in the course of its activities. Hoping that 
the guideline could help the ZBS to disburse the fund more effectively, the Mufti 
himself mentioned that it had been delineated so as to suit the current need and new 
interpretation (penafsiran semasa).91  
 In the paperwork submitted in 1999, the ZBS suggested, among other things, 
that the zakat fund should be mainly directed towards eradicating poverty, basing the 
argument on the prophet’s saying that zakat is the duty taken from the rich and given 
to the poor in the community.92 This proposal received a positive response from the 
Mufti in the guideline through the principles of fund disbursal outlined in it. One of 
the principles is that of Isti’ab (inclusiveness), which states that the disbursement 
                                                          
89Jabatan Mufti Selangor, Meeting minute of Fatwa Committee, File no. Mesyuarat J/Fatwa 6/2008; 
“Kertas Cadangan Mengemaskini Fatwa Sistem Pengurusan Agihan Zakat Negeri Selangor” Paper 
presented in Fatwa Meeting, December 30, 2008.   
90 “Sistem Agihan Asnaf Diberi Nafas Baru”, 10; Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Catatan Ringkas”; Pusat 
Zakat Selangor, “Kertas Cadangan Mengemaskini”. 
91 Mufti Negeri Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan”, preface. 
92 Refer to Bukhari , Sahih Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 24, Number 537 available at http://www.usc.edu 
/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/024.sbt.html (accessed 
March 20, 2011) ; Refer also to Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Kertas Cadangan Mengemaskini”, 4. 
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should encompass all eligible recipients should they all be available at the moment of 
disbursal.93  This does not mean, however, that the distribution must be extended 
equally to all the recipients. The fatwa in this regard separated eligible recipients into 
two groups. The first includes the poor (miskin), the needy (faqir), the zakat collector 
(‘amil) and those whose hearts are to be won (muallaf qulubihim); while the second 
includes the captives (al-riqab), the debtors (al-gharimin), the wayfarers (ibn al-
sabil) and those in the path of Allah (fi sabil allah). As far as distribution is 
concerned, the first group should be given priority over the second. 94 
  In this aspect, such a view is actually derived from the classical 
understanding of the Shafi’is school in particular, who are of the view that the first 
group should receive more attention through distribution of the fund in person with 
complete ownership of it. Regarding the productive distribution, the guideline clearly 
stipulated that the objective of distribution for the poor and needy is to develop them 
and help them out of poverty for good. The zakat body should also establish 
initiatives for economic development. As for the concrete practice, the guideline 
underlined the type of distribution for income generation, such as capital aid for 
business and for initiatives such as agriculture and fisheries, among others. The poor 
and needy recipients also could be given necessary training and courses to enhance 
their capability and skills.95   
 Apart from the official fatwa, the same aspiration has also been expressed by 
the Mufti through other means.  In an interview concerning zakat disbursement in 
2005 for example, he stated that the zakat is a core Muslim economic system which 
counts poverty eradication among its objectives. According to him, the zakat does 
not merely release the beneficiaries from poverty, but also transforms them into 
potential payers.96 
 Although we could not determine with absolute certainty why the interview 
was conducted at this time, in view of the fact that many projects related to income 
                                                          
93 Mufti Negeri Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan”, 4. 
94 Mufti Negeri Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan”, 22. 
95 Mufti Negeri Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan”, 8, 11.  
96 “Wawancara Berhubung isu Menegeluar dan Mengagihkan Zakat Secara Sendiri bersama S.S Dato’ 
seri Utama DiRaja Mufti Selangor”, http://www.muftiselangor.gov.my/E-Book/Download/ 
Temuramah/ 1TemuramahAgihanZakat.pdf (accessed March 21, 2011).   
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generation were initiated in 2004, there was nothing strange about seeking greater 
clarification or reconfirmation from the main individual to provide the ZBS with 
stronger justification. 
 Apart from the interview, this practice was elaborated in greater detail in a 
more recent guideline revised in 2008. U nder the principle of awlawiya (priority) 
which was newly introduced, the poor and needy must be given priority to the extent 
that if the needs of these groups are sufficiently pressing, the provision for other 
groups could be transferred to meet their needs.97 Such a s tatement could be 
perceived as a blanket approval for giving an advantage to those groups over other 
rightful recipients.   
 Since the fatwa has indicated that income generation and poverty eradication 
provide the approach the ZBS must adopt, it is not surprising that there has been a 
gradual increase in provision for this segment since early 2000. This also shows how 
ijtihad reacts to current demand, in this case to the ZBS enquiry which was perceived 
as superior because of the ZBS’s knowledge of the needs of rightful recipients.  
7.4.2 Indirect intangible (manfa’a) disbursement for poor and principle of 
ownership 
 As mentioned in earlier chapter, the concept of al-tamlik (conferral of 
ownership) denotes the right of the recipients to full title to the disbursed fund and, 
consequently, the right to determine freely how to spend it. Such a principle could 
only be realized in a situation in which the distribution involves tangible assets.98 
This issue merits discussion, since income generation through zakat in Selangor is 
closely related to the offer of initiatives which are clearly intangible in nature.  
 The issue of al-tamlik is also related to the sharing of ownership among the 
poor. In this case, the disbursed fund will not be owned permanently by one 
individual but must be shared with other people. The mobile entrepreneur project is 
an example of a disbursement subject to this mechanism. The van provided to the 
                                                          
97 Lembaga Zakat Selangor, “Kertas Cadangan Mengemaskini”, 11. 
98 Please refer to the discussion regarding the principle of al-tamlik in chapter 4 (Pakistan and 
Indonesia case).  
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selected participants will still be held by the ZBS as sole trustee of the fund.99 
Technically, the van belongs to all eligible recipients and the participants need to hire 
it on a  monthly basis for a specified period of time before it is permanently 
surrendered. In other words, the recipients only have temporary and partial 
ownership within that period. 
  Although, in terms of development, this is a mechanism designed to improve 
the zakat distribution system and also to provide the poor with a profitable asset, it 
contradicts the ownership principle. Acquisition of the asset by the poor is unlikely 
without the help of zakat, since financial institutions would turn their backs on 
them.100 A special section in the guideline devoted to the al-tamlik concept is 
interesting to consider, as it shows how the issue is resolved by the fatwa. 
   As also discussed earlier, it is widely known that the majority of classical 
scholars are inclined to have zakat distributed tangibly. In this case, the majority of 
Hanafis hold to the strictest ruling, according to which all recipients have the right to 
full title; while Shafi’is are of the rather lenient view that the principle is only to be 
applied to the first four recipients stated in the verse (al-tawba: 60). The majority in 
the latter school, however, still hold that the poor and needy are subject to the 
principle.101  
 In contrast to classical opinion, the fatwa is affirmative in the matter of 
intangible distribution to the poor and needy. This ruling gives clear consent for the 
ZBS to choose to disburse any type of asset without restriction. In this respect, the 
fatwa is based on a hadith narrated by Anas, one of the prophet’s companions. In the 
hadith, it was reported that prophet used to give permission for a group of people 
from ‘Urayna tribe to utilize a herd of camel (as source of milk) which were given as 
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zakat without completely owning them.102 The hadith, according to the fatwa, 
indicated the permissibility of giving intangible forms of zakat wealth.103 
 With reference to the linguistic aspect, the preposition “li” specified for the 
poor in al-Tawba: 60 doe s not mean ownership al- tamlik but merely al-takhsis 
(specification), denoting that zakat must be given exclusively for the eight eligible 
recipients specified in the verse.104 The fatwa then supports its arguments with the 
following: 
Narrated Abu Ma'bad, (The slave of Ibn ‘Abbas), Allah's Apostle said to 
Mu’adh when he sent him to Yemen, "You will go to the people of the 
Scripture. So, when you reach there, invite them to testify that none has 
the right to be worshipped but Allah, and that Muhammad is His 
Apostle……. And if they obey you in that tell them that Allah has made it 
obligatory on them to pay the Zakat which will be taken from the rich 
among them and given to the poor among them……"105 
 The hadith (in Arabic) clearly shows that the poor, like all other recipients, 
are associated with the preposition “fi”. This is rather different from the pattern of 
usage in the verse al-Tawba, where only four groups (belonging to the second group) 
are addressed by such a preposition. What could be understood here is that there is 
no difference between “fi” and “li” and hence they could be used interchangeably. 
The ruling therefore comes to the conclusion that the intangible disbursement may be 
freely offered to all groups including the poor and needy. This basically differs from 
the pure classical Shafi’is view, as the majority of scholars in the sect only permitted 
the second set of four groups to receive such an offering.  
 Apart from that, the fatwa also ruled that the disbursement must be based on 
the public interest (maslaha). As for the best means of upholding the interest of the 
recipients, the ZBS is entitled to use its discretion to decide how the fund must be 
                                                          
102 Sahih Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 24, Number 577 available at http://www.usc.edu/schools 
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103 Mufti Negeri Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan”, 26. 
104 Mufti Negeri Selangor, “Fatwa Pengurusan Agihan”, 27; For further discussion regarding the 
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disbursed.106 This argument could be based on the opinions of a few classical 
scholars. Ahmad Ibn ‘Ali ibn Muhammad (known as Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani (773-
852 AD)), a classical Shafi’i scholar for example, is of the view that the ruler (al-
wali) should determine the portion to be given to the recipients, on the basis of their 
needs. In doing so, the ruler could assist them from the zakat fund, which does not 
necessarily mean distribution of the fund itself in physical form.107 In more or less 
similar vein, Malik Ibn Anas (711- 795 AD), the founder of Maliki school of law, 
argued that the disbursement of the zakat fund must be at the discretion of the ruler, 
who has the best knowledge of the people’s affairs.108 In addition, the fatwa reflected 
one of the maxims of Islamic law (Qawa’id Fiqhiyya) as outlined by another Shafi’i 
scholar, Jalal al-din al-Suyuti (1445-1505 AD), namely, “The affairs of the imam 
concerning his people are judged by reference to maslaha”.109   
 As is evident from the above discussion, the Mufti through the fatwa has 
clearly approved intangible disbursement and incomplete ownership, an issue that 
has been discussed by classical scholars. The consent indirectly encourages the ZBS 
to creatively enhance the effectiveness of zakat use to the best of its knowledge and 
understanding, in accordance with the prerogative bestowed upon it.   
  In 2005, t he ZBS carried out a study of its disbursement practice before 
asking for clarification as to whether disbursement in the form of intangible assets 
should be limited. This was because the 2002 fatwa merely gave permission for the 
disbursement without delineating its limits. In this case, the ZBS apparently wanted 
to avoid going overboard with a policy that might lead to a waste of funds.110.  
 If we look into the background of the situation at the time, it was actually an 
unsurprising act, as in 2004 the ZBS had introduced many training programs. While 
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in this case there is no record indicating rejection or social resentment of the 
programs, it is  still possible that payers or the public in general demanded 
clarification of the issues related to their introduction. That may be why the ZBS 
stated in its proposal that a fatwa was needed to enable the body to offer a concrete 
explanation (membuat penjelasan) to society.  
 Of 3800 recipients among the poor and needy who were surveyed, 63% 
received the disbursement in the form of intangibles such as various courses, 
training, house rentals and insurance. Fewer than 40% received tangible assets such 
as money and other necessities.111  
 Responding to the ZBS proposal, a fatwa produced in 2006 e xpressed the 
opinion that no limit should be set as long as the interests of the recipient are taken 
care of. In addition, the fatwa suggested that the focus should be on development and 
personal confidence-building, as well as on causing people to become more 
observant Muslims. This means that the intangible disbursement is as important as 
the tangible disbursement, with the two complementing each other. From this fatwa 
it appeared that the ZBS need have no m ore concerns about offering creative 
programs in accordance with public need. The issue of the scope of ZBS power will 
be elaborated further in the next subsection. 
7.4.3 Issues of the limit of funds disbursed and monitoring service 
 The provision of income generation aid usually involves a great deal of 
money. The over-disbursed will jeopardize others’ prospects of similar aid, while the 
projects of the underfinanced will end in failure. Hence, the amount and limit of 
disbursement for income generation is a matter with which the ZBS needs to concern 
itself.   
 The distribution limit has actually been specified by some classical scholars. 
As referred to in an earlier chapter, Hanafi scholars have stipulated that no 
distribution may exceed the value of nisab (the minimum value of taxable assets). 
Other classical jurists, on the other hand, are of the view that recipients could receive 
assistance to the extent of the sufficiency limit. But how the sufficiency limit is  
                                                          
111 Lembaga Zakat Selangor, “Kajian Keberkesanan Agihan Zakat Dari Segi Zat dan Manfaat” in 
Pengesahan Aktiviti Agihan dari Dana Fakir Miskin 2005 dalam Konteks Zat dan Manfaat, Paper 
presented in Fatwa Meeting, June 26-27, 2006, 4.  
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determined is an interesting question, especially when it involves the distribution for 
income generation.112  
  The issue of the distribution limit has been touched on in several fatwas. The 
2002 guideline, for example, briefly indicated that the disbursement must be 
sufficient to meet basic needs.113 In this context, the principle of kifaya (sufficiency) 
is among the factors highlighted in the guideline. The principle means that the 
provision of zakat must suffice for the individual’s needs in terms of basic requisites 
including food, clothing, shelter, education, health expenditure and transportation.114 
In this respect, the minimum household sufficiency (had al-kifaya) in monetary 
denominations was introduced through a fatwa in 2002. As discussed in chapter 6 
and shown in appendix 2, the had al-kifaya is the mechanism for measuring the 
economic condition of applicants for zakat funding. Those who earn less than the 
minimum limit are considered poor and entitled to zakat assistance. 115    
 In the implementation of the principle of kifaya, those who need capital will 
be helped to the extent that they can be expected to achieve at least minimum level of 
income (had al-kifaya).116 As the ultimate objective of the disbursement for the poor 
and needy, as stated in the guideline, is release from poverty, no s trict maximum 
amount of disbursement has been specifically set. This is important, since it means 
that the provision for them will be enough to generate income, rather than being  
directed towards meeting their daily needs. As the assessment is carried out annually 
for those who receive capital aid, they will cease to be given zakat if their initiative 
or business yields income above the had al-kifaya.117   
                                                          
112 For further discussion about the dispersal limit refer : Al-Sarakhshi, al-Mabsut, v3, 4; Ibn Humam, 
Sharh Fath al-Qadir, v2, 266, 303-306; Ibn ‘Abidin, Radd al-Mukhtar, v.3 , 303; Sham al-Din 
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114 Mutalib, “Keciciran Fakir Miskin”, 4; Jantan, “Takrif Fakir dan Miskin”, 24. 
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117 Interview with Fauzi Masdan, Head of Department, Entrepreneurial Development Unit, ZBS, Shah 
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 To ensure that the disbursed fund is utilized only for income generation, the 
ZBS must maintain a systematic fund administration. Through the principle of 
muraqaba (monitoring), the guideline indicated that the disbursement must be under 
proper management accompanied by close supervision.118 According to the principle, 
any application for zakat funding from prospective recipients must be first certified 
by at least two individuals. In this respect, the process of fund management demands 
complete honesty from ZBS staff at all levels of administration.119  
 In addition, the disbursement must be accompanied by a proper monitoring 
mechanism, to confirm that the disbursed fund is used in the manner agreed upon 
prior to the disbursement. Should there be any fund diversion or contract breaking, 
the ZBS has the right to take any necessary action such as admonition or cessation of 
further aid.120  
 In close connection with what has been discussed earlier, although the ZBS 
has considerable power to determine the distribution approach and to supervise the 
disbursed funds, according to the muraqaba principle, the body must at the earliest 
possible date consult the Mufti for clarification should any new legal issue arise.121 
As we have seen in this section, it seems that the ZBS has never bypassed the Mufti 
in any case needing clarification. 
 From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the expanding role of 
zakat, in particular regarding income generation, has involved changes in aspects of 
Islamic law. There are some issues related to distribution which have been 
reinterpreted to enable the implementation to suit modern requirements. As for zakat 
management in Selangor, the introduction of new ijtihad and its ongoing deliberation 
has involved direct collaboration between the ZBS and the Mufti.   
  From the Mufti’s perspective, income generation is among the best solutions 
to poverty eradication; hence the fatwa, as clearly evident, has accommodated 
necessary changes. The problem of intangible disbursement is no longer an issue. 
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 In many respects, the fatwas produced by the Mufti regarding zakat 
distribution, besides being used as guidelines, underline principles which clarify the 
interrelated issues of income generation through zakat. Looking at the justifications 
and reasons given for the fatwas produced, it is clear that the process of ijtihad in 
modern Selangor does not strictly follow any particular classical opinion and no 
longer tied literally to classical texts.  
  The fatwas to an extent display independent reasoning which arrives at 
interpretations by examining the texts of the Quran and hadith. This occurred, as we 
have seen, in the matter of intangible distribution for the poor, in which the ruling 
was deduced directly from the two sources. Looking back to the type of ijtihad 
introduced by al-Qardawi in Chapter 2, pe rhaps such an interpretation could be 
described as an ijtihad bayani – that is, applicable to the cases mentioned in the 
Quran and hadith but in need of further explanation.   
 Besides that, the ZBS also offered zakat funding in keeping with the public 
interest and recipients’ needs, confirming the important role that zakat can play in 
economic development. In this case, the statement in the fatwa that the ZBS has the 
right to disburse the fund at its discretion for the interest of society could be a form 
of what al-Qardawi characterized as ijtihad istislahi – deducing new rulings on the 
basis of public interest.  
 Although what is suggested regarding the type of ijtihad employed may not 
be accurate, the important thing we can glean from the discussion in this section is 
that Islamic law has been proved to be dynamic when facing changes in modern 
society and the economy.   
 
7.5 The Achievement and Impact 
 The income generation implemented in Selangor has had an impact in many 
respects, particularly on recipients, and to a greater extent on the zakat institution. 
The impact can be seen from economic and non-economic perspectives, as follows: 
7.5.1 Economic betterment of recipients 
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 The poverty eradication and disbursement for income generation has to a 
certain degree contributed to the improvement of recipients’ living conditions. A few 
studies have been carried out to measure the impact of the initiative upon the poor in 
Selangor.  
 In 2001 Nor Ghani Md. Nor et al. conducted research on the extent to which 
income generation programs have helped the recipients to successfully raise their 
income.122 They selected a sample of 106 recipients of capital aid (mainly business 
aid) to be analyzed as to whether they had succeeded in their economic activities. As 
the study concentrated on zakat recipients residing in the Klang valleys and 
surrounding area, 50 pe rsons in the sample received the aid from the ZBS. The 
evaluation is based on the change between recipients’ income before and after they 
received the aid. In addition, the research was designed to identify related factors 
leading to the success or failure of their businesses.123  
  The research indicated that the zakat fund has to a notable extent promoted 
the advancement of recipients’ living standards. In a fairly encouraging result, 67% 
of the recipients were considered successful as their incomes were generally higher 
than they had been prior to receiving the capital aid.124 Some factors were identified 
as having contributed to the success rate, namely, gender, supervision and experience 
gained before receiving the aid. In this regard, the supervisory factor is empirically 
the most significant, as those who received better and more frequent supervision 
were more likely to be successful. To a l esser extent, female gender and past 
experience in business contributed to the higher success rate.125  
 The downside of the research is that it was not based on a  large sample of 
respondents, so it would  not be easy to generalize the findings with application to 
the whole state. Although it might not have produced such a favourable result had it  
incorporated more respondents, the study still gives us a clue to the importance of 
supervision as a crucial element of the income generation program. In this regard, it 
was found that financial distribution is not sufficient by itself, but needs to be 
supported with non-financial factors as well.  
                                                          
122 Nor et.al, “The Contribution of Zakat”, 69-70. 
123 Nor et.al, “The Contribution of Zakat”, 73-74.  
124 Nor et.al,  “The Contribution of Zakat”, 76. 
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 What is interesting to note here is that, although the ZBS had not yet 
introduced a systematic and comprehensive income generation program, the capital 
aid offered at that time at least slightly advanced the recipients’ standard of living. 
This was indeed an initially good experience for the zakat institution, encouraging 
the further introduction of such initiatives.  
 Patmawati Ibrahim conducted another study of 480 z akat recipients in 
Selangor. Closely collaborating with the ZBS in 2002, s he based her study on the 
population of 5862 poo r recipients throughout the state.126 The objectives of the 
research were among other to analyze the effect of zakat distribution in Selangor on 
income inequality and poverty in society.127 More or less similar to Nor’s, this study 
seeks to determine whether post-zakat assistance income distribution is more equal 
than pre-zakat assistance income distribution.128 In order to evaluate income 
inequality two main statistical analyses were employed, namely, the Lorenz curve 
and the Gini Coefficient.  
 The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution 
function of the empirical probability distribution of wealth. The curve shows, for the 
bottom percentage (x%) of households, what percentage (y %) of the total income 
belongs to them.129 Within the study sample, the recipients prior to receiving zakat 
belonged to the bottom 10% of the population, holding merely 0.4% of total income, 
while the top 10% held more than 35% of the total income.130  
 Another statistical approach used in the research is the Gini Coefficient, 
which ranges from 0 to 1. A low Gini Coefficient indicates a more equal distribution, 
with 0 c orresponding to complete equality. The most unequal society will be one 
(G=1) in which a single person receives 100% of the total income and the rest of the 
population receives none; while the most equal society will be one (G=0) in which 
every person receives a similar amount of income.131  
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 Regarding income equality, the research found that, without zakat aid, the 
index was 0.52. However, it was observed that the index was slightly lower, at 0.47, 
after the zakat had been disbursed. This indicates that zakat disbursement contributed 
to more equal income distribution.132 A similar pattern could be observed in the 
Lorenz curve after zakat disbursement, with 10% of the bottom population holding 
10% of total income, a proportion slightly higher than that prior to disbursal. At the 
same time, the top 10% of the population only held 32%, a slightly lower proportion 
of income than before zakat distribution.133  
 In terms of poverty reduction, the research found that zakat successfully 
reduced poverty by approximately 15%, in which cases the income of the recipients 
exceeded the poverty line.134 On average, the income of every recipient incorporated 
in the sample increased by approximately 27.5%.135 The result showed that zakat has 
to a cer tain extent achieved its objective of poverty eradication by generating 
permanent relief. 
 Although Ibrahim’s research offered comparatively more detailed analysis, it 
did not specifically focus on di stribution for income generation. This was perhaps 
because, at the time of the study, distribution for income generation was still new and 
unorganized, making individual measurement somewhat problematic. The result, 
however, still appreciably reflected the overall performance of zakat disbursement, 
including income generation programs. It should be noted that it is a normal practice, 
according to Ibrahim, for the ZBS to provide many incentives to productivity, such 
as capital aid and skills training. As the majority of the sample of recipients (52%) 
were between 25 to 55 years old, which is the age of productivity, they could 
definitely receive capital aid as well as other non-productive capital.136 
 In 2009, the ZBS itself ran a brief internal audit covering 222 out of 1772 
recipients who had received capital and income generation aid since 2000. The brief 
study was carried out from 2004 to 2006.137 This step was part of an internal exercise 
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to determine the overall performance of the income generation program. Mohd Fauzi 
Masdan, head of the department managing income generation affairs throughout the 
state, delivered the report at a seminar in November 2009.138  
 From the last part of the report, we can see briefly how well the income 
generation programs in the state had performed. The recipients were divided into 
four groups, namely, successful, potential, unchanged and failed. The category of 
successful recipients referred to those who had reached incomes above had al-kifaya, 
and whose economic initiatives were running smoothly without the need for further 
zakat assistance. “Potential” recipients were those who were not yet out of poverty, 
although their existing activities were still in operation and achieving a higher 
income than before they were given capital aid. The report indicated that the former 
group comprised 11% of overall audited recipients whilst the latter consisted of 
9%.139 
 The next category, “unchanged” recipients, consisted of those who had not 
benefitted from the distribution, their activities remaining the same with no 
improvement. In other words, the zakat fund provided had neither increased nor 
reduced their professional income. This segment must be further helped to enable 
them to be more successful, lest they fail completely. This group comprised 32% of 
the total sample of recipients. It is, however, unfortunate that, as the report revealed, 
48% of the recipients belonged to the last, “failed” group, whose distribution-aided 
projects ended in total failure. Normally, in this case, their business or economic 
activities no longer existed and they were back to relying on zakat distribution.140  
 Although the report incorporated a huge number of recipients, it was very 
brief and no empirical analysis was employed, making a more critical deliberation 
rather difficult. The findings relied considerably on internal records of the ZBS and 
personal observations by staff, carried out during the supervision process. The study 
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also did not give any explanation of the pattern of the findings or the factors 
contributing to the recipients’ success or failure.  
 It is interesting to note that, despite this less than remarkable achievement, 
the ZBS throughout the report expressed the strong belief that the practice in 
question could be improved with time. Looking at it positively from a different 
perspective, Masdan was of the opinion that there must be more concentration on the 
programs. According to him, this was the only way that the zakat could turn the 
recipients into payers, hence ensuring the future inflow of zakat collection. He then 
cited in the report a f ew examples of former zakat recipients who had achieved 
remarkable development in their professions and secured a considerable monthly 
income as a result of the program.141 With the trend indicated by the continuing 
increase in provision for this program, the ZBS seemed to agree with Masdan and is 
continually providing the support necessary to achieve its ultimate objective.  
  The most recent research was done by Hamdino Hamdan in 2009. In this 
case, Hamdan considered the ZBS income generation programs as a micro financing 
initiative, in which the grants resembled those given by other institutions, namely, 
Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM), Yayasan Tekun Nasional (TEKUN) and Yayasan 
Basmi Kemiskinan (YBK). These are among active institutions in Selangor that offer 
funding aid for income generation programs. The way in which ZBS slightly differs 
from these institutions is through offering its aid without requiring the recipients to 
pay it back, whereas the others only provide loans for the poor.142  
 In general, the research tried to analyze and empirically measure the 
performance of each organization in helping the poor through their income 
generation programs, and to identify factors associated with their success or 
failure.143 The research incorporated 446 recipients from all bodies, including 49 
ZBS recipients, and all resided in Selangor. In considering the findings of this study 
we shall concentrate especially on its value regarding ZBS, as the main focus of this 
thesis, with a brief reference to other organizations where necessary.  
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 The ZBS, according to Hamdan’s findings, succeeded in helping the 
recipients to move away from poverty. They achieved a significant increment in their 
income and profit from their businesses by an average increase of RM1000 per 
month. The research also revealed several important factors contributing to this 
performance: recipients’ personal experience, the age of the business and monitoring 
aid. Working experience prior to receiving aid boosted performance.144 As stated 
earlier, these findings are consistent with Nor’s research carried out eight years 
earlier.  
 Monitoring, as previously found, was again the key element of success. The 
study clearly showed that monitoring is the critical factor in income generation 
programs, and must be brought into sharper focus by all institutions. AIM emerged 
as the best in this respect, enabling the organization to remain on top as compared to 
the other researched bodies.145  
 Although the ZBS has now been proven to be among the important 
institutions offering support for the poor in the state, its overall performance 
indicated that it only came third after AIM and TEKUN. Hamdan successfully 
revealed some problems pertaining to the overall practice of ZBS. The training and 
supervision implemented by ZBS still have not been really effective. Only 63% of 
the zakat recipients were visited occasionally by zakat officials. When asked about 
supervision, 71% of them believed that the ZBS still did not do what was required 
and that they needed more attention of this kind.146 As with supervision, they also 
believed that training was important in helping them to improve their income 
generation practices. The majority of them, not fully satisfied with the training 
provided, scored ZBS less than 4 out of 5.147 Based on this result, Hamdan concluded 
that if the ZBS wanted to improve its programs it would first need to rectify these 
two shortcomings.  
 From the above discussion and the research findings, it is  undeniable that 
zakat has the potential to be an effective development tool, especially in regard to 
poverty eradication through income generation. The income generation programs 
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offered by the ZBS have through time proved able to achieve a certain level of 
success in helping the poor to free themselves from the poverty cycle. What is 
interesting is that this role has been gradually recognized through studies and 
research projects in which the role of zakat is not perceived merely as distribution of 
a religious fund. The zakat institution is currently comparable to other non-religious 
development institutions operating hand-in-hand to achieve the common objective of 
poverty reduction in the state. 
 What is actually happening, from a perspective that we might be unaware of, 
is that this development to a certain extent embodies the aspirations of the 
government. Looking back to what we discussed earlier in chapter 4, regarding the 
prime minister’s suggestion in the 2006 M alaysia Prospective Plan that the zakat 
institution should help government in eradication poverty similar to that other 
agencies like AIM, the findings in the studies discussed here could be viewed as a 
reflection of that very aspiration.148 
7.5.2 Expansion of the religious organization and its role 
 Income generation through zakat has directly influenced the shape of the 
zakat organization, in this case the ZBS. The expanding role of zakat demanded a 
larger organization to manage it. The role of the zakat institution was no longer 
solely religious, since it had also become the state agency for poverty eradication. 
Accordingly, its effectiveness is no longer based merely on the collection and 
distribution of zakat but also on the degree to which it can help its recipients change 
their lives permanently. It is all the more essential that the practice adopt the modern 
way of poverty eradication, which in this case is the income generation program. 
 In order to meet its expanding role, the ZBS has undergone an organizational 
enlargement. The number of ZBS officials has increased significantly. In early 2000, 
the staff consisted of 50 people; at the end of 2010 the body had about 200 s taff 
throughout the state.149 The expansion has been accompanied by more systematic 
overall operation and organizational management. In this respect, the ZBS has 
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proven its capability by securing the international certificate of MS ISO9002 for its 
operational quality and excellence since 2003.150 
 Regarding the distribution for income generation, a specific unit entitled the 
Department of Beneficiaries Development (Jabatan Pembangunan Asnaf) was 
introduced in 2005 to manage income generation programs.151 The initiation of many 
new programs since then has reflected the establishment of this department. In early 
2009, the programs were centralized under a larger, newly created department. The 
Department of Entrepreneurial Development of Zakat Recipients (Pembangunan 
Usahawan Asnaf Selangor), with approximately 30 s taff, was established to 
accelerate the initiative. Additionally, in 2007 a nother branch was set up to focus 
specifically on t raining, including training for people receiving income generation 
distribution.  
 The process of adapting the institution to more comprehensive current needs 
will definitely not stop at this point. Ibrahim, who is an active researcher and also 
currently one of the advisers of the ZBS, in her earlier-discussed study suggested not 
only that the allocation of zakat distribution should be expanded, but also that it is 
time to seriously consider zakat as an important tool in policy planning, especially as 
an instrument of the state’s fiscal policy. According to her, the time has come for the 
zakat institution to play an augmented role: if not replacing, at least working hand-in-
hand with the conventional taxation system in our economy.152 Should this ambition 
be realized, the organization surely will be further expanded over time. 
7.5.3 Greater responsiveness and dynamism of ijtihad 
 Inherent in the expanding role of the zakat institution is its direct impact on 
the development of shari’a through the process of new ijtihad. In this context, the 
new resolution concerning income generation through zakat indicates that Islamic 
law is dynamic and is compatible with economic development. 
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 On looking back at the discussion on the legal aspect of income generation 
and the use of zakat for productive purposes, the new fatwa seems very flexible in 
approving income generation programs and indirect disbursement. It appears that the 
distribution involving non-tangible assets presented no pr oblem but rather was 
encouraged. There was no i ssue at all in giving more manfa’a (intangible benefit) 
than ‘ayn (tangible material), since the objective of zakat is not only material 
enrichment but spiritual development as well.  
 With reference to decision-making on new issues pertaining to zakat, in 2002 
the Mufti of Selangor suggested that Islamic scholars should prepare to be reformist 
in the face of new problems and questions surrounding zakat. According to him, they 
should be open to any new zakat reform in keeping with the fresh demands posed by 
current circumstances. He proposed the implementation of ijtihad Ibdai Insyai 
(practical reasoning), by which the production of ijtihad no longer strictly follows the 
earlier opinions of scholars. This demonstrates the openness of the Mufti himself in 
his use of ijtihad when forming the new zakat ruling.153 Clearly in line with his 
exhortation, as we have seen, certain opinions are no longer derived from Shafi’i, the 
dominant school in the state, and in fact in many situations, maslaha is the main 
reason given for legitimating a certain initiative. 
 It is worth noting that, besides the consents that have normally been granted 
in favour of the ZBS, the Mufti has been cautious in approving new programs, 
granting approval only in cases of pressing need and avoiding any unnecessary 
expenditure which could put the initiative at risk. Applications which were not in the 
interests of the recipients have been rejected. For example, the application to use 
‘amil funds for investment was rejected at the end of 1999. In this case, the ZBS 
asked for permission to invest the unused ‘amil funds in a financial institution for use 
in managing the body.154 In the ruling, the disbursement of any excessive amount to 
‘amil was rejected, on grounds that the distribution must just be enough for zakat 
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administration, not for profit-making by the zakat body from zakat funds.155 In 2003, 
the ZBS asked whether or not zakat officials could receive zakat disbursement from 
the portion of fi sabil li al-lah should they perform any extra tasks beyond their 
normal obligations.156 Again, the Mufti rejected the application, saying that they 
should not receive provision from another portion, but preferably should transfer 
undistributed funds towards poverty eradication.157 This decision showed that the 
Mufti, while conferring substantial power to manage the fund, at the same time 
wanted to keep administration costs to a minimum and to avoid any leakage of funds 
through unnecessary expenditure.  
 The application of ijtihad, based on the current needs of Muslims, enables 
zakat not only to be more reactive in solving modern economic problems, but also to 
be shaped in conformity with local features. Arskal Salim, in delivering his 
discussion of zakat in Indonesia, has briefly touched on this process, which he called 
Indonesianizing Islam.158 In his account, the practice of zakat collection has changed 
from total voluntary personal disbursement to a more institutionalized approach. 
Consequently, zakat law No.38/1999 has been introduced.159 The formation of the 
law, according to him, suggested the possibility of obligatory payment that could be 
implemented in the future. Referring to the shift as an Islamization through law, he 
took the view that it did not necessarily represent the genuine application of Islamic 
law. Zakat in that case could lose its authenticity in order to meet worldly 
objectives.160  
  A similar process, with the same consequences, could potentially take place 
in Selangor. For example, the fatwa which has given considerable power to the ZBS 
could transform it in to something different from what it w as before its active 
involvement in the development initiative. The influence of the ZBS on z akat 
expenditure has resulted in a stricter use of zakat, which could previously be used by 
the poor in more flexible ways. Zakat will no l onger be seen as a religious 
                                                          
155 “Keputusan Fatwa Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan”, http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/mufti/fatwa _warta_ 
view.asp?keyID=1106; “Keterangan”, http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/mufti/fatwa_warta_hujah_view 
.asp?KeyIDv (accessed March 28, 2010).  
156 Pusat Zakat Selangor, “Hak Amil Terhadap Peruntukan Agihan Fi Sabil li allah”, Paper Presented 
in Fatwa Meeting, August 8, 2003. 
157 Jabatan Mufti Selangor, Meeting Minute of Fatwa Committee, File no. Mesyuarat J/Fatwa 4/2003.  
158 Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice, 63. 
159 For further discussion about the change in law refer:  Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice, 56-59. 
160 Salim, The Shift in Zakat Practice, 63.  
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endowment, but as more or less similar to a financial institution’s lending fund for its 
own benefit. Being less tangible, the assets distributed for income generation 
purposes could lead to terrible consequences should the programs end in failure.  
 Apart from that, the ZBS is a body accountable to state government, and it is 
of the nature of such organizations to feel pressured to accommodate governmental 
aspirations. As earlier mentioned, affirmative policies in favour of Malay Muslims 
having been a feature of the Malaysian economy, it is possible that the fund will be 
further used to achieve this target. For zakat to be made additional use of for 
development, many other changes to aspects of law will be needed to help the 
institution adapt to the new objectives.  
 
7.6 Fatwa on income generation through zakat – development beyond Selangor 
 Selangor’s practice is not confined to that state. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, it can be clearly observed that other states have adopted similar measures, 
many of them offering financial and other services for income generation through the 
zakat fund. Such steps may have been partly influenced, directly or indirectly, by 
Selangor’s initiatives. Almost all states implementing income generation have made 
official visits to ZBS, which has received working visits not only from other states’ 
zakat bodies, but also from the Yang Dipertuan Agong (Supreme Ruler). Over time, 
the ZBS has proudly shown visitors the zakat programs for income generation across 
the state. In addition, ZBS staff and its CEO have frequently spoken about its income 
generation programs at seminars and zakat meetings, to introduce other states to the 
ZBS approach.161 That is why some writers have identified Selangor as the leader 
and model for other states as regards income generation.162 
The implementation of zakat disbursement for income generation by these 
states signifies that the Muftis have given them a green light. As far as Islamic law is 
concerned, the process of ijtihad has evidently been taking place, in a similar manner 
to developments in Selangor.  
                                                          
161 “Delegasi Keda Kagum Pengurusan Zakat PZS”, Asnaf, 3/2004, 14; “Permaisuri Agong Lawat 
Desa Ehsan PZS”, Asnaf, 3/2004, 14. 
162 Hussin, “LZS dalam Membangun dan Mengembangkan Usahawan” 1. 
290 
 
 Terengganu, for example, in the mid 2000s, gave implicit approval by 
decreeing that any zakat left over after the annual disbursement could be utilized by 
any means, including investment for development. Although the brief fatwa does not 
elaborate, it could be understood that the initiative of providing business finance to 
the poor obviously forms part of the concept of investment for development.163  
 Melaka made it clear in 2011 that using the disbursement to help the poor 
become entrepreneurs is a positive measure. According to the fatwa, it should be 
noted, the zakat distribution to the poor for business purposes should be given 
outright with no ne ed for repayment. The fatwa argued, in support of that policy, 
that it was the recipients’ right, as poor people, to get at least a portion (one-eighth) 
of the fund. Should the zakat body still want to lend the fund, which could be 
understood as something extra on top of what was given, the fatwa suggested that 
the loan should be given from the debtor’s (al-Gharimin) portion. The ruling also 
stated that other support, such as training and necessary courses, should be provided 
for the poor.164 
 Looking at the Melaka fatwa carefully, it appears that the Mufti has given 
permission for the use of loans, provided they are not taken from the poor people’s 
portion. This means that Melaka Mufti still hold somewhat firmly to the Shafi’i’s 
opinion that al-tamlik must be confined to distribution from the poor portion, while 
at the same time trying to compromise on the basis of current need. This is a rather 
different position from that of Selangor, as Melaka in this case is a bit careful about 
giving unqualified permission for the loan to come from the poor portion.  
 Such a cautious approach does not, however, indicate that reasoning based on 
maslaha is totally rejected. The use of maslaha has also been observed in the two 
above states. The fatwa mentions that, in completing its task, the zakat body can use 
its discretion on the basis of recipients’ interests, concomitantly affirming that “the 
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affairs of the imam concerning his people are judged by reference to maslaha”, the 
legal maxim also quoted in the Selangor fatwa. The Terengganu fatwa, for its part, 
says that “any investment could be run by the religious council so long as it could 
benefit (faedahnya) the eligible recipient”.165 “Benefit” here could also be considered 
an element of maslaha, which is concerned with the interest of recipients.  
Although not every state has come up with a similar fatwa, the existence of 
such initiative, as mentioned in the previous chapter, suggests that the program has 
been readily accepted with no objection from anyone. In Kelantan, Kedah and Johor, 
for example, distribution for income generation exists without any specific fatwa 
having been issued and openly published.  
  In this case, the zakat bodies have used their discretion to do their best to 
relieve poverty. Indeed it is obvious that, by definition, the poor and needy in these 
states include those who have no adequate vocation, and are thus entitled to receive 
zakat money.166 Nevertheless, the distribution could only be carried out provided 
there was no obj ection from the state religious council or the Mufti. In fact, 
permission from the religious council and Mufti could be based on their confidential 
periodic meetings, without necessarily taking the form of an official published fatwa. 
As the zakat bodies are still under the respective states’ religious councils, any 
program run by the former will affect the latter should society perceive any 
infringement of laws.  
 In Malaysia, the aspect of the income generation program on which it seems 
zakat bodies have still not reached consensus is the use of zakat in the form of loans. 
So far only a few states, notably Selangor and Melaka, have clearly demonstrated a 
positive view. Other states have not yet taken a clear stand on this particular matter. 
 Indeed such an issue needs to be dealt with carefully, as the majority of 
Muslims in Malaysia still hold to the Shafi’i’s opinion, so that giving zakat as a loan 
is something new for them. Society in this case could feel that the practice conflicts 
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with some basic rule of zakat such as the need to confer ownership, a conflict which 
could create public confusion. Thus, it is not surprising if the Muftis do not hastily 
display their support for implementation of the initiative –although their silence does 
not necessarily signify opposition to it.  
 It is also worth mentioning that in Malaysia there is a mechanism whereby all 
Muftis in the country can meet together from time to time and discuss any issues that 
need to be resolved collectively. This procedure is handled by the Jawatankuasa 
Fatwa Majlis Kebangsaan Bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam Malaysia (National Fatwa 
Committee for Malaysian Islamic Affairs) which is comprised of all state Muftis. It is 
common for Muftis to discuss any issues related to the national interest about which 
they are at variance. In view of the current situation, with the implementation of 
income generation through zakat and related questions being increasingly discussed 
by the public, perhaps in the near future the Muftis will sit together to reach a 
collective conclusion.  
 Indeed, the phenomenon in Malaysia, as illustrated by the practice of the 
zakat bodies and also by the fatwa, indicates that the process of ijtihad has been 
clearly in operation not merely in Selangor but also in other states. The reasoning 
based on maslaha is also being given greater attention as time passes. The question 
which may arise here is whether the pattern of decision making could possibly be 
extended to adopt the neo-mu’tazilite’s style based on pure logic, as has been shown 
in the Indonesian case.   
 Based on obs ervations from the present study, the Malaysian situation as 
regards this particular issue is still far from that of Indonesia, with the probability of 
imitating it very slim, if existent. There are a few reasons why the neo-mu’tazilite’s 
style will not easily get a grip on Malaysia. The first is that the position of the Mufti 
and religious council is part of the state government’s authority. The Mufti’s decision 
will definitely affect the government as a whole. As the majority of Muslims still 
hold strongly to Shafi’i, it would be rather difficult for the government to take the 
risk of introducing a totally new way of thinking. Indeed, it would be a big risk to 
expose the community to different ideas, perhaps sparking a religious clash within 
Muslim society which in turn could lead to political instability. In this case, there is 
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obviously no Mufti who wants to be accused of sponsoring heretical innovation 
(bid’a).  
 Apart from that danger, state laws (enactments) clearly state that to reach a 
legal conclusion the Mufti must take into consideration not only al-Quran and Sunna 
but also classical opinions, especially Shafi’is. Such provisions definitely limit the 
freedom of Muftis to advance their personal opinions haphazardly. Based on t he 
discussion in this chapter, it is obvious that Muftis in many cases have never totally 
sidelined classical opinions, but rather have carefully employed maslaha as a 
justifying element.     
7.7 Conclusion 
 From the discussion, we can see how income generation in Selangor is being 
implemented. The process is a manifestation of continuous improvement in overall 
zakat management, enabling the role of the institution to broaden while incorporating 
basic systems of zakat collection and distribution.  
 Religious scholars and academicians have been among those actively urging 
that such a mechanism be implemented. Responding positively, the state government 
and higher authority have given the ZBS a green light for offering the programs. This 
process can be regarded as a feature of the Islamization of society and the state which 
gradually enhanced the role of zakat.  
 Methods of implementation have been discussed in the second part of the 
chapter. The gradual amendment and more creative operation of income generation 
programs offered by the ZBS signified a steady increase in the role played by the 
body. Indeed, it did not merely distribute zakat, but also played a considerable part in 
ensuring that the distribution could generate better incomes for the recipients. To this 
end, the ZBS, besides providing training and supervision for every recipient, 
designed income generation programs so as to require the recipients to act 
purposefully and to accomplish what had been agreed upon by both parties, with any 
breach of the agreement likely to lead to withdrawal of the aid. What was actually 
accomplished by the ZBS, apart from establishing that the fund could be effective in 
poverty eradication, was to complement the state’s accommodative policy towards 
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zakat. In this context, the ZBS has sought to demonstrate its competence in the effort 
to eradicate poverty.   
 As the implementation of a new way of zakat distribution falls within the 
realm of religious affairs, any change must be approved by the Mufti, the highest 
authority in expounding Islamic questions. In this case, the Mufti has given his full 
support to income generation with distribution in the form of both tangible and 
intangible assets. He has also shown his open-mindedness by formulating the ruling 
without strict adherence to traditional rulings or to a specific school of law and the 
fatwa is currently based to a great extent on the needs of Muslim communities. Such 
a style of issuing fatwa is not merely confined in Selangor but could also be observed 
in other states which similarly offering income generation through zakat.  
 In sum, the implementation of the income generation program is evidence of 
the zakat institution’s wider role in economic development. It also shows the effort 
made by the religious institution to complement policies recommended by the state, 
which is willing to accommodate religious elements within its originally secular 
character. The achievements of the programs, as shown in the final part of the 
chapter, indicate that income generation through zakat has met with some success. 
This outcome is living evidence of the process of Islamization in the country, 
whereby religion shares in the wider reality of the state’s economic, social and 
political progress. Along the way, the shari’a also, to a degree, affects changes in the 
law according to local need. What can be observed here is that not only has shari’a 
impacted on local economic development, but also the other way round.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
 
8. 1 Conclusion 
 The thesis is about the impact of Islamization upon t he zakat institution. 
Throughout the thesis four objectives are pursued: namely, to survey the meaning of 
the Islamization phenomenon, particularly in relation to the zakat institution; to 
explore the theoretical meaning of income generation through zakat as manifested by 
the Islamization process, while briefly surveying its practical implementation in a 
few Muslim countries; to understand the Islamization phenomenon in Malaysia and 
how such a phenomenon could affect zakat; and finally, to study the implementation 
of the income generation program through zakat in Malaysia generally and in 
Selangor specifically. 
 Islamization is a phenomenon whereby Islam plays an enhanced role in the 
state and in civil society, with both of which it is interrelated in many areas including 
politics, economics and social policy. The Islamization process can be initiated and 
inspired from above (the state) or below (society). In the case of Islamization by the 
state, as indicated in Chapter 2, the process consists of giving the religion a more 
significant role in government, ultimately leading to the formation of an Islamic 
state. Islamization by society is associated with the increase in awareness among 
members of the community of the need to practise Islam in every aspect of their 
lives. In this type of Islamization, the groups or movements aim to instil Islamic 
values in every individual, in the hope that a true Islamic society can eventually be 
established.   
 Zakat is a religious obligation which simultaneously has economic functions. 
It is a dynamic institution, which through time has adapted to its surroundings and 
tried in many ways to accommodate constant change. In accommodating the 
Islamization phenomenon, zakat has been projected as not merely a religious 
institution but one playing a significant role in economic development including for 
the income generation programs.  
 Apart from expanding the role of zakat, Islamization entailed legal 
reinterpretation in issuing zakat rulings. In this context, ijtihad or legal expediency 
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has to be employed to justify the new role of zakat in accordance with current needs 
and demands. The new ways of using the zakat fund must be clarified by modern 
jurists before implementing the programs, since classical rulings do not necessarily 
provide satisfactory answers to the many questions surrounding zakat. Throughout 
Chapter 2, Islamization has been thoroughly discussed and defined; accordingly, the 
first objective is fulfilled.  
 From a theoretical standpoint, Chapter 3 has discussed the concept of income 
generation through zakat. Income generation is a mechanism of modern development 
and poverty eradication in which NGOs or governments normally target poor 
households to help them to become productive. In this approach, poor people with 
the potential to sustain themselves by their own efforts will be helped through 
various initiatives such as financial aid, training and advice. Income generation is an 
initiative has been gradually emerging as a popular development strategy in many 
developing countries since approximately the 1970s. The strategy was popularly 
adopted to complement the then main development policies namely industrialization 
and green revolution as the latter policies unable to effectively eradicate poverty in 
the nations.    
 Discussions of zakat in connection with distribution for income generation 
programs have proliferated alongside general modern writings on zakat. The 
theoretical pattern indicates that Muslim scholars since the mid-twentieth century 
have been referring to distribution of the zakat fund for income generation as a 
mechanism of poverty eradication which produces better results for eligible 
recipients. The proposers, in this case, could be understood, to an extent has based 
their view on the existing modern income generation programs. Such an initiative is 
not unrealistic, given that zakat is an adaptable institution, besides which, this type of 
distribution appears to be in line with zakat’s objective of helping the poor and 
needy.  
   In considering income generation through zakat, Muslim scholars have 
suggested that the fund should not be distributed merely in the form of money or 
daily needs for consumption by the eligible recipients. Instead, they should be given 
capital, training or related skills to enhance their ability to produce a sustainable 
income hence, ensuring that they will not be dependent on the fund for their entire 
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lives. Indeed the new way of distribution is an initiative that presents zakat as a 
modern tool for economic development. By the end of Chapter 3, it is clear that the 
theoretical aspect of income generation through zakat has been comprehensively 
examined, enabling the second objective to be partly fulfilled.    
 The dispersal of zakat fund for income generation programs has been carried 
out in a number of Muslim countries. The implementation of such programs appears 
to have been influenced by the Islamization phenomenon in each country. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, Pakistan and Indonesia in this respect have been chosen as 
models of implementation. The chapter is basically designed to partly fulfil the 
second objective, namely, to survey the practical implementation of income 
generation through zakat in Muslim countries.    
 Pakistan has been implementing income generation through zakat as part of 
its Islamization of the economy, during which process, in the 1980s, the government 
tried to include zakat in its national taxation system and poverty eradication 
mechanisms. Islamization in that country was begun by President Zia ul Haq after he 
came to power in 1979, subsequently running the country by martial law. The 
government established a centralized zakat administration with zakat collected 
through mandatory deduction from bank accounts. Collection of the fund by the 
government, as clearly shown in the chapter, was totally at the discretion of top 
government officials, without proper public consultation. As a result, the collection 
diminished through time, as people gave only half-hearted support to the project. 
 To improve the distribution system, the government introduced income 
generation programs in 1980s, accompanied by enactment of the laws needed to 
enforce implementation. Apart from that, the government established the National 
Zakat Foundation, a special body to help the zakat institution carry out the programs. 
In this case, the government went to great lengths to ensure that the zakat body could 
function effectively.  
 As for legal considerations, although for the most part classical jurists have 
had no objection to distribution of zakat for income generation, some aspects are still 
problematic. Classical jurists, especially from the Hanafi sect, argued that the fund 
must always be disbursed tangibly, and that the distributed fund must be fully owned 
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by the recipients. Looking at modern income generation programs, it seems that the 
practice of giving non-monetary aid, such as training and advice, is in conflict with 
classical rulings. In this respect, the National Zakat Foundation has supported the 
programs by using government money instead of zakat to provide training. Hence, 
Pakistani scholars in this case are more inclined towards upholding classical 
opinions.  
 Overall, the implementation of income generation in Pakistan could be 
perceived as part of the effort to build an Islamic state, an agenda visualized by the 
government, especially its president. The realization of the program was strongly 
backed by the government and controlled through regulations and laws expressing its 
commitment to Islam. As the government struggled to attract popular support, it 
chose the safe path of avoiding any problems in implementation of the policy. Thus, 
it eventually decided to supplement zakat with state money, rather than persuading 
scholars to employ new rulings justifying the use of zakat for development purposes. 
  Indonesia is another country which has implemented income generation 
programs since the 1980s. By contrast with the zakat institution in Pakistan, that in 
Indonesia has been largely under popular control, with income generation programs 
introduced by local people and Non Governmental Organizations.  
 Islamization in Indonesia has never received strong official support. Since the 
country became independent in the late 1940s, the Indonesian government has 
maintained the policy of keeping the state free from religious influence. The first two 
presidents came from a military background and had no interest in facilitating 
government promotion of any religion. The government also tried to constrain 
Muslim scholars and Islamists from active involvement in politics. Facing 
restrictions on political action, Muslim scholars turned to social activities through 
which to propagate Islam, including the effort to revive the zakat institution.   
 In 1968, there was an attempt by a few religious individuals to produce a 
ministerial decree establishing a zakat collection system in every district in 
Indonesia. The then president, however, introduced his version of a national 
collection, which resulted in the earlier-circulated decree being annulled. When, after 
a few years, he discontinued the initiative, it appeared that the president’s motive had 
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been merely to keep the government at a distance from religion, in the area of zakat 
administration as well as generally.  
 Realizing that the government was not keen to improve the zakat institution, 
civil society, mainly led by scholars and the middle class, established individual 
collection and distribution centres. From the 1970s on there were also seminars and 
surveys calling for more creative methods of collection and disbursement. The 
established collection bodies have to compete to attract potential payers and to 
disburse creatively. In this effort, income generation has been one of the methods 
given attention as a program for social development. 
 In regard to legal rulings, Indonesian scholars generally do not tend to hold 
strongly to classical decrees. Although the Shafi’i school – the dominant sect in the 
country – is rather lenient in the matter of disbursement for income generation, it also 
imposes some limitations related to ownership. The classical Shafi’is, for example, 
still reject the use of zakat for loans. In this case, local scholars ruled that ownership 
need not be observed in all cases. They also permitted loans from zakat as a 
disbursement consistent with local needs. Such local rulings are unsurprising as 
Muslims in Indonesia are free to hold plural opinions to the extent that some of their 
scholars fully embrace the spirit of rationalism in determining religious rulings. The 
positive attitude without any question towards income generation initiative from 
zakat fund is indeed expected.    
 What we can see from the pattern in Indonesia is that society to a certain 
extent has challenged the secular government to prove that it can do without the help 
of the former. After the demise of the second president and the rise of more 
democratic government at the end of the twentieth century, civil society, through 
forums and collaboration with zakat agencies, has continuously urged the 
government to be more actively involved in the zakat institution. The government 
has partly met the demand by introducing a zakat law in 1999, although so far the 
law acts primarily as a guideline, without obliging people to observe their duty.  
 Looking at the models illustrated by the two states discussed above, we can 
suggest that both sources of Islamization, the state and society, must act 
simultaneously. Besides the state’s commitment to assume greater power over the 
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fund, there must be support for it from society. This is because the fund comes from 
the people and must be returned to them. Government in this case should accelerate 
the development and facilitate the management of zakat through encouragement and 
persuasion. Coercion or rejection from any party can only have negative implications 
for the overall management of zakat and lead to the complete failure of the system.  
 The subsequent Chapter 5 has dealt with the Malaysian case, thus achieving 
the third aim of the thesis by the end of the chapter. As in other Muslim countries, 
the development of zakat in Malaysia has been closely associated with the 
Islamization phenomenon. From the time of its independence in 1957, Malaysia has 
politically adopted a secular democratic state. As a majority religion within the 
country’s multiracial composition, Islam was designated an official religion, 
although this status was maintained merely for purposes of solemnization.  
 After approximately a decade of independence, interracial misunderstanding 
led to racial tension. Consequently, the Malaysian government introduced an 
affirmative economic policy, giving an advantage to the Malay Muslims who also 
constitute the majority of Muslims in the country.  
 The Islamization phenomenon in Malaysia began to be noticed in the early 
1970s.  It was sparked by several religious groups, mainly organized by young 
people, who thought that the government was only focusing on material development 
in dealing with Muslims’ problems. The groups, on t he other hand, wanted the 
government to be more concerned with Islam, to the extent of turning Malaysia into 
an Islamic state. The religious movements also gained support from civil society, 
support which eventually developed into greater awareness among Muslims of their 
religious obligations. Apart from that, the groups became actively involved in 
politics, opposing the government in national elections.  
  As a reactive measure, the government took bold action in the 1980s by 
introducing its version of Islamization. The state’s Islamization agenda included, 
among other features, the co-option of religious individuals and the establishment of 
Islamic banking and the Islamic University. In this case, however, the Islamization 
was not directed towards creating an Islamic state but rather towards strengthening 
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Muslims socially and economically. By adopting such an agenda, Malaysia, while 
remaining a secular state, became more accommodating towards Islam.  
 As far as zakat is concerned, the institution had been administered by state 
religious councils since the early twentieth century. Administration by the councils 
was the result of the shrinking power of state rulers under colonial government, 
leading them to focus on religion as their principal surviving power. Since then zakat 
has been a key resource of religious councils in running their activities.  
 Prior to the Islamization phenomenon, the zakat institution could be regarded 
as merely an effort by the ruler to encourage people to fulfil their obligation. The 
religious councils collected and disbursed the zakat fund without considering the 
economic condition of society. Ultimately, the collection was small and 
disbursement did not benefit Muslims economically.  
 The Islamization of society since the 1970s has changed the practice of zakat 
in the country. The religious movements, besides calling for members of society to 
observe their personal obligations, also called for the inclusion of zakat in economic 
development plans. In the 1980s the Malaysian federal government started to react 
positively to the call, through seminars and surveys aimed at improving the zakat 
administration system.  
 In the 1990s, the federal government (through IRCFT) introduced 
corporatization, a new type of zakat administration in which the fund was managed 
as though the administrative body were a corporate business entity. The model 
introduced is to an extent influenced by the then current practice of the Malaysian 
government where the government has transferred many services to the private 
companies that the latter could perform the duty hitherto carried out by the former 
believing that the private sector could deliver the better services. 
 The new model has successfully attracted a larger collection of funds and 
since then has been replicated by a number of states. Apart from that, the government 
has gradually endorsed zakat as an integral part of its economic strategy, recognizing 
the fund as an important resource for poverty eradication. Since the federal 
government’s role in this case was primarily advisory in nature, it depended on states 
to implement the proposals.  
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 The increase in collection has led a n umber of states, such as Federal 
Territory, Selangor and Kedah, to introduce income generation programs since the 
end of the 1990s. This step was emulated by other states including Johor, Kelantan 
and Negeri Sembilan in the 2000s. To compare briefly, Selangor appeared to be the 
leading and most innovative state in its income generation program, both in the 
amounts disbursed and in the program offered.  
 As we can see from the pattern of Islamization in Malaysia, the phenomenon 
seemed to be dominated neither by government nor by society. We can safely say 
that Islamization in society pushed the government towards embracing Islam, leading 
officials to be more accommodating towards the religion notwithstanding the state’s 
secular nature. In regard to zakat, the government appeared to encourage the use of 
the fund for development.   
 In Chapter 6 the case of Selangor was discussed. Malaysia, as a f ederated 
country, gives powers pertaining to development and poverty eradication to the 
federal government, with states playing the secondary role of implementation and 
monitoring. For these purposes, the state, in this case Selangor, is financially limited 
and mainly depends on federal aid. This limitation, however, does not prevent the 
state from helping its people to improve their living conditions, since it has a clearer 
picture of conditions within its own territory. In these circumstances, the state must 
look for any additional resources that might be available, including help from the 
religious fund.  
 The collection of zakat in Selangor has been managed by the IRCS since the 
1950s. Initially, the administration of the fund merely made it easier for Muslims to 
observe their obligation, without using the collected fund effectively for 
development. This situation changed after Islamization. 
 Islamization in Selangor to a degree resembled the process in Malaysia as a 
whole. The Islamization of society through the proliferation of religious movements 
in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged Muslims to fulfil their zakat duty. This 
phenomenon in turn induced the IRCS to explore the related possibilities, at first 
through seminars and discussions. Finally, in the mid-1990s, the IRCS adopted the 
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corporatization model, an Islamization measure earlier introduced by the zakat body 
in Federal Territory.  
 The new model of management proved to be an effective mechanism for 
appealing to payers to pay their zakat. The constant increase in collection can be 
understood as reflecting both growing awareness among Muslims and their 
confidence that the IRCS had gradually improved its practices. At the end of the 
1990s Selangor took the further step of corporatizing its disbursement function. 
 Having more resources to disburse, the new management body (the ZBS) 
faced the challenge of sustaining the fund’s increment. The ZBS believed that 
Muslims would contribute more once they saw the benefits accruing from payment. 
Accordingly, the distribution system now placed more emphasis on pove rty 
eradication and income generation programs. With better administration, the 
government realized the potential of the fund for development and, over time, 
showed its interest by incorporating the institution as part of the official mechanism 
for eradicating poverty.    
 Discussion of the implementation of income generation projects in Selangor, 
and their impact, has been offered in chapter 7. Indeed, the project is a manifestation 
of continuous improvement in overall zakat management due to Islamization in the 
state. As shown in the chapter, income generation through the zakat fund has been 
strongly advocated by local religious scholars and academicians to ensure that the 
zakat endowment improves the recipients’ condition. The state government and 
higher authority later responded positively to such exhortation by giving the ZBS a 
green light for introduction of the programs.  
 The ZBS started offering the scheme at the end of the 1990s, and in the 2000s 
the programs were gradually strengthened with greater financial allocation and more 
creative mechanisms. The ZBS, besides providing training and supervision for every 
recipient, designed income generation programs in such a way as to require the 
recipients to act purposefully and to accomplish what had been agreed upon by both 
parties, with any breach of the agreement likely to lead to withdrawal of the aid. 
What was actually accomplished by the ZBS, apart from establishing that the fund 
could be effective in poverty eradication, was to complement the state’s 
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accommodative policy towards zakat. Thus, the ZBS has sought to demonstrate its 
competence in the effort to eradicate poverty.   
 As far as the legal aspect is concerned, the Mufti gave his full support to the 
project. He also showed his open-mindedness by formulating the ruling without strict 
adherence to traditional rulings or to a specific school of law. The legal issues in 
income generation, such as those surrounding ownership and intangible 
disbursement, did not appear to pose a problem and the fatwa is currently based to a 
great extent on the needs of Muslim communities. In addition, the pattern of fatwa is 
not merely confined in Selangor but also could be observed in other states.   
 Hence, implementation of the income generation program is evidence of the 
zakat institution’s wider role in economic development. The achievements of the 
programs, as shown in the final part of the chapter, indicate that income generation 
through zakat has met with some success. Currently, zakat has been evaluated 
alongside other, secular, development mechanisms. Although a few weaknesses can 
still be observed, it appears that the zakat management has shown its commitment to 
continuous effort and improvement of existing methods. Altogether, the 
implementation of the program shows, especially in the Malaysian context in general 
and Selangor in particular, the effort made by the religious institution to complement 
policies recommended by the state, which, for its part, is willing to accommodate 
religious elements within its originally secular character. In brief, Chapters 7 and 8 
have together achieved the final objective  
 On the whole, the thesis has shown how the Islamization phenomenon in the 
Muslim world has transformed zakat into a development institution whereby religion 
shares in the wider reality of the state’s economic, social and political progress. 
Islamization is a dynamic phenomenon which not only revives religious duty but also 
induces changes in the interpretation of law. It appears from the study that adaptable 
Islamic institutions, in this case zakat, can face the challenges of the modern era, in 






8.2 Recommendations and further exploration 
 Throughout the study, possible recommendations emerge. The first is that, as 
suggested by the findings, the Islamization agenda must be supported by both sides 
(society and government) to ensure that plans can become fully functional and be 
carried out effectively. It seems that a strong commitment from one party alone 
cannot promise a desirable outcome. The case of Islamization in Pakistan, for 
example, revealed that, although zakat was made mandatory through enforcement 
and legal requirements, society was still not persuaded to give its support. In 
addition, it is recommended that, in appealing to the masses to support the 
Islamization project, the soft approach of propagation and education must be 
adopted.  
 It is also clearly found that, through better management, religious duty, in this 
case zakat, can help society to improve its living conditions. On the basis of the 
findings we believe that a similar approach could be taken towards other religious 
obligations such as waqf (inalienable endowment), the pilgrimage fund, or any other 
sadaqa (voluntary contribution). The creative and effective use of the fund through 
modern management techniques could help Muslims with economic development. In 
this context, the practice of development organizations should be studied and 
consequently emulated.  
 Apart from that, to ensure that the religious institution can be functional in 
the modern era, the religious authority must uphold the principle of ijtihad, without 
which the institution will be perceived as merely an expression of personal piety. In 
this respect, while the classical rulings should not be neglected, scholars must take a 
broader view in the light of society’s current needs.  
 As this research is confined to the zakat institution, some suggestions for 
future research may be offered. In further exploration of the Islamization 
phenomenon, perhaps other aspects of Islamization could be illustrated. As a 
dynamic phenomenon, Islamization could be defined so as to comprise many other 
elements beyond those indicated in this study.  
 As far as the institutions to be focused on a re concerned, we believe that, 
apart from zakat, additional Islamic observances could be studied. Other financially 
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related religious institutions such as waqf and charity, or non-financial institutions 
such as prayer, hajj (pilgrimage) and sawm (fasting), could be examined within the 
purview of the Islamization phenomenon. We believe that, should there be any 
further studies of such religious practices, there will appear a new pattern in the way 
Muslims observe their duties. Such a discovery could reflect interesting changes in 
the modern environment.  
 Within the context of zakat, apart from income generation, there might be 
other new programs on which the fund could focus. In this respect any new initiative 
could be the sign of a bigger process behind it. As zakat is an adaptable institution, 
we believe that it will evolve through time and that, accordingly, many related issues 
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Had al-Kifaya (Sufficiency Limit) Evaluation  
No Category Had Kifaya Limit 




a. Head of Family 
1. Rented house 
390 235 
 2. Owned house 190 135 
b. Adult/ spouse 
1. Non-working spouse 
100 70 
 2. working spouse 150 70 
c.  Adult Dependent (above 18) 170 110 
d.  School-aged Dependent (13-17) 125 85 
e.  Child Dependent (5-12) 105 65 
f. Infant 60 30 
 Additional (if applicable) 
g. Disabled dependent  200 150 
h. Nursery cost 150 100 
i.  Chronicle illness 200 200 
 
Example: 
Mr A and his family reside in urban area living in a rented house. He is working as a 
security officer earning RM 800 a month. Apart from his wife, he has five other 
dependents comprising: 
1. Two children in secondary school 
2. Two children in primary school 
3. One disabled child 
No Category Had Kifaya Limit No of 
People 
Amount (RM) 
  Urban Rural   
a. Head of Family 
3. Rented house 
390 235 1 390 
 4. Owned house 190 135   
b. Adult/ spouse 
3. Non-working 
spouse 
100 70 1 100 
 4. working spouse 150 70   
c.  Adult Dependent (above 
18) 
170 110   
338 
 
d.  School- aged Dependent 
(13-17) 
125 85 2 250 
e.  Child Dependent (5-12) 105 65  210 
f. Infant 60 30   
 Additional  
g. Disabled dependent  200 150  200 
h. Nursery cost 150 100   
i.  Chronicle illness 200 200   
 Had Kifaya    1150 
 
Category:  Poor (income is less than his minimum sufficient income).  
 
A
PP
E
N
D
IX
 3
 
D
is
bu
rs
em
en
t o
f Z
ak
at
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
G
ro
up
 o
f R
ec
ip
ie
nt
s (
20
00
- 2
00
8)
 
G
ro
up
 o
f 
R
ec
ip
ie
nt
s 
20
00
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
01
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
02
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
03
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
04
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
F
aq
ir
 
(D
es
tit
ut
e)
 
1.
53
5 
4.
67
 
0.
52
3 
1.
0 
1.
18
4 
1.
78
 
2.
68
7 
3.
15
 
2.
17
5 
2.
15
 
M
is
ki
n 
(P
oo
r)
 
4.
82
0 
14
.6
6 
12
.9
63
 
24
.6
8 
17
.3
35
 
25
.9
3 
26
.5
74
 
31
.1
7 
30
.9
96
 
30
.7
 
Am
il 
(C
ol
le
ct
or
) 
4.
85
4 
14
.7
6 
5.
46
9 
10
.4
1 
9.
00
6 
13
.4
7 
11
.8
93
 
13
.9
5 
12
.0
43
 
11
.9
3 
M
ua
lla
f 
(C
on
ve
rt
s)
 
2.
44
0 
7.
41
 
3.
31
9 
6.
32
 
3.
80
8 
5.
7 
4.
95
3 
5.
81
 
5.
54
4 
5.
49
 
F
i s
ab
il 
al
la
h 
(I
n 
th
e 
w
ay
 o
f 
G
od
) 
8.
41
9 
25
.6
 
13
.3
41
 
25
.4
 
32
.9
84
 
49
.3
4 
35
.7
79
 
41
.9
7 
45
.3
48
 
44
.9
2 
G
ha
ri
m
 
(D
eb
to
r)
 
1.
51
3 
4.
6 
3.
04
6 
5.
8 
1.
69
9 
2.
54
 
2.
75
1 
3.
23
 
4.
09
5 
4.
06
 
Ib
n 
Sa
bi
l 
(T
ra
ve
lle
rs
) 
0.
15
9 
0.
48
 
0.
56
6 
1.
1 
0.
39
5 
0.
6 
0.
30
4 
0.
35
 
0.
37
9 
0.
38
 
R
iq
ab
 
(T
ho
se
 in
 
bo
nd
ed
) 
9.
14
9 
27
.8
1 
13
.3
02
 
25
.3
2 
0.
43
0 
0.
64
 
0.
29
9 
0.
35
 
0.
35
6 
0.
35
 
T
ot
al
 
32
.8
90
 
10
0 
52
.5
3 
10
0 
66
.8
43
 
10
0 
85
.2
41
 
10
0 
10
0.
93
7 
10
0 
So
ur
ce
s:
 L
em
ba
ga
 Z
ak
at
 S
el
an
go
r,
 L
ap
or
an
 P
en
gu
ru
sa
n 
Za
ka
t S
el
an
go
r, 
va
ri
ou
s 
is
su
es
. 
 
339 
 
D
is
bu
rs
em
en
t o
f Z
ak
at
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
G
ro
up
 o
f R
ec
ip
ie
nt
s (
20
00
- 2
00
8)
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
G
ro
up
 o
f 
R
ec
ip
ie
nt
 
20
05
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
06
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
07
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
08
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
09
 
(R
M
 m
il)
 
%
 
20
10
 
(R
M
 m
il 
) 
%
 
F
aq
ir
 
(D
es
tit
ut
e)
 
2.
17
5 
2.
15
 
2.
58
9 
1.
76
 
2.
09
2 
1.
18
 
11
.3
94
 
6.
02
 
34
.9
46
 
12
.5
1 
50
.3
40
 
15
.2
3 
M
is
ki
n 
(P
oo
r)
 
30
.9
66
 
30
.6
8 
38
.5
25
 
26
.2
2 
54
.0
36
 
30
.5
3 
51
.1
74
 
27
.0
8 
70
.7
06
 
25
.3
2 
76
.8
62
 
23
.2
6 
Am
il 
(C
ol
le
ct
or
) 
12
.0
43
 
11
.9
3 
19
.7
39
 
13
.4
4 
27
.3
97
 
15
.4
8 
30
.3
97
 
16
.0
8 
35
.4
73
 
12
.7
1 
42
.1
16
 
12
.7
4 
M
ua
lla
f 
(C
on
ve
rt
s)
 
5.
54
3 
5.
49
 
7.
65
1 
5.
21
 
8.
72
9 
4.
93
 
11
.6
72
 
6.
18
 
15
.9
75
 
5.
72
 
19
.9
56
 
6.
04
 
F
i s
ab
il 
al
la
h 
(I
n 
th
e 
w
ay
 o
f 
G
od
) 
45
.3
48
 
44
.9
2 
66
.9
15
 
45
.5
5 
66
.2
02
 
37
.4
1 
63
.5
95
 
33
.6
5 
89
.2
52
 
31
.9
6 
10
8.
30
3 
32
.7
8 
G
ha
ri
m
  
(D
eb
to
r)
 
4.
09
5 
4.
1 
9.
99
9 
6.
81
 
17
.1
30
 
9.
68
 
18
.9
77
 
10
.0
4 
30
.1
44
 
10
.7
9 
29
.1
05
 
8.
81
 
Ib
n 
Sa
bi
l 
(T
ra
ve
lle
rs
) 
0.
37
9 
0.
37
 
0.
44
6 
0.
3 
0.
42
9 
0.
24
 
0.
69
9 
0.
37
 
1.
08
1 
0.
38
 
1.
22
3 
0.
37
 
R
iq
ab
 
(T
ho
se
 in
 
bo
nd
ed
) 
0.
35
5 
0.
35
 
1.
04
1 
0.
71
 
0.
96
5 
0.
55
 
1.
08
9 
0.
58
 
1.
61
 
0.
57
 
2.
45
4 
0.
74
 
T
ot
al
 
10
0.
93
7 
10
0 
14
6.
90
6 
10
0 
17
6.
97
9 
10
0 
18
8.
99
9 
10
0 
27
9.
19
1 
10
0 
33
0.
36
4 
10
0 
So
ur
ce
s:
 L
em
ba
ga
 Z
ak
at
 S
el
an
go
r,
 L
ap
or
an
 P
en
gu
ru
sa
n 
Za
ka
t S
el
an
go
r, 
va
ri
ou
s 
is
su
es
. 
340 
